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ABSTRACT 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s partnership has come to be the accepted mechanism for 
the delivery of regeneration initiatives. The widespread evidence of partnership % orking 
across all spheres of government activity suggests that it now represents the new economic 
orthodoxy in the approach to co-ordination. During the same period there has been 
considerable attention drawn to the emergence of new forms of co-ordination based upon 
networking. The growth of partnership and networking has however proliferated in the 
absence of any systematic evaluation of their efficacy as an organisational form. Throughout 
this period a major objective of regeneration partnerships has been to alter the internal 
dynamics of partnership by broadening the range of participants involved. Partnership and 
network forms of working have thus become significant channels through which a range of 
actors have been incorporated into regeneration initiatives. 
In light of the growth of partnership and networking a major lacuna in our understanding 
arises from the absence of any theoretical framework which might describe the specific 
characteristics of these organisational forms of co-ordination. This thesis seeks to fill that 
vacuum by postulating a theoretical model of both partnership and network forms of 
co-ordination. The key attributes of the two models are identified, with common 
characteristics and key differentiating qualities discussed. This approach generated a set of 
analytical tools (a partnership checklist) designed in the first instance to be of practical use 
to the community and voluntary sectors as they engage in partnership but also to be of use 
to practitioners and participants generally. The checklist was tested on the Single 
Regeneration Budget partnership formed by the Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership, 
however, the insights developed have wider application for our understanding of partnership 
and networks in general. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The most expensive words he had ever had to listen to were: This time it’s different 
(Sir John Templeton, FT. 25/6th October 1997)  
One time will never fit neatly into another, and the old pictures we force into new frames 
always look out of place (Tocqueville,1970). 
 
REGENERATION PARTNERSHIPS: A MOVABLE FEAST 
DIFFERENT PROBLEMS: ONE SOLUTION 
Introduction 
Since the late 1970s central government has sought to actively encourage regeneration 
through a series of policy instruments. A primary aim of policy throughout this period has 
been attempts to establish regeneration partnerships that involve local communities. In 
policy terms this has been an extremely creative period with a series of major policy 
innovations coming out of central government on an almost regular basis. The election of a 
Labour government in May 1997 after eighteen years of Conservative administration 
continued the relentless cycle of policy innovation. One of the first actions taken by the 
incoming Labour government was the establishment of the Social Exclusion Unit in 
December 1997. This was located within the Cabinet Offices as part of the Economic and 
Domestic Affairs Secretariat reporting directly to the Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Its remit 
was to: “develop integrated and sustainable approaches to the problems of the worst 
housing estates, including crime, drugs, unemployment, community breakdown, and bad 
schools (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998:preamble). Although the lexicography of what is 
intrinsically multiple deprivation has changed over time many of the themes and policy 
solutions continue. In an examination of the efficacy of policy the Prime Minister was clear 
that:  
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Too much has been imposed from above, when experience shows that success depends on 
communities themselves having the power and taking the responsibility to make things 
better {Tony Blair cited in the Foreword to Bringing Britain together: a national strategy 
for neighbourhood renewal (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998)} 
The key issue then for social scientists is not simply an examination of the efficacy of 
policy in some abstract quantitative fashion but rather as the Prime Minister suggests policy 
must be examined by the way it serves communities. To parody Lincoln, policy should not 
only be for the people but it should be by the people. A critic might suggest that continuous 
policy innovation reflects past policy failures. A supporter would no doubt argue that policy 
is an iterative process where change reflects learning. Regardless of which of these 
explanations you accept both political parties would agree that part of the explanation for 
this fertile policy arena lies in the observation that the term regeneration and partnership are 
both inextricably bound together and each of the terms has proved to be enormously 
malleable constructs.  
Methodology 
The central task of this thesis is to describe a theoretical model of an ideal partnership and 
from this develop a conceptual toolkit that can be used to examine any regeneration 
partnership. With partnership working clearly occupying centre stage in government 
regeneration policy from the time of the 1977 White Paper (HMSO, 1977) the attention of 
this thesis is on the evolution of what can best be described as ‘the partnership approach’ to 
the delivery of regeneration policy. Partnership was a central pillar of successive 
Conservative governments and so the thesis focuses primarily on the evolution of 
partnership through the period of successive Conservative administrations, 1979-97. 
Although the focus is principally on the development of policy towards partnership under 
the Conservatives a great deal of their approach has been carried forward by the Labour 
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administration. The significance of this for policy and what this reveals about partnership as 
a continuing economic orthodoxy is noted. Within the time frame the specific focus of this 
thesis is on the evolution and development of one partnership, the Coventry and 
Warwickshire Partnership (CWP), formed for the first round of the Single Regeneration 
Budget (SRB). This policy initiative was introduced by the government with considerable 
publicity in 1994. In hindsight it can be seen to have been the apogee of the Conservative 
government’s partnership approach to regeneration; the roots of which can be clearly traced 
right back to the 1977 White Paper.  
The development of policy in this area is not linear, developing as it did in fits and starts. 
Periods of intense activity followed periods of almost quiet consolidation and organic 
growth. Because of the clear policy lineage however it is sensible, when trying to give an 
account of the evolution of regeneration policy under the Conservatives, to look back to 
these roots in the late 1970s. This period is significant for two reasons. First, the 1977 
White Paper presaged the formalisation of a partnership approach by government. Second, 
this period coincides with the advent into office in 1979 of Margaret Thatcher’s first 
Conservative government and with it the break with the post war consensus that had existed 
between the two major political parties. The change of government had repercussions 
throughout the body politic of the UK; these changes reverberated not only throughout 
economic life but also changed the institutional landscape and manifestly changed the way 
people understood, and responded to, the problem of regeneration. These factors in turn 
changed the way the concept of partnership was defined. 
The first round of the SRB sparked off a wave of partnership formations. More than 600 
were assembled and submitted outline bids (Mawson et al, 1995:para.4.9). By the time that 
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the final bids were announced this figure had been reduced to the 201 ‘winning’ 
partnerships. The CWP was chosen as the focus of the case study because it had a number 
of particular attributes that distinguished it from what might reasonably be described as a 
typical SRB partnerships. Principal amongst these was the sheer magnitude of the task 
facing the putative partnership. The historical, political, cultural and economic obstacles 
that needed to be overcome to create a partnership were enormous. Exploring these 
different dimensions created what was in effect a series of case studies albeit under the 
umbrella of the one partnership case study.  
Interestingly, the CWP, in the process of creating a new sub-regional space, was one of 
only a handful of round one SRB partnerships that sought to create an entirely new 
geopolitical structure. The scale of the achievement was all the more interesting given the 
magnitude of the task. There had been no previous history of joint working on this scale: 
the structures that were created effectively had to start from nothing. Remarkably, given its 
subsequent success, underlying the creation of this new space were stark political tensions 
that had historically prevented collaborative working between authorities at this [or any 
other] scale. The partnership that was assembled was extremely intriguing for a researcher 
of local government. Principally this was because the success in creating a partnership 
suggested that the CWP had successfully overcome the difficult task of bridging the 
political antagonisms that separated the local authorities at the sub-regional level. Not only 
that. The CWP reputedly created a structure that managed to not only assimilate a range of 
statutory actors but included the voluntary, community and ethnic minority sectors. 
Notwithstanding these formidable achievements the CWP also appeared to achieve the holy 
grail of regional planners since the time of Barlow (1940) in that it claimed to have 
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successfully bridged the chasm between urban and rural at a time when the aspirations of 
these communities were considered mutually exclusive. 
Research questions 
This thesis seeks to answer two fundamental research questions.  
(1)  What in theoretical terms do we mean by a true regeneration 
partnership? The term true is taken from the Bidding Guidance issued in 
conjunction with the SRB. The significance of the term true is that it is 
understood to be a metaphor for a regeneration partnership that is not 
governed top-down but rather bottom-up. The Labour prime minister, Tony 
Blair, has made clear that his vision of partnership devolves power and 
responsibility down to the local community it seeks to serve.  
(2) How does the quality of partnership working developed by CWP 
compare to that predicted in the theoretical model and how useful is the 
model as an analytical tool? 
The research questions having posed two problems the first needed to be answered 
conceptually the second practically. Astonishingly when approaching the first question it 
became clear that there appeared to be an almost inverse relationship between, on the one 
hand, a widespread, uncritical acceptance of the merits of working in partnership with, on 
the other hand, a complete absence of any theoretical foundations that might explain the 
dynamics of partnership working and what is actually understood by the term partnership. 
The literature review began therefore by examining partnership understood simply as a 
form of co-ordination and explored the literature on business co-ordination and 
interorganisational analysis to build a theory of partnership. With this in mind the second 
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research question could only be understood by examining the internal dynamics of the 
CWP. This was approached through a series of semi-structured interviews with key 
personalities representing the various sectors that came together in the partnership. The 
principle objective was to chart the chronology of key events and in so doing be able to 
establish who was party to what deliberations and how these effected the CWP and the 
strategy it subsequently pursued. These interviews were complemented by interviews with 
officers from the Government Office responsible for the regulatory oversight of the CWP. 
Official documents and the minutes of the CWP were also examined to corroborate the 
chronology of events. This documentary information was supplemented by official 
partnership publications, correspondence in the public domain and private correspondence.  
Chapter two begins with an examination of the ascendancy of partnership as a new 
economic orthodoxy. Beginning with the publication of the climacteric 1977 White Paper 
Policy for the Inner Cities (HMSO, 1977) the role of partnership is examined. Following 
the entry into office in 1979 of a radical Conservative government [although ideologically 
diametrically opposed to its predecessors in many arenas] partnership was not abandoned 
but rather recast and in the process consolidated as the new economic orthodoxy. 
Chapter three looks at the development of urban policy seeking to place the SRB in a 
historical context. The SRB represents in many ways the apogee of the partnership 
approach to regeneration but many of the themes found in the SRB mechanism have roots 
which can be traced back to earlier policy initiatives. The perennial concern with 
co-ordination and value for money which shaped SRB clearly hark back to the 1977 White 
Paper and before. The SRB can thus seen to have been shaped both by the political 
landscape it inhabited and by the lessons learnt from earlier policy initiatives especially 
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City Challenge. 
Chapters four and five seek to understand the macroeconomic and microeconomic forces 
that shaped the growth of partnerships. Chapter four begins by establishing the 
macroeconomic context within which partnerships were located in the 1980s. During this 
period the impact of global political, economic and social change had a profound impact on 
local economies. It was argued that the economy was in transition where global forces were 
precipitating profound local reverberations creating new economic spaces. It was argued 
that in these locations partnerships were proliferating. Throughout the 1980s, alongside the 
growth of partnerships, claims were also made that a new model of development was 
underway with a number of authors drawing attention to the growth of network forms of 
partnership. The theoretical analysis takes at its starting point that both partnership and 
networks represent different forms of co-ordination. The development of a theoretical 
model of co-ordination is however seriously prejudiced by the dearth of material on the 
topic. In the absence of a theory of partnership the approach taken is to explore the 
principle of co-ordination by examining adjacent policy arenas where more substantive 
work has been undertaken. Through the development of a theoretical model a distinction is 
made between partnership and network forms of co-ordination. In the process of 
articulating the model the analysis provides a partnership checklist that can be applied to 
any regeneration partnership. 
Chapter six describes the sub-regional landscape that the CWP inhabited. Through 
semi-structured interviews with key actors involved in the creation of the CWP and a 
review of key published and unpublished documents it details the political and historical 
context within which the SRB partnership evolved. The chapter concludes with a 
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chronology of key events in the creation of the SRB partnership. 
Chapter seven presents the research results of the case study on the CWP. The checklist 
developed in chapter four forms the basis of a systematic dismantling of the CWP and 
seeks to describe and comment on the quality of partnership relations within the CWP. 
Chapter eight presents an analysis of the partnership checklist and examines how this 
worked in practice on the case study. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the 
trajectory of urban policy over the last thirty years and what it tells us about the evolution 
of partnership as an organisational form. 
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CHAPTER 2: PARTNERSHIPS & NETWORKS 
NEW LABOUR & PARTNERSHIP  
PARTNERSHIP IN THE LATE 1990S 
Introduction 
The start of 2000 is an interesting time to be writing about partnerships in regeneration. In 
1997 after being in opposition for eighteen years a ‘New Labour’ administration swept into 
office. What is clear is that the new administration saw the political landscape in entirely 
different terms than the outgoing administration. Over their period in office there will 
undoubtedly be what Solesbury (1993) would call a reorientation of the ‘policy frame’ as 
New Labour’s ideology is translated into action and becomes embedded in society and the 
institutional landscape. However in the medium term what is remarkable is the continuity 
of Labour’s approach in a number of key policy areas not least in the promulgation of 
partnership working.  
Partnership has been used by successive UK government’s as an organisational form to 
address what was in the 1990s generically termed regeneration policy. The term 
regeneration however is comprehensive. The Conservatives in their first competitiveness 
white paper (HMSO, 1994b) stated that: “The principle aims of regeneration are to improve 
the competitiveness of firms, the job prospects and quality of life of local people, and the 
social and physical environment.” Under New Labour the stress on competitiveness is not 
so manifest but regeneration still manages to include: “…housing, health, employment, 
crime, transport, education and almost any other social, environmental or economic issue” 
(DETR, 1998d: para.4). 
Remarkably, the progressive redefinition of the parameters of regeneration has not led to 
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any fundamental reappraisal of partnership’s potential to deliver the burgeoning range of 
policy objectives. So, even as the nature of the problem evolved from a simplistic concept 
of poverty—urban or rural—progressing to deprivation, multiple deprivation and more 
recently with the Conservatives in the 1990s under the more generic term ‘regeneration’ it 
would seem that these all remain to be solved by partnership.  
Partnership it would appear has been accepted, largely uncritically, by both Labour and 
Conservative administrations and yet surprisingly the efficacy of partnership working has 
not been rigorously examined. As one cynical observer suggested: partnership was perhaps 
going to be the most overworked word of the 1990s (Tighe, 1995). The very real concern is 
that: “…partnership is a convenient smokescreen behind which to conduct business, as it 
always has been” (Popham, 1995:11). The hegemonic domination of the partnership 
philosophy is evident in the affirmation given to it in the 1997 Labour Party Manifesto with 
no less than 29 mentions of partnership, and which includes the statement that: “Labour 
pioneered the idea of public/private partnerships” (Labour Manifesto, 1997). This theme is 
reproduced and reiterated in the separate document Labour Business Manifesto (1997) 
which states in unequivocal terms that: “In the future, public/private partnerships will play 
an increasing role in procuring public services and investment.”  
This would appear to be no sudden conversion on the road to Damascus. Previous 
Conservative administrations were as vigorous in their promotion of the partnership ideal as 
a means of policy delivery as New Labour now intend to be. A measure of the universal 
acceptance of partnership is that after nearly twenty years of Conservative administration 
there remain few areas of government not touched in some way by the impact of the 
partnership philosophy. The ‘New Labour’ administration appear as committed to 
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maintaining the principle of partnership working as the last Conservative administration. 
Given this remarkable continuity in policy approach across the political spectrum it is 
reasonable to assert that partnership has indeed become the prevailing orthodoxy in 
regeneration policy. 
THE 1977 WHITE PAPER  
Partnership & regeneration policy 
Given what would appear to be a consensus on all sides of the political spectrum of the 
merits of partnership how is this explained?  
The 1977 Policy for the Inner Cities White Paper proved to be a key turning point in the 
promotion of partnership. In the White Paper partnership was assigned a fundamental role 
in the regeneration of inner cities. This legislation set the parameters within which 
regeneration policy would play-out over the next two decades. And indeed the seeds of 
many of the tensions which would plague urban policy were set in place then.  
The 1960s and early 1970s have been described by Lawless as a period of experimentation 
(Lawless, 1979) reflecting the shifting understanding of the dynamics of inner city decline. 
[Hambleton (1978) provides an illustration of the diversity of programmes operating in the 
period in Appendix (A): Evolution of Neighbourhood Policies in Britain 1964-77] By the 
time of the publication of the 1977 White Paper a considerable body of research had been 
conducted into inner city decline—for example, the three Inner Area Studies; the twelve 
Community Development Projects etc. The White Paper’s publication in effect synthesised 
a decade of research in urban experimentation, it proffered an analysis of the failure of 
inner city economies which was unusual in the fact that it was both strategic, and widely 
accepted. That it could establish a consensus on the understanding of the problem is 
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perhaps not so surprising given the state of many inner city economies. Evidence of decline 
may have remained overlooked or obscured by two decades of post-war prosperity. 
However, by the 1970s a casual visitor to the inner city areas of many of the major UK 
cities would have difficulty evading the palpable evidence of decline. Moore (1992:117) 
characterises the position as: 
At the beginning of the 1980s Britain’s inner city population of working age had 
experienced three decades of uninterrupted decline, from just under 5 million to about 3·3 
million. Similarly, employment of inner city residents had also fallen relentlessly in this 
period from 3·8 million to 2·2 million. In the same period, the number of unemployed inner 
city residents had risen by 269,000 and their unemployment rate was some 50% above the 
national average. Thus not only was there a problem of persistently higher unemployment 
rates among inner city residents stretching back over 30 years, but this problem was steadily 
intensifying. 
The evidence appeared irrefutable: the UK and the wider international economy were 
experiencing unprecedented shocks and these were having profound and disproportionate 
impacts on inner city communities.  
The Labour government’s White Paper Policy for the Inner Cities (HMSO, 1977) was a 
response to this deteriorating situation which saw an alarming escalation in the levels of 
unemployment and the wholesale collapse of urban economies. The White Paper’s 
historical importance lies in the fact that for the first time government officially endorsed 
partnership as a policy prescription (para. 41(6). In the White Paper the Government 
acknowledged the importance of private sector investment but laid greater stress on issues 
of co-ordination within the state and the need to focus and target resources. The small print 
of the paper reflected the prevailing strategic analysis and, without explaining why, 
proposed partnership as the preferred method by which the Government’s objectives were 
to be delivered. Moore & Booth (1986:365) suggest that: “One major assumption behind 
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the partnership approach is that a synthesis of central agencies and local government effort 
will result in more effective policy making and action than would otherwise be the case”, 
although why this should be the case has never convincingly been made. 
The White Paper was clear in identifying the key participants in the process of inner city 
regeneration. However the model of partnership envisaged in the paper was strictly 
circumscribed being narrowly cast to directly include only central and local government. 
Local authorities were thus given a specific mandate to act—as a partner—in conjunction 
with the central state. The White Paper acknowledged the role of other agencies and actors 
but conferred special status on local authorities. In the process of defining the key parties 
the Government of the day was effectively [and inadvertently] embedding the principle of a 
hierarchy within the partnership model, this was a feature soon to be exploited by the 
incoming Conservative government. 
In the context of the evolution of partnership the White Paper was to be of profound 
influence. It did this in two important ways. First, it legitimated partnership as a credible 
policy response: though partnership working was nothing new. Boyle (1993) cites examples 
of local authorities working with the private sector dating back to the 1930s, and Healey 
(1989:125) suggests that: “Throughout the post-war period, planning has provided the 
framework within which market transactions have occurred, and has often fostered 
partnership between the public and private sectors in the development process. The crucial 
change however, is in the impact that Parliamentary approval gives to the concept of 
partnership and the funding attached to partnership. By promulgating a particular policy 
model the government de facto legitimates a new orthodoxy. Secondly, having formally 
introduced and defined the policy response—partnership—the White Paper set in train a 
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discussion as to who should be involved in the partnerships. The White Paper commended 
as: “…one of the most far-sighted policy reviews in the post war period…” (Bailey et al, 
1995:45) does give due weight to the valuable contributions made by the wide range of 
actors and agencies operating in the inner cities. However, the Government of the day 
clearly saw local authorities as their preferred partner amongst the many disparate actors 
operating in the inner city. 
The case for choosing local authorities was made by central government on the grounds of 
accountability. Peter Shore, the Labour SoS for the Environment, in a debate in the House 
of Commons on ‘Inner cities’ (Hansard, 6 April 1977) which preceded the White Paper, set 
out the Government’s position. In identifying who should spearhead the process of 
addressing inner city decline he stressed that: “…local authorities…must be the main 
agents for action…” (col.1227){my emphasis} and in the same tone: “It is therefore right 
and proper that local authorities should have somewhat greater powers than they have at 
present to do things to help their own urban economies” (col.1245){my emphasis}. When 
challenged about what would be the role for community associations and community 
groups in the proposed partnership schemes the SoS replied:  
I am glad that the hon. Member has brought me back to the important part that voluntary 
bodies and community groups can play in the inner areas. I believe they have a very 
important part to play. Local people should be involved in planning and development in 
their own areas, but whatever we do in this direction, I do not wish to derogate from what I 
believe to be the prime responsibility of properly elected councillors (Hansard, 6 April 
1977, col.1237). 
It was clear to the government that local authorities and their legitimate representatives 
were both acknowledged and expected to lead partnerships. This view was categorically 
spelt out in Part IV of the White Paper which stated:  
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(i) Local authorities are the natural agencies to tackle inner area problems 
(para.31). 
 [and] 
(ii) [The Government proposed to]…enter into special partnerships with the 
authorities—both districts and counties—of certain cities (para.41 {6}). 
In the process of translating political conviction into the formulation of policy the Labour 
government of the day clearly maintained the view that local authorities—working with 
central government—were to be the leading actors in the process of partnership. The White 
Paper acknowledged the important contribution of other actors but the overriding principle 
of: “…accountability to the local electorate” (para.31) convinced the government that the 
key partner, over and above any other agency or sector, was to be the local authority. In a 
second ‘Inner Cities’ debate in the House of Commons the merits of allowing local 
authorities to lead partnerships was again challenged. In replying to a question from the 
floor, the SoS, Peter Shore, restated the Government’s commitment to local authorities and 
their legitimacy enshrined by the process of democratic accountability. Rather more 
prophetically for events that followed he ridiculed the idea that partnership could be led by 
any other agency. The exchange is quoted in full: 
Mr. Steen: Will the Minister agree that one of the things learned from the last 10 years of 
poverty programmes is that people should be consulted when they are to be affected by 
decisions, before a decision is taken rather than afterwards? Why was it, therefore, that 
when the right hon. Gentleman came to Liverpool on Friday he talked about the big 
bureaucracies and ministerial committees rather than insisting that people, and the inner city 
communities, should be part of the process? Was he thrown off balance when he missed his 
train from London to Liverpool? 
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Mr. Shore: I met the elected representatives of the city of Liverpool. The hon. Gentleman, 
whose contributions I have studied, had better make up his mind whether he is backing 
representative government at local and national level, or whether he sees urban area policies 
being conducted as a straight dialogue between Government and voluntary bodies and 
agencies of all kinds. I believe that voluntary bodies and other interests have a most 
important part to play at the local level, but it is not at the level of the partnership 
committees themselves (Hansard, 8 November 1977:493). 
By bestowing special status on local authorities the Government in effect downgraded the 
contribution of the voluntary, community and private sectors. More crucially for the 
evolution of policy, the Government by their partisan support of one sector established a 
notional hierarchy amongst the various actors. This implicit hierarchy inadvertently 
introduced an internal tension and dynamic into the model of partnership. Whereas the 
White Paper’s strategic analysis of the underlying problems facing inner cities was 
informed by extensive urban research dating back to the 1960s, and by the time of its 
publication this analysis was widely accepted, the mechanisms to address the problem were 
open to challenge. 
The partnership paradigm has not however been a static construct. The Labour 
government’s model of partnership established in the White Paper singled out local 
authorities as lead partners. In coming to this position the Government were clearly 
expressing their own ideological preference - but in politics ideology is contestable. Under 
successive Conservative governments—post 1979—the elements of what constitutes a 
partnership have been repeatedly redefined. In a pluralist democratic society by establishing 
a principle of preference in its choice of partners the government of the day set in train the 
possibility that this could be contested. In retrospect it is clear that a hierarchy sustained 
only by political conviction would be liable to challenge, as indeed it was. The hegemonic 
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status of partnership should therefore be viewed more as a reflection of the dominance of a 
specific organisational paradigm reflecting contemporary political thinking on regeneration 
rather than on any objective assessment based on operational efficacy. 
THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY  
THATCHER AND THATCHERISM 
Partnership post 1979 
With the arrival into office in 1979 of an ideologically driven right-wing Conservative 
government under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, the character and direction of 
regeneration policy changed markedly. The incoming government had a clear vision of the 
future direction of government policy succinctly captured in the maxim, ‘The business of 
government is not the government of business’. This new understanding of the role of 
government had a functional imperative which would have a radical impact on the political 
landscape. Prior to Thatcher:  
For almost 30 years the bi-partisan approach to Keynesian economics and full employment 
remained relatively intact, with an interventionist public sector operating a policy of 
demand management and a universalist approach towards consumption (Bailey, 1995:6). 
Margaret Thatcher’s election effectively marked the collapse of the consensual politics 
which had overseen UK politics since the post-war Atlee Labour government. Thatcher was 
resolved to start as she intended: 
Our first opportunity to demonstrate to both friends and opponents that we would not be 
deterred by the [economic and social] difficulties [facing the country] was the Queen’s 
Speech. The first Loyal Address (as it is also called) of a new government sets the tone for 
its whole term of office. If the opportunity to set a radical new course is not taken, it will 
almost certainly never recur. And the world realizes that underneath all the brave new 
rhetoric, it is Business As Usual. I was determined to send out a clear signal of change 
(Thatcher, 1993:38){my emphasis}. 
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By the end of the debates on the Address it was evident that the House of Commons could 
expect a heavy programme, designed to reverse socialism, extend choice and widen 
property ownership (Thatcher, 1993:39) {my emphasis}.  
The gulf between Thatcherite ideology and what had preceded her represents the post-war 
political cleavage. What is only now clear in hindsight is the impact of Thatcherism. During 
the 1980s and 1990s although obfuscated by the rhetoric of party politics the vast 
administrative machine and tiers of government, which remain largely unobserved but 
which constitute and underpin the modern state, adopted a new course. Critics of successive 
Thatcher governments rightly point out that many of the central tenets of her radical agenda 
were never successfully implemented: the Poll Tax ‘U’ turn, the collapse of the ‘property 
owning democracy’ and claims to be the party of low taxation are evidence of policy 
failure—for an excellent exposition see for instance Dunleavy (1995). But these policy 
failures should not in any way deny the real influence of successive Thatcher 
administrations. And as Gamble observes (1988:219) a major shift in policy becomes 
permanent when opposition parties adopt it as their own. The irrefutable legacy of 
successive Conservative administrations is rather less polemic but nonetheless crucial in the 
evolution of regeneration policy and partnership in particular. 
Whilst all post-war governments prior to Thatcher accepted Keynesian Demand 
management, this was considered to be anathema, indeed it represented part of the problem. 
Drastic problems required drastic solutions most notably this took the form of an 
abandonment of ‘demand side’ interventions in favour of ‘supply side’ solutions and an 
experiment with a Monetarist macroeconomic policy. The new policy approach was spelt 
out at the 1984 Conservative Party Conference by Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and a member of Margaret Thatcher’s inner circle, he stated: “Let us be quite 
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clear, you will not reduce unemployment by increasing what governments spend or 
borrow” (cited in Roper & Snowdon, 1987:113). In his autobiography Lawson spelt out the 
rationale of what is generically termed Thatcherism. It is: 
…the greatest practicable market freedom within an overall framework of firm financial 
regulation [and] 
...instead of seeking to use macroeconomic (i.e., fiscal & monetary) policy to promote 
growth and microeconomic policy (of which incomes policy was a key component) to 
suppress inflation, the Government should direct macroeconomic policy to the suppression 
of inflation and rely on macroeconomic (or supply side) policy such as tax and labour 
market reform, to provide the conditions favourable to improved performance in terms of 
growth and employment (1992:9). 
Paradoxically, and what is most surprising, is that the concept of partnership established 
under the previous Labour government was not equally discredited and abandoned with the 
change of government. At a philosophical level it is perhaps easier to understand why a 
government would chose to be involved in partnership if the foundation of your political 
economy is built on consensus and the active demand management of the economy. 
Logically partnership should have been rejected because the political economy of 
Thatcherism which stresses: “…a free market philosophy, deregulation and privatisation of 
state assets” (Bailey, 1995:7) was the antithesis of partnership working; which where it 
involves the state, harks back to some form of collectivism and implies regulation, 
intervention and an anti-market position. In the event, partnership was simply recast to 
reflect the ideological and functional imperatives of Thatcherism.  
In a radical departure to the post-war consensus Thatcherism as a political economy was 
not socially constituted: it made no pretence of being interested in socially re-distributive 
policies. [Indeed it was observed by many on the political right that the re-discovery of 
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poverty in the inner cities in the 1960s even after two decades of a Welfare State was a 
stark indictment of interventionist socialist policies] Rather, Thatcherism was concerned 
first and foremost with the welfare of the economy and personal liberty. Implicit in 
Thatcherism was the presumption that improvements in the general prosperity of the nation 
would inexorably feed through [trickle down] to deprived communities. “The underpinning 
argument was that national economic recovery was the most effective urban policy, since ‘a 
rising tide will float all ships” (Solesbury, 1993:34). In order to effect the transformation of 
the UK, successive Conservative administrations set about reorienting both policy and 
policy instruments in the image of their political economy. This required a new approach to 
regeneration policy. For Thatcherism the problem was the public sector and the solution lay 
with the private sector. This particular analysis propelled a distinct policy trajectory which 
emphasised the advantages of the private sector. 
This policy shift variously described as ‘marketisation’ or ‘privatism’, sees the prosperity 
of a place tied inextricably to the vitality of the private sector (Barnekov & Rich, 1989; 
Deakin, 1991; Edwards & Deakin, 1992) and by logical extension to a diminution of the 
public sector. In order to understand the growth of partnership it is important to appreciate 
the impact of Margaret Thatcher. Here we must make the distinction between individual 
policies instigated by Margaret Thatcher and the political economy of Thatcherism. The 
term Thatcherism is used here to describe a generic set of political precepts—as distinct 
from specific political actions—which codified and institutionalised an entirely new policy 
agenda not only within government but also in the broader public and private sphere. This 
analysis should not be misunderstood to imply that there exists any generalised acceptance 
of a political ideology defined as Thatcherism. Rather, it acknowledges that throughout the 
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1980s and into the 1990s Thatcherite ideology subtly redefined, and made respectable, a 
new orthodoxy in which the parameters of the debate surrounding regeneration policy were 
progressively circumscribed and depicted in narrow market economy terms. It is 
abundantly clear that practitioners of regeneration policy may disagree on the relative 
importance of market mechanisms but none would now dare to refute the market and the 
interests of private capital. Labour’s 1997 manifesto is perhaps the clearest example of how 
Thatcherism has permeated beyond the boundaries of Conservative ideologues, as Tony 
Blair acknowledged: “Some things the Conservatives got right” (Labour Manifesto, 1997). 
Throughout the Conservative period in office the UK experienced enormous internal and 
external pressures. Internally the dominant force was the impact of what has been described 
as the ‘Thatcherite project’ - taken here to include the policy innovations of John Major. 
Externally, the UK faced massive pressures from global forces as changes in the 
international political arena and revolutions in technology transformed, and made 
increasingly more permeable, the boundaries of the nation state. “The world economy is 
increasingly dynamic, open, and internationally competitive” (OECD, 1995:7). Indeed, the 
rate of change and the growing interdependence of the global market place can be said to be 
the defining condition of this new world order. Together these forces had a profound effect 
catalysing the expansion and proliferation of partnership working. 
The Thatcher government’s reservations regarding the public sector, specifically the way in 
which local government could deflect central government’s attempt to constrain—if not 
curtail—public sector borrowing, precipitated a growing centralisation of powers in 
Whitehall as a means of effectively imposing control. The ability of the early Thatcher 
administrations to control local authority spending was challenged by a number of high 
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profile left-wing local authorities using a variety of creative mechanisms. These tactics by 
local authorities proved to be pyrrhic victories as successive legislation severely 
constrained the room for manoeuvre. By what John (1994) describes as a process of “policy 
learning”, the Government had by the end of the 1980s eventually introduced an effective 
system of financial ‘capping’ controls which could impose robust financial constraints over 
wayward local authorities. Hambleton supports this view of growing centralisation 
suggesting that: “…over fifty acts of parliament have been passed since 1979 which have 
eroded the powers of local authorities” (quoted in Imrie & Thomas, 1993:89). 
Abolition of the metropolitan counties 
In 1986 Margaret Thatcher’s government abolished the Greater London Council (GLC) and 
the Metropolitan County Councils (MCCs). The Government explained its actions in terms 
of the need to remove a unnecessary tier of government.  
It was not signalled as a reorganisation of local government by the national government 
which instigated it, in the same way the 1974 local government reorganisation was so 
clearly designated. It was presented as a measure for removing an unnecessary and 
superfluous tier of local government, in one part of the country only - the metropolitan areas 
as opposed to the shire areas (Leach et al, 1990:1) 
The MCCs, it was argued, represented an inefficient bureaucracy which squandered public 
funds and was located at too great a distance from the electorate it purportedly claimed to 
represent. The Government was resolute that abolition was proposed on efficacy grounds 
and that abolition was a ‘streamlining’ process, [the phrase taken from abolition Act 
Streamlining the Cities Cmnd 9063, 1983] removing waste, saving costs and, in the 
process, bringing power closer to the electorate. The evidence would seem to contradict the 
political rhetoric. Many of the strategic functions previously carried out by MCC continued 
to be required after abolition. For this reason an extensive array of joint arrangements 
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followed from abolition in order to service strategic functions previously operated by the 
MCC. Abolition therefore created new statutory and voluntary joint boards and a raft of 
new partnership relations both formal and informal to fill the strategic vacuum. The exact 
nature of these were in turn shaped by the history, complexion and general climate of the 
local political situation in any one location. Not surprisingly then Leach et al (1990:3) 
conclude that:  
Very little that was done by the metropolitan county councils (and the GLC) has ceased to 
be done since abolition; and the level of activity in the fields where local government can 
choose to operate (rather than be obliged to) has not been materially affected. All that has 
happened is that a different range of organisations is now responsible for these activities at a 
local level… 
Leach et al (1990, chp.4) catalogues the ‘process of re-adoption and influence’ of MCC 
members. Successive local elections provided opportunities for a significant number of key 
former MCC figures to re-establish their political careers within district councils. Through 
this route they re-entered local politics and found there way back into positions of 
responsibility either on statutory joint boards or on one of the range of joint co-ordinating 
arrangements created following abolition. Leach et al (1990) conclude that this mechanism 
provided the opportunity for key MCC personnel to return to positions of power fulfilling 
roles similar to those vacated at the MCC but simply reconstituted at a different spatial 
scale and within different partnership relations. If abolition did in fact not lead to 
‘streamlining’ and cost savings as Leach et al assert, it is difficult not to disagree with the 
suggestion that abolition represented nothing less than a ideologically motivated act 
[entirely consistent with the political economy of Thatcherism] addressed at preventing any 
other alternative economic agenda challenging the hegemony of the central state. Although 
some see abolition as simply a vindictive political act Whitehead (1994:11) saw abolition 
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of the MCCs as part of a wider process of institutional realignment inspired by the Thatcher 
Government. The government’s actions can be understood both as a pragmatic reaction to 
events but also as a response to imagined enemies. An obvious enemy was the highly 
visible power and influence of Ken Livingstone and a Labour GLC located as it was 
literally on the doorstep of Parliament. However, it is also clear that the government were 
motivated by a desire to curtail local authorities being used as an experimental laboratory 
for policy initiatives that ran counter to the political economy of Thatcherism. At the heart 
of the abolition battle was central government’s conviction that local government should 
have its hands prised off the steering wheel henceforth only to be responsible for booking 
the taxis. Ironically then, for the Conservatives, the evidence of the abolition of the MCC 
suggests a great deal of continuity in both policy activities and – in the medium term – the 
personalities. For partnership however the importance of the institutional turmoil 
surrounding abolition lies in the dislocation of policy networks and their subsequent 
reformulation with the opportunities this offered in creating new partnership structures. 
Privatisation 
Heald (1988:36) notes that: “Until 1979, the United Kingdom possessed one of the largest 
public sector enterprise sectors in Europe. By the end of three terms of Thatcher 
government [i.e. 1992], it is scheduled to be extinct. Foreman-Peck speaking in 1989 
suggested that “The sale of state owned industrial assets by the Thatcher Government 
promises to be the most radical restructuring of British industry at least since 1951” 
(1989:129). History would perhaps suggest that this was an underestimation. Privatisation 
is without doubt the defining characteristic and lasting legacy of Thatcherism. The 
magnitude of the impact of privatisation can be seen in the very existence of the annual 
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publication, Privatisation Yearbook, which records the scale of global privatisations. The 
1994 issue notes:  
Any attempt to estimate accurately the total size of global privatisations over the next few 
years is fraught with difficulty…World Bank figures show over 6,000 companies were 
privatised in the years 1980-1991 and another 6,000 in 1991-1993. The process has been 
accelerating and shows no sign of slowing down, with privatisations in Europe alone 
forecast to raise $150 billion over the next five years. To put that figure in perspective, the 
UK privatisation programme has so far raised the equivalent of about $75 billion 
(Nicholson, 1994:10). 
Privatisation has an import push-effect for partnership. The reason for this is that 
privatisation invariably leads to unemployment as industries restructure—either in the run 
up or subsequent to privatisation—in order to become competitive and/or to reduce costs. 
The growth of unemployment feeds through into local economies and encourages local 
actors and agencies to engage more pro-actively in economic development activities. Tight 
fiscal controls, imposed by central government, on local authorities prevents them from 
acting unilaterally and so they turn to partnership opportunities to lever in resources. At a 
second level, privatised industries gain the potential for far wider managerial discretion in 
the pursuit of their strategic objectives albeit in the cold climate of the market place. This 
combination of managerial autonomy and competitive pressures created a climate for 
partnership working. 
Next Steps & Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) 
As part of the process of introducing the private sector ethos into public policy the 
government introduced in its 1988 Local Government Act a compulsory regime of 
competitive tendering. This clearly expanded upon the approach of encouraging the private 
sector developed very early in the Conservative’s first administration. 
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Local authorities have been statutorily required…to subject the provision of services to 
competition. The Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980 introduced competition 
for building and highways construction and maintenance. The Act provides that local 
authorities’ own workforces may not enter into a contract unless they have won it in fair 
competition. In house service units are required to adopt commercial style accounting 
principles including meeting a financial objective set by the Government (HMSO, 
1991b:22). 
The subsequent 1988 legislation, which in its initial guise, incorporated a narrowly drawn 
list of “defined activities” including refuse collection and street cleaning. However, the 
importance of the legislation on the structure of local government may not have been 
evident at the onset. Implicit in the 1988 legislation was the authority to amend and add to 
the list of defined activities. Having secured enabling legislation the government set about 
to progressively extend the range and scale of activities caught up in CCT. In their 
evaluation Shaw et al are unequivocal: “…CCT was from the start envisaged as an 
incremental process which would by degrees fundamentally alter both central-local 
relations and the internal organisation of local authorities” (1995:65). CCT can thus 
pre-eminently be seen as an attempt to increase the market orientation of local authorities, 
whether this occurred directly, with private sector competition ‘winning’ contracts, or as 
has often been the case, by in-house direct labour organisations becoming ‘leaner and 
meaner’ in order to beat off the private sector. Either way CCT has made a material impact 
on the way local authorities operate. Traditionally, local authority services were not 
awarded on the basis of a competitive tendering regime and the internal accounting 
structures [rather the lack of them] within local authorities reflected this. CCT, by imposing 
a statutory obligation to tender, forced local authorities to examine their internal cost 
structures. It can be seen that in the process, the operational demands of CCT have 
advanced a distinct managerial response which has been called the ‘New Public 
36 
 
Management’. Dunleavy & Hood (1994) describe the key characteristics of this as 
primarily making the public sector less qualitatively distinct and in practice more akin to 
private sector modes of working. Operationally, it means bringing public sector 
management reporting and accounting approaches closer to business methods; reworking 
budgets to be transparent, costs attributed to outputs; disaggregating separable functions 
into distinct cost centres; separation of policy and implementation.  
Paralleling the CCT innovation within the local state the Government were pursuing a 
similar agenda at a national level. In 1988 the Government Efficiency Unit, having spent 
only three months conducting research, published a report Improving Management in 
Government: The Next Steps, which would have an enormous impact on the institutional 
landscape. The report’s four main recommendations were accepted uncritically by the 
government and so was born the Next Steps initiative - see HMSO, 1988; NAO, 1989.  
The Next Step principles committed the Government to a radical restructuring of state 
organisations, this meant that [to]: “…the greatest extent practicable, the executive 
functions of Government would be carried out by units designated as agencies headed by a 
Chief Executive. And the Government committed itself to a continuing programme for 
establishing Agencies…” (NAO, 1989 para.1). The success of this initiative is 
unambiguous. By 31st December 1996 129 Executive Agencies had been established 
(Cabinet Office, 1997:306-7). The transformation of state organisations into Agencies 
would, it was argued, transform operational [in]efficiency and in the process sweep away 
the endemic, anachronistic public sector culture which stifled innovation and helped to 
perpetuate the wholly negative image of many of these organisations. Agency status would 
herald a managerial revolution analogous to that of New Public Management. Sound 
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private sector disciplines would ensure the delivery of value for money and consumer 
responsiveness. Ministers would continue to set targets and negotiate strategic objectives 
but the reward for the organisation would be operational discretion by management in how 
objectives would be met.  
In order to effect and institutionalise this permanent revolution and to make all public 
services answer better to the wishes of their users, and to raise their quality overall (HMSO, 
1991a:2) a series of Citizen’s Charters would seek to define and refine targets. The 
structure of the targets and the government’s approach is to ensure that competition is 
injected into every facet of service provision. 
The impact of these two initiatives, CCT and Next Steps, has been to transform the 
institutional landscape by fragmenting service delivery. CCT has inexorably altered the 
provision of services at the local level. Unquestionably, the private sector is now much 
more active in the delivery of local services. This occurs directly where the private sector 
wins contracts or indirectly, some would say insidiously, where the ethos of the private 
sector now pervades traditional public sector thinking. Similarly, Next Steps Agencies have 
dynamically altered the relationship between agency and government and instigated a 
managerial revolution in the delivery of services. Although these are disparate 
organisations they share a prevailing market ideology which shapes the way in which they 
operate. The common thread which links these initiatives is the perennial squeeze on 
finances. For local authorities this has meant a culture of ‘service level agreements’ both 
within an authority and with a range of external partners who undertake to provide services 
under contract. For Next Step Agencies rigorous targets place stringent demands on 
management to deliver results and they use their newly found discretion to ‘contract out’ a 
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raft of services to the private sector. In each case new relations are developed which add 
complexity to the formal institutional landscape as new actors and agencies are 
incorporated into the provision of service delivery. The relationship of these new actors to 
sponsoring organisations may be termed ‘contractual’ but the reality is that in effect the 
relationship is no more than a partnership defined in contract. This theoretical discussion is 
explored in more detail in chapter four. 
URBAN POLICY 
Regional urban policy or inner city urban policy? 
The Thatcher government did not in fact have an explicit urban dimension to policy in 
1979. The government’s political agenda was set out in its manifesto from which its 
priorities were clearly stated: “…the Conservative government’s first job will be to rebuild 
our economy and reunite a divided and disillusioned people (Conservative Manifesto, 
1979:7). The manifesto went on to list five tasks. The first, reflecting its importance to the 
government, was the control of inflation. None of the five tasks make any explicit reference 
to an urban or regional dimension to policy. The reality was that the government inherited 
from the previous administration the remnants of a regional policy—administered by the 
DTI—which [coincidentally] had an urban impact along with an embryonic inner cities 
programme initiated by Labour’s 1977 White Paper – but only given legislative force in 
1978 in the Inner Urban Areas Act. The inner cities programme envisaged the creation of 
formal Partnerships bringing together key actors [principally central/local government] who 
would identify strategic objectives, co-ordinate local strategies and in the context of these 
strategies bend mainstream budget headings to support these objectives. The reality in 1979 
was that the inner city initiative was in its infancy with transitional arrangements in place: 
“…whereby selected authorities were to receive known Urban Programme allocations in 
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advance of the preparation of their bids” (Hambleton, 1979a:878){my emphasis}. In similar 
terms Michael Heseltine, SoS for the Environment, derided these early Partnership 
meetings as nothing more than a ‘carving up’ of additional resources. They [Partnerships] 
were: 
…all looking for the little bit of their programme that they had not been able to get out of 
the traditional budget from their local authorities…[and]…It was very much an autonomous 
group of people, coming together to see if there was a bit more for them in what happened 
to be on the table (HC, 1982: para.341). 
Regional policy was based on a map of spatially delineated ‘Assisted Areas’, divided into 
four sub-categories, reflecting a range of relative deprivation in discrete parts of the 
country. It was in effect a map of pockets of severe unemployment. Coincidentally all of 
the Assisted Areas lay within urban centres and only in this sense could regional policy be 
realistically described as constituting an ‘urban policy’. Certainly prior to the 1977 White 
Paper the government of the day would not have understood the ‘problem’ in anything 
other than regional terms. In 1979, at the start of the Conservative’s first administration, 
regional and urban policy could be seen as moving in the same direction. Interestingly, 
given the subsequent policy changes, the Conservative’s April 1979 manifesto makes no 
direct reference to regional policy. It does, in part 3, however contain a section on Industry, 
Commerce and Jobs that by inference refers to regional policy when it stated:  
Government strategies and plans cannot produce revival, nor can subsidies… 
Of course, government can help to ease industrial change in those regions dependent on 
older, declining industries. We do not propose sudden, sharp changes in the measures now 
in force. However, there is a strong case for relating government assistance to projects more 
closely to the number of jobs they create (Conservative Manifest, 1979:14-15). 
Upon entering office in 1979 Thatcher set about refocusing regional policy. The ensuing 
changes ensured that the parallel trajectory of regional and urban policy became 
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progressively disengaged. The principle changes to regional policy were the re-drawing of 
boundaries (1979, 1983, 1993) and significant alterations in qualifying criteria and the 
range of eligible industries - see HMSO, 1983; 1988. The regionalism legacy lingers on in 
the ‘Assisted Area Status’ and the DTI continue to administer a regional policy in the form 
of ‘regional selective assistance’. [The continuing existence of Assisted Area status has 
been explained as no more than political expediency given that some form of delineation of 
declining areas is a pre-requisite for attracting assistance from European Structure Fund 
money. Alongside the obvious accepted measures of deprivation that figure in any 
discussion about Assisted Area boundaries Martin (1993) provides a compelling account of 
the importance of the political dimension in defining the re-drawing of the Assisted Areas].  
In the late 1990s, with the benefit of hindsight, the historical importance of Labour’s 1977 
White Paper can be seen clearly. After 1977, the allusion of a regional policy with urban 
impacts was manifestly displaced by the reality of an urban policy without recourse to 
regional pretensions: urban policy had came of age. The Labour government had accepted 
the problem as one essentially located in inner cities and this new understanding saw the 
mantle being passed on: from a regional policy located with the DTI (and its precursors) to 
an urban policy with the DoE. After 1977 the policy focus shifted from an inter-regional 
policy to an intra-regional policy. The policy approach was hereinafter to concentrate on 
small areas—and the small areas were all urban. The White Paper still prescribed a role 
for regional policy: “There is still a strong need for a continuing regional policy with 
differentials in industrial incentives for areas with major structural problems…[but it made 
the paramount distinction that what was required was] “…an intra-regional emphasis to 
policy designed to help inner areas in the Assisted Areas…(HMSO, 1977 para.50). For 
41 
 
urban policy, and especially partnership, the 1977 White Paper can be seen as a rubicon. It 
created the idea and gave substance to an urban policy based on partnership and, 
simultaneously, without formally rejecting regional policy, ensured through diminishing 
resources that regional policy was ultimately eclipsed. 
Local economic development 
In the early 1980s the first Thatcher administration presided over a recession which 
precipitated a rapid increase in unemployment much of which was concentrated in inner 
urban areas. The phrase ‘de-industrialisation’ was coined to describe the magnitude of the 
restructuring and the absolute decline evident in many inner city economies. Historically, 
local authorities had been involved in what were known as ‘traditional’ economic 
development initiatives including promotional activities, site development, and the 
development of industrial estates and associated infrastructure. Invariably many of the areas 
suffering the most acute distress were Labour controlled administrations. The severity of 
the recession encouraged a number of these larger municipal authorities to experiment with 
a broader range of interventionist economic development initiatives which immediately 
brought them into conflict with the Government. Many of these initiatives exploited 
revenue from section 137 of the 1972 Local Government Act which: “…gave local 
authorities the power to spend up to the product of a 2p rate in the interests of their area…” 
(Audit Commission, 1989 para.154). The best example of these radical initiatives was 
Enterprise Boards. These provided a vehicle in which a local authority could invest in local 
firms. Because of the local authorities position as largest shareholder it could dictate the 
terms and conditions attached to its investment strategy. These terms invariably had social 
aspirations well beyond narrow market criteria typically expected by the private sector. The 
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apotheosis of this position can be seen in a GLC publication which argued that: “Profit is 
no longer an accurate guide to the way out of economic crisis” (GLC Economic Policy 
Group, 1983:17)1 Given the Thatcher Government’s unequivocal laissez-faire credentials 
suggesting that profit was not the overriding objective would have caused apoplexy in her 
Government and could only be understood as a direct threat to the Government’s 
management of the economy. 
In this climate the 1980s came to be seen as a period of intense conflict between central and 
local government as the former attempted to [re]assert its authority over the latter. The 
Government’s desire to control expenditure and shift the balance of the economy towards 
the private sector laid the foundation of the conflict. The political economy of Thatcherism, 
it must be remembered, asserted that where an economy is dominated by the public sector 
this inexorably represses the wealth creating private sector. [The intellectual case for the so 
called ‘crowding out’ phenomena was set out in Bacon & Eltis’ influential [amongst 
Thatcherites] book, Britain’s Economic Problem: Too Few Producers (1978).] By 
challenging local authority economic development activity the Government sought to 
re-establish their right to dictate both the direction and character of economic policy. For 
a variety of reasons local authorities lost the challenge. The resources they could muster in 
no way matched the scale of the problem; it became abundantly clear to the most left-wing 
authority that unilateral action could not solve the problem and; successive Conservative 
election victories reaffirmed the Government’s mandate to pursue their policies. 
Notwithstanding these factors the Government ensured their success by introducing 
legislation in the Local Government Housing Bill 1989 which, by making economic 
                                                 
1 GLC publication: Jobs for a Change quoted by Cochrane in Chp.8:162 in Campbell {Ed} 1990). 
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development a statutorily defined function, removed the discretionary Section 137 spending 
and, in a stroke, redefined economic development to fall within the “category of 
discretionary expenditure” (Emmerich, 1994:2) thus placing it on an equal footing with 
other authority functions. In what many saw as an ingenious tactical manoeuvre the 
Government had legitimised economic development and simultaneously emasculated it. In 
future, economic development would have to compete against: “…dozens of functions 
where an authority’s effective funding is derived via the extremely stretched ‘Other 
Services’ Block of the Standard Spending Assessment” (Emmerich, 1994:2). The financial 
constraints endemic in local authorities however made it more and more difficult to 
sanction autonomous expenditure on economic development. For this reason Hayton felt 
that local government’s future role would be more corporate and that there would be a: 
“…greater need for local authorities to become involved in partnership with the private 
sector…” (1991:55). However, the contentious battles which had raged between a number 
of high profile local authorities and the Government diverted attention from the fact that by 
the end of the 1980s nearly all local authorities had developed some form of local economic 
development capacity—see Sellegren, 1987; 1990; Nickson, 1991; Audit Commission, 
1989. And whilst the amounts of money spent specifically on economic development under 
Section 137 was small in relation to total local authority expenditure (less than 1% - Audit 
Commission, 1989 para.115), spending under main budget headings did have significant 
impacts on local economies.  
By the mid 1980s, according to Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy 
(CIPFA) estimates, over £250 million was being spent annually out of revenue budgets on 
economic development and promotion by local authorities...These amounts rival the level of 
central government spending on regional policy and in any case substantially 
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underrepresent actual spending on economic development, since some is buried under other 
(mainstream) budget heads (Cochrane p157 chp.8 quoted in Campbell 1990). 
Economic development in its widest sense, which had begun as a marginal activity pursued 
by some of the more radical left-wing [Labour] local authorities, had become by the end of 
the 1980s, a legitimate and widespread function throughout local government. The DoE 
concluded that: 
During the 1980s, local authorities have tended to move away from their traditional 
involvement in the provision of industrial land and premises, towards more direct assistance 
to industry and towards new business development, often through the provision of advice 
and financial support. In some cases a more active and ambitious policy has been attempted 
based on a co-ordinated approach towards particular sectors. More recently, authorities have 
looked for ways of targeting assistance more directly towards the unemployed and 
disadvantaged groups, which has led to initiatives on issues such as training, community 
business, co-operatives, equal opportunities, employment subsidies, black businesses, and 
negotiated agreements with employers on local recruitment (DoE, 1990 para.2.12). 
However, during this period stringent fiscal constraints and a tight regulatory regime meant 
that the experience of economic development was in fact the practice of partnership.  
UDCs 
Running in parallel to the growth of local authority economic development in the 1980s the 
Government progressively sought to alter the balance between the public and private sector. 
This substantive change in character of inner city policy was set out in 1981 in a major 
policy statement by Michael Heseltine, SoS for the Environment. He made clear the 
Government’s intention to place the interests of the private sector much higher than had 
been achieved previously. Heseltine stated:  
The private sector should be encouraged to play the fullest possible part. I therefore intend 
to make effective consultation with local industry a prior condition of providing urban 
programme grant. The voluntary sector can also contribute much, and should also be 
consulted (Hansard, 1981 col.603). 
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Part of this process can be seen in terms of the Government’s attempts to quell the activities 
of radical left-wing Labour authorities who, as described above, were seeking to redefine 
the parameters of economic policy at a local level. In effect local authorities were seeking 
to assert their right to adopt a economic policy independent of [and, in this case, contrary 
to] central government. However, running in the opposite direction, the political economy 
of Thatcherism promoted privatism, and in 1981 in one of its first major urban policy 
initiatives the Government introduced Urban Development Corporations. Imrie & Thomas 
suggest that: “The UDCs were forerunners in reorienting urban policy towards new 
economic imperatives in urban regeneration…” (1993a p4). The Act which created UDCs: 
…did not define regeneration but indicated some of the ways by which regeneration might 
be achieved—for example by bringing land and buildings into effective use, by encouraging 
the development of industry and commerce, and by ensuring that housing and social 
facilities are available to encourage people to live and work in the area (HC, 1988 para.3). 
The early UDCs can be seen as spectacular examples of the imposition of a new policy 
regime. Ironically the act of imposing on the local state, an alien structure with significant 
powers and resources, rather than synthesising and co-ordinating economic activity in an 
area, had the perverse effect of adding to the fragmentation of local economic structures 
and by definition encouraging the need for partnership. Whilst the early UDCs, especially 
London, were vociferously criticised for being too narrowly focused on property, later 
UDCs had a significantly moderated mandate with wider economic and social objectives. 
Whilst UDCs were perhaps an extreme example of government intervention in the local 
economy they undoubtedly had an important impact on the development of local 
partnerships. The growth of partnership occurs regardless of whether UDCs were more or 
less open to private, as distinct from say the local statutory sector, or the community and 
voluntary sectors. The reason for this is the scale of resources and powers vested to UDCs. 
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By creating new institutional forms with significant budgets and relative local autonomy 
vis-à-vis existing local institutions, and then at the same time constrain if not diminish local 
authority spending, creates a compelling environment to promote co-operative working and 
by definition partnership proliferation. A number of local authorities attempted to resist the 
imposition of UDCs but the record shows that these attempts proved fruitless and by the 
end of the 1980s confrontation had largely been replaced by co-operation. As the Audit 
Commission noted:  
There is less evidence now of unproductive effort by councils and a greater degree of 
coherence, co-ordination and pragmatism” (Audit Commission, 1989 para.10)...[and]… The 
era of confrontation between government and local councils on inner city policy is fading 
rapidly. There are examples of constructive co-operation and instances of quite remarkable 
changes of heart on the part of council leaders who were previously implacably hostile to 
government policy (op cit, para.43). 
City Action Teams, Task Forces  
Throughout the 1980s the Government was repeatedly criticised for a lack of co-ordination 
in its management of urban policy. This was not new. The 1977 White Paper had first 
raised the need to co-ordinate activity in order to gain the maximum advantage from the 
disparate actors operating in the inner cities. Co-ordination remained a perennial problem 
haunting the Government and a great body of research repeatedly drew attention to the 
problem throughout the 1980s: Scarman, 1982; Stewart, 1987; Audit Commission, 1989; 
HC, 1990. The high point of this criticism was the scathing rebuke made by the Audit 
Commission (1989)—the Government’s own audit watchdog—in describing Government 
policy as a “patchwork quilt” (p1) and “programme overkill in a strategic vacuum” 
(para. 102). The Government had introduced a number of initiatives specifically to address 
co-ordination. City Action Teams and Task Forces (TF) were two such examples. City 
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Action Teams brought together, on a regular basis, senior regional officials of the various 
regional departments of state, and representatives of departments without a formal regional 
presence, in order to ensure that each was working together effectively; Task Forces were 
similarly mandated consisting of small teams of civil servants from a variety of 
departments and people seconded from local authorities, the private and voluntary sectors 
(DoE, 1988b). Departmental parochialism inhibited the former from asserting any real 
effective influence on the policy agenda and by inference, co-ordination. The latter was 
criticised on account of their extremely small budgets, they were time limited, and the fact 
that they had no statutory powers to force co-ordination; rather they worked through 
voluntary agreements with all the reservations that this implied where intractable positions 
are encountered. Each of these initiatives was effectively a partnership building machine 
whose raison d’être was co-ordination. Ironically, in the case of Task Forces the chairman 
of the Environment Select Committee [although examining initiatives in Merseyside his 
comments apply equally to all Task Forces] suggested to the SoS for the Environment, 
Michael Heseltine, that: 
…it is ironic that the Task Force is in essence trying to do what the Liverpool Partnership is 
supposed to have been doing for the past 3 years, namely, bringing together the relevant 
public and private institutions in an effort to identify key problem areas and appropriate co-
ordinated responses, and conduct of affairs (HC, 1982: para.341:148). 
City Challenge & the Single Regeneration Budget 
Many of the policy initiatives introduced in the 1980s were criticised and much of this 
criticism was directed at the role of the private sector. In the 1980s a situation was created 
where the private sector [or its values] had come to dominate urban policy and critics 
argued that the Government in shifting the balance of power so strongly in favour of the 
private sector had effectively marginalised local authority involvement in local economic 
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development. Perhaps the most extreme examples of this policy shift—where local 
authorities were effectively excluded from the policy process—were Enterprise Zones and 
UDCs but this shift was mirrored in many other initiatives throughout the 1980s. This was 
especially the case in planning where in one of the government’s first initiatives a 
presumption in favour of development was implemented; planning by Appeal to the SoS 
repeatedly overturned local decisions; and a system of urban grants evolved from one 
which brought local authorities and the private sectors together to a situation in which the 
local authority was expressly omitted. Critics argued that this policy reorientation which 
saw the ascendancy of the private sector had created a democratic deficit where lines of 
accountability were blurred and co-ordination in the implementation of policy was severely 
lacking. 
Appearing towards the end of the decade the Audit Commission Report on ‘Urban 
Regeneration & Economic Development’ which synthesised many of the criticisms directed 
at government policy (Audit Commission, 1989). Similarly, a report published in 1990 by 
the influential Committee of Public Accounts (HC, 1990) reiterated the Audit 
Commission’s largely critical report. The Audit Commission’s (1989) report made a 
number of specific observations: 
para.36 successful urban regeneration has nearly always been accomplished in a 
framework of genuine partnership…it is of great benefit that a wide range of 
interested bodies should be substantially included, particularly local 
authorities. 
para.41 it is widely perceived that central and local government departments do not 
work together as closely or effectively as the might…one of the clearest 
messages to emerge is that the efforts to turn around Britain’s cities will be 
shackled so long as the present uneasy relations between central and local 
government persist. 
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para.44 (a) Government rhetoric, allied to some specific changes designed to cut down the 
local authority role, has contributed to a climate which is less favourable for 
co-operation than it might be; 
para.44 (b) The multiplicity of governmental agencies and schemes generates confusion 
on the ground, in the minds of local authority decision makers and business 
leaders alike; 
para.44 (c) the structures and procedures of individual programmes do not harness the 
energies as effectively as they could; some are too constrained and 
bureaucratic; 
para.44 (d) There is in spite of some positive developments in some areas inadequate co-
ordination of local strategies, and the totality of government effort is less than 
the sum of its parts. 
para.157 Local authorities themselves often experience difficulty in co-ordinating 
actions across departmental boundaries… 
The City Challenge initiative announced in May 1991 can clearly be seen to have been 
organised to directly assuage these criticisms. Winning bids needed to show a 
comprehensive and integrated approach to urban regeneration. In the first of two rounds 
Michael Heseltine, SoS for the Environment, invited 15 local authorities to participate in a 
competition for funds. Eleven of these pace makers were successful. A second round was 
held which opened up the competition to all 57 Urban Programme authorities from which 
20 were successful. Out of the two rounds 31 City Challenge Partnerships were formed 
with each receiving £37·5m spread over 5 years. City Challenge was important because it 
reaffirmed the importance of local authorities in the local development process but more 
importantly it categorically restated partnership as the preferred delivery mechanism 
and it made clear that these would include local authorities, the private and voluntary 
sectors and the local community (DoE, 1997c: para.4.31). City Challenge was first and 
foremost a competition to create partnerships. It encouraged partnership because only 
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partnerships could enter and win the competition. 
An anticipated third round was overtaken by events. City Challenge was abandoned and 
replaced by the Single Regeneration Budget—for an exposition of the key implications see 
Mawson et al, 1995. The SRB developed the ideas begun in City Challenge but addressed 
some of the criticisms associated with it. SRB has had a profound impact on partnership 
formation. The three rounds of SRB has seen the creation of 552 partnerships formed 
specifically to implement SRB objectives (DoE, 1997c: para.4.6). With the SRB the 
Government effectively reaffirmed the commitment it made to partnership in the 1977 
White Paper. Ironically, the position for partnership in the late 1990s under SRB is 
somewhat akin to that outlined in the 1977 White Paper which saw an important role for all 
the community of interests in the resurrection of inner city economies. The difference under 
SRB rules is that a partnership is only eligible to enter the competition if it formally 
includes all these actors in the development of the local strategy.  
SUMMARY 
Partnership by the end of the 1990s was without doubt the policy tool of government and 
which had effectively become the new economic orthodoxy in the delivery of regeneration 
policy. Along the path to ascendancy it had weathered strident political storms. Remarkably 
even as the post war consensus collapsed with the advent into office of the first Thatcher 
government, partnership appeared to be apolitical, remaining as it did the preferred delivery 
mechanism for the Tories throughout the 1980s and 1990s. During the early period of 
Thatcher’s government there were several celebrated cases of local authorities attempting 
to resist the new political and economic settlement introduced by Thatcher. The approach 
for these authorities was invariably to try and nurture an alternative interventionist political 
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platform based upon a radical socialist agenda, remarkably, partnership remained the 
preferred delivery mechanism. Ultimately, these challenges proved futile and were 
comprehensively defeated by the actions of central government. However, what that these 
challenges revealed was the potential for partnership to exploit and manipulate the political 
tensions inherent in the internal dynamics of partnership as constituted in the model set out 
in the 1977 White Paper. The experience of partnership during this period reflected its 
chameleon character and perhaps suggests something of its value to politicians who 
appreciate the fundamental flexibility of a policy instrument that has no theoretical 
boundaries.  
The lesson for urban policy and perhaps for government policy in general was what might 
be called the Thatcher legacy. That is to say that dirigiste intervention either by central or 
local government was no longer tenable. Partnership had now become the new economic 
orthodoxy. Remarkably, the promise of effectiveness and value for money arising from 
partnership working as laid out in the 1977 White Paper has never been challenged 
theoretically. Experience in the 1980s and 1990s was that the key issue was control of the 
rules governing partnership formation. No one has yet sought to challenge the efficacy of 
partnership working or indeed provide anything other than an anecdotal description of what 
constitutes partnership. These matters will be explored in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE SINGLE REGENERATION 
BUDGET 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to describe the origins of the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) and set 
it in the historical context of the evolution of urban policy. Many of the characteristics of 
the SRB can be traced directly back to earlier policy initiatives. These earlier initiatives 
help explain the trajectory of urban policy and are examined in order to help explain why 
the SRB turned out like it did. The evolution of urban policy under successive Conservative 
administrations in the 1980s and 1990s can be seen to have advanced in three stages and 
these phases are examined in detail.  
Evolution  
The SRB is only the latest evocation in a long line of regeneration initiatives addressed 
predominantly, although not exclusively, on urban problems. Indeed, that the SRB operates 
outside of what are considered traditional urban problem areas is just one of the 
characteristics which sets it apart from earlier regeneration initiatives. However, the SRB 
needs to be examined in the wider context of an evolving political economy: one which has 
continued to evolve over two decades. The SRB can therefore only be understood by 
examining the interplay between, on the one hand, a prevailing political ideology, and on 
the other, the changing understanding of what constitutes the problem it seeks to address. 
Immediately a major methodological problem arises in trying to understand the evolution of 
regeneration policy and specifically the trajectory that the SRB has followed. The reason 
for this is that there have rarely been clearly articulated objectives for urban policy and this 
specific criticism was made by Robson et al in a comprehensive review of urban policy 
commissioned by the DoE—see Inner Cities Research Programme: Assessing the Impact 
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of Urban Policy. The report argued that:  
…there is some difficulty both in determining unambiguously what government has aimed 
to achieve in developing its urban policy at any one time and in trying to characterise those 
aims over the course of the last two decades (DoE, 1994c: para.1.4). 
What is clear from the early initiatives was that they can be characterised as attempts to 
systematically apply positive discrimination on discrete areas of the inner city. Higgins et al 
(1983:15-16) in a comprehensive review of the origins of urban policy argue that the 
original Community Development Programme:  
…was not conceived as a poverty programme in any but the broadest sense, and its main 
thrust was towards encouraging the personal and moral growth of individuals, and the 
growth of hope and enthusiasm in declining communities. 
The subsequent Urban Programme running in the period 1967-78 was characterised as a 
policy initiative which sought: 
…the alleviation of urban deprivation or stress in areas of special social need by 
supplementing main programmes and filling gaps left by them, but it has also always had a 
special concern with immigrant areas and ethnic minorities (Higgins et al 1983:49). 
Operationally however the policy approach adopted has always been to target what can be 
regarded as the symptoms of poverty articulated in terms of multiple deprivation. This 
approach can be seen as distinct from a policy that would attack poverty directly as, for 
example, transfer payments might. Success in policy terms was therefore determined with 
reference to proxy indicators: the best example of which has been unemployment [or the 
inverse, i.e., job creation, jobs protected]. The reason for this is tied up with the symbolic 
importance of unemployment which from the end of the second World War and to just 
prior to the advent of the first Thatcher government had been a touchstone of the efficacy of 
government economic policy. The actual process of disengagement from a commitment to 
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full employment began under the previous Wilson/Callaghan Labour administration The 
Labour prime minister James Callaghan who took over from Wilson in April 1976 may 
indeed have maintained an ideological commitment to full employment but in the face of 
overwhelming economic pressure his government acceded to the de facto abandonment of 
this aspiration as unemployment breached the one million mark in 1976. [Numbers 
unemployed in the UK in June 1975 were below 900,000 by June 1976 this figure was 
1,331,838 – see Annual Abstract of Statistics, HMSO, 1977: Table 6.7]. 
The differences in political economy between Callaghan’s Labour and Thatcher’s 
Conservative administration is important in the trajectory and evolving character of 
regeneration policy. Both Labour and previous Conservative administrations prior to 
Thatcher were committed to full employment and this was as much a moral as an economic 
imperative. However, the Labour administration was overwhelmed by a ‘tidal wave of 
economic forces’ and adopted a pragmatic view of the parlous state of the UK economy 
conceding that government in many respects was impotent and could not spend its way into 
full employment. Callaghan as prime minister vigorously made the point when he 
addressed the 1976 Labour Part Conference at Blackpool: 
The cosy world we were told would go on for ever, where full employment would be 
guaranteed by a stroke of the Chancellor’s pen, cutting taxes, deficit spending – that cosy 
world is gone… 
When we reject unemployment as an economic instrument – as we do – and when we reject 
also superficial remedies, as socialists must, then we must ask ourselves unflinchingly: what 
is the cause of high unemployment? Quite simply and unequivocally it is caused by paying 
ourselves more than the value of what we produce… 
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We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession and increase 
employment by cutting taxes and boosting Government spending. I tell you in all candour 
that that option no longer exists, and that insofar as it ever did exist, it only worked on each 
occasion since the war by injecting a bigger dose of inflation into the economy, followed by 
a higher level of unemployment as the next step. Higher inflation followed by higher 
unemployment (text of speech quoted in Callaghan, 1987:425-6). 
Interestingly the contrast with the Thatcher administration is only one of degree. The 
Thatcher administration, like all previous administrations, was genuinely concerned with 
unemployment, however, the political economy of Thatcherism, whilst sharing the same 
broad objective of a free and prosperous nation had a different view as to how this objective 
could be realised. Its distinguishing feature then is not as many would have it, of an 
indifference to unemployment—because Thatcherism presupposes that a prosperous 
economy creates jobs and removes all but [acceptable] frictional unemployment—rather, 
the substantive difference is the primacy given to economic over social objectives. For 
Thatcherism it is axiomatic that when you get the economy right you automatically solve 
unemployment and so policies for unemployment per se are no longer a legitimate 
government concern. All policy is thus subjugated to getting the macroeconomy working 
right. The level of unemployment is no longer an objective it simply becomes one 
symptom, amongst a range of many possible symptoms, which could be used to gauge how 
well [or not] policy is operating.  
However, making judgements as to how an economy was operating, especially inner urban 
areas, is problematic. How do you evaluate the quality of the environment, the 
competitiveness of an area, educational endowment, crime levels, deprivation etc? Even 
where this evaluation could be shown to be done objectively it raises the question as to 
what is the relationship between any one—or even more problematic—combinations of 
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these variables and the efficiency of a local economy. Because of these substantive 
methodological difficulties the evaluation of urban policy in its various manifestations has 
largely been judged on its impact on unemployment. The basic reason for this is that 
comprehensive unemployment figures are collated regularly and whilst the definition of 
unemployment has been politically contested, unemployment figures [however defined] 
remain a robust empirically objective indicator commanding widespread respect in their 
underlying collation. The Treasury offer support to this interpretation, talking about 
additionality as a general concept relating to any output of regeneration policies they note 
that: “In practice, most empirical work relates to employment (HM Treasury, 1995:25)”. 
SRBs lineage. 
Historically then the origins of contemporary urban policy lie in a series of urban 
experiments introduced primarily by the Home Office and the DoE in the 1967-75 period—
see Appendix (B): Chronology of Urban Policy. In all, about a dozen separate projects were 
initiated in this period in both Wilson’s 1964-69 Labour administration and Heath’s 
1970-74 Conservative administrations (Lawless,1988:531). Cullingworth (1988:287) notes 
that:  
…the legislative landmarks (though modest) were the Local Government Act 1966 (section 
11) and the Local Government (Social Need) Act of 1969. These constituted the statutory 
basis for the ‘educational priority areas programme’. The 1966 Act provided for grants in 
aid of staff costs involved in ‘dealing with some of the transitional problems caused by the 
presence of Commonwealth immigrants’. The urban aid programme was broader in 
concept, ‘designed to raise the level of social services in areas of acute social need, and thus 
help to provide an equal opportunity for all citizens…[and] 
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‘Areas of special social need’ were not defined in the legislation, but government circulars 
referred to ‘localised districts, within the boundaries of an urban authority, which bear the 
marks of multiple deprivation, such as old, overcrowded, decrepit houses without plumbing 
and sanitation; persistent unemployment; family sizes above the average; a high proportion 
of children in trouble or in need of care; or a combination of some or all of these.  
The assessment of these initiatives were generally critical. Even before the publication of 
official DoE research by Robson et al (DoE, 1994b) criticised a lack of clearly articulated 
objectives for urban policy, Lawless (1988:531), in a prescient observation, was already 
suggesting that research was indicating that these experiments: “…proved unable 
rigorously to define urban deprivation or effectively monitor ameliorative policy”. The 
importance of these early initiatives however was the critical impact they had upon 
changing the direction of government policy. By repudiating a social pathology view of 
deprivation the research attributed the decline of inner cities to economic forces resulting 
from the contraction in employment opportunities and the consequent diminishing 
individual and community wealth (Lawless,1988:532). This analysis was persuasively 
argued in the conclusions of the ‘Inner Area Studies’ [Liverpool, Birmingham, Lambeth] 
instigated by Peter Walker as Secretary of State for the Environment in the 1972 Labour 
administration. The force of these arguments was acknowledged in the introduction of the 
1977 White Paper ‘Policy for the Inner Cities’ (HMSO, 1977:1) which acceded that the 
cumulative impact of research into the various urban initiatives pointed to an economic 
explanation for urban decline. The logic of the analysis suggested that an economic 
problem required an economic solution and this policy frame dictated the nature of the 
urban policy initiatives. As chapter two described the 1977 White Paper introduced the 
concept of Partnership as the new idea to tackle the problem in inner cities. The problem 
was complex and multifaceted and so the response needed to reflect this and so the Inner 
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Area Partnerships were formed. As chapter one argued partnership has continued to be the 
policy response even when the government changed bringing in its train a new political 
economy to bear on the inner city problem.  
THREE STAGES OF URBAN POLICY 
It can be seen that the evolution of policy has occurred in roughly three stages—illustrated 
in figure 3.1 below—and each of these stages contributed to the essential character of what 
was to become the SRB.  
Figure 3.1: Stages in the development of urban policy 
Partnership City Challenge
 
 
Stage I: need and targeting 
Stage I introduced two concepts which would play an important part in future policy 
initiatives: need and targeting. It also heralded the establishment of partnerships in the 57 
towns and cities considered to be suffering the most extreme effects of economic decline. 
The actual process of identifying eligible locations [in this case a figure of 57 areas] 
involved a combination of indices some of which were subjective and open to political 
interpretation. Peter Shore, as the then SoS, outlined the criteria used to select Partnership 
areas in a debate in the Commons: 
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We have referred specifically to loss of population, to loss of jobs, to the actual social 
composition of population in the inner city areas, and to a number of quantifiable and, to 
some extent, admittedly, difficult to quantify, social factors (Hansard, Inner Cities debate 
08/11/77 col.495). 
Exchanges in the debate however emphasised the political dimension to these deliberations. 
Whilst the centres of many of the older industrial cities would readily qualify on any 
objective criteria of deprivation and, as the SoS stated, would be ‘almost self selecting’ 
(ibid. col.490), some legitimately needy locations failed to qualify and this point was raised 
more than once in the debate by MPs from these constituencies. Indeed, Hambleton 
(1981:53) suggests that: “…hints that the policy would seek to concentrate resources in 
particular areas resulted in a scramble for selection by many of the urban local authorities.” 
However, the subjectivity of the government’s analysis, and their sensitivity to the political 
dimension, was unambiguously stated in the subsequent White Paper which asserted that:  
The Government have given careful thought to the selection of areas for partnership 
arrangements. There are no satisfactory objective criteria, comparable between one area 
and another, covering the whole span of problems—economic decline, physical decay and 
social stress (HMSO, 1977: para.72). {my emphasis}[and] 
Account will be taken not only of the intensity of problems, but also of their extent and any 
wider effects on surrounding areas (ibid. para.77) 
Chapter two argued that at this critical initial stage the concept of partnership was 
embedded in the policy process and whilst policy objectives changed over time the policy 
mechanism remained consistent. Crucial to the future development of policy was that the 
policy analysis outlined in the 1977 White Paper received widespread support. The problem 
was fundamentally economic in nature [which was new] and, given the magnitude of the 
problem, there was a desperate need to involve all the different sectors in a co-ordinated, 
and spatially concentrated, response to the problems facing inner city economies.  
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In stage (I) then the principle objectives of partnership were to administer a quadruple 
increase in the Urban Programme budget (£30m to £125m a year in 1979/80 - HMSO, 
1977: para.64) and to improve co-ordination—in strictly circumscribed parts of inner 
cities—amongst the raft of players operating there. As chapter two details, during this stage 
the concept of partnership formally involved only the central state and local government. 
Although the 1977 White Paper had presciently identified the withdrawal of private sector 
investment as part of the inner city problem, the partnerships proposed under the revised 
Urban Programme placed control with local government. Operationally this effectively 
inhibited the potential contribution of the private sector. The White Paper had envisaged 
that the new partnership arrangements would lead to innovative developments in working 
practices: the evidence suggests that this did not occur.  
Many local authorities were ill prepared for the substantial policy initiative. The speed of 
the introduction of the new partnerships meant that early partnership meetings, rather than 
instigating or supporting innovative methods of working transcending traditional 
operational and departmental boundaries, quickly descended into parochial departmental 
bidding mechanisms. Rather than developing new projects which would seek to exploit the 
potential synergy of a co-ordinated approach many projects were simply off-the-shelf 
projects brought forward by individual departments in order to exploit a new funding 
stream.  
Stage II: ascendancy of the private sector 
Following Margaret Thatcher’s election in 1979 the new Conservative government set 
urban policy on a new trajectory: one which sought to reconcile existing policy 
mechanisms with the new political economy of Thatcherism. Stage (II) began in the early 
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1980s with a raft of policy initiatives. These continued to use partnership as the preferred 
delivery mechanism and a policy of targeting resources. This continuity and change was 
spelt out by Michael Heseltine, SoS for the Environment, when he announced that: “The 
Inner City Partnership and Programme Authority arrangements will continue…I have 
decided not to make any changes now in the list of authorities with partnership or 
programme authority status…” But Heseltine also reaffirmed his intention, subject to 
Parliamentary approval, to set up UDCs in London and Merseyside (DoE, Press Notice 
59/81 ~ 9th February 1981). The fundamental thrust of this new initiative was to incorporate 
the private sector into the policy making arena; at the same time the progressive inclusion 
of the private sector saw parallel moves to exclude the public sector. The Public Accounts 
Committee heard evidence that the experience of the 1977 Urban Programme Partnerships 
had convinced the government that: “…inner city regeneration was better led by private 
sector investment than by local authorities” (HC, 1990: para.10). 
Ironically the lesson of stage (II) was the same as that which had been spelt out in the 
original 1977 White Paper which had called for co-ordinated action from all sectors active 
in the inner city. However initiatives undertaken under stage (II) especially Urban 
Development Corporations, which by the late 1980s were consuming the largest portion of 
the DoE’s Regeneration Budget Heading, were widely criticised and considered by many of 
the government’s critics to be the apogee of the privatism culture which Thatcherism 
fostered. Ironically, the basis of much of the criticism of UDCs arose from the observation 
that the government had in effect created a mirror image of the Inner Area Partnerships’ 
(i.e., those created by the 1977 White Paper and designated under the Inner Urban Areas 
Act 1978) and in so doing, exposed them to the same fundamental criticisms. It should be 
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remembered that the Inner Area Partnerships had been criticised because they were narrow 
secular partnerships consisting of only central and local government. And yet UDCs were 
structurally remarkably similar, although this time round the partnership was between 
central government and local private interests. However both of these approaches appeared 
to contradict the policy analysis in the 1977 White Paper which called for far wider 
participatory structures which would not exclude key sectors in local communities.  
UDCs were controversial from the very beginning. Over time a burgeoning body of 
evidence was suggesting that the privatisation of public policy had gone too far. There may 
indeed have been merits in adopting elements of best practice found in the private sector 
and there were certain practical advantages of levering private sector capital into 
regeneration initiatives. However by the end of the 1980s it became clear that to exclude 
the public sector [amongst others] wasted a valuable resource. The public sector contained 
both a breadth of talent and experience and, in light of the continuing criticism of a 
democratic deficit, it brought to partnership legitimate local leadership, underpinned with 
genuine democratic credentials secured through the ballot box. Painter et al (1997:241) 
graphically illustrates this when describing local authority’s democratic legitimacy as a: 
“…major resource which can be used as a bargaining counter in relations with other 
agencies”, and goes on to quote an interview with a local authority officer who suggested 
that: “For them [referring to quangos] the positive thing…is they get caught up in the slip 
stream of our accountability.” 
Of great significance for the evolution of urban policy and the character of the SRB 
Challenge Fund was the shift in emphasis away from need during this period. Urban policy 
throughout this period had instead been predicated on physical renewal which had a needs 
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element but this was not the primary aim. The focus of policy was rather on a property-led 
solution which would seek to resolve the legacy of decay. It was envisaged that public 
sector funding would lever in private sector capital, creating markets where none existed 
previously. The logic underpinning these initiatives was that public sector funding, 
administered by the private sector, would be used to build flagship projects and 
complementary infrastructure and that this would stimulate a climate conducive to further 
private sector [re]investment in the inner cities. The result of this public sector led 
investment [reverse leverage as its critics termed it] would be a virtuous circle of 
investment and growth which through the process of ‘trickle down’ would percolate 
prosperity downwards to the incumbent local communities. 
Stage III: co-ordination revisited & reconciliation of public sector 
Stage (II) was brought to an abrupt end at the end of the 1980s by the convergence of a 
number of critical factors. The collapse in the property market at the end of the 1980s 
exposed the weakness of a policy predicated on the creation of a property market 
(Solesbury, 1990; Turok, 1992; Imrie, R & Thomas, 1993). Alongside the puncturing of 
what had become a highly speculative property market bubble there had been a growing 
body of research and comment publicly criticising existing regeneration policy on a number 
of fronts. So, by the end of the 1980s highly influential sources were highlighting a 
continuing lack of co-ordination evident in many of the initiatives and a growing concern 
with what was described as the ‘democratic deficit’ of many of the policy tools—see Audit 
Commission, 1989; HC, 1990. This changing policy climate is described in detail in 
Mawson et al (1995): 
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…an alternative policy model was emerging, based on a collaborative approach, which 
sought to draw together all the key actors and agencies within a locality. Comparative 
studies of the successful regeneration of cities in North America and Europe had suggested 
that certain common features were evident in their strategic management and organisational 
capacity. In particular, there was evidence of a partnership between all the key local 
agencies, leading to a shared analysis of problems and opportunities, and the development 
over time of a vision expressed in an agreed strategy. These themes were also present in the 
Audit Commission's advocacy of the preparation of a Local Regeneration Audit, and in 
the thinking emerging from the work of the Business Leadership Teams in various British 
cities supported by the Business in the Community (BITC) and the CBI (para.2.3). {original 
emphasis} 
The ideas were brought together in an accord between the Chambers of Commerce, BITC, 
the Enterprise Agency movement and the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) at 
Sunningdale, in September 1991, which proposed that a process be launched to develop 
joint ownership of local strategies throughout the country. This would involve a shared 
audit, development of a co-operative strategy based on a core vision and declared 
objectives, targets and action. This process would involve extensive consultation, leading to 
joint ownership, and publication of an agreed strategy, followed by incorporation by the 
partners into their respective organisation’s plans (para.2.4). 
In one sense the policy shift which occurred at the end of the 1980s was both pragmatic and 
politically expedient. It would have been untenable to support if not commercially naïve to 
continue pumping large sums of public money into built solutions when the property 
market had so manifestly collapsed. New solutions were demanded. Out of this situation 
came City Challenge which presaged a major innovation in urban policy and marked the 
start of stage (III). Interestingly Davoudi & Healey (1995:80) give support to the above 
analysis suggesting that the funding for City Challenge was: “…primarily unspent grant 
allocations available as a result of the lack of interest in property development initiatives 
because of the property slump.” 
Published towards the end of the 1980s The Action for Cities paper (Cabinet Office, 1988) 
had already begun to shift the character of the discourse surrounding the problems of inner 
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cities. In announcing the fact that they were spending £3b in the inner city the government 
sought to promote the idea that they were now making a major commitment to resolving 
the inner city problem. The three billion figure soon became a focus of critical scrutiny. 
Observers suggested that the figure was disingenuous (Lawless, 1988b; Nevin & Shiner, 
1993). An FT leader article described it as: “strong on presentation but weak on new ideas 
or new money…[and]…the fatness of the prospectus is in inverse proportion to its 
contents” (FT, 08/03/88). The actual ‘new money’ targeted at the inner city represented 
only a small proportion of the £3b figure; the bulk of which was in fact made up by 
including statutorily defined departmental spending which would have occurred with or 
without a commitment to the inner city. These critics concluded that the £3b figure 
although crudely accurate was nothing more than a legitimate accounting manipulation 
which did nothing more than reflect the actual level of resources already directed at the 
inner city2.  
Arguments over the funding aside, the paper was influential in other more subtle ways. 
Throughout the narrative of the paper a number of key concepts were introduced which 
proved highly influential in shaping future initiatives. First, Margaret Thatcher began in the 
Foreword to the paper by restating the government’s commitment to partnership. Second, 
at a different level, and perhaps of more symbolic significance for future policy, the paper 
in describing the range of government initiatives embracing inner cities went some way to 
define how the political economy of Thatcherism had been translated into practical policies 
in the inner city. The suggestion made by the government in the paper [although contested 
by critics] was that the sum of these initiatives reflected a deliberate, coherent strategic 
                                                 
2 Labour in 2000 have been similarly criticised. See, for example, the ‘more spin than substance’ criticism 
para.45-53 Trade & Industry Select Committee Minutes of Evidence HC261-i); FT 11/02/00. 
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policy response to the problem of inner cities, rather than as critics would argue, a list of 
departmental activities which coincidentally had an urban impact. At the launch of the 
Action for Cities initiatives Margaret Thatcher was quoted by the FT as saying that: “I don’t 
think there is a single new policy here” (Pike, FT 08/03/88) but as the FT made clear: “Her 
remark was not made defensively” (ibid). The FT observed that in “words which occurred 
repeatedly” the Government saw the initiative as adding: “better co-operation, 
co-ordination and concentration of effort and resources” (Pike, FT 08/03/88) and, as if to 
reinforce this message of an innovative co-ordinated approach, the launch was attended by 
six cabinet ministers. 
Collage or strategy 
Regardless of which interpretation is taken—collage or strategy—the paper, when seen in 
its totality, sets out [and this may indeed have been deliberate or inadvertent] a structurally 
coherent and comprehensive programme for future inner city policies. In retrospect it can 
be seen that in the process of describing the various initiatives The Action for Cities paper 
sets out extremely crucial themes which went on to shape both City Challenge and the 
future SRB initiatives. In particular these include: 
• comprehensive integrated solutions 
• enterprise / opportunity 
• local solutions 
Re-reading The Action for Cities paper with these themes in mind, City Challenge’s  
lineage becomes clear. Responding to the ‘lack of co-ordination criticism’, City Challenge 
required a comprehensive programme of activities. There would be a requirement to focus 
on a discrete area in order not to spread resources too thinly and this came with the added 
benefit that results would be more visible. Additionally City Challenge sought to stimulate:  
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…the releasing of development potential, understood in terms of both economic 
development and property development, with the targeting of "areas of concentrated 
disadvantage", to improve their access to opportunities, primarily conceived in terms of 
access to the mainstream economy (City Challenge: government guidance (DoE, May 
1991) quoted in Davoudi & Healey (1995:80). {my emphasis} 
Aside from an understandable antipathy amongst local authorities associated with [any] 
reductions in public expenditure the City Challenge initiative was widely commended. The 
Conservative government certainly thought it a valuable exercise. In September 1992, 
Michael Howard, then SoS for the Environment, told the Association of Metropolitan 
Authorities that City Challenge had:  
…revolutionised the way local authorities are tackling key localities in run-down urban 
areas…[and had]…‘dramatically changed’ the attitudes of local authorities in their quest for 
urban regeneration. 
Working closely in partnership with the Government, the private sector and voluntary 
bodies had made them [local authorities] think afresh about how they can bring about real 
and lasting benefits to the people in their areas…[and] 
It is not only the winners who have benefited…Everyone taking part will have gained from 
the relationship which they have forged with their partners. That is the real prize of City 
Challenge (extracts of speech reported in Planning, 27th September 1992). 
City Challenge certainly had an influential impact on government thinking. The 1992 
Conservative Party Manifesto (The Best Future for Britain, 1992) made this clear: 
Competitive bidding [in City Challenge] has already galvanised towns and cities into 
bringing forward imaginative proposals for regeneration. It has improved co-ordination, 
secured better value for money and encouraged programmes which tackle problems on a 
number of fronts. We will continue to extend City Challenge and allocate a greater 
proportion of resources by competitive bidding (1992:39). 
The DoE’s evaluation of urban policy, Assessing the Impact of Urban Policy (DoE, 1994c) 
also supported the judgment that City Challenge had been welcomed: 
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There was widespread agreement, whatever limitations were expressed about the initiative, 
that City Challenge represented a significant institutional innovation in the attempt to create 
local partnerships which even in the initial phase was showing some degree of success DoE 
(1994c: para.xxvi, pxi). 
The interim evaluation of City Challenge conducted for the DoE commended the initiative 
concluding that it was the most promising regeneration scheme so far attempted 
(DoE, 1996d). By 1999 KPMG who had completed the final national evaluation of City 
Challenge spoke in glowing terms of City Challenge’s achievements: 
City Challenge was a ground breaking and very successful programme, which has provided 
the basis for a step change in regeneration policy. Many of its features have been 
incorporated into subsequent regeneration and area-based programmes. It provides lessons 
for current and future regeneration activity (DETR, 1999a).  
For local government the principle reason for their change of sentiment lay in the fact that 
after more than a decade of marginalisation and exclusion central government’s hostility 
had receded to the point where local authorities were now considered ‘no longer part of the 
problem’ but part of the solution. Environment secretary, Michael Heseltine, credited with 
devising the City Challenge initiative, announced that: “Local authorities will be invited to 
enter into partnerships with their local businesses and their community to draw together 
imaginative programmes for the regeneration of their areas” (DoE Press Release 335/91 ~ 
23/05/91). [The irony of this policy ‘U’ turn was not lost on the government’s critics who 
recalled the fact that the original 1977 White Paper had singled out the important 
contribution that local authorities could make] Heseltine then went on to outline the raison 
d’être of City Challenge arguing that it represented an opportunity to enhance the 
effectiveness of government expenditure in urban areas in England. This was clearly a 
reference to the perennial concern of central government with ‘value for money’ but 
Heseltine also made clear the critical importance of attracting private finance and using the 
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private sector in managing any programme that was put forward. It could be argued that 
City Challenge was in effect no more than a restatement of the aspirations of the 1977 
White Paper but adjusted to reflect the political economy of Thatcherism.  
A defining feature of City Challenge then was that it effectively rehabilitated local 
authorities, re-establishing the legitimacy of their involvement in regeneration initiatives. 
However, the government maintained rigid control over the competition to select potential 
partnerships. Heseltine extended an invitation to 15 authorities chosen from the 57 Urban 
Programme authorities. The original press release suggested that there would be ten 
winning partnerships. In the event 11 pacemaker partnerships (involving 13 authorities) 
were selected from 21 competitors in the first round (DoE, 1993b: para.5.12). [The 21 
figure arose from unsolicited submissions to the Secretary of State]. Following a second 
round a further 20 partnerships were established.  
Through their manipulation of the City Challenge competition, likened to either a 
competition without the participants knowing the rules (Beecham, 1993) or a system of 
free-for-all prize fights for government cash (Bevins, 1994), the government in effect 
forced the creation of new extra-local institutional structures. These were mandated to 
incorporate a wider range of interest than any previous initiatives and this was seen by 
many participants as a genuine attempt at innovation albeit with the caveat of an extremely 
short lead-in time. The experience and critical feedback gained by the government through 
the two rounds of City Challenge appears to have been received constructively and this 
clearly fed through into the structure of the SRB.  
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The SRB took the fundamental principles embodied in City Challenge including:  
• an explicit competition for resources; 
• a comprehensive approach; 
• focus on a discrete area; 
• a partnership approach involving all interested parties; 
• output driven ~ with set targets; 
but in addition the SRB addressed some of the perceived shortcomings of City Challenge 
by: 
• allowing more flexibility in the income stream rather than a fixed £37.5m per annum for 
5yrs; 
• an enhanced localism; 
• flexible time scale ~ from 1 to 7 year programme; 
• an even more diverse range of output measures; 
• not just an urban focus; 
• additional obligations to monitor ethnic minority outputs. 
An immediate problem facing participants in the first round of SRB in 1994/95 was the 
rapidity of its introduction.  
The SRB was announced in principle by the Secretary of State in November 1993. In 
January 1994 draft bidding guidance for round one was issued. Following a wide 
consultation, which included local authority associations, local authorities, TECs, voluntary 
organisations, academic and specialist consultancies, final bidding guidance for the round 
was issued in April 1994 (HC, 1995b: para.12). 
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Figure 3.2: Round One Bidding Timetable 
 14 April 1994  Final Bidding Guidance issued: opening of bidding round. 
 31st May Deadline for submission of Outline bids* 
 May-June  Outline bid stage: discussions between Government Office for 
the Regions and bid partners. 
 7th September  Deadline for submissions of bids to Government Office. 
 October-November  Government Offices made recommendations on bids received to 
the SoS for the Environment who reached final decisions in 
consultation with cabinet committee. 
 6th December  SoS announced winners. 
 From January 1995  Preparation of Delivery Plans by Partnerships 
 April 1995  Implementation of approved bids. 
(adapted from HC, 1995b: para.13)  
*NB although this date did not appear in the published Bidding Guidance timetable it 
nevertheless was applied nationally) 
Genuine partnerships – in six weeks? 
The 31st May deadline gave bidders approximately six weeks to assemble and submit a bid 
and at the same time establish a comprehensive delivery mechanism. The latter had to be in 
the form of a partnership that would in effect be superimposed on the existing institutional 
landscape. This time scale was criticised by Mawson et al (1995) as being wholly 
unrealistic.  
The SRB had consolidated the principles of City Challenge by institutionalising an entirely 
new agenda to regeneration initiatives the primary aim of which was to develop genuine 
partnership building. It is clear that the structure of the SRB Challenge Fund competition 
incorporated a specific institutional logic reflecting the political economy of Thatcherism. 
Underpinning the whole idea was that partnership in conjunction with competition would 
deliver tangible [and wholly positive] benefits, including: 
• Partnership would deliver co-ordination [and]  
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• Partnership working would inexorably lead to a cross fertilisation of ideas and this would 
stimulate innovative organisational responses in both partnerships and the participant 
organisations/interests;  
• The competition between partnerships as they bring forward programmes would guarantee 
that the best schemes were brought forward and this would simultaneously maximise the 
leverage of any programme.  
The government were certainly convinced that partnership and competition worked: 
We have made competition a central part of the Single Regeneration Budget Challenge 
Fund and I make no apology for that. Competition has produced over 200 winning bids 
[i.e., partnerships] which will bring in nearly £3bn in private investment…[and] 
The bidding process and the formation of partnerships pulls in people who have never 
before been involved in regeneration… (DoE Press Release 241/95 ~ 23rd May 1995){my 
emphasis} 
This message was repeated when the Environment Select Committee conducted its first 
report on the Single Regeneration Budget: 
Ministers consider that competition stimulates a creative approach to addressing an area’s 
needs and priorities and galvanises local people into preparing co-operative, constructive 
proposals. They believe that it was essential to maintain the effort started in City Challenge 
to break away from the routine allocation of resources characterised by the Urban 
Programme, and that competition has raised the quality of bids and has encouraged a range 
of partnerships, many of which will continue even in the absence of Challenge Fund support 
(HC, 1995b: para.39). 
Beyond the obviously partisan political realm academic research was revealing evidence 
that partnership working had encouraged organisational innovation in response to new 
institutional structures, for example Hall et al (1996; 1997), however, this work has only 
focused on successful SRB bids and so the impact of partnership on failed bids remains 
unexplored. [Similar observations however have been made in relation to the City 
Challenge initiative see DoE, 1996d] Why partnership should inevitably lead to 
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co-ordination is similarly questionable. The experience of the Inner Area Partnerships 
shows that other far less constructive result are equally possible. [The experience of 
Merseyside Partnership perhaps being the best example of poor partnership working which 
is extensively documented in HC, 1982; HC, 1983; see also Higgins et al 1983; Heseltine, 
1987]. Competition may bring the best schemes forward but this has not been proved either 
way; research does not yet exist to unequivocally sustain this proposition and so this 
presumption can only be taken for what it is as simply political rhetoric.  
At a practical level Mawson et al (1995) review of the first round of SRB argued that 
genuine partnerships could not be built in such a short time scale and that many participants 
had failed to appreciate the fundamental shift in the character of policy. The failure to be 
sensitive and responsive to what was in effect a radical change in the policy environment 
meant that a number of bidders were caught out. The government had set out what they 
envisaged from partnerships in the round one Bidding Guidance issued shortly after the 
announcement of the SRB:  
The Budget is intended to encourage joint approaches to regeneration through local 
partnerships. Bids should therefore be supported by partnerships representing the 
appropriate range of interests (Round 1 Bidding Guidance, DoE, 1994b:para.27) {my 
emphasis} 
The broadening of the constituency of local partnerships was an integral element of the 
government’s approach to the SRB. It is probably no coincidence that attracting a wider 
range of partners (a long standing aspiration from as far back as the 1977 White Paper) 
perhaps continued to reflect an element of the residual disdain to the prospect of local 
authority domination of the SRB initiative. To help attract this wider constituency the 
government ensured that the Bidding Guidance issued before each round consistently 
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stressed the need to involve a range of interests.  
Following round one, bidders discovered that titular partnerships assembled simply to 
qualify for the SRB pot were quickly exposed in the competition process. This experience 
confirmed to many that ‘business as usual’ was no longer tenable and that government’s 
expectations of partnerships had changed fundamentally and were now shaped by the City 
Challenge and not the Urban Programme model of partnership. 
The government however proved receptive to the criticisms about the quality of some of the 
partnerships assembled for round one. Their response was to tighten the qualifying criteria 
for entry into the second round of SRB. They did this by inserting a clause in the bidding 
guidance that accompanied the second round of SRB. The effect of this was that all 
partnership submissions would be scrutinised by GOs to: “…look to ensure that there are 
true partnerships with real involvement of [all] groups” (Bidding 
Guidance, 1995b:para.12){my emphasis}. The subsequent report by the Environment 
Select Committee (HC, 1995a) sought to add substance to these phrases and suggested that:  
The lesson we draw from our consideration of the respective roles of each of the partner 
organisations is that a good partnership; one where partners adopt leading or secondary 
roles as appropriate but have the opportunity to contribute to all aspects of a bid. 
Conversely, a bad partnership is one where a partner or more than one partner is for any 
reason not permitted to participate in the full range of work connected with the bid, or is 
dominated by more powerful partners (HC, 1995a: para.56). 
That this model of partnership continues to have currency can be seen from the guidance 
issued by the Labour administration for round five in September 1998 which stated: 
The Government believes it is crucial to ensure the active participation of local 
communities in the regeneration of their areas and that they should be directly involved, 
both in the preparation and implementation of bids (Round 5 Bidding Guidance DETR 
(1998c) para.3.6). 
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Bids must be supported by partnerships representing all those with a key interest. The 
make-up of partnerships should reflect the content of the bid and characteristics of the area 
or groups at which it is aimed (para.5.1). 
GOs and subsequently RDAs will look to ensure that partnerships truly represent and 
involve these interests, throughout the bidding process and, if bids are successful, in their 
implementation (para.5.2). 
Historical parallels 
There would appear to be many historical parallels between the introduction of the SRB 
and the Inner Area Partnerships. The latter were hurriedly introduced following the 1977 
White Paper. Critics suggested that the speed of introduction, with an annual bidding cycle, 
with financial controls prohibiting ‘rolling forward’ underspends, injected a sense of 
urgency that dictated the type of projects brought forward and the scope of engagement 
with wider interests—precisely the criticism directed at the first round of the SRB. These 
constraints severely inhibited Partnerships’ responses: consultation and project feasibility 
takes time. So although policy anticipated innovation, Inner Area Partnerships were in 
effect placed in a position where it was easier to put forward either ‘pet projects’ or 
‘off-the-shelf’ projects previously languishing without funding (see Stewart, 1983; 
Hambleton, 1979b; 1981; Leach, 1982; Heseltine, 1987).  
A new localism 
The introduction of SRB was complicated further by the fact that in November 1993, the 
government announced a radical shake up in the organisational structure of regional 
departments of state. For the first time the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
Department of the Environment (DoE), Employment Department (DEmp), and the 
Department for Transport (DT) were assimilated into one organisational structure under a 
Senior Regional Director, reporting to the relevant Secretaries of State. In explaining why 
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the Government Offices for the Regions (GOs) had been established, John Gummer, SoS 
for the Environment, in a debate in the House of Commons on Regional and Urban Policy 
on the 4th November 1993, stated that: 
We will therefore meet the widespread demand that there should be a single point of 
contact for local authorities, businesses, and local communities. That will provide a better 
service without increasing the power or cost of central Government one iota. In fact, there 
should be some room for savings in overhead costs (Hansard, col.517). {my emphasis} 
However, the case for integrated offices was not only justified by efficacy. In the debate 
Gummer expanded this line of argument and made clear that the government thought that 
the SRB would make an important contribution in its own right in developing this new 
localism: 
The [SRB] budget will mean that priorities are set locally in the light of local needs, not in 
Whitehall. It will give local authorities, businesses and local communities real influence 
over spending priorities (Hansard, 4th November 1993, col.517). [and] 
With the new offices, the Government’s response to the needs of localities will be better 
informed….Local needs, rather than departmental interests, will be the prime 
considerations (col.518). {my emphasis} 
The press release that followed the debate succinctly articulated how the locus of power 
was to be shifted under the government’s new policy. The creation of Integrated Regional 
Offices and the new SRB, would result in: “…sweeping measures to shift power from 
Whitehall to local communities and make Government more responsive to local priorities” 
(Press Release Notice, 731/93 ~ 4th November 1993).  
It is clear that in uniting previously disparate departments of state and linking this to the 
provision of a single point of contact, the establishment of the GOs was an attempt to 
address the perennial criticism of co-ordination; allied to which was an emphasis on a new 
localism to policy. The government clearly felt that localism and partnership were the 
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cornerstone of the SRB. Michael Gahagan, Under Secretary, Cities and Countryside Policy 
Directorate at the DoE, giving evidence to the Environment Select Committee explained: 
The point of the Single Regeneration Budget, the Challenge Fund element, is that the 
priorities are local, that there is the local partnership and that the programmes are worked up 
locally, with local priorities, not determined by any of the constituent programmes. And it is 
consistent with the philosophy that it should be the bidders who themselves decide on the 
priorities within their bid—that is the thinking behind it (HC, 1995b: para.27). 
The emphasis here is clearly on the delivery of efficiency through local partnership. This is 
precisely what the government were thinking and this is evident from the way the initiative 
was promoted. The government in announcing the SRB made clear in the headline on the 
press notice which announced the SRB and the setting up of GOs: John Gummer 
Announces Measures To Bring A New Localism To Improved Government Services (press 
notice: 731/93 4th November 1993)].  
Upon establishing the system of GOs the Government set about a process of restructuring 
internal relations between what had previously been disparate departments of state. This 
process encouraged organisational innovations: “…to facilitate enhanced inter-
departmental working through thematic working groups and area teams (Mawson & 
Spencer, 1997:81). This led David Richie, Regional Director for the GOLO, to observe that 
GOs were operating: “…in a far more integrated fashion than ever before” (quoted in 
Mawson & Spencer, 1997:82). The cumulative impact of these changes transformed the 
policy environment within GOs and this message was not lost on a number of local 
authorities who attempted to innovate their own policy responses in order to exploit this 
emergent policy arena.  
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SUMMARY 
The form and character of the SRB can be seen to have evolved from yet another period of 
experimentation in urban policy the roots of which can be traced all the way back to the 
1977 White Paper.  
It can be seen that the principle result of the publication of the White Paper was to bestow a 
certain legitimacy on the concept of partnership. However, it is reasonable to argue that the 
widespread support that the White Paper achieved was based fundamentally upon a 
common acceptance of the policy analysis it contained, i.e., agreement on the problem. In a 
sense this consensus can be seen to have overshadowed any wider debate about the 
appropriateness of the delivery mechanism; the idea that partnership itself should be 
examined simply did not enter the debate.  
Following from the White Paper partnership became effectively embedded in the ‘policy 
frame’. It has been argued that urban policy evolved through three stages in the period from 
the late 1970s through to the 1990s. During the first period, commencing with the 
publication of the White Paper in 1977, the understanding of the problem shifted away 
from a social pathology explanation to an economic analysis. The key concern of 
partnership activity during this period was to address needs with a focus on targeting effort. 
The second stage began with the arrival of the first Thatcher government. During this 
period partnership was recast to reflect the political economy of Thatcherism. This period 
saw the progressive estrangement of the public sector and the ascendancy of the private 
sector. The third stage began with the City Challenge initiative. This period saw the 
rehabilitation of the public sector alongside a commitment to a more comprehensive, co-
ordinated, and local approach to regeneration policy. It is clear in retrospect that the shape 
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and character of the SRB was a product of this evolution. In what might be described as an 
iterative process elements from each of the three stages endured and cumulatively came to 
describe the principle characteristics of the SRB. Two decades later partnership is still the 
preferred mechanism to deliver regeneration policy.  
The SRB, predicated as it was on a partnership building competition not surprisingly 
created partnerships. Also significant, because it occurred in the same time frame as the 
SRB, was the creation of GOs, described as: “…a radical departure from the centralised and 
compartmentalised traditions of the civil service…” (Mawson & Spencer, 1997:81). By 
bringing previously disparate government departments together under the umbrella of a GO 
and then giving these organisations a raison d’être of co-ordination accelerated partnership 
working. This obligation to co-ordinate activity with a range of agencies meant that GOs 
were being increasingly propelled into partnership working and this experience 
fundamentally changed the institutional architecture. Over two decades urban policy had 
progressively been transformed through the three stages of development described above. 
Taken together with the changes in the institutional landscape arising from the creation of 
GOs the net effect has been to fundamentally embed both the philosophy and the practice 
of partnership working. This then was the climate under which round one SRB partnerships 
formed. 
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CHAPTER 4: EXPLAINING PARTNERSHIP 
GROWTH (I) 
MICROECONOMIC 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine a number of micro-economic explanations that might 
provide a theoretical rationale for the growth in partnership and network activity.  
This chapter will seek to argue that partnership and networks are fundamentally similar 
organisational forms. However, there are differences between the two models, albeit subtle, 
and a theoretical exploration of these differences is a theme of this chapter. However, the 
case will be argued that for many purposes the terms are interchangeable but this creates 
difficulties in the presentation of the argument in the text. With this caveat in mind and in 
order to avoid any semantic confusion the term partnership will be assumed to subsume 
networks unless otherwise indicated. 
A CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM 
Muddy waters 
The problem facing the researcher is that the wholesale adoption of partnership working 
has muddied the conceptual waters.  
Partnership means many things to many people. Indeed it is not clearly defined precisely 
because its ambiguity can be politically attractive. It is difficult to be opposed to 
partnership. Unlike other institutional initiatives...it is not possible to identify particular 
administrative regulations or statutes which underpin them. They are not characterised by 
distinct fiscal regimes, organisational structures or modes of operation. There is no single 
easily transferable model of partnership. They vary in scope, purpose, membership, the 
degree of formality or their organisational structures, the level of resources they command 
and their actual and potential impact. All attempts to build upon their strengths which vary 
widely between places, according to history, economic circumstances, size, political 
tradition and the composition and capacity of the private sector. 
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Different organisations have adopted different definitions of the phenomenon. Sometimes 
partnership has been used to describe an agreement by actors to work together towards a 
specified economic development objective analogous to a contractual relationship. Others 
have included any initiative which is funded by more than one agency. Others have 
attempted tighter definitions. The ideal type would achieve synergy by pooling resources 
and gaining co-ordinated action, avoiding duplication and achieving more than the sum of 
its parts. It is generally agreed that all partners must get something out of the arrangements 
to reinforce their commitment and keep them at the partnership table (Roberts et al, 
1995:16-7). 
What is clear from the above quote is that the generic title partnership covers a myriad of 
organisational relations where substantive differences exist between partnerships. The 
DETR commissioned Newchurch and Co. Ltd to attempt to provide a definition of 
partnership. Their conclusions published in November 1999 was that:  
Our review of published material has so far failed to find a completely satisfactory 
definition. There is no single definition which captures the totality of the local authority 
partnership phenomenon (DETR, 1999b). 
The central premise of chapter two was that partnership was a contestable concept. Under a 
different political economy it took on a radically different trajectory. In terms of conferring 
kudos on the partnership concept and its establishment as the new economic orthodoxy 
what has been the remarkable achievement of partnership is that regardless of the objective, 
social, economic or environmental, or indeed the manner of its achievement, with more or 
less accountability, the institutional form is still called partnership. Huxham (1996:2) 
conveys a sense of this linguistic abuse and the semantic difficulties that surround 
organisational relations when he suggests that: “...strategic alliance, joint venture, 
public-private partnership, co-ordinated service delivery, community development are all 
terms now in common usage...” and where each describes a form of partnership 
‘relationship’. The questions arising from this diversity is whether any or all of these 
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‘collaborative arrangements’ impute partnership and within this plurality can categorical 
partnership qualities be identified? A central premiss of this thesis is that it is possible and 
indeed crucially important to precisely clarify what is intended by the term partnership—
and this is especially the case for the future involvement of local communities. 
In order to try and answer this, the first step must be to develop a robust theoretical model 
of what is understood by partnership. Such a model should provide a benchmark by which a 
partnership could, in the first instance, be objectively identified, and, be of sufficient detail 
to allow comparison with other organisational forms. To have relevance the model must 
describe both the structure and the internal dynamics of partnership. A two-pronged 
approach combines a functional analysis (mapping an organisations structure) with an 
approach which explores the qualitative dimensions of partnership working.  
The partnership enigma  
Chapter two described the historical evolution of partnership in regeneration policy and 
argued that a partnership approach had become the accepted orthodoxy in regeneration 
policy. Concomitant to the proliferation of partnership has been a trend towards complexity 
resulting from the increasing diversity in the range of partners typically brought together in 
any regeneration partnership—for a discussion see Stewart & Stoker (1995). However this 
complexity presents severe methodological problems. In order to understand the growth of 
the partnership phenomenon it is essential to address two issues:  
1. What do we in fact understand by the term true regeneration partnership?  
2. Why has partnership achieved pre-eminence as the organisational form to address regeneration?  
This section will seek to address these two questions. It will also seek to argue that 
alongside the proliferation of partnership working has arisen an explosion in networks and 
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networking; the growth of which complements and is in many ways intrinsically related to 
the growth of partnerships. The inherent structural similarities between the two 
organisational forms suggests that they may in fact be connected in a symbiotic relationship 
and evidence of this will be explored. A key hypothesis of the research is that partnership 
and networks are similar structures differing only in degree. Therefore one purpose of this 
chapter is to explore the theoretical distinctions between partnership and networks in order 
to draw some conclusions as to whether these are in fact clearly differentiated 
organisational forms or fundamentally similar, diverging only at the margins. 
The complexity of partnership relations evident in regeneration partnerships introduces 
additional methodological problems. Regeneration partnerships by definition bring together 
a range of actors and individuals. Each of these partners contributes different things to the 
partnership. For example, community and voluntary sectors although unlikely to possess 
physical assets often have a wealth of expertise in their particular field; the private sector 
also contribute expertise but it is likely to be of a different type and in addition they are far 
more likely to possess tangible assets. The task then is to develop a robust model which 
should promote the development of analytical tools [a check-list] which allow 
organisational relations to be dissected and evaluated. However, the diversity in 
partnerships presents immediate methodological problems. It is reasonable to assert that the 
different sectors drawn into partnerships have different aspirations and priorities and not 
surprisingly would make contrary judgements on regeneration partnerships. This 
observation in no way diminishes the obvious fact that even with widely different 
aspirations diverse partners do work together in regeneration partnerships presumably 
because there is some advantage [or less disadvantage] in doing so. This thesis is concerned 
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primarily with the contribution of the community and voluntary sectors in regeneration 
partnerships and whilst the theoretical approach to understanding the dynamics of 
partnership remains consistent regardless of which sector is considered the choice of sector 
will have an important bearing on the qualitative assessment of partnership working. 
The reason why the choice of sector will influence the qualitative assessment within 
partnership is best understood using Arnstein’s (1969) eight rung ‘Ladder of Citizen 
Participation’ which provides a useful methodological framework for looking at this 
problem.  
Figure 4.1: Arnstein’s ladder of citizens participation 
Degrees of citizen power
Citizen control
Delegated power
Partnership
Placation
Consultation
Informing
Therapy
Manipulation
Degrees of tokenism
Nonparticipation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
(source: Arnstein, S.R ‘A ladder of citizen participation’ in
Journal of American Institute of Planners   (1969) Vol.35 p217)  
The ladder has proved an extremely influential conceptual tool widely used in planning and 
community development spheres. This is because it provides a method of assessing the 
quality of engagement of [typically] community organisations in the process of community 
development and planning but it has relevance beyond these groups and could readily be 
applied to any sector. The purpose of the ladder is to provide: “A typology of eight levels of 
participation...[to gauge]...the extent of citizens’ power in determining the plan and/or 
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programme” (Arnstein, 1969:216-7){my emphasis}. However, an inherent flaw with the 
ladder concept is that the ability to rank the various partners sphere of influence requires all 
participants to have a normative consensus which includes a clearly understood and shared 
hierarchy of objectives. 
This point is understood better by example. Consider a partner brought into a partnership—
one composed of a large number of partners—simply to fulfil a narrow objective. An 
example in a regeneration programme might be to refurbish a community centre. An 
individual partner may indeed have complete managerial discretion in the implementation 
of this objective, and, be entirely happy with what at first appears to be complete autonomy 
in this role. In terms of this particular project they have ‘delegated’ power—level 7 on 
Arnstein’s ladder (see above)—and this may lead them to erroneously conclude that they 
rate highly on Arnstein’s ladder. However what the example shows is how relative the 
concept of autonomy is. The example raises the much more fundamental issue about who 
determined the agenda. How was the decision to refurbish the community centre arrived at? 
Did the partner play any part in setting that wider agenda? Arnstein supports the contention 
that: “...participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for 
the powerless” (Arnstein, 1969:216). What Arnstein’s ladder does is draw attention to the 
relationship between power and the need for prior agreement as to what constitutes the key 
issues. Without agreement any sector represented in a partnership could appear to rate 
highly [on Arnstein’s ladder] in terms of their own narrow sectoral objectives. The test of a 
partnership should be how an individual sector’s objectives have been assimilated into the 
wider partnership’s strategies. Clearly sectoral objectives will vary. The private sector, for 
example, is unlikely to be motivated by the same rationale as [say] the community sector; 
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and it is this plurality of interests that needs to be considered. An individual partner can 
only really comment on the quality of their engagement after having first examined how 
their sectoral interests have been assimilated and [presumably] transmuted in the process of 
incorporation into the wider partnership strategies and structures. 
WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD BY THE TERM PARTNERSHIP? 
The co-ordination of collaboration: partnership as one form of co-ordination 
Part of the mystique and confusion surrounding partnership relates to the lack of conceptual 
foundations. At an abstract theoretical level a partnership, by definition, describes a 
situation which brings at least two [typically more] actors together. Partnership is, at its 
simplest, what Hanf & Scharpf call a form of ‘co-operation’, a term: “...generally used to 
describe joint action by two or more parties for mutual benefit” (1978:22); what Hudson 
(1987) in a similar vein describes as a ‘collaborative activity’. Thus whenever we speak of 
partnership we are in fact simply describing a particular form of co-ordination. For the label 
partnership to have some objective reality—one which can have some methodological 
relevance—the concept must describe the specific set of institutional and organisational 
relations used to co-ordinate the behaviour of a group of actors involved in some form of 
joint endeavour.  
The conceptual approach adopted in this chapter—seeing partnership as a particular form of 
co-ordination or governance structure—locates the evolution and development of 
partnership within the theoretical landscape discussed in the literature on organisational 
theory and inter-organisational analysis. Adopting this approach makes it possible to 
compare and contrast the characteristics of partnership in relation to other forms of 
co-ordination and identify and ascribe the unique qualities which both define and 
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distinguish partnership from other forms of co-ordination.  
Markets or hierarchies 
An examination of this literature suggests that the principle cleavage identified in 
inter-organisational analysis is between market or hierarchical forms of co-ordination—see 
Williamson, 1975; Thorelli, 1986; Powell, 1990; Thompson et al, 1991. If you were to take 
all possible forms of inter-organisational co-ordination and set them out on a continuum, 
then markets or hierarchies would be located at opposite ends. Located somewhere between 
these two polar extremes lie partnership and networks. The implication of this literature for 
partnership and networks is the suggestion that partnerships and networks are organised 
neither like markets or hierarchies although they may exhibit qualities evident in both.  
In order then to understood what we mean by the term partnership we need to understand 
the logic of partnership. Why do they form? What are the particular institutional and 
organisational arrangements which both define it and [presumably] distinguish partnership 
from other forms of co-ordination? As chapter two described, partnership has been 
intricately embroiled in the delivery of regeneration policy since the 1977 White Paper. The 
increasing importance of partnership is itself a reflection of the realities of stringent public 
sector expenditure constraints. A tight fiscal climate has encouraged local authorities in 
particular to explore innovative approaches to capturing additional resources for their 
localities. An indication of the changing role facing local authorities lies in the observation 
by Metcalfe that: “...the distinctive task of management in any public organization is 
getting things done through other organizations, rather than through other people” (quoted 
in Huxham, 1993:21). This shift of emphasis by management away from inter-personal 
co-ordination to inter-organisational co-ordination is itself a reflection of the ascendancy of 
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the partnership orthodoxy. The move has not however entirely removed the personal 
dimension. Pulling in the opposite direction have been recent innovations in regeneration 
policy. For example, City Challenge and the SRB place an obligation on partnerships to 
broaden the range of actors involved in regeneration activity. The longstanding traditional 
established mainstream statutory actors have thus been supplemented by – amongst others – 
representatives of the private, voluntary and community sectors. All other things being 
equal, increasing the number of partners involved in any regeneration partnership only 
complicates the co-ordination of collaboration. 
Forms of co-ordination 
It is crucial to see the discussion of partnership in the wider debate on forms of 
co-ordination: where partnership is an expression, and only one particular expression of 
co-ordination. The complete set would represent a typology of co-ordination in all its 
various manifestations. The problem facing the researcher interested in advancing a theory 
on partnership as a particular form of co-ordination is the lack of any rigorous theoretical 
body of knowledge which might inform the debate. Part of the problem stems from the 
wholesale abuse of the term partnership [captured in the quote above]. It is the combination 
of a dearth of theoretical knowledge and semantic abuse which prevents a rigorous 
theoretical analysis. In contrast however there is a substantial body of work developed over 
many years which focuses on the two extreme forms of co-ordination—markets and 
hierarchies—conceptualised in Williamson’s theory of the firm (1990). This literature deals 
specifically with these two forms of co-ordination and invariably caricatures the two forms 
as mutually exclusive. The intention, in the first instance, is to conceptually link this work 
on markets and hierarchies to partnership. By examining the theoretical antecedents 
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developed in this literature it should be possible to provide a theoretical insight into 
co-ordination generally and by analogy to inform a theory of partnership. Given the dearth 
of theoretical knowledge on partnership this represents a pragmatic and useful reference 
point from which to start a wider examination of other forms of co-ordination. 
Economists have devoted enormous amounts of time and energy examining the relative 
merits of co-ordination either through markets or hierarchies. The primary aim of this work 
has been to develop theoretical insights into the process by which a particular form of 
co-ordination is chosen, what Williamson (1990:2) describes as the ‘make or buy’ decision 
or less prosaically ‘organisational logic’. The historical emphasis, in what has been 
caricatured as a dichotomy between markets and hierarchies, is explained by the 
predominant paradigm in Economics and the influence of the prevailing structure of 
industry in late twentieth century capitalism. This sees the political economy of the non-
communist world predicated upon liberal free-market economics with an industrial 
landscape populated with large [and growing] firms or organisations invariably linked to a 
more international orientation. The principle concern developed in the literature on the 
theory of the firm is an examination of how firms co-ordinate production; in particular it 
seeks to understand both the strategies and the methods firms employ as they strive to 
achieve an optimal level of output.  
A major contribution to this debate was a seminal paper by Coase published in 1937 and 
which, at the time, represented a radical departure to the conventional approach to the 
theory of the firm. Although largely neglected at the time it subsequently proved extremely 
influential. Coase had observed that contemporary economic theory focused on the 
individual firm, in which the co-ordination of production was understood to be entirely 
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subordinated to the price mechanism (Coase, 1937). In his 1991 Nobel lecture he took the 
opportunity to reflect upon the impact on what had been the prevailing economic paradigm. 
In the lecture he argued that this approach, focusing narrowly on: “...the determination of 
prices led to...a neglect of other aspects of the economic system” (Coase, 1995:644). Whilst 
an approach which focused on the price mechanism could be seen to determine output at 
the level of the firm, it offered little in explanation for the organisation of an industry [or 
by extension an entire economy]. “What was lacking in the literature, or so I thought, was a 
theory which would enable us to analyze the determinants of the organization of industry” 
(Coase, 1972:62). At the time of Coase’s original article contemporary economic thinking 
on the firm offered no explanation for the distribution of firms: why was it that some firms 
were large and others quite small? Contemporary economic theory therefore told us nothing 
about how a particular co-ordination strategy is determined. Coase suggested that firms 
represented “islands of conscious power in [an] ocean of unconscious co-operation” 
(Coase, 1937:388 quoting Robertson 1932),. contending that firms were an alternative to 
the market as a method of co-ordinating production. His perceptive insight was that there 
were considerable indirect costs associated with production and these would stimulate firms 
to organise outside of the market, in firms, where the costs of co-ordinating production 
could be managed internally.  
Outside the firm, price determines the allocation of resources, and their use is co-ordinated 
through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within the firm, these market 
transactions are eliminated, and the allocation of resources becomes the result of an 
administrative decision (Coase, 1972 reproduced as Chp.1 in Williamson, O.E & Masten, 
S.E (Eds) (1995:63) 
These ideas lay fallow and ignored until the 1970s when Williamson, openly 
acknowledging the intellectual debt of gratitude for the ideas stimulated by Coase’s initial 
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deliberations, effectively triggered the start of what was to become the school of 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). Williamson argued that: Given bounded rationality, 
uncertainty, and idiosyncratic knowledge...prices often do not qualify as sufficient statistics 
and that a substitution of internal organization (hierarchy) for market-mediated exchange 
often occurs on this account (Williamson, 1974:5).  
For Williamson then TCE provided a powerful insight in the internal dynamics of firms and 
a theoretical basis for understanding the organisation of industries. His important 
contribution was to directly relate the cost of transactions to the form of co-ordination a 
firm adopted. Williamson argued that: “Markets and firms are alternative instruments for 
completing a related set of transactions...[and]...whether a set of transactions ought to be 
executed across markets or within a firm depends on the relative efficiency of each 
mode...” (Williamson, 1975:8). Where the transaction costs are higher in the market, then a 
firm: “...may decide to bypass the market and resort to hierarchical modes of organization. 
Transactions that might otherwise be handled in the market are thus performed internally, 
governed by administrative processes instead” (Williamson, 1974:9)[my emphasis]. For 
Williamson then the primary cleavage in understanding co-ordination is a dichotomy 
between organisation by markets or by hierarchically organised firms.  
Opportunistic behaviour 
An important additional insight that Williamson brought to this discussion which is 
pertinent to this thesis was the concept of ‘opportunistic behaviour’.  
Opportunism extends the conventional assumption that economic agents are guided by 
considerations of self-interest to make allowance for strategic behaviour. This involves self-
interest seeking with guile and has profound implications for choosing between alternative 
contractual relationships (1975:26){original emphasis}.  
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Williamson observed that in situations where ‘large-number conditions’ exist [i.e., where 
there are many competing potential partners] then the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour 
is drastically reduced. However, where ‘small-number conditions’ prevail the likelihood of 
opportunistic behaviour increases. Understandably, as an Economist Williamson discusses 
the costs and benefits of opportunistic behaviour in economic terms. Accordingly, the 
concern is that under small number conditions a monopoly or oligopoly situation arises. 
Economic theory, supported by a wealth of thoroughly researched case studies, suggests 
that market manipulation occurs under these conditions significantly distorting the decision 
frame. Developing this theme, Williamson describes a scenario where a large number 
condition might realistically apply at the commencement of a contract, but at the point of 
renewal, a partner may enjoy ‘non-trivial cost advantages’ over other potential partners. 
Examples of these non-trivial cost advantages which might accrue through a period of joint 
working could be the establishment of a [good or bad] reputation for competency, 
diligence, efficiency etc. These historically determined factors can potentially become 
important considerations at the point of contract renewal. Given that transactions are 
conducted under uncertainty when it is very costly, perhaps even impossible, to describe 
the complete decision tree (Lacity et al, 1993) then reliance on previous relations and 
experience is much more likely to reduce the situation to a position where a small numbers 
condition applies. The significance of opportunistic behaviour is that under small number 
conditions partners in any partnership are much more likely to act opportunistically in 
their own self interest as distinct from the interest of the wider partnership. 
The wider relevance to partnership of the TCE literature lies in the observation that a firm 
can be seen to represent a particular form of co-ordination. And so by analogy, the 
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theoretical insights developed in the Transaction Cost’s literature can be used to illuminate 
the internal dynamics of other forms of co-ordination. 
ORGANISATIONAL LOGICS 
EXCHANGE AS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Partnership: one form of exchange 
It has already been argued that partnership represents a particular expression of 
inter-organisational collaboration. A defining feature of any partnership, and one which 
distinguishes it from other organisational forms, is that in entering into a partnership the 
participants are engaging in an exchange relationship. Levine & White (1960/1:583) 
suggest that under conditions of scarcity, inter-organisational exchanges are essential to 
goal attainment. Gray (1985:912) drawing on a variety of authors lists three other possible 
conditions which encourage collaboration. 
1. ‘Indivisible’ problems, i.e., problems which are bigger than any single organisation acting alone can 
solve. 
2. Limitations of traditional adversarial methods of resolving conflicts, and 
3. Increasing environmental turbulence [which occurs when] large, competing organisations, acting 
independently in diverse directions, create unanticipated and dissonant consequences for themselves and 
others. 
Hudson (1987:178) observes that:  
An exchange relation is balanced when the actors have equal power (or equal levels of 
dependency), but equality is not a precondition for exchange. What is necessary, is that 
neither party is powerless in relation to others, otherwise exchange will amount to little 
more than the formalisation of the clear dominance of one party over another. 
At its simplest then a partnership brings two actors together in an exchange relationship and 
this situation is illustrated in the model below. Figure 4.2 is a Model of an Ideal 
Partnership and presents a crude graphical depiction of partnership relations with two 
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actors {A} and {B}and the model explores the concept of partnership in relational terms. 
Figure 4.2: Model of an ideal partnership 
 
A
B
equality
C
 
 
 
The line which transects the arc, infers that only at one point {C} does a point of equality 
exist where each actor is held to be equal. The concept of equality is crucial in 
understanding the dynamics of partnership. Underpinning the crude depiction of 
partnership relations in the model above is the idea that a partnership has distributional 
effects. The significance of point {C} is that it represents a theoretical point of equality 
where relations are symmetrical. The model can only be seen to have any theoretical 
relevance if agreement exists between the parties on what is distributed. Levine & White 
(1960/1:597) approaching the question from a resource dependency model suggest there 
can be no exchange of elements without some agreement of understanding however 
implicit [and] exchange agreements rest upon prior consensus regarding domain. And 
Gray (1985:917) in a similar vein: “Unless some consensus is reached about who has a 
legitimate stake in an issue and exactly what that joint issue is, further attempts at 
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collaboration will be thwarted. Examples of domain could include: money, mandated 
authority, physical assets, human assets, tacit knowledge, goodwill etc. However, whilst 
comparing money is straightforward comparing money with [say] tacit knowledge is far 
more problematic because there is no objective criteria to compare the value of tacit 
knowledge with money. 
It follows from this that if partnership is something more than the clear dominance of one 
party over another then there must first be agreement or at least tacit acceptance amongst 
the partners on the nature of their exchange relationship. Only where agreement exists on a 
notional index does it follow that we can make an exploration of partnership dynamics. In 
our abstract model we can see that by shifting the intersect line {C} either towards {A} or 
{B} alters the dynamics within the relationship: the balance between actors becomes 
asymmetrical. The model as an ideal type makes simplistic assumptions but implicit in the 
model is that movement in any direction away from equilibrium, by definition, rewards one 
actor at the expense of the other.  
The models of asymmetry in figure 4.3 below extends the discussion further and describes, 
in the first case, a familiar situation in regeneration partnerships, where two actors in a 
partnership are not endowed equally and where the actor with a resource advantage 
[resources taken here in their widest sense] exploits this situation (circles of different 
diameters). The reality in regeneration partnerships is often a model of complex 
asymmetry. A typical partnership brings together combinations of resources. As the 
complex asymmetry suggests this may entail bringing a group of actors together who are 
similarly endowed (circles of equal size), or more likely, actors may possess similar 
resources but which are unequally distributed (circles of different diameters). A final 
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possibility is where the resources themselves are dissimilar (circles of different diameters). 
Hanf & Scharpf (1978:354) are clear that in any exchange relation: “The benefits 
exchanged may be quite different in kind, and they may also consist of the avoidance of an 
evil which would otherwise be inflicted.” 
Partnerships formed to address regeneration issues are rarely constituted with two partners. 
More often than not a multiplicity of groups are drawn together. Complex asymmetry is 
therefore more likely to be the norm than the exception. Complicating this analysis there is 
clearly no reason to presume that relations between partners remains immutable: the 
internal dynamics which underpin relations may indeed fluctuate over time. Given the 
diversity of interests what is perhaps most remarkable is the ability of partnership to sustain 
complex asymmetrical relations over time. 
Figure 4.3: Asymmetry in partnerships 
 
 
COMPLEX ASYMMETRY ASYMMETRY 
Hanf & Scharpf (1978:356) develop a typology of exchange relations which can potentially 
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exist in a two party relationship consisting simply of two actors A & B. Table 4.1 below 
summarises the characteristics of A’s dependence on B and of B’s dependence on A. 
Table 4.1: Typology of relations 
A’s dependence on B  
 High…………………………………………..Low 
(1) mutual 
dependence 
(2) unilateral 
dependence 
 
B’s  
dependence 
on A 
 
High 
 
 
Low 
(3) unilateral 
dependence 
(4) mutual  
independence 
 
Hanf & Scharpf (1978:355) suggest:  
These comprehensive characteristics of an exchange relationship constitute the structural 
determinants of the feasibility of influence strategies attempted by A or B in specific policy 
interactions.  
They go on to explain the range of possible positions which could potentially be adopted by 
partners within any exchange relation. 
(1) A relationship of mutual independence is less likely to facilitate policy 
co-ordination. If the exchange relationship is either not very important to either party, or if 
alternative sources of supply could be easily found, none of the parties is likely to be very 
responsive to influence strategies intended to facilitate intrinsically disadvantageous 
interactions. In spite of the existence of an ongoing exchange relationship, the relative 
autonomy of both parties is maintained and specific interactions are likely to occur only if 
they are either mutually beneficial or if the request for a significantly disadvantageous 
response is accompanied by offers of adequate compensation. 
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 (2)+(3) In the case of unilateral dependence, the interest of the more dependent party in 
the maintenance of ongoing exchange relationship must be greater than the interest of the 
less dependent (dominant) party. This asymmetry of interests may be exploited in influence 
strategies directed by the dominant against the weaker party. Specific policy interactions 
which may be intrinsically unattractive to the weaker party may still be accepted if a refusal 
might jeopardise the underlying exchange relationship. Unilateral-dependence relationships 
can thus be powerful (but unidirectional) facilitators of policy co-ordination.  
 (4) In the case of mutual dependence, the resources received are important for both 
parties, and neither party has easily available alternative sources of supply. Under such 
conditions, both parties should have a high interest in maintaining the ongoing relationship, 
and both should be willing to accept considerable disadvantages in order to avoid 
disruptions. Mutual dependency relations thus seem to present excellent preconditions for 
the application of influence strategies in interorganizational policy co-ordination.  
(Hanf & Scharpf, 1978:356-7) 
The abstract models raise a number of fundamental lines of enquiry for our understanding 
of partnership dynamics, specifically:  
• What conditions need to prevail before co-ordination becomes a viable strategy; 
• Why do actors enter in exchange relations; 
• What is the organisational logic which promotes co-ordination through partnerships. 
What conditions need to prevail before co-ordination becomes a viable strategy? 
Before any group of actors can collaborate they must have defined a common interest. The 
schema in figure 4.4 below seeks to describe the institutional landscape which potential 
partnerships may inhabit and indicates the dynamics which propel individual actors into 
collaborative arrangements. The model is in effect a crude taxonomy of organisational 
forms and so includes both partnerships and networks. What the model in figure 4.4 seeks 
to describe is a theoretical position where the conditions arise—somewhere between market 
and hierarchy—which are conducive to their formation. 
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Figure 4.4: The institutional landscape of partnerships & networks 
Directed action 
purposive 
Mutuality / Exchange 
Internal relations 
merger/unity 
Networks  Partnership  
no direct relation 
(e.g. competition) 
MARKET HIERARCHY 
 
On the left of the continuum organisations share limited operational or strategic interests 
and effectively compete with each other. If this continuum were to be extended to the 
extreme left we would uncover organisations who for reasons either of geographical 
remoteness from competitors, or by virtue of operating in such specialised markets, they 
effectively compete with no one. As we move right, along the continuum, there is greater 
likelihood of a coincidence of organisational objectives and under these conditions a 
situation potentially arises which could sustain the development of partnerships and/or 
networks. Axiomatically:  
When organisations have similar domains, they are likely to be aware of one another and to 
have the resources needed to help each other achieve their respective goals, but similar 
domains also increase the potential for territorial disputes and competition (Hudson, 
1987:178).  
The schema suggests that as you continue to move to the extreme right you would find a 
landscape dominated by merged organisations. The logic for this lies in economic theory 
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which suggests that the greater the coincidence of organisational objectives the more likely 
that organisations would merge. The presumption in a dynamic free-market is that where 
similar goods or services are traded and cartels are effectively prohibited then competition 
would ensure only one organisation could survive.  
The continuum can thus be seen to describe the nature of relations between organisations. 
The institutional landscape on the left is occupied by organisations who, by the nature and 
character of their activities, are engaged in competitive relations with each other. In 
contrast, again because of the nature and character of their activities, the right is occupied 
by merged organisations who structure their operations hierarchically. The model in figure 
4.4 postulates that between the two extremes of market and hierarchy lies a environment 
where partnership and/or network formation is practicable.  
Using Williamson’s TCE as a framework for analysis we can speculate why partnerships 
and networks arise. Transaction Cost Economics characterises the economic landscape as a 
dichotomy. Firms achieve co-ordination either externally through markets or internally 
through hierarchy. Logically then, the existence of partnership and networks suggests that 
these organisational forms are arranged neither like market or hierarchy. Economic theory 
suggests that, in the environment they inhabit – ceteris paribus – they must be a more 
optimal form of co-ordination than either markets or hierarchy. For firms to adopt these 
methods of co-ordination then presumably they must possess attributes superior to either 
market of hierarchy. Figure 4.5 below is an attempt to understand the organisational logic 
that encourages the adoption of novel forms of co-ordination lying between market and 
hierarchy. 
In figure 4.5, at the hypothetical point {A}, between the two extreme positions, lies a point 
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where organisations share a ‘domain of interest’ and where collaboration could be justified. 
Following Huxham (1996:1) the interpretation given to collaboration is one used in 
common parlance and taken to mean a situation where individuals or organisations work 
together towards some common aim. At point {A} organisations need to evaluate the 
possible advantages or disadvantages of entering into partnership; a process which sees 
organisations evaluating: “...the pitfalls of individualism - against those which arise out of 
collaboration” (Huxham, 1993:22). At this point TCE tells us that if the benefits of 
co-ordination through partnership exceed the benefits of individualism in the market then 
partnership becomes a potentially viable strategy.  
Figure 4.5: Organisational logics schema 
INDEPENDENCE SYNERGY MERGER
Domain 
Overlap of interest 
With all the caveats implied by the construction of an ideal type model the models seek to 
explore the dynamics—the organisational logics—which fuel the growth of partnerships 
and networks. The conceptual models seek to describe in abstract terms the theoretical 
landscape in which partnership and networks are located and where they are positioned 
A
A 
no commonality 
of interest 
complete 
commonality 
mutual 
interest 
ever increasing overlap 
MARKET HIERARCHY 
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along the continuum defines the nature of their relationship to each other. The circles 
depicted in the schema represent the multiplicity of organisations inhabiting civil society 
where these could be individuals, organisations or any other coherent group active in civil 
society. 
Why do actors enter into exchange relations? 
There are two fundamental reasons why actors enter into exchange relations. The first is the 
complexity of the environment within which organisations operate. Hanf & O’Toole, 
(1992:166-7) maintain that:  
Many important policy questions are increasingly dealt with in arenas in which no 
individual or organisational actor possesses the wherewithal to co-ordinate by using 
authoritative pronouncements.  
The inter-organisational nature of the policy world is an endemic feature of the modern 
era… [and]  
The dominant feature of the public sector is the relationship between many organised actors 
with separate interests, goals and strategies. 
Painter et al (1997:230) concurs: The structural upheaval entailed by [the] expansion of the 
local unelected state and associated fragmentation of local public service delivery has had 
obvious implications for organisational relationships.” The process of de-industrialisation, 
the restructuring of industry, privatisation, the fragmentation of the local state, can, each in 
their own way, be seen as catalysts, encouraging both organisational and institutional 
diversity. It is this proliferation which has dramatically altered the economic landscape 
making the environment that organisations inhabit cumulatively more complex. Exchange 
is thus a fact of life. A complementary factor which has already been suggested is that 
exchange is more likely to occur under conditions of scarcity. So: 
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Under realistic conditions of element scarcity, organisations must select, on the basis of 
expediency or efficiency, particular functions that permit them to achieve their ends as fully 
as possible. By function is meant a set of interrelated services or activities that are 
instrumental, or believed to be instrumental, for the realisation of an organisation’s 
objectives. 
Although, because of scarcity, an organisation limits itself to particular functions, it can 
seldom carry them out without establishing relationships with other organisations… Levine 
& White (1960/1:586) 
Levine & White (1960/1) thus conceptualise exchange relations [and by analogy their 
organisational logic] as a product of the interplay of actors seeking [their] goal attainment 
and, through this process: “…co-ordination occurs as organisations try to adapt to their 
environment or to maximise their own goal attainment (Hall et al, 1977:457). Benson 
(1975) agrees with the central premiss of scarcity but describes a slightly different 
organisational logic in his analysis when he suggests that organisations are linked by a 
common concern with resource acquisition:  
The interorganizational network may be conceived as a political economy concerned with 
the distribution of two scarce resources, money and authority. Organizations, as participants 
in the political economy, pursue an adequate supply of resources. Interactions and 
sentiments of organisations are dependent upon their respective market positions and power 
to affect the flow or resources (Benson, 1975:229). 
In Benson’s terms then actors enter into exchange relations specifically to capture 
resources. The efficacy with which partners achieve their aims is related to the structure 
and distribution of power within any given political economy and where success is a 
measure of the ability to exert power over others. Contrasting the Levine exchange model 
with Benson’s resource acquisition model Aldrich (1976) suggests that the former model 
presupposes consensus amongst participants, whereas in contrast, the latter model 
assumes: “…sentiments such as "consensus" are a result of the pattern of interaction that 
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emerges, rather than playing a role in conditioning the outcome” (1976:422-3)[original 
emphasis]. In each case however exchange is entered into voluntarily. Yet this is not the 
only basis upon which exchange can occur. Hall et al (1977) discuss ‘other bases of 
interaction’ [organisational logics] offering a typology of exchange that includes: 
voluntary, standardised-voluntary or mandated, where each describes differing degrees of 
asymmetry in the exchange relation. Aldrich (1976:422) makes clear that in some 
situations: “The manipulation of formal authority is a major strategy that organisations can 
use to increase their dominance in an inter-organisational field or to reduce their 
dependence on other organisations.” The research done by Hall et al (1977:466) 
corroborates this finding and supports what many would intuitively suspect, namely that: 
“A voluntary basis for interaction was much less strongly related to co-ordination than 
interactions mandated by law.” If we accept that exchange takes place in situations of 
complexity and scarcity then these models predict that the organisational form adopted is 
contingent on the nature of the exchange relationship and this in turn is governed by the 
organisational logic of the actors involved. In any exchange a participants organisational 
logic is shaped by both the character and distribution of resources. Hanf & Scharpf 
(1978:23-4) propose the following four tier typology in table 4.2 below. 
Implicit in this categorisation in table 4.2 is that relations between partners and their 
subsequent strategic behaviour in any partnership is contingent on both the distribution and 
character of resources each participant is endowed with.  
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Table 4.2 Hanf & Scharpf’s typology of exchange relations  
 
Co-operation 
A term generally used to describe joint action by two or more parties 
for mutual benefit. It describes a relationship between two or more 
directly involved parties and implies no reference to third parties 
who may be benefited or harmed by the co-operation. 
Collusion. Similar to co-operation, providing net benefits to the co-operating 
parties but simultaneously imposes costs on third parties. 
Competition. Describes a relationship which has reference to a minimum of three 
parties, where two parties compete to co-operate with the third. 
Coercion. Refers directly to a minimum of two parties but it implicitly implies 
that the coerced party has no option but to meet the preferences of 
the coercing party or bear some sanction imposed by that party. 
 
(source: Hanf & Scharpf, 1978) 
 
WHAT IS THE ORGANISATIONAL LOGIC PROMOTING CO-ORDINATION 
THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS? 
Why co-ordinate? 
How do we explain what it is that drives organisations to co-ordinate their activities within 
partnerships? In an area which lacks any substantial body of theoretical work Mackintosh 
(1993) provides a rare opportunity to shed some analytical light on the dynamics 
underpinning partnership formation. Mackintosh adopts a theoretical examination of the 
mechanisms propelling the formation of partnership identifying three conceptual models to 
help explain why partnership form. Logically the first precondition for any partnership is an 
acceptance by all partners of a ‘domain of interest’—point {A} in the Organisational logics 
schema depicted in figure 4.5. The distinctive feature of Mackintosh’s three models is that 
they each describe a different organisational logic and yet embrace the same organisational 
form: partnership. The first organisational logic identified by Mackintosh is synergy. 
Mackintosh’s partnership logic: (1) Synergy 
Synergy is a fundamental concept that is crucial in understanding the dynamics of 
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partnership formation. Economic theory suggests that one of the fundamental reasons why 
a partnerships is formed is specifically to exploit synergy. In the context of the SRB 
Challenge Fund the government define synergy as: “The process by which programmes 
interact with each other and give added value, achieving something more than the 
individual programmes would.” [my emphasis](Government definition, reproduced from 
the Bidding Guidance as used in all four SRB Challenge Fund rounds). Mackintosh sees 
synergy in similar terms—see figure 4.6. In the first model an archetypal partnership 
 
Figure 4.6: Partnership logic (1): Synergy 
 
(source: Mackintosh, 1993) 
 
Public interest 
institution 
serving social  
objectives 
 
Private company 
pursuing 
private profit 
 
Joint venture producing 
synergy from complementary 
assets, skills and powers 
 
is described. Here a public sector institution pursuing social objectives collaborates with a 
private company pursuing private profit. For Mackintosh then, partnership can produce 
synergy by bringing disparate actors together in order to exploit distinctive yet 
complementary assets. The unique attributes ascribed to synergy are that it produces 
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outcomes which neither sector could have produced in isolation and—equally as 
significant—it delivers both a social and a private dividend. Gaster affirms this 
interpretation asserting that: “...synergy is a measure of the result of collective, or joint, 
action, compared with what would have been achieved by each party acting separately” 
(1997:18). Gaster then goes on to qualify what is in effect a static view of synergy by 
suggesting that synergy: “...is a form of additionality in relation to process rather than 
outputs or outcomes, although it is of course a means to both these ends” (1997:18). 
Gaster then proceeds to outline some of the formidable methodological problems associated 
with an analysis of synergy which may in fact discourage assessment. A questionable 
assumption associated with synergy is the presumption that all participants benefit. 
Interestingly, in partnerships where the benefits accruing from synergy can unambiguously 
be shown to outweigh the costs [of co-ordination], the concept of synergy has nothing to 
say about distributional effects and whether benefits are distributed 
equitably/proportionally amongst partners. To complicate the matter further Gaster notes 
that synergy may have a temporal dimension which suggests it may only be evident at 
certain times during the lifecycle of a partnership.  
Given these very real methodological difficulties a more realistic scenario is where there 
has been no rigorous objective appraisal for the evidence of synergy. Indeed it has been 
stated to the author in a number of interviews with SRB partners that the difficulty of 
effectively quantifying synergy has encouraged them not to attempt to bother, relying rather 
on a ‘gut feeling’ that synergy is occurring. Given that synergy is one of the central pillars 
underpinning partnership it would seem that without evaluation it is more a matter of faith 
or conviction. Similar misgivings are raised by Grucca et al (1997) in a short but cogent 
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article exposing some of the myths surrounding synergy. They argue that synergy arises out 
of the sharing of resources but add that sharing is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for synergy. What is more important is the nature of the shared resource because only 
certain key critical resources have the potential to yield synergy. The point they stress is 
that: “When a shared resource does not lead to synergy, it is simple at that point to identify 
it as being not critical to output creation. The important issue is how to identify critical 
resources before basing decisions on their shared usage (Grucca et al 1997:609)[original 
emphasis]. The logic this entails for partnership is that there should be a clear 
understanding about what it is that is brought together in a partnership which has the 
potential to yield synergy. The concept of synergy thus suggests that bringing together 
diverse interests—as occurs in the case of regeneration partnerships—provides an 
opportunity to pool the disparate resources distributed amongst participants and in the 
process yield benefits which are more than the sum of the whole. Crucially though, simply 
bringing together diverse interests does not automatically mean they yield synergy. If we 
can not prove synergy occurs. Or whether it exists at all. How else can we explain the logic 
of partnership?  
Mackintosh’s partnership logic: (2) Budget enlargement 
Mackintosh’s second model proposes that partnership is motivated by a desire by both 
public and private sectors to increase budgets; where the ability to tap into a resource 
stream is contingent on joint working between public and private sectors. For the public 
sector joint-working reflects the general resource constraints endemic in the public sector 
during the 1980s and 1990s and which has resulted in the promotion of opportunistic 
behaviour. For the private sector, the possibility of tapping into public resources represents 
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an opportunity to subsidise risk.  
Figure 4.7: Partnership logic (2): Budget enlargement 
 
 
Private sector company 
seeking public 
subsidy or risk 
reduction 
 
Public sector institution 
suffering from financial 
constraint 
 
Joint venture aimed at 
attaining funds 
from third parties 
(source: Mackintosh, 1993) 
 
In this model, in what is essentially a selfish position, each sector adopts a pragmatic 
approach to joint working which sees results simply in terms of the ability to increase 
budgets. Although notionally working together. The reality is that the private and public 
sectors work in what could be described as, in parallel, where the parent organisations 
remain functionally independent of each other. The organisational logic is fundamentally 
cynical and sees partnerships assembled merely to gain resources or to qualify for resources 
that individually they would not be eligible for. Mackintosh provides an example of this 
logic: 
...local authorities are in partnership schemes to raise money. If they could raise more funds 
themselves, they would not be undertaking joint ventures. These schemes are second best 
ways of achieving our aims (Local authority Chief Housing Officer) (quoted in Mackintosh, 
1993:217) 
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Mackintosh’s partnership logic: (3) Transformation 
Mackintosh’s third model describes a situation where the partnership has a transformation 
logic. This model envisages public and private sectors working together, not in parallel as 
in the budget enlargement model, but in a way which fundamentally changes the 
relationship between the public and private sectors. Through their involvement in 
partnership working each sector learns to appreciate the objectives, culture and methods of 
working of their partners. This leads to a situation where partnership: “...becomes a mutual 
struggle for transformation” (Mackintosh, 1993:216) where each of the sectors is: “...trying 
to move the objectives and culture of the other more towards their own ideas” (1993:216).  
However, during the Conservative period in office the evidence suggests [and chapter two 
made the case] that it was not a mutual transformation based upon reciprocal relations 
rather, where it did occur, it typically benefited the private sector at the expense of the 
public sector. 
Figure 4.8: Partnership logic (3): Transformation 
 
 
Joint venture attempting mutual  
transformation of culture 
and objectives 
 
Public or non-profit institution 
with mixed (internal & social) 
objectives, socially inefficient 
objectives 
 
Private company 
pursuing short term and narrow 
objectives, socially inefficient 
(source: Mackintosh, 1993)
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Huxham’s partnership logic: Collaborative advantage 
Huxham (1993a; 1993b; 1886) provides another approach in understanding the logic of 
partnership through the concept of ‘collaborative advantage’. This analysis draws attention 
to the particular relationship which exists between what are described as ‘centrally involved 
organisations’. These organisations have an intimate symbiotic relationship based upon the 
fact that they share a similar organisational logic: “...that is, they complement, rather than 
compete with or service, each other...”. Collaborative advantage is therefore:  
...concerned with the creation of synergy between collaborating organizations. It will be 
achieved when something unusually creative is produced—perhaps an objective is met—
that no organization could have produced on its own and when each organization, through 
the collaboration, is able to achieve its own objectives better than it could alone (Huxham, 
1993a:22). 
This perspective clearly draws inspiration from the concepts of synergy already discussed. 
However, Huxham extends the idea in two ways. First, by suggesting that an organisations 
own objectives can be enhanced as a result of its participation in some way mirrors 
Mackintosh’s transformation logic; although here the emphasis is on how one organisation 
gains by furthering its own objectives over others. Secondly, Huxham introduces the 
concept of ‘meta strategy’. This envisages a situation where through the process of 
collaborative advantage ‘broader societal objectives’ are achieved. The implication is that 
positive externalities, although not strictly prescribed by any one organisation [within a 
partnership], can result as a consequence of collaboration and that this ‘dividend’ is over 
and above the implicit objectives arising from participation in a partnership.  
However, understanding why actors enter into exchange relations in the form of a 
partnership becomes ever more problematic with the introduction of externalities. The 
collective action of individual partners may result in broader societal objectives but as 
112 
 
these are not specified by the partnership or made explicit by the participants at the outset it 
remains enormously difficult to attribute these ‘windfall gains’. However, any approach 
which seeks to credit positive externalities must evaluate negative externalities to maintain 
any sense of credibility. The history of the evaluation of the Urban Programme has proved 
quite conclusively how contentious and problematic it is to quantify externalities. Benefits 
may indeed result from collaboration through partnership but the lesson of the Urban 
Programme however is that they could as easily be the product of a myriad of other 
initiatives operating in the same environment. 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that partnership is an ambiguous concept not least 
because it is possible to capture a huge range of organisational relations within its ambit. 
The theoretical discussion above has presumed that the construction of partnerships is 
anything but equal. Considerable variations appear to exist in their constitutions and as 
Mackintosh and Huxham make clear they can have entirely different logics.  
NETWORK THEORY: A CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM  
The network enigma. 
Any analysis of networks needs to combine an exploration of both the theoretical dynamics 
which encourages their initial formation with an explanation of the structural dynamics 
which govern their internal relations and which distinguishes them from other forms of 
co-ordination. But in just the same way that partnership appears to mean all things to all 
people, networks suffer a similar conceptual abuse. “The network concept is ‘enigmatic’ 
and appears in many shapes and forms. It is sometimes so varied as to fall into the 
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‘whatever-you-like’ category” (Genosko, 1997:2853).  
Thus networks are: 
…a number of distinguishable organisations having a significant amount of interaction with 
each other. Such interaction may at one extreme include extensive, reciprocal exchanges of 
resources or intense hostility and conflict at the other. The organisations in a network may 
be linked directly or indirectly. Others may be characterised by a clustering or centering of 
linkages around one or a few mediating or controlling organisations (Benson, 1975:230). 
A cluster or complex or organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies 
and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of resources 
dependencies (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992:182). 
A network is generally defined as a specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, 
objects or events (Mitchell, 1969 quoted in Thompson et al, 1991:175). 
Generically, a network may be viewed as consisting of ‘nodes’ or positions (occupied by 
firms, households, strategic business units inside a diversified concern, trade associations 
and other types of organisation) and links manifested by interaction between the position 
(Thorelli, 1986:38). [original emphasis] 
In general terms…the network metaphor is usually used to convey ideas of lateral rather 
than hierarchical structures; horizontal rather than vertical processes; collaborative rather 
than competitive relationships; and flexible rather than routinised responses (Harvey & 
Bennington, n/d) 
Networks are a form of proto-organisation, or ‘loosely coupled’ organisation. … Networks 
differ from organisations by degree of formalisation of relations and by type of 
co-ordination (Van Waarden, 1992:31) 
When the entangling of obligation and reputation reaches a point that the actions of the 
parties are interdependent, but there is no common ownership or legal framework, do we 
not need a new conceptual tool kit to describe and analyse this relationship? Surely this 
patterned exchange looks more like a marriage than a one-night stand, but there is no 
license, no common household, no pooling of assets. … such an arrangement is neither a 
market transaction nor a hierarchical governance structure, but a separate, different mode of 
exchange, one with its own logic, a network (Powell, 1990:301). 
                                                 
3 citing Backhaus & Meyer (1993:332) Strategische Allianzen und strategische Netzwerke. 
Witschaftswissenschafliches Studium, 22, pp330-34). 
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Background: Proliferation 
The growth of networks is widely discussed in academic circles and a number of authors 
suggest that this development represents a new economic paradigm (Morgan, 1992; Cooke 
& Morgan, 1993; Stoker & Young, 1993; Amin & Thrift, 1995) reflecting a strategic 
response to environmental complexity. An explanation for the apparent increasing 
complexity draws heavily on the literature informing the previous discussion surrounding 
the proliferation of partnerships. The network literature however identifies a pre-eminent 
significance to the impacts of technology. Supporters argue that technological development 
invariably entails prohibitively expensive start-up costs in R&D and it is this feature that, in 
combination with a parallel shortening in the product life-cycle, encourages joint working 
through networks to share the risks inherent in bringing new products to market. 
An explanation for the growth of network forms of co-ordination comes from a growing 
body of work which questioned the validity of many of the presumptions underlying classic 
organisational relations in competitive markets. In classic neo-liberal models of free 
markets, economists have sought to perpetuate a myth of an atomised, rational economic 
man guided by the hidden hand of market forces. Granovetter (1985:487) refutes this 
proposition arguing that this is a painfully fallacious misrepresentation. Rather, attempts at 
purposive action are in fact embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations, and 
it is this social dimension which has been overlooked by mainstream economists.  
The complexity and capriciousness of the environment which organisations, public and 
private, find themselves operating in—what Emery & Trist, 1965 describe as turbulent 
fields—has encouraged them to adopt strategies to reduce their exposure to uncertainty. 
This move is evidenced by a shift away from what are described as transactional relations, 
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where competition is the dynamic, towards adopting more relational ways of operating 
where trust and personal relations define interactions. At its most basic this reflects a move 
away from relations governed simply by crude market forces where price signals 
co-ordinate an organisation’s actions. Literature drawn from a variety of different 
disciplines – organisational analysis, inter-organisational analysis, strategic management, 
business management – gives an account of the distinctions between transactional and 
relational methods of working and is reflected in their widespread absorption into academic 
discourse. The characteristics of the two approaches are contrasted below: 
Figure 4.9: Comparison between transaction and relational relations 
 TRANSACTIONAL  ~ o ~ RELATIONAL  
 
 Competition Trust 
 Price Reputation 
 Quantity Quality 
 Market rules Market exclusion 
 Contractual relations Personal relations 
 Short term relations Long term obligations 
 Dependence Interdependence 
 Established common knowledge Tacit knowledge ~ Information rich/dense 
 Repetitive standard transaction Occasional idiosyncratic transaction 
 Inflexible Flexible  
 Hierarchical organisation Non-hierarchical 
 Vertical integration Horizontal integration 
It has been argued that in a deregulated global market with digital technologies 
revolutionising product and process innovations, existing relations underpinned by 
competition, market rules, hierarchies etc appeared anachronistic and ineffective in this 
new economic landscape. One of the strategic responses to this new environment was 
therefore to question traditional methods of co-ordination. Organisations adopted the 
language if not the strategies of relational exchanges and in this sense accepted the 
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substance of Granovetter’s ‘social embeddedness’ argument. Networking can thus be seen 
as a practical expression of the acceptance of relational working arrangements. In a 
situation where a changing environment prevents effective planning and implementation, 
organisations responded to the limitations imposed on them by pursuing strategies which 
extricated them from this harsh environment. Networking then, it is suggested, developed 
as a response to the impacts of structural and political changes taking place at the global, 
national and local level. The underlying presumption is that networks possess an 
organisational logic which enables them to take [greater] control of their environment. The 
perception then is that networks are somehow inherently more effective in delivering 
objectives in turbulent environments than other models of co-ordination. 
The organisational logic of networks. 
Powell (1990) provides a structural rationale for the growth of networks. He suggests that a 
network’s organisational logic is based on the fact that: 
• They are based on know-how and detailed knowledge of the abilities of others - so called tacit 
knowledge; 
• The exchange of distinct competencies, be they knowledge or skills - is more likely to occur in 
networks. The transfer of resources - tangible items, such as equipment, services, patents and the like 
- more commonly occur through market transaction or among organisational units; 
• The more general and more substitutable are resources, the more likely they will be secured through 
short term market transactions. 
The Organisational Logics Schema in figure 4.5 described the conditions where 
organisations co-ordinate activity and which might be conducive for partnership and 
network formation. The primary motivating factor to co-ordination in a network is a degree 
of mutual interest and what Stoker & Young (1993) describe as the recognition by parties 
that: “…they depend on one another.…(p183) [and it is this]…mutual orientation which 
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provides the glue that binds together the various participants” (p185). Only when this 
‘mutual orientation’ is achieved, and recognised, by the participants can the potential, 
though not the necessity, for network formation become practicable. This mutual 
orientation is depicted in The institutional landscape of partnership & networks schema in 
figure 4.5. The extreme left is inhabited by actors with no commonality of interests with 
other parties, and accordingly act independently. As you move to the right conditions 
develop where mutual interests may overlap with other parties. At this point, a domain of 
interest can apply and, it may be advantageous for parties to co-ordinate activities. As you 
move further to the right you describe a situation of ever increasing commonality of 
interests culminating in complete coincidence of interests. At this extreme position 
participants have no reason to co-ordinate actions and are therefore liable to either merge or 
compete directly with each other. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTNERSHIP AND NETWORKS  
Similar organisational forms 
This discussion on partnerships and networks should be seen as part of a wider debate on 
‘governance structures’. It seems clear that the research task is to examine the competing 
claims made about the efficacy of various governance structures in order to see how 
effective they have been in delivering their stated objectives. The objective of partnership 
and network structures is both to secure co-ordination—amongst partners—whilst 
delivering this joint effort in the most optimally efficient manner. Partnerships and 
networks can thus be seen as a contemporary response by organisations operating in 
complex environments—especially in the public sector, under conditions of scarcity. The 
normative assumption implicit in the wholesale promotion of partnership by government[s] 
is that they are functionally superior to previous governance structures. This has however 
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neither been tested or proved. Until substantive research proves otherwise it remains 
entirely erroneous to infer that shortcomings in one approach equates to the superiority of 
any other approach. 
However, the relationship between partnership and networks is problematic. It has been 
argued that partnership and networks are similar organisational forms that differ only in 
degree. The case has been made, through analogy with the literature on the firm, that 
partnerships and networks lie [somewhere] between market and hierarchical forms of 
co-ordination—depicted graphically in The institutional landscape of partnership & 
networks schema in figure 4.5. This conclusion is in itself relatively uncontroversial but 
drawing categorical distinctions between partnership and network forms of co-ordination, 
and clarifying the distance between these two forms on the market/hierarchy continuum, is 
far more problematic. Notwithstanding the obvious shortcomings related to the depiction in 
figure 4.2 of an ideal type, a number of observations can be drawn. 
Difference between partnerships and networks  
(1) The primary cleavage differentiating a partnership from a network is the 
formalisation of institutional arrangements governing behaviour and objectives. The 
process of drawing up, and agreeing, clearly identified objectives and, as is often the case in 
regeneration initiatives, a vision of how they are to be secured, invests a partnership with a 
directed purposive mandate.  
(2) A partnership’s mandate is formalised through a process which reveals the 
distribution of [Benson’s] two scarce resources, money and authority. The most important 
observation is that there is no reason to presume that the current usage of the term 
partnership implies any form of equality amongst partners. Indeed, one of the semantic 
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difficulties associated with the partnership label is an implicit assumption that partnership 
brings together partners, if not exactly as equals, then with a degree of mutual dependency 
which is reflected in the power relations and the distribution of resources within any given 
partnership.  
(3) It has been argued that the widely applied label of partnership simply describes a 
form of organisational co-ordination which, at it crudest, brings together a number of actors 
in a joint endeavour. Crucially though, as it currently stands, the label, partnership, says 
nothing about the character of the relations, the relative autonomy of the partners, or the 
distribution of resources between partners, and can be as Hudson (1987:178) warns us, 
nothing more than the formalisation of the clear dominance of one party over another.  
(4) The Hanf & Scharpf typology suggests that only when partner relations are 
mutually dependent can each partner possess the capacity to influence the direction of a 
partnership. If this assumption is correct and if, in addition, we accept also that the concept 
of synergy explains why it is that partners come together. Then a real partnership should 
exhibit evidence of synergy which must be as Gaster (1997) argued, demonstrated in 
relation to process as well as ‘gross’ gains. Therefore any real partnership should exhibit 
demonstrable [synergetic] output gains [as distinct from synergetic claims] and there 
should be clear evidence of a process of mutual re-orientation by the participants. This 
reciprocity can be best understood as organisational learning evidenced by, for example, 
changes in an organisation’s culture, changes in working methods, a redefinition of 
collective objectives, and each might occur individually or together [Mackintosh’s 
transformation logic]. Axiomatically then, evidence of [Hanf & Scharpf’s] coercion or 
[Williamson] opportunistic behaviour implies unilateral or mutual independence that 
120 
 
undermines the potential for mutual dependence and genuine partnership working. 
Logically then any co-ordination mechanism which aspires to the title Partnership must 
exhibit both clear evidence of synergy and mutual dependency between partners. A 
contract or a service level agreement cannot in this sense qualify as partnership because the 
Hanf & Scharpf test of mutual dependence fails if the contract could have been awarded to 
other parties—there is no obligation of reciprocity. In this example a contract legally 
defines and circumscribes the relationship; reciprocity where it occurs is incidental but not 
essential to the relationship. 
(5) The distinguishing feature of a network form of co-ordination is the emphasis 
placed upon the qualitative nature of relations amongst participants; and this is explicitly 
reflected in the way in which resources are understood to be embedded in a social setting. 
The management of resources—understood to include a richer meaning than simply 
material resources which might for example include, knowledge, prestige, legitimacy etc—
within a network therefore attaches enormous importance to the role of relationships 
between participants. Extending this theme of exploiting a wider range of resources beyond 
the simply material Powell (1990) draws particular attention to the importance of ‘tacit’ 
knowledge. This is understood to be invested in individuals—and perhaps can be best 
understood as a form of intellectual property. Because tacit knowledge is held by an 
individual it moves with them. Again, this importance of the individual further exaggerates 
the focus on the qualitative dimension of relationships between partners. The concept of 
reciprocity here reflects the importance attached to the character of the mutual dependency 
within a network. The cement which ties network participants therefore is reciprocity as 
distinct from a reliance on formal or contractual obligation and this can only be achieved 
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and maintained through trust. Indeed the importance of trust in networks is underlined by 
the absence of formal contractual relations evident in partnership. Logically again, if a 
series of formal rules govern the character of relations amongst partners then the 
co-ordination mechanism cannot reasonably be described as a network rather it must be a 
partnership. 
THE PARTNERSHIP CHECKLIST 
Part of the problem surrounding partnership lies in the observation that all co-ordination 
mechanisms labelled partnership believe that they are ‘real’. It has been argued that the 
reason this occurs is the lack of a conceptual model of what real partnership means. 
Therefore the principal task of this chapter has been to fill that void by theorising 
partnership in abstract terms. However, beyond the boundaries of academia partnership is 
an experience not a theoretical construct. Moving from the abstract to the concrete however 
requires conceptual tools that can link theory to practice. What is required is a practical 
method of evaluation, a toolkit which enables the partnership experience to be 
deconstructed and where that practical experience can be compared to that predicted in the 
theoretical model. Partners can in this way compare their experience to that postulated in 
the theoretical partnership model.  
For the checklist to work the theoretical insights developed in the model of partnership had 
to be translated into practical tools. The key objective was to ensure that the checklist 
successfully addressed the key theoretical concerns. For example, the theory suggests that 
no one party should dominate. The checklist therefore had to operationalise this theoretical 
aspiration in a robust test which ‘reveals’ domination – or its absence. In practice this 
concept was explored by applying several tests: power sharing was one test but independent 
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arbitration reveals something of the power relations. The partnership checklist below 
therefore draws together the key theoretical themes identified in this chapter but seeks to 
interpret these into a systematic and practical methodology – one that recognises and is 
deliberately informed by good practice.  
(i) Power sharing 
To avoid the accusation that a partnership is nothing more than the clear domination of one 
party over another then partners should share power. A typical regeneration partnership 
brings together a vast range of partners with [potentially] enormous differences in resource 
endowment. A partnership structure that simply mirrors the power relations of the 
constituent organisations is not sharing power.  
(ii) Agreement on key issues 
The aims and objectives of any partnership should reflect the joint aspirations of all 
partners. Objectives should be established through an open process of bargaining and 
negotiation. A partnership’s strategic objectives simultaneously defines and circumscribe 
its current and future actions. Crucially, a partnership’s objectives, once agreed, forms a 
normative framework that ensures a particular pattern of resource distribution prevails. The 
setting of objectives is therefore a pivotal activity. Who is involved in this process, and 
when, says a great deal about the quality of partnership relations. The setting of objectives 
should never simply reflect the hegemony of any one dominant party or cabal: where this 
occurs the partnership is effectively nothing more than a contract or service level 
agreement. Organisations that have not been involved in the establishment of objectives 
cannot realistically be described as partners. 
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(iii) Organisational learning 
Structures should not be set in stone. Partnerships should be flexible. Where serious 
concerns arise adaptive potential provides an opportunity for partners to re-negotiate a 
partnership’s terms of reference. Building-in, from the start, a mechanism that can 
challenge and change the way a partnership operates makes explicit to all involved that it 
is prepared to learn. [An analogous mechanism taken from the private sector would be the 
oversight function of non-executive directors who can challenge and potentially censure 
the main board and its strategies] Learning occurs when a partnership acknowledges 
changing circumstances and responds strategically to the challenge. Organisational 
learning might occur in response to, for example, a dramatic or unforeseen change in the 
environment; mistakes [e.g., the extreme case of maladministration, fraud etc]; or by the 
adoption of [new] ‘best practice’ arising in the wider policy arena.  
(iv) Independent arbitration 
The greatest concern for potential participants in any partnership is that it may not be real. 
It may in fact be nothing more than the clear domination of one party over another. This 
potential pitfall can be ameliorated if the partnership is a learning organisation—as 
described above—and adapts to overcome the concerns of partners. A second line of 
support for a partner, concerned about the uneven distribution of power and the limits of 
their own influence, would be independent arbitration. A partnership is clearly not real if 
the structure of a partnership emasculates partners and operates in such a way as to 
effectively institutionalise the hegemony of any one partner [or sub-set of partners]. 
(v) Mutual reorientation 
Partnerships bring together disparate organisations endowed with very different resources 
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and organisational cultures. Within statutory constraints for probity and efficacy working 
practices should—not as of right—reflect the objectives of the partnership and not the 
habits or culture of dominant partners. Diversity of interests represent diversity of 
opportunity. Cultural diversity amongst partner organisations suggest that, for any given 
task, there will be a range of approaches and methods of working which could potentially 
be explored. If partners are meeting as equals then it is not unreasonable to expect that 
there should be evidence of an exchange of ideas and the adoption of novel ways of 
working. In practice this should be read backwards. Evidence of exchange should be taken 
as a proxy measure of the quality of partner relations. Where novel methods or approaches 
are proving to be effective within the partnership there should be evidence of these ideas 
percolating down and influencing the organisational culture of the partner organisations. 
(vi) Standing orders 
The conduct of a partnership should be governed by mutually agreed rules. These should 
seek to prevent the imposition of arbitrary decisions and/or the domination of the 
partnership by any one party. In order to allay concerns of overt domination new 
partnerships could formally adopt a common set of Standing Orders. A learning 
partnership would—over time—amend or adapt these to suit their particular 
circumstances. 
(vii) Entered into voluntarily 
There should be no barriers to entry or exit. There should be no costs or sanctions 
associated with not entering into partnership. Where a partner is coerced into joining a 
partnership the resultant organisation is not a real partnership because of the obvious 
disparity in power relations. 
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(viii) Accountability supported by sanctions 
A major complication arises from the fact that partnerships bring together diverse interests 
each potentially with their own resource systems and associated patterns of accountability. 
The effect of this is that partner organisations may in practice have a subtly different 
understanding of accountability and these may in practice be resolved through different 
lines of accountability not necessarily compatible with those of organisations spending 
public money. An indication of the tension that arises in accountability between dissimilar 
organisations is evident in the Employment Select Committee examination of the work of 
TECs (HC, 1996a). Part II of the report specifically looks at TECs and accountability and 
the report describes TECs as: “…a new type of organisation, a hybrid body 
(para.7)…[which are]…unaccountable by design” (para.8). Much of the discussion in the 
report focuses on the alleged democratic deficit arising from the way in which TEC boards 
are constituted and the lack of transparency in the way they operate. With TEC/Local 
authority relationship clearly in mind the Association of London Authorities propose an 
Accountability Index (Figure 4.10 below) that seeks to promulgate a model of 
accountability good practice. Essentially a procedural model it is based upon the 
presumption of independence and transparency linked to democratic oversight. 
Figure 4.10: Association of London Authorities Accountability Index 
• Whether they are directly elected 
• Whether they come within the remit of one of the public sector Ombudsmen 
• Whether there is extensive statutorily defined public access to policy and decision-making 
meetings 
• Whether there is extensive statutorily defined public access to information 
• Whether members of the body are liable for surcharge 
• Whether members of the body have a statutory requirement to declare any interests which 
may conflict with their duties 
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• Whether there are monitoring officers charged with a statutory duty to ensure probity and 
financial regularity 
(source: cited in HC (1996a, Appendix 15 para.43(v)), The Work of TECs {Employment 
Committee: First Report} House of Commons Papers, Session 1995/96 HC 99) 
Given the different types of organisation brought together in a partnership the definition of 
accountability can be problematic4. Responding to widespread public concerns the 
government set up a commission headed by Lord Nolan to examine the issue of 
accountability in public bodies. His report Local Public Spending Bodies, argued that: 
The term accountability is used in a variety of ways, some rather loose and ill-defined. 
Processes of consultation, openness, and responsiveness are frequently characterised as 
accountability. They are certainly aids to, and components of, accountability, but on a more 
precise definition service providers and others are truly accountable only to those able to 
exercise sanctions over them (HMSO, 1996c para.16 p13). 
The importance of sanctions is crucial and fundamentally related to the distribution of 
power in a partnership. If a partnership is to be more than the clear domination of one party 
over another then partners need a mechanism which allows them to call a partnership to 
account. Complicating matters, accountability operates at several levels.  
Table 4.3: Levels of accountability 
Levels Lines of accountability 
internal between partners within the partnership. 
external back to the organisations represented within partnerships. 
upwards to government and/or other funders 
downwards to the wider constituency the partnership aims to serve. 
 
These conflicting demands need to be resolved by partners at the outset and could be 
embodied in an explicit participation strategy which clarifies precise lines of accountability 
and the mechanisms by which the partnership will be held to account. 
                                                 
4 For a comprehensive account see Day & Klein (1987) Accountabilities: Five Public Services 
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(ix) Participation strategy 
To avoid potentially conflicting lines of accountability identified above a partnership 
should publish a participation strategy which states how the different lines of accountability 
will be resolved. Given that local populations are the target and the primary reason for the 
existence of many partnerships how do these interests feed into the partnership structure? 
Critical evaluation by the public or by partners necessitates informed judgement and this 
requires information. If a partnership is genuine in its aspiration to share power it must 
ensure that adequate information is both available and disseminated in a form that is 
accessible to all the interests it represents. 
(x) Expenditure audit 
Partners need to be able to identify what they put in and what they get out of partnership. 
Given that synergy is said to underpin partnership working, logically then, it must be 
evaluated. Partners individually, and the wider partnership, can only gauge the efficacy of 
their contribution if evaluation takes place. Any cost/benefit analysis should be sensitive to 
the range of resources brought together in partnership and should extend beyond the 
customary finance criteria to include contributions ‘in kind’ [i.e., the private sector brings a 
particular type of expertise, similarly, community and voluntary groups bring their own 
form of expertise]. Partnerships almost always seek to target a number of objectives 
simultaneously. Although crude, money is a practical measure of the importance a 
partnership actually attaches to specific action areas. A primary aim of any audit is to 
compare a partnership’s stated priorities with the actual resources attached to each objective 
to see if they do in fact coincide.  
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Similar but different 
Partnerships and networks continue to proliferate and evidence of their widespread 
adoption is clear in a variety of different institutional settings. Not unreasonably, given this 
application across such a wide policy arena one should expect to see considerable variation 
in membership. However, a core concern of this thesis has been to examine the process of 
partnership. The challenge has been to examine the implicit claim that partnership 
represents an optimal co-ordination mechanism for regeneration initiatives. The unresolved 
and as yet largely neglected, research question remains: is this particular form of 
co-ordination mechanism functionally superior to [any] other organisational form?  
If we look at networks we see they are fundamentally defined by the character of the 
relations which govern their co-ordination. In this their principle distinguishing 
characteristics are trust and reciprocity. In this respect network forms of co-ordination can 
be seen to equate to what the government would describe as ‘true’ partnership. Figure 4.11 
below illustrates this. What the figure shows is how partnerships are the most common 
form of co-ordination [as you would expect given their longstanding and widespread 
approval]. However, within this larger set there are a distinct but minor subset that exhibit 
the characteristic trust and reciprocity. These could best be described as ‘networked 
partnerships’. The observation that networks appear to also lie outside of the wider 
partnership set reflects the way that some networks exist simply by virtue of the fact that 
they act as mediums or conduits for communication. It was established that an agreed set of 
objectives which structure or guide purposive actions was a necessary pre-requisite for any 
partnership [co-ordination]. Absence of agreement negates the possibility that a network 
can act as a co-ordinative mechanism. 
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Figure 4.11: The networked partnership 
 
 
Partnerships Networks 
Networks thus represent the development of a particular governance structure ideally 
adapted to a complex rapidly changing environment. It is clear that partnerships and 
networks do not represent a simple dichotomy. Rather it is much more likely that they 
occupy the same institutional landscape appearing as complex overlapping and interlocking 
layers, where the boundaries between the two are diffuse and open to conjecture. It has 
been argued that in the case of networks co-ordination occurs when actors are assimilated 
into new relationships based upon reciprocity and trust. These characteristics, reciprocity 
and trust, are like invisible chains which both govern and circumscribe network relations. 
Because networks are a pattern of linkages based upon reciprocal relations, where the 
parameter of a network is defined only by those actors assimilated into it, then in this sense, 
networks can be said to have an internal perspective. The contrast with partnerships is one 
of degree. Networks are considered to be information rich, underpinned by principles of 
trust and collaboration, where this fluidity and informality represents its key distinguishing 
characteristic. However unlike partnerships networks do not necessarily share any agreed 
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mandate for action.  
In attempting to contrast partnership with network forms of co-ordination it is important to 
make the crucial distinction between what the government euphemistically call ‘real’ 
partnerships and others. It has been argued that the definition of a real partnership is one 
which shares power and successfully manages a process of learning and adaptation. These 
partnerships are in fact exhibiting reciprocity, founded on trust, amongst partners, and 
could be said to be emulating network forms of co-ordination. In contrast to a network the 
primary distinguishing feature of a partnership is that they are proactive, externally 
oriented, with a formal mandate to direct purposive action. Where partnerships are not 
‘real’ the organisational logic is entirely different. Here partner/s abuse their dominant 
position to dictate outcomes simply by fiat. In these situations there is no reciprocity or 
trust between partners, no organisational learning or mutual reorientation; any relationship 
formed is therefore purely contractual (hierarchical), largely symbolic, and has the role of 
minor partners diminished to performing nothing more than a delivery service . 
Partnerships and network structures have been widely adopted in the 1990s because they 
apparently offer so many advantages. At a superficial level—if the rhetoric is to be 
believed—the advantages of partnership seem self evident. Synergy. The holy grail of 
policy: where everyone is in a win win situation. Risk sharing. When funding is tight 
anything which reduces, or helps militate, an individual organisations financial exposure is 
obviously appealing; the pooling of finite resources is clearly an advantageous by-product 
of partnership building. At a political level partnership is a pragmatic response to a 
fragmented state. Partnership, by definition, let alone constitution, is a vehicle of 
incorporation. In this role a succession of governments since 1977 have used it very 
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prescriptively to integrate specific interests. Post 1979 Conservative governments focused 
first on private sector interests although the emphasis later shifted towards the 
voluntary/community sector. Clearly governments of different persuasions can as easily use 
this same mechanism to integrate other preferred interests.  
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine microeconomic explanations for the growth of 
partnerships and networks. Methodologically this proved difficult because of the absence of 
any substantive existing theory to underpin the two concepts. It was clear that both 
partnership and networks had suffered considerable semantic abuse and this was evident 
from the variety of definitions that one finds. In order to progress a discussion the approach 
taken was to begin by acknowledging the dearth of theory and instead look to 
complementary arenas which might inform the debate. The key to this approach lay in 
recognising that partnership and networks could and should be understood simply as 
co-ordination mechanisms. The rationale of this approach was that any co-ordination 
mechanism would display a specific co-ordinational logic. By examining the particular 
co-ordinational logic it should then be possible to describe the type of co-ordination and, 
by definition, comment on whether what is under examination is a partnership or a network. 
The advantage of approaching the problem identified in terms of co-ordination was that it 
captured a considerably wider and more developed literature. Three key theoretical 
disciplines were examined: exchange theory, inter-organisational analysis and transaction 
cost economics. In addition, Macintosh [uniquely] provided three different models of 
partnership each with different co-ordinational logics and the significance of these was 
evaluated. Each of these approaches was in turn explored in order to categorise the various 
‘logics’ inherent in the different models of co-ordination. The end result of this was the 
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development of a conceptual framework within which co-ordination could be more readily 
understood and within which partnership could be located. It was this conceptual 
framework that provided the necessary theoretical insights which then allowed the 
construction of an ideal model of partnership and an ideal model of a network – each of 
which displayed their own unique co-ordinational logic. Having developed the two models 
it then became possible to contrast them. The research suggests that the two forms share 
many similarities with the potential for the two to overlap. The principle cleavage, and the 
key to understanding what differentiates partnerships from networks, is most apparent in an 
examination of the quality of and the degree of formalisation of relations which govern 
their actions. With a clear conceptual framework it then was possible to describe in detail 
the co-ordinational logic of the specific form of partnership which the government describe 
as true. Axiomatically, the process of describing the co-ordinational logic of a true 
partnership simultaneously generated the conceptual framework upon which the partnership 
checklist which based. 
The rhetoric of partnership makes a convincing argument. It suggests that partnership 
incorporates disparate interests who each bring unique skills to bear on complex 
regeneration problems. This contribution of the many, attacks problems on several fronts, 
delivering synergy in a structure which guarantees inter-organisational co-ordination. At 
the same time, in the process of uniting diverse interests, partnership has legitimated 
objectives that the constituent partners may indeed never individually have been in a 
position to support or deliver. 
For over three decades successive governments have been criticised for a lack of 
co-ordination in policy delivery. And for almost three decades partnership has been 
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uncritically promoted as the solution. Given the dearth of evidence of synergy or evidence 
of genuine power sharing it remains to be proved whether partnership is indeed the optimal 
co-ordination mechanism for regeneration initiatives.  
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING PARTNERSHIP 
GROWTH (II) 
MACROECONOMIC 
PARTNERSHIPS & NETWORKS: A NEW STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE 
Introduction  
In contrast to the previous chapter the aim of this chapter is to examine a number of macro-
economic explanations that might provide a theoretical rationale for the growth in 
partnership and associated network activity.  
Not a new activity 
Partnership activity is not a new phenomenon. It should be recalled that the Labour 
government’s 1977 White Paper had been predicated on a partnership approach to 
regeneration. However initiatives like City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget 
dramatically propelled partnership formation during the 1990s. During the same period a 
growing body of authors were drawing attention to the growth of networks. The burgeoning 
body of literature being published suggested that a new model of development had perhaps 
been discovered. 
This chapter begins by first examining the theoretical basis upon which claims of a new 
model of development have been made and relates these to the proliferation of new 
organisational forms. This will be followed by a look at the various ‘organisational logics’ 
which have been put forward to explain specific forms of co-ordination. Finally, the often 
opaque and ambiguous characteristics which are ascribed to partnerships and networks will 
be examined. This approach will give substance to a critical theoretical model of 
partnerships and networks which both describes and differentiates the two concepts. Having 
135 
 
arrived at a theoretical model a partnership checklist is proposed which might be used to 
examine any regeneration partnership. In chapter seven the checklist provides the 
methodological toolkit used to systematically deconstruct the CWP and comment on the 
quality of partnership relations. 
BACKGROUND 
Wider structural changes 
Chapter two described the arrival into office in 1979 of a Conservative administration 
mandated with a radical political agenda. It was argued that the political economy of 
Thatcherism sustained and promoted the development of partnerships. However, this 
represents only part of the explanation of their growth throughout the 1980s. To understand 
the context of proliferation it is important to relate these phenomena to the wider debate on 
structural changes taking place in the global economy throughout the 1980s. This chapter 
will therefore seek to conceptually link the evidence of partnership and networks to 
prevailing theories on the dynamics of change in contemporary society.  
The 1980s was a period of dramatic change for the UK both nationally and internationally. 
Indeed it could be argued that this period is defined by the conjuncture of social, political 
and economic forces, which in combination, profoundly restructured the UK state during 
this period. The UK’s orientation to the global economy was markedly changed by the 
growing internationalisation of trade. This was a complex phenomena which was both 
sustained and encouraged on different levels. Internationally the 1980s witnessed the 
dramatic collapse of Communism in the former USSR. The ensuing ideological vacuum 
was quickly filled with Western neo-liberal economic philosophy with its emphasis on 
free-trade and markets. The case for this is made by Fukuyama (1992) whose central thesis 
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is that communist ideology has collapsed and has been entirely displaced by capitalism5. 
And so in a short space of time ‘the market’ had completed its global hegemony—that the 
market means different things to different people is acknowledged but this does not in any 
way reduce the enormity of this event.  
The ascendancy of Western neo-liberal economic philosophy had two important 
consequences. First, it created new economic spaces. In the 1980s Communism had been 
effectively discredited as a model for growth by its inability to deliver the same levels of 
[relative] prosperity self-evident in the West throughout much of the post war period. At 
the same time former Communist states and developing countries around the globe eagerly 
strove to attain the benefits of ‘first world’ status by actively inviting foreign direct 
investment as a means of modernising their own economies. Many of these previously 
insular command economies offered international investors substantial opportunities, 
offering vast reservoirs of cheap [often educated] labour combined with low social costs 
and a relaxed approach to development and the repatriation of profits etc.  
The second factor in this account is that the hegemony of this new political economy had 
itself been progressively re-defined throughout the 1980s in the West and came to be 
described as Thatcherism in the UK or Reaganism in the USA. As has been described in 
chapter two the political economy of Thatcherism has an inherent economic logic which 
fundamentally ran counter to the prevailing post-war settlement. Thatcher’s free-market 
convictions secured the removal of national obstacles in the UK which had previously 
curtailed the free movement of capital to anywhere in the globe. Thatcher herself 
acknowledged that this was the one element of her first budget that gave her the: 
                                                 
5 This same theme has been repeatedly explored in the FT, see for example, No left, right or centre (12/13 
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“…greatest personal pleasure…” (Thatcher, 1993:44) [this policy was copied by Reagan in 
the USA]. Removing these legal impediments made it easier to invest abroad encouraging a 
greater internationalisation of the UK economy:  
…Not only do our companies invest more directly in overseas enterprises than nearly all our 
foreign competitors, but the UK also receives a similarly large amount of direct investment 
from overseas. UK inflows and outflows of portfolio investments are also very large by 
international standards…(HM Treasury, 1996b para.1.4){original emphasis} 
Although the UK economy has always had a significant international outlook to trade, the 
effect of removing capital controls was to further substantially reinforce growing 
internationalisation—a process already evident from the end of the second world war. 
The direct and portfolio investment positions of the UK make it one of the most globally 
integrated countries in the world. Relative to its size, the UK has greater international 
investment interests than any other country…(HM Treasury, 1996b para.53) 
In addition, the growing process of internationalisation was substantially reinforced by the 
impacts of technology where it appeared that the world had been shrunk by digital 
technologies. This meant, for example, that the capacity to manage industrial production 
remotely had been significantly enhanced. Throughout this period advances in technology 
accelerated exponentially: computing capacity increased whilst the actual price decreased. 
The generic nature of the technology ensured it permeated into every facet of life catalysing 
a whole range of process and product innovations which only sought to reinforce the 
capacity of industry to operate globally—see Fröbel et al, 1980. By the start of the 1990s it 
was abundantly clear that we were living in a rapidly changing global economy and that 
this was having a profound local effect upon the UK economy. Indeed, the rate of change 
and the growing interdependence of the global market place may indeed be the defining 
                                                                                                                                                    
Oct 96); The global standard (18 Apr 98). 
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condition of this new world order. Eisenschatz & Gough (1993) put forward three 
competing explanations for changes in the UK economy.  
• all places are made equal by the omniscient global market.  
• places are made unique as they respond flexibly to satisfy fragmented markets.  
• the branch plant paradigm is no longer national but global with core and periphery operating at a much 
wider geographical scale.  
It appeared to many that the internationalisation of the world economy was having 
profound structural impacts on national economies and it was suggested that this growing 
globalisation emasculated the nation state: dirigiste policy instruments and institutions 
which had their origins in an older industrial epoch appeared anachronistic as we entered 
the so-called information age6.  
In the 1980s the UK central government responded to this challenging economic and 
political environment by introducing new forms of policy instrument to combat the 
invidious decline of many of the older urban areas. Parallel innovations were implemented 
by local government, the voluntary and community sectors and the private sector, as they 
each sought to respond to the common threat. It appeared that throughout the 1980s in both 
the private and public sectors the changing dynamics of the international economy and 
regulatory shifts within the UK economy were encouraging the proliferation of partnership 
and networks. Indeed, in terms of Government policy the growth of partnership working 
was so conspicuous that it is reasonable to assert that by the end of the 1980s partnership 
had come to represent the archetypal policy response to this complex, dynamic, changing 
environment. 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of the emasculation of the nation state see Jessop’s ‘Hollowing Out’ thesis (Jessop,1994). 
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A CLIMATE FOR PARTNERSHIP AND NETWORKS  
Crisis 
It had already been observed that towards the end of the 1960s the UK—along with other 
major capitalist economies—was experiencing serious economic difficulties. The problem 
appeared to be one of intensifying international competition, declining profits, and 
stagnating markets (Schoenberger, 1988:245); productivity was slowing down, the 
capital/output ratio began to rise, and the rate of profit was falling and these conditions 
seriously threatened the vitality of capitalist economies (Leborgne & Lipietz, 1988:264-5). 
Similarly, Scott & Cooke (1988) argued that the entire economic system based on 
Keynesian welfare-statism had become mired down in seemingly incurable stagflationary 
conditions and, with the collapse of Bretton Woods, a major international economic crisis 
was precipitated. The conjuncture of these circumstances led to: “…a massive crisis of 
deindustrialization, job loss, and capital flight, with severe repercussions on the old 
industrial regions and especially negative impacts on employment and wages” (Scott & 
Cooke, 1988:241). 
These changes in the global economy throughout this period—and the UK’s relationship to 
them—stimulated a vociferous debate amongst academics on the potential emergence of a 
new model of development. Indeed, a number of authors postulated that wider 
macroeconomic forces were held to have had a fundamental impact on the new geography 
and sociology of production. Whilst many academics would not dispute the widespread 
evidence of change there was little agreement on the mechanisms driving these changes. 
Loader & Burrows (1994:1) captured the intellectual dilemma when they noted:  
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That significant socio-economic changes have occurred in the UK and other advanced 
capitalist societies over the last twenty years or so is not in any doubt. However, how best to 
interpret these changes has become a source of much controversy. The literature on 
processes of ‘restructuring’ has been marked by a plethora of attempts to make some sort of 
sense out of recent economic, political and social change. 
However one understands and explains the ‘crisis’ evident in Western capitalist economies 
it remains widely accepted that it heralded a period of dramatic structural adjustment. In an 
effort to understand the impact of this restructuring one hypothesis explored in this chapter 
is that these wider structural forces created a climate which propelled specific forms of 
organisational response: namely partnership and networks.  
Transition 
The point of departure for this debate is the concept of the state in transition: moving from 
one model of development to another. The principle starting point for this debate is the 
widespread acceptance [and inherent utility] of the concept of Fordism as an apposite 
description of the dominant political economy in Western capitalist economies. Jessop 
(1994:15) defines Fordism:  
…in terms of its dominant labour process (the mass production of complex consumer 
durables); its nature as a feasible macro-economic system (a virtuous, balanced circle of 
mass production and mass consumption in a largely autocentric national economy); its 
profile as a social mode of economic regulation (notably the role of institutionalised 
collective bargaining and a Keynesian welfare state); its general implications for social 
organisation and cohesion (an urban-industrial, ‘middle mass’, wage-earning society); or 
even, finally, the co-presence and co-evolution of all four possible Fordist phenomena. 
Arising from these observations a number of academics discussed in abstract theoretical 
terms the possibility, or even the probability, that the state was undergoing, or had 
undergone, a major structural realignment. Social scientists from a variety of disciplines 
became engaged in attempts to develop a theory which could help explain these processes 
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of change and a lively debate was joined.  
Starting from the premiss of a Fordist state, the restructuring process has been variously 
described in terms of a move from away from a Fordist’ to a ‘post or neo-Fordist’ 
economy. Amin (1994a:18) illuminates the potential diversity with lucid descriptions of 
these various models, suggesting neo-Fordism stresses a strong element of continuity; post-
Fordism denoting a genuine resolution to the crisis of Fordism; and after-Fordism 
designating a period after Fordism rather than a new phase of capitalist development. 
Although as Jessop (1994:14) readily admits: “Even a cursory review of accounts of 
Fordism and post-Fordism reveals massive disparities in the use of these concepts”. 
Notwithstanding this criticism there is more agreement on the former than the latter. These 
reservations aside, within the post-Fordist literature the key task is to: “…excavate the key 
forces governing this shift from one societal form to another and to seek to discern the 
shape of the new order” (Murdoch, 1995:732) and it is to an exposition of the shape and 
how this translates into organisational form that we turn to next.  
Regulation theory 
Regulation theory has its origins firmly rooted in this inquiry. Championed primarily 
[although not exclusively] by a group of European academics, Regulation Theory offered a 
comprehensive, ‘totalizing’, theory of political economy. It has many supporters principally 
because it attempts to:  
…provide some sort of conceptualising underpinning [for the process of change]. The key 
notion here is that the expanded social reproduction of capitalism is never guaranteed, but 
has to be continually secured through a range of social norms, mechanisms, and institutions 
which help temporarily to stabilise the system’s inherent contradictions around a particular 
regime of accumulation (Goodwin et al, 1993:68).  
The French regulationists’ argued that the state was [either] in transition or being 
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transformed. This idea of the state in transition clearly draws heavily on Marxist theory 
which sees the evolution of capital located within distinct historical epochs—periodizing 
capitalism. Aglietta, one of the architects of regulation theory, and one of its leading 
intellectual lights, alludes to these Marxist origins when he describes regulation theory as: 
“…an approach to capitalism which isolates the conditions and rhythms of its long run 
cohesion and the forms of its crisis and social transformations under the disruptive and 
irreducible effects of class struggle” (1979:15){my emphasis}. This discourse is echoed 
within the regulation school surrounding the apparent transition from Fordism to [for 
example] post-Fordism.  
Regulation theory’s appeal lies in the fact that it seeks to give an account of the processes 
of change, evident in many of the capitalist economies, and which ascribes as much 
importance to the social and institutional structure of the state as the economic. It does this 
by providing an account of restructuring which—unlike Marxism with its historical 
determinism underpinned by invariant laws which presumed the collapse of capitalism—
was internally flexible enough to explain the divergent paths taken by different capitalist 
economies. Jessop (1990) in a comprehensive review of the subject maintains that 
Regulation Theory:  
…can be seen as a distinctive approach to problems of economic and social analysis (p171). 
[and] 
The regulation approach stresses the successful development and institutionalization of a 
mode of regulation whose principal features are defined in terms of their contribution to 
maintaining the capital relation (p205).  
Much of the appeal of regulation theory is the way it provides, what seems at first glance, a 
simple conceptual model. This simplicity however betrays its substantive theoretical 
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foundations grounded in empirical analysis of the various manifestations of capitalism 
exhibited in different nation states across the globe. Figure 5.1 below graphically depicts 
the key characteristics of the regulation model. 
Figure 5.1: A model of regulation 
The model has three principle dimensions: (1) a regime of accumulation; (2) an 
accumulation system; (3) a mode of social regulation. The regime of accumulation emerges 
from the tension between the accumulation system and the mode of social regulation. 
 
(Source: Peck & Tickell, 1992:349) 
(2) 
Accumulation 
system 
(3) 
Mode of 
social 
regulation 
(1)  
Regime of Accumulation 
The breadth of the regulation school and their own divergent trajectories make categorical 
definitions of these terms problematic, indeed the degree of this divergence is discussed by 
Jessop (1990) who identifies seven main schools within the regulationist approach. With 
this caveat in mind the following definitions have been harvested from several authors to 
convey the general thrust of the elements set out in the theoretical model. 
(I). A regime of accumulation: “…describes the medium-term to long-term stabilization 
of the allocation of production between consumption and accumulation (Murdoch, 
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1995:733). In its early incarnation this was theorised as operating at an international level 
with the primary unit of analysis as the nation state. Within this paradigm Boyer identifies 
four ‘stylised historical models’ which equate to regimes of accumulation:  
1. ancienne regulation, 18th Century;  
2. competitive regulation, 19th Century;  
3. modified competitive regulation, early 20th Century;  
4. monopolistic regulation, 1947-76.  
(Source: Dunford, 1990:307 elaborating on Boyer (1978) ‘Les salaires en longe période’  
in Economie et Statistique Nº.103 pp27-57). 
(II). The accumulation system is the dominant mode of economic growth and 
distribution. Elements of the accumulation system include the conditions of production 
(such as the amount of capital invested, the distribution of capital among the different 
branches and norms of production) and the conditions of consumption (such as 
consumption patterns, collectivized consumption expenditures” (Peck & 
Tickell, 1992:349). 
(III). The mode of social regulation refers to an ensemble of regulatory mechanisms 
which guarantee the reproduction of the accumulation system (Murdoch, 1995:734). Hirst 
& Zeitlin (1991:19) distinguish four major modes of regulation in the history of capitalism 
since the eighteenth century: 
1. extensive accumulation; 
2. intensive accumulation without mass consumption (Taylorist); 
3. intensive accumulation with mass consumption (Fordist); and, 
4. an emergent post-Fordist accumulation regime whose contours have yet to be fully determined. 
The distinctive contribution of regulation theory is that it does not have Marxism’s 
determinism. So: “…the emergence of a new regime of accumulation is not a preordained 
part of capitalism’s destiny” (Murdoch, 1995:734), [rather] “…there is no [single] logic of 
capital but a series of [potentially alternative] logics…” (Jessop, 1990:189). A new regime 
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of accumulation thus: “…emerges from the clash of multiple strategies” (Jessop, 
1990:195). It is not the result of [Marxist] class struggle but is rather “…emergent, 
contingent, provisional, and unstable (Murdoch, 1995:736). The formidable task then for 
regulationists is to predict the trajectory and form of these evolving patterns of 
development.  
As Jessop (1990) contends regulation theory is a broad church with common intellectual 
roots which over time has evolved and diverged. Irrespective of which of these positions is 
taken a number of common elements persist. They all stress the complexity and 
inter-connectedness of the social, political and economic world. All argue that regulation 
theory represents a synthesis or matrix of ideas which both interact and overlap and which 
provide an insight into the structural forces shaping and redefining the nation state in a 
changing global economy. However, the veracity of regulation theory remains challenged 
and as Jordan (1990:329), echoing Jessop’s sentiments about the diverging trajectories of 
the different regulation schools, muses: “…any academic theory tends to become 
fashionable - at the cost of being amended into something approaching a caricature of the 
more sophisticated and cautious formulations of their originators.”  
However, whether Fordism exists as a specific form of political economy is itself 
debatable. Whether we have entered a new era remains equally contentious. Indeed whether 
we accept Peck & Tickell’s caution that: “Regulation theory has a very weak grasp on the 
nature of the transition, being unable to identify a single motive force to drive the transition 
from one regime of accumulation to another” (Peck & Tickell, 1995:23 citing: Gertler, 
1992:267; Tickell & Peck, 1992) is not the primary concern here. What it is possible to say 
with confidence is that we continue, through lack of evidence, to be convinced of the 
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direction of causality—or even the relevant magnitude—of the forces shaping 
contemporary economic restructuring: do economic forces shape society or is it society that 
shapes economic forces? The resolution of this conundrum requires significantly more 
research. Of more importance to the argument examined here is the compelling evidence 
assembled by the regulationists which suggests that the economic and social sphere are 
fundamentally inter-related.  
Regulation theory has been used to describe variously, the contours of a post-Fordist 
regime of accumulation, or indeed to suggest that that process of transition is incomplete 
and as yet emergent. In these accounts the evidence of restructuring is not in dispute: the 
dispute lies in whether the phenomena of restructuring collectively constitutes a new 
regime of accumulation. What is compelling about the various regulationist accounts of 
changes in the state is the importance attached to the growth of new forms of production 
and the associated organisational relations this imparts. What the regulation debate does is 
to draw attention to the evidence of changes in capitalist economies. The predicament for 
the regulationists lies not in the paucity of evidence of change, because this is not in 
dispute, rather their problem is in making sense of what these changes mean. Do these 
changes constitute a new form of capitalist production? If so, what are the social 
implications of this? The importance of regulation theory to this thesis lies not in the 
observation that its adherents and critics disagree on whether a new regime of accumulation 
has emerged to replace Fordism, rather, it is that—arriving from different directions—each 
observe and comment on the growth of a new organisational form, namely the flexible firm, 
archetypically constituted around a nexus of networks.  
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Flexible specialisation 
Without necessarily resolving the economic/social controversy contained in a totalizing 
theory—like regulation theory—discussed above, a number of academics drew attention to 
the existence of a number of discrete industrial districts where, it was suggested, a new type 
of industrial space was being created. In these locations traditional relations between firms 
had been displaced by a new form of co-ordination: the networked firm (Amin & Thrift, 
1992; Morgan, 1992; Cooke & Morgan, 1993; Murdoch, 1995). In these areas networks 
were prolific and it was reasoned that it was the existence of these dense network relations 
that had contributed to their success and that this phenomena represented a new model of 
capitalist development. 
The precursor to much of this work was the seminal book by Piore & Sabel (1984) which 
developed the concept of ‘flexible specialisation’. They argued that we had entered a 
qualitatively new industrial age which they termed the ‘Second Industrial Divide’. Piore & 
Sabel however disagree with the regulationist school on a number of issues. Like the 
regulation school they take as their point of departure the concept of Fordism as a 
description of the dominant socio-economic paradigm. Whereas a regulationist approach 
sees the concept of capitalism as a mode of production; with capitalism as a contradictory 
and inherently crisis-ridden economic system which requires some form of institutional 
regulation for its continued reproduction (Hirst & Zeitlin, 1991:18) they rejected this as 
reductionist. Fundamental to the flexible specialisation thesis was an emphasis on the 
regulation of the social dimension of industrial organisation. Their research, based on case 
studies, drew attention to the importance of institutional structures and arrangements which 
supported the mediation of competition.  
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Their work identified a number of industrial districts which had successfully repositioned 
themselves in a growing international economy. In these areas they documented a range of 
structures or organisations which had evolved—or had been specifically developed—in 
order to diffuse innovative practices and promote relationships which encouraged a climate 
of co-operation and trust. They argued that successful industrial districts were defined by 
three mutually dependent characteristics (Piore & Sabel, 1984:29):  
1. the districts’ relation to the market;  
2. their flexible use of increasingly productive, widely applicable technology; and  
3. their creation of regional institutions that balanced co-operation and competition amongst firms  
Having argued that the first industrial divide occurred in the early nineteenth century with 
the victory of mass production over craft production their book sought to refute the idea 
that the mass production paradigm’s success was absolute. They then give an account of the 
mass-production-economy in crisis in which they attribute the deterioration in economic 
performance from the inherent: “…limits of the model of industrial development that is 
founded on mass production...” (Piore & Sabel, 1984:4).  
Their research and historical analysis focuses on a simple dichotomy of industrial 
production along the cleavage of mass production / craft production; with the former 
becoming the dominant economic paradigm in the post-war period. They go on to show 
that the domination of the Fordist mass production paradigm did not in fact lead to the 
entire subjugation of craft skills. Instead they argue that the survival of craft skills is a 
fundamental and important element of capitalist mass production techniques. Thus 
paradoxically, a second and contrary form of production [craft skills] is inherent in the 
logic of mass production (1984:27). For them then, in opposition to Marxist determinism or 
regulationist’s reductionism: “Industrial technology does not grow out of a self-contained 
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logic of scientific or technical necessity…” (1984:5) rather, at certain key points in history 
the path of technological development can diverge in a number of directions. At these 
industrial divides “social conflicts of the most apparently unrelated kinds determine the 
direction of technological development for the following decades” (1984:5).  
What Piore & Sabel’s book and the literature on flexible specialisation spawned was an 
examination of the social fabric of industrial districts. The concern was to examine how 
firms were embedded in their localities. What was it that tied firms together? What were the 
characteristics and mechanisms which made these districts uniquely privileged in this new 
competitive global market? Emerging from this literature was the identification of the 
prime importance of network structures which, it was argued, were fundamentally 
important to the success and vitality of these industrial districts.  
Both the regulationist and the flexible specialisation analysis seek to understand the forces 
underlying the processes of change in contemporary society. Each in there own way can be 
seen to offer a compelling account of the underlying mechanisms of contemporary 
restructuring. Each view has its adherents and critics and these have sought to expose the 
others shortcomings. It remains unlikely that this competition of ideas will be resolved 
objectively; if only because of the influence of Marxist ideas on regulation theory. The 
contested and subjective nature of any ideology always alienates some people. 
Consequently, for some, Marxism is a pejorative term and through association the 
credibility of regulation theory will always be questioned.  
SUMMARY 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s partnerships and networks proliferated. This chapter 
suggests that the background to this growth should be seen in relation to changes to the 
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wider economy which have in effect fuelled proliferation. In the 1980s and 1990s a number 
of authors have sought to provide compelling accounts which might explain the dynamics 
of change in what was a turbulent, complex and increasingly global economy. What is 
extremely interesting is that two of the dominant theories which were extensively debated 
throughout this period, regulation theory and flexible specialisation, provide compelling 
accounts of restructuring which give primacy to the creation of new forms of organisational 
relations with new organisational logics. So, on the one hand, to resolve the crisis in 
capitalism, the regulationist literature identifies the importance of:  
…the sedimentation of a culture of co-operation, trust and negotiability between firms 
trading with each other, as well as within firms, as a key condition underwriting the 
interdependence and flexibility demanded by this model of industrial organization (Amin, 
1994a:21). 
 
and all this is achieved through partnerships based upon a network approach to industrial 
organisation. On the other hand, to remain competitive and profitable in a capricious and 
highly volatile global marketplace, flexible specialisation theorists would argue that simply 
in order to survive a new relational approach to organisation is demanded. And once again 
the solution is the networked firm. Remarkably then each theory arriving from different 
ideological trajectories provides a rationale for the creation of networks and partnerships. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE COVENTRY & WARWICKSHIRE 
PARTNERSHIP 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter two described the policy lineage of partnership initiatives. It sought to explain the 
particular form of the SRB in the context of the historical evolution of a regeneration policy 
that had its roots in the 1977 White Paper. Following this historical account of partnerships 
chapter three described the particular policy lineage of the SRB. Chapters four and five 
then sought to deconstruct the rhetoric of partnership to build a substantive critical theory 
of partnership. Having proposed a theoretical model of partnership chapter four concluded 
by moving from the abstract to the concrete by producing a partnership checklist.  
The aim of this chapter is to move the level of analysis from the global to the local—from 
the abstract to the concrete—to examine the particular development trajectory of one SRB 
partnership, the Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership (CWP). The research was 
principally concerned to identify how this partnership was conceived. How it fitted into the 
existing institutional landscape. How it evolved. How developments in the evolution of the 
partnership structure shaped relations between partners and how these dynamics shaped the 
character of the subsequent bid for Single Regeneration Budget funding. (See Appendix 
(C): Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership Chronology for an account of key events). 
Given that in Warwickshire plans to form a partnership organisation preceded the SRB, 
albeit by only a few months, an objective of the research is an attempt to understand why a 
partnership organisation was already being pursued and why did it form when it did. In this 
context it was also important to understand how it evolved in the critical early stage, 
specifically the chronology of involvement of the various participants prior to the formal 
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incorporation of the organisation as a partnership company limited by guarantee.  
BACKGROUND 
SRB announcement 
The government announced the first round of the SRB on the 14th April 1994. The Bidding 
Guidance (DoE, 1994b) and detailed timetable for bid submission were published to 
accompany the announcement (see Figure 3.2: Round One Bidding Timetable).  
Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership Limited was registered as a company limited by 
guarantee on 19th August 1994. The Board had 25 directors (see table 6.1 below) 
representing a range of organisations drawn from the sub-region; alongside these however 
the partnership listed fifty seven member organisations—see Appendix (D): Membership of 
CWP at May 1995.  
Table 6.1: CWP Board structure at May 1995 
Chamber of 
Commerce and 
Training & 
Enterprise Council 
 
Local 
Authorities 
 
Private Sector 
 
Further & 
Higher 
Education 
 
Community and 
Voluntary 
Sector 
 
Trades Unions 
4 5 7 4 3 2 
(source: Coventry & Warwickshire Partnerships Limited ~ Annual Report 1996 (CWP, 1996a) 
 
Occurring only four months after the government’s announcement the speed with which the 
partnership was constructed had an important bearing upon the partnership subsequently 
assembled.  
Preceding the introduction of the SRB the government issued a Draft Bidding Guidance in 
January 1994 inviting interested parties to comment. Responses were received from a 
variety of sectors including: local authority associations, local authorities, TECs, voluntary 
organisations, academic and specialist consultancies (HC, 1995b: para.12:3). 
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Representatives of the voluntary and community sectors, in particular, expressed severe 
reservations at the unreasonably short time scale preceding the introduction of a major 
policy initiative and the likely effect that this would have upon the quality of partnerships 
subsequently formed. Research by Mawson et al (1995) evaluating the first round of the 
SRB confirmed—in a prophetic echo of a previous period of urban experimentation, which 
saw the start of the Urban Programme sprung upon a largely unprepared local 
government—the negative impacts that arise when a major new policy initiative is 
introduced too quickly. Notwithstanding the obvious short time scale, Mawson argued that 
the resource imbalance between and statutory and non-statutory sectors was so marked that 
the non-statutory sectors would be unable to engage effectively with the statutory sector. 
Mawson and the NCVO (1994), amongst others, argued that if the government seriously 
intended SRB partnerships to include a range of partners then steps should be taken to 
overcome both the material and the organisational disadvantages inherent in the bidding 
process. Mawson proposed that the resource imbalance could be mitigated by directly 
investing in the capacity of the non-statutory sectors in order that they might more 
effectively engage with statutory agencies in the process of partnership building. 
Significantly, whilst acknowledging these criticisms the government were not convinced of 
the merits of setting aside any portion of the SRB for capacity building arguing that such 
measures were already in place—see the Government Response to the Environment 
Committee ~ First Report into the Single Regeneration Budget Cm 3178 (HMSO, 1996a), 
details of these extant measures are listed as Appendix (E): Extant Capacity Building 
Measures; see also DETR (1998d) Community-Based Regeneration Initiatives: Working 
Paper. 
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Partnership activity before the SRB 
The significance for the CWP of the short SRB bidding timetable is that, unlike the 
experience of many other SRB partnerships nationally, the CWP partnership had a 
substantive form prior to the SRB. The partners who would ultimately come together to 
form the CWP company had already been in discussions about the formation of a 
partnership organisation with which they might pursue common economic development 
objectives.  
Four core partners 
Even before its formal incorporation as a company limited by guarantee, with a specific 
SRB remit, a putative partnership organisation had been assembled amongst a group of core 
organisations. Individually, each of these organisations represented major players in the 
economic development of the sub-region in their own right: 
1. Coventry City Council 
2. Warwickshire County Council (WCC) 
3. Coventry and Warwickshire TEC 
4. The Warwickshire Chamber of Commerce and Industry  
 
This meant that by the time of the official announcement of the SRB these core 
organisations were already working on a partnership initiative. 
At that time the concept of working together in some form of partnership was a radical 
departure from traditional methods of working. This was especially the case for local 
authorities where partnership working was de facto an acceptance of a move from 
traditional dirigiste policy solutions, where they naturally assumed control, to a more 
innovative flexible approach to policy. In this sense a move to partnership working 
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represented a seismic shift in the way that local authorities [especially] but also other key 
statutory agencies approached joint working. This shift was radical not because it 
represented a new method of working because, as chapter two described, partnership was 
already a widely adopted method of working. Indeed, it was argued that partnership was so 
widely accepted that it had come to represent the accepted orthodoxy in economic 
regeneration. As a method of working then partnership was not, in the strictest sense, in any 
way radical. However, the seismic shift described here refers to a philosophical change 
rather than a literal one. The context for this change lay in the fact that economic, social 
and environmental problems remained and, in places like the inner cities, was getting worse 
(Robson et al DoE, 1994c:paras.xxxii / 5.3) but at the same time there was a grudging 
recognition by all those who had an interest in regeneration that the resources available to 
any individual organisation in no way matched the scale of the problem [Another echo from 
the 1977 White Paper]. This recognition arose in part as a by-product of the privatisation of 
policy that occurred under successive Conservative administrations. As chapter two argued, 
this process effectively removed the hegemony local authorities had enjoyed in the 
application of regeneration policy and also injected a range of alternative interests into the 
policy equation. This was also a period when ‘radical socialist alternatives’ were very 
publicly marginalised by a hostile central government and where local authorities were 
forced to confront the weakness of their own position – for a review of this literature see 
Boddy & Fudge, 1984. The reality for radical authorities was that they lacked both the 
resources and the autonomy of the central state with which they might hope to tackle many 
of the social and economic problems facing local communities. For many local authorities 
the lesson of this period of confrontational politics was that it simply exposed their 
impotence vis-à-vis central government. 
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The legacy of this period was twofold. First, it was clear to all involved that, when judged 
by the resources it attracts, regeneration has never been a government priority. Second, the 
analysis of what constitutes the regeneration problem has been continuously evolving. The 
problem was no longer simply viewed as one of poverty or unemployment but had 
expanded to include, for example, the competitiveness of a region, the quality of its 
environment, social exclusion, crime etc. The problem was increasingly being defined in 
ever more complex terms and this in turn demanded ever more complex solutions. In 
hindsight it is clear that the precedent set by City Challenge was the writing on the wall for 
the future shape of regeneration policy.  
The new SRB initiative now demanded comprehensive solutions. This requirement became 
a threshold participants had to fulfil in order just to enter into a competition [that you might 
lose] for resources that in global terms were actually diminishing in real terms [see table 3.2 
Expenditure on programmes within the SRB 1981/82-1994/95 in Mawson et al, 1995]. In 
this way the SRB changed the way statutory agencies thought about policy. Under the SRB 
it was understood that partnership was the only way of moving forward. The structure of 
the SRB and the way in which resources were distributed ensured that no individual sector 
could solve the problem alone or unilaterally dominate a partnership. The realpolitik of the 
SRB was that control could only be achieved through a process of bargaining and 
negotiation. Partnership had arrived again – having once more been redefined for the 
circumstances of the 1990s. The more astute players recognised this fact earlier than others 
and exploited this knowledge. Ultimately the rest were forced to acknowledge—often only 
after failure—the new political reality.  
This philosophical shift took time to percolate through the institutional landscape. 
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Notwithstanding then the changes in philosophical outlook that enabled—for the first 
time—a partnership organisation an opportunity to ‘speak’ for the Coventry and 
Warwickshire sub-region, it is also equally important not to underestimate the degree of 
joint working that already existed between the core organisations. Previously, these core 
organisations had been involved in a variety of joint initiatives. The importance of these 
existing ties can be seen by the fact that they are acknowledged in the opening paragraph of 
the partnership’s draft economic strategy [this document describes itself as a position 
statement that was to form the basis of a wider consultation exercise. Indeed, the Economic 
Strategy for Coventry & Warwickshire 1995-1998 (CWP, 1995) that evolved out of this 
consultation process, and was subsequently adopted, did in fact not diverge a great deal 
from the draft] which stated: 
In Coventry and Warwickshire there is a long history of liaison and ad-hoc alliances 
between agencies involved in actions to support the local economy. This reflects the 
inextricable links between the economies of the two areas based on Coventry’s industrial 
past and the dependency one has on the other for its economic success and employment 
prospects. Early successes of the Coventry and Warwickshire local authorities working in 
partnership with the Coventry and Warwickshire Training and Enterprise Council (TEC) 
and Chambers of Commerce to bid for UK and European Union (EU) help to restructure the 
local economy have demonstrated the power of collective action locally and played their 
part in fostering a new spirit of co-operation and mutual support (CWP, 1994 para.1.1). 
Examples of this joint working include how the Coventry & Warwickshire TEC delivers 
training and education for Coventry City and also provides a similar service to WCC. 
Similarly, Coventry City Council [especially as regards their economic development brief] 
and the Warwickshire Chamber of Commerce and Industry share a common business 
agenda. These examples illustrate that joint working was a common experience for the 
organisations that would ultimately come together to form the core members of the CWP. 
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[The draft strategy document Meeting the Challenge of Change (CWP, 1994) is primarily 
an audit of the extant partnership initiatives and provides an excellent overview of the range 
of measures engaged in by the various organisation in the sub-region] However, the 
importance of these examples lies more in the observation that they typically illustrate 
bi-lateral relations. The distinguishing and radical departure [for the sub-region] of the new 
partnership organisation was that for the first time all four of the core organisations 
voluntarily accepted the need to jointly co-ordinate their approach around a number of 
mutually agreed economic development objectives.  
FAULT LINES ~ THE SUB-REGIONAL LANDSCAPE 
Tensions between county & city  
That all four of these organisations should accept the need to work in partnership would 
perhaps seem a natural extension to the examples of previous joint working. However, 
given their importance to the sub-region, a very important exception to these positive 
examples was the ambivalent relationship between Coventry City Council and WCC. 
Indeed, prior to the advent of the CWP a major problem bedevilling attempts to develop a 
sub-regional economic strategy was any agreed common agenda, or even an acceptable 
starting point from which to commence a dialogue between county and city. Separating 
these two dominant players in the sub-region were historical, political, economic and 
cultural differences that effectively precluded the possibility of joint working. A number of 
councillors interviewed observed that it was possible to characterise relations in two ways. 
If you took a sympathetic analysis. Then at the very least it could be said that the diversity 
between county and city created a climate of mutual indifference. A more cynical 
interpretation is also possible. This analysis sees the fractured relationship as the product of 
mutual animosity based upon competition and it is this that more realistically explains the 
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lack of any effective co-ordination on economic development matters.  
In interviews with senior councillors in both councils it was repeatedly stated that prior to 
the CWP there had been nothing but mutual antipathy between city and county. A senior 
Coventry Labour councillor interviewed suggested that: “Coventry has a city state 
mentality, the ring road has taken over from the old city wall and it isn’t designed to help 
people get in, its designed to keep people out…”. On the other side similar sentiments were 
expressed by a senior WCC Labour councillor. Asked what was the nature of the 
relationship between the City and the county prior to the CWP initiative the councillor 
explained the longstanding historical antipathy existing between the two local authorities. 
Part of this antipathy he attributed as the result of the fractious reform of local government 
that occurred in 1972. During reorganisation the county lost influence in two ways.  
Loss of influence (I) 
First, the loss to the county was literal as the status of Coventry City changed to that of a 
metropolitan district and it was enlarged by the addition of certain areas of Warwickshire 
(Municipal Year Book, 1998). This boundary change, along with the creation of the West 
Midlands Metropolitan County (WMCC) that occurred at the same time, had the effect of 
removing a number of the county’s strategic functions it also meant a loss of direct 
influence in the areas ceded to Coventry and the WMCC. The case for reform had 
originally been made by the Redcliffe-Maud Commission. In metropolitan areas they had 
proposed a move to city regions with boundaries extending well beyond the traditional 
urban areas to cover areas corresponding roughly to travel-to-work areas—i.e., the 
implication for Coventry would be to move its boundaries outwards and into rural 
Warwickshire. In the event Coventry’s boundaries were adjusted, however, the effects were 
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marginal being more of a administrative tidying up of boundaries rather than any full scale 
reorganisation implicit in Redcliffe-Maud. The Conservative government of the day chose 
not to adopt the report’s recommendations in full. This was obviously politically expedient 
for them to do so, they understood that any radical redrawing of boundaries would have 
serious implications for its political base. Nationally, Shire counties have traditionally been 
dominated by Conservative administrations; any widening of the boundaries of urban 
authorities could potentially dilute Conservative strength in the Shires and simultaneously 
pose the threat of extending Labour influence beyond their existing traditional urban 
strongholds. This was clearly a politically unpalatable outcome. Given these concerns not 
unsurprisingly, under the circumstances, the logic of Redcliffe-Maud was tempered by 
political expediency. The outcome for Coventry was that its boundaries remained 
essentially constrained to its urban footprint. In contrast, the implications for WCC were: 
…drastic, involving the removal of Coventry, Solihull and Sutton Coldfield. 
The passage of the Local Government Act [vis The 1972 Local Government Act that 
became effective on 1st April 1974] therefore effected a dramatic change in the county of 
Warwickshire. Its boundaries, frequently noted through the years for their peculiarity, 
became even more irregular, assuming the shape of an inverted ‘C’ (Mitchell, 1988:xxi-
xxii). 
Perhaps more revealing in exposing underlying tensions was the implications for the county 
resulting from boundary changes: 
The removal of these areas in the West Midlands ‘corridor’ brought with it a reduction of 29 
per cent in the county’s population, demoting it from the thirteenth largest to the sixth 
smallest in the country…[and this]…loss was accompanied by a 19 per cent drop in the 
County Council’s administrative, professional, clerical and other grades of 
staff…(Mitchell, 1988:xxii). 
Leach et al (1990:52) in research [albeit] examining the implications of the abolition of the 
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MCCs emphasised the personal dynamics flowing from reorganisation:  
The antipathy to the metropolitan counties which was so strong in the mid 1970s, but still a 
significant force in the mid 1980s had little to do with the rational arguments for and against 
metropolitan counties per se. They had much more to do with the impact of the 1974 
reorganisation on the interests of many of the key sector actors involved in the districts. 
{authors emphasis} 
What Leach et al observed was that during abolition and the subsequent reorganisation of 
strategic functions “material interests, power and status could all in principle be affected” 
(1990:52). The research also observed that the threat of loss or diminution of these interests 
provided a fertile ground for mutual enmity. Interestingly, the research indicated that the 
legacy of the bitterness revealed in the 1974 reorganisation continued to cloud judgements 
[about the merits or effectiveness of the MCCs] long after the original event. What was 
particularly revealing—and relevant to this research—was the suggestion that the acrimony 
that had its origin in [one] particular reorganisation effectively became institutionalised 
through the collective [subjective] experience of the participants. This observation is all the 
more pertinent if you step back and take a longer historical perspective. 
Predatory neighbours  
Mitchell’s (1988) historical account of the development of WCC from its creation under 
The Local Government Act 1888 describes a catalogue of boundary conflicts with 
‘predatory’ neighbours. It would appear that ever since it inception the county of 
Warwickshire has fought a series of acrimonious battles with neighbours with a voracious 
appetite for land for expansion. As Mitchell (1988:xiv) wryly notes: “Warwickshire was 
particularly fated in respect of boundaries in having to accommodate Birmingham and 
Coventry”. For Warwickshire this has meant that: “For most of its life one of [its] 
controlling ideological commitments had been the maintenance of the distinction between 
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town and country.” There seems little doubt that the rivalry that exists between 
Warwickshire county and the City of Coventry has a long lineage and these tensions were 
both evident and deeply ingrained in the institutional landscape long before the 
reorganisation in 1974. That fractious relations have persisted between the two authorities 
is in no small measure attributable to this acrimonious history of boundary skirmishes. 
Notwithstanding governments’ repeated attempts to review and instil some rationality in 
the structure and effective delivery of local government, history has allowed town and 
county to evolve in ‘splendid isolation’. Because of this Mitchell (1988:xiii) observes that: 
“Alterations in Warwickshire’s boundaries have always impinged upon ancient loyalties 
and aroused varying degrees of resentment.” This is nothing new. The President of the 
Local Government Board speaking of the [boundary] problem from an administrative point 
of view, can be seen to echo Leach’s research result about the longevity of bitterness 
There is nothing which has created more feeling throughout the country than the 
supposition on the part of the inhabitants of the Counties that either County boundaries or 
their Union boundaries are to be altered…It is a feeling entirely sentimental; but 
Honourable Gentleman will understand that sentimental grievance is by no means the least 
difficult to overcome (quoted in Mitchell, 1988:xiii). 
The significance of the comment is the date: 1888. Seen in this longer perspective the 
1990s review of local government that saw districts pitted against county—threatening its 
very survival—is just yet another example of the principle of county government under 
siege. Understanding these historical developments helps to explain the tensions and 
ambivalent relationship that had developed between neighbours. Without the constant 
threat and the ever present need to defend itself from all sides, county politics may have 
proved to have been far less insular and introspective looking than it has historically been. 
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Loss of influence (II) 
Beyond the obvious loss of resources resulting from reorganisation noted above, the second 
way that the county lost out over the City arose through an erosion of its political influence 
because of a shift in power to the newly constituted WMCC. With Warwickshire not part of 
the WMCC it was in the unfortunate position of having no direct influence on a major 
policy body right on its doorstep. In contrast, Coventry as part of the metropolitan county, 
took the opportunity to exert influence in what was a major political innovation; with this 
situation considerably improving as, over time, all the MCCs came to be Labour controlled. 
Coventry with its long history of Labour control consistently returned only a minority 
Conservative presence. The implication of isolation was political imbalance. Taken 
together, it is clear that any erosion of Conservative influence, even where this occurred 
from historically modest levels, simply reinforced Labour’s domination and these 
circumstances simply compounded the existing town and county dichotomy. 
However, other fault lines run as deep, if not deeper, than the obvious historical political 
cleavage between county and city and these fault lines operate on a number of different 
levels. Coventry for example, is a urban environment with an economy based 
predominantly on [automotive] manufacturing. Whilst in contrast, Warwickshire is a rural 
environment, with an economy based predominantly on services – with parts of 
Warwickshire having been farmed for some ‘five thousand years’ (Mitchell, 1988:iv). The 
distinctive characters of county and city can be seen to reflect these widely divergent 
historical and cultural traditions. It could be argued that the process of local government 
reform [both 1972 and more recently in the 1990s] has only sought to compound these 
historically embedded differences and feed a sense of mutual ambivalence. The political 
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reality of a schism between the county and the city, and the basis of much of the underlying 
tension from which it is derived, was succinctly captured by a WCC Conservative 
councillor’s observation that: “Coventry had the jobs but Warwickshire had the land”. 
County / City cleavage 
In geopolitical terms, after reform, the Shire county resembled a part eaten doughnut – see 
figure 6.1. It had become physically disengaged, loosing parts of its area and, with it, 
influence it might have had there on strategic matters; and because of Labour’s urban 
dominance it was now completely politically disengaged. The county / city cleavage was 
now complete: it was both spatial and political. These very different trajectories were 
simply reinforced by the divergent history and culture of the two areas. It is understanding 
this background that helps to explain why it was that, from a county perspective, Coventry 
City Council could be caricatured as the ‘dreaded enemy’ and that because of this 
animosity, you would “perish the thought” of mutual assistance (interview with 
Warwickshire Labour councillor). Interestingly, in Warwickshire, at the county level, this 
mutual antipathy towards the City appeared to have been accepted as almost an apolitical 
act of faith. That these sentiments crossed the political divide at WCC can be seen from the 
comments of a senior WCC Conservative councillor who asserted that: “irrespective of 
which party was in power in Warwickshire, there wasn’t a lot of love lost politically 
between the two [the county and the City] councils”.  
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Figure 6.1: The sub-region 
 
 
NB*: The map is for illustrative purposes only. The actual administrative boundary of Warwickshire extends 
westwards. With Coventry Unitary authority at its centre and with Solihull removed during Local Government 
Boundary changes the map graphically illustrates Warwickshire’s inverted ‘C’ footprint. 
Solihull, although actually coterminous is shown detached for emphasis. Solihull formally applied  
to join the CWP becoming a member in mid 1998. 
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County politics 
Historically then political rivalry was an obvious ‘fault line’ running through county / city 
relations, with the City a Labour bastion and the county traditionally Conservative. 
Although clearly never apolitical, prior to the 1980s county politics were not characterised 
by overt politicisation or the polarisation of politics that was endemic in the national 
political arena. Indeed, the county’s conservatism prior to the 1980s was of the small ‘c’ 
variety, with the politicisation of county politics only becoming a significant electoral issue 
following the economic downturn of the early 1980s. The growing trend towards 
politicisation of local government was not only a county phenomenon it had been an 
important factor identified by Widdicombe (HMSO, 1986); Leach (1987). Even after the 
1980s a senior WCC Conservative councillor noted, without any hint of irony, that: “The 
difference between the Labour and Conservative on Warwickshire council the man in the 
street would be hard pushed to define what the difference was.” While there was certainly 
competition for control of the county throughout the 1980s – and control changed hands 
reflecting the shifting fortunes of the various political factions – party affiliation did not 
automatically constitute a major point of conflict. That this sentiment was more widely held 
was supported by a comment made in an interview with a senior Labour county councillor. 
He suggested that because the distribution of seats amongst the various political parties 
within the county is ‘fairly evenly balanced’ and that, ‘even in the worst years of the 
various Conservative governments they [Conservatives] still had a substantial 
representation’. It was his belief that this relatively stable political climate, the political 
fundamentals, influenced the way in which all the parties operate. This has meant that: 
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…in the county, in the Shires, we learn to work with our opponents for practical reasons. 
You’re not going to get anything done if you shout and argue with each other. Now the 
MCCs can’t understand this because at both Coventry and at Birmingham they’ve got so 
much of an overwhelming majority at the moment. 
By the 1980s the Conservatives had been in control at WCC for over twenty years. This 
position was only relinquished in 1985 to a [unofficial] coalition of Labour and Liberal 
Democrats supported by independents. The Conservatives briefly took back control again 
with the support of minority parties following the 1989 elections but this slim advantage 
was overturned within a year. Following further erosion of Conservative support at the 
county, Labour as the largest party, took effective control following the 1993 by-elections.  
Table 6.2: Distribution of seats on Warwickshire County Council 1979-98 
Year 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Conservatives 43 43 43 30 30 31 30 26 26 26 26 32 32 31 31 19 19 19 19 22
Labour 10 10 10 27 27 27 26 24 24 24 23 24 24 24 24 30 30 30 30 31
Liberal    3 3 2 2  6 6           
Lib/Dem             4 4 4 10 10 10 10 8 
Independents 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 
Alliance        10             
RA    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1        
SD       1  4 4 4          
SLDP            4         
SLD           6          
Other                     
Vacant       1    1          
(source: Municipal Journal/s various years; WCC) 
 
Table 6.3: Growth of Conservative opposition on WCC 1979-98 (% of seats) 
Year 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Conservatives 78 78 78 48 48 50 48 42 42 42 42 52 52 50 50 31 31 31 31 35
Labour 18 18 18 44 44 44 42 39 39 39 37 39 39 39 39 48 48 48 48 50
Others 4 4 4 8 8 6 10 19 19 19 21 10 10 11 11 21 21 21 21 15
Labour+Others 22 22 22 52 52 50 52 58 58 58 58 48 48 50 50 69 69 69 69 65
(source: adapted from table 6.2 above: Row two is the percentage of seats held by Conservatives; row three Labour seats; row four 
combines all non-Conservative seats to show the growth of opposition) 
 
Table 6.3 above reflects the changing political dynamics on WCC and the gradual erosion 
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of Conservative power from the late 70s. The table seeks to illustrate the strength of the 
combined opposition to the Conservative administration which grew throughout the period. 
Several points emerge. First, following local elections in 1982, the Conservative’s lost their 
majority; opposition parties taken together now held more than 50% of all seats, potentially 
threatening the Conservative’s absolute majority. In 1994 Labour substantially increased 
the number of seats which although not bringing absolute control in numerical terms gave 
them de facto control over the Conservatives and the administration. 
Labour’s triumph represented an enormous reversal of fortunes for the Conservatives and a 
rude awakening. This was an uncomfortable psychological blow to a party given to 
believing in its natural right to lead. This was doubly galling by the fact that the 
Conservatives’ losses had (for the first time ever) presented Labour with control of the 
county. But for Labour, control provided a window of opportunity to actively pursue a 
number of policy innovations that would subsequently have a direct impact upon the 
formation of a sub-regional partnership.  
Political contradictions 
A closer examination of the sub-region reveals an extremely complex and often 
contradictory political landscape. The perhaps obvious and understandable political 
cleavage that had historically marred relations between a Shire county and a metropolitan 
City is only one dimension. Remarkably then at the same time, within the county, the 
political distance between parties that nominally sit in ‘opposition’ was marginal.  
The socialists at Coventry basically make the Labour members in Warwickshire look like 
Conservatives because obviously they [Coventry councillors] are much more to the Left by 
and large than they are in Warwickshire (senior WCC Conservative councillor). 
These sentiments help to explain why it was that even when Labour took power in WCC 
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there remained a considerable political gulf between WCC and Coventry. The legacy of 
distrust and mutual indifference that had built up over time did not automatically disappear 
just because both authorities were now led by Labour administrations. Having successfully 
managed to avoid working together for so long the two authorities needed to be convinced 
of the merits of partnership working. The enormity of Labour’s achievement in taking 
control of a shire county was equivalent to a revolution in county politics: given its history, 
for WCC to then consider working with Coventry was a comparable revolution. However, 
the changing relations between county and city cannot be simply explained away by an 
electoral shift in county politics. Given the different character of Labour politics at county 
and city it is clear that political determinism alone does not explain the improvement in 
relations between the two authorities. Whilst a common politics may have created a more 
fertile terrain upon which improving relations could be built between the two local 
authorities, it does not on its own explain how they would come to share a common 
economic development trajectory within the CWP. For this to occur required other 
catalysts.  
This complicated political landscape is further exposed when the five district councils 
within the sub-region are brought into the equation; their involvement only adds further 
layers of complexity and exaggerates the potential grounds for sub-regional rivalry. Closer 
examination of the relations between these tiers reveals further contradictions that explain 
some of the tensions manifested in the sub-region. Leach (1987) provides an excellent 
account of the tensions inherent in the county / district cleavage. 
Tensions between county & districts 
The animosity which had historically dogged county / city relations extends into the 
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political quagmire that represents county / district and city / district relations. Indeed, a 
measure of the complexity and tensions underpinning sub-regional relations was evident in 
the degree of antipathy if not outright hostility between the various Labour groups within 
the sub-region. A measure of this political hostility was publicly exposed during the 
[rolling] Local Government Commission review which began in the early 1990s. In a telling 
indication of their mutual antipathy four of the five districts and WCC [who subsequently 
subscribed to the CWP] submitted separate submissions to the Local Government 
Commission in an attempt to present a case—typically at the expense of their neighbours—
for unitary status or an extension of boundaries or functions or both – for a summary of the 
proposed options put forward by the councils see HMSO, 1994a).  
The review process brought into sharp relief the extent of the political antagonisms between 
neighbours. In a more telling indictment of the nature of relations between local authorities 
the review conspicuously revealed the degree of mutual enmity that existed amongst 
Labour controlled councils. As a senior WCC Labour councillor observed: “You’ve got to 
bear in mind that a Labour district councillor hates a Labour county councillor more than 
his Conservative opponent.” Alongside the obvious stark political aspirations revealed by 
the submissions, the Local Government Commission review exposed the competitive nature 
of the relations between the authorities; this was clearly not a climate conducive to 
harmonious relations from which spontaneous co-ordination or the recognition of mutually 
advantageous strategic objectives could emerge.  
Structure of local government 
To get an insight into the origins of the tensions between the tiers of local government it is 
necessary to examine the structure of local government. In the Shire counties local 
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government operates on two tiers: county and district. [This is not true in the strictest sense 
but given the very limited powers that parish councils possess they are, for the purpose of 
this discussion, to all intents and purpose marginal players in relation to the two upper tiers] 
Because local government does not have unitary status in the Shires this has meant that 
certain strategic functions, and associated budgets, are administered by the county but their 
effects are felt in the districts. Crucially though, the strict hierarchical nature of a two tier 
administration however means that [on paper] the reverse is not true! The best examples of 
these strategic functions conducted by the upper tier, and perhaps the most important to 
local politicians because of their size [in relation to the whole budget], are education and 
social services. In the political sphere this has led to resentment by district councillors in 
what they see as continual political interference by the county in district matters. That this 
is important to the districts can be seen from the fact that concern with political interference 
was a recurrent theme in submissions by districts to the Local Government Review; where 
districts couched their argument in terms of the need for local government to be ‘nearer’ the 
people, closer, more sensitive and responsive to local needs. What districts wanted was to 
be their own master without the added complication of another tier of government looking 
over their shoulders telling them what to do. In the highly charged atmosphere surrounding 
the Local Government Review every argument advanced for greater autonomy by districts 
was a clear threat to the political survival of a county administration. 
Yet for all this political animosity, paradoxically, a two tier administrative system had 
meant that although district councillors deeply resent county interference the political 
reality had been that the two tiers, regardless of political persuasion, by necessity, have had 
to work together and politically cohabit. The effect of this is to puncture and blur the 
172 
 
picture of an apparently strictly hierarchical administration that sees county hegemony. The 
political reality is that whilst the county may manage important strategic functions, districts 
actually deliver them—the fact is that the county does not have the manpower to deliver 
many of the services even if it wanted to. This means that in order for the county to achieve 
its objectives requires either the tacit support, or at the minimum, no resistance, from the 
districts. This interdependence makes the relationship between county and district much 
more subtle. It is certainly not the black and white picture of a ‘top-down’ relationship that 
would be inferred if the relationship were simply depicted in an organisation chart. Rather 
the complicated political landscape of county politics has created a much more intricate and 
diffuse pattern of power distribution between county and district. This blurring of the 
boundaries of power has meant that the relationship between the two tiers is actually much 
more interdependent than the rhetoric reveals and it is this symbiosis that appears to have 
instilled a large degree of political pragmatism into working relations.  
Tensions between city & district 
It has already been noted that Coventry has had a long period of Labour dominated 
administrations with a Conservative presence that has progressively diminished throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s 
Table 6.4: Distribution of seats on Coventry City council (% of seats) 
Year 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Cons 56 43 28 28 35 39 39 35 24 20 19 19 17 15 24 24 20 20 7 6
Lab 44 57 72 72 62 61 61 63 74 76 80 80 81 85 76 76 80 80 91 93
(sources: City of Coventry Civic Diary ~ annual publication/various years; Coventry Committee Services)  
 
In stark contrast to the two tier administrative system operating in the Shires, Coventry as a 
metropolitan district effectively operates on unitary lines. The lack of a second tier makes 
for very real differences in character between the two authorities. The absence of a second 
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tier—whether that relationship is understood to be hierarchical or [viewed less 
deterministically] interdependent—shapes the way that Coventry manages its affairs and 
this impacts upon the character of the administration and its relations with other authorities. 
It has been noted above that in a scenario that saw WCC secure a mandate to carry out a 
policy initiative it would need, at a minimum, the compliance of the district/s in order to 
implement or at least not stifle objectives. At the county the two tier administration has 
effectively institutionalised interdependence and so local councils have chosen to adopt 
pragmatic political relations, this being the only way that any of them could hope to achieve 
any objective. These relations have occurred because all the parties appear to have accepted 
their relative strength / impotence within their given structure of local government. This 
would appear to suggest that, in county politics, the structure of local government has had 
a direct effect upon the character of county politics and this in turn has impacted upon the 
nature of relations between the county and the districts. The important point that should not 
be overlooked is that pragmatism in political matters has not removed old enmities rather 
they are set aside. In Coventry, the dominance of a Labour administration, in power for a 
long period, combined with a marginal opposition operating under a unitary system of 
government produced an entirely different institutional character and this in turn impacted 
upon the nature of relations between the city and the surrounding authorities. What is 
remarkable is that with such different trajectories how is it that these very different 
organisations, after a period of neglect and indifference, came to work together in 
partnership? 
CATALYSTS FOR CHANGE 
The impact of City Challenge on partnership thinking 
Remarkably then, at the very same time that political relations were floundering, the 
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national experience of City Challenge and pronouncements by government regarding the 
forthcoming SRB were having an important influence at officer level. That the government 
were convinced of both the merits and principles embodied in the City Challenge model—
discussed in full in chapter three—were made clear by pronouncements by Michael 
Howard, Conservative SoS for the Environment who argued that:  
Competitive bidding for inner city funds…has dramatically changed the attitudes of local 
authorities in their quest for urban regeneration. 
Working closely in partnership with the Government, the private sector and voluntary 
bodies has made them think afresh about how they can bring about real and lasting benefits 
to the people in their areas…It is not only the winners who have benefited…Everyone 
taking part will have gained from the new relationship which they have forged with their 
partners. That is the real prize of City Challenge (Extracts from a speech to the Association 
of Metropolitan Authorities conference quoted in Planning 25/09/92)  [and] 
I believe that City Challenge has been immensely successful in sparking off a new wave of 
urban regeneration. Its competitive edge has provided the spur to bring together partners to 
work hard for the benefit of their towns and communities…We want to take stock of 
progress in, and learn lessons from, the first two competitions (Extracts from a speech to 
British Property Federation seminar quoted in Planning 29/01/93). 
In the context of the highly charged local political environment it was not surprising that 
there was little evidence of any spontaneous co-ordination of resources or any recognition 
of mutually advantageous strategic objectives. However, it was clear to observers of the 
wider policy environment that the national experience would feed into the evolving SRB 
agenda. A senior officer in the CWP [interviewed in November 1996] suggested that in 
complete contrast to the political hostility at the local level, a recognition of the changing 
national policy environment was seen to have encouraged a “spirit of co-operation at 
officer level.” In interviews, officers close to the process suggested that it was only after 
acknowledging this changing national political environment was it possible to then begin a 
wider discussion on sub-regional strategies. 
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A second crucial influence came to prominence at the start of the 1990s. Unemployment 
was rising throughout the UK and its effects were particularly sharply felt throughout the 
sub-region. As the UK slipped into recession the West Midlands followed. The 
internationalisation of the manufacturing economy that had continued apace throughout the 
1980s meant that the Coventry economy, relying as it did on manufacturing exports 
suffered particularly badly. Warwickshire, which had secured substantial growth through 
the development of the service sector was not immune to these global pressures as service 
industries shed jobs. Warwickshire was particularly vulnerable and in fact had to bear a 
double burden. On the one hand the county lost service sector jobs. On the other hand its 
position was compounded further by the economic downturn in Coventry where many of its 
residents commuted to work.  
Table 6.5: Unemployment in the CWP area 1990-98 
Year 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 
Coventry 147,504 191,975 240,727 241,874 201,441 165,387 151,821 113,068 98,970
North Warwickshire 14,214 21,963 31,082 32,352 25,467 19,589 16,847 11,630 9,582
Nuneaton & Bedworth 33,899 52,669 73,178 72,975 60,821 47,183 39,634 30,571 25,363
Rugby 18,329 30,727 42,305 43,974 36,434 30,036 25,834 18,858 15,005
Stratford 12,935 25,477 37,075 40,180 33,911 27,090 22,818 15,903 12,512
Warwick 24,043 39,631 53,441 54,780 45,672 37,624 32,481 23,232 20,479
Totals =  250,924 362,442 477,808 486,135 403,746 326,909 289,435 213,262 181,911
% change  +44 +32 +2 -17 -19 -11 -26 -15 
(source: provided by WCC Committee services) 
 
Table 6.5 illustrates the impact of recession on the CWP area. What the figures show is the 
rate of increase in employment throughout the CWP area in the early 1990s. The point to 
note is the context within which discussions surrounding the development of a partnership 
initiative had been taking place. Although by the time of formal incorporation the economy 
had turned the corner—with unemployment beginning to fall from 1994—the early 
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discussions took place during a period of a dramatically rising unemployment. What the 
recession of the early 1990s did was to emphasise to the two major players in the 
sub-region the degree of interdependence between their economies. It painfully revealed 
their vulnerability to external shocks. What did not go unnoticed however, and what was 
crucially significant for future developments in the sub-region, was that the severity of the 
impacts of external shocks was interpreted as a [growing] measure of the 
internationalisation of the sub-regional economy. It was clear that the local economy had 
become [even more] intimately linked, and exposed to, the vagaries of a global economy. 
The slowdown in the economy and the growth of unemployment had a significant impact 
on a number of influential figures involved in economic development in the sub-region. 
These themes taken together: the philosophical change in how national regeneration policy 
should be delivered, a growing realisation of the impotence of local economies in the face 
of global forces and rapidly rising unemployment, changed the way the core partners 
thought about each other and helped to create an environment that was more conducive to 
partnership working. 
Political convergence at county and city 
The obvious county / city political cleavage of an urban Labour authority and a rural 
Conservative county was overtaken by events. Following local government elections in 
May 1993, Labour, with the support of three independent councillors, took control of WCC 
for the first time in its history. The incoming Labour administration came into office with a 
more interventionist platform than its predecessor and from the start sought to realign the 
County’s economic strategies to reflect the new political order. The historically divergent 
trajectories of the city and the [previously] Conservative-led county administration is 
177 
 
clearly revealed in the importance each authority attached to economic development. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s while Coventry was expanding its economic 
development activities, paradoxically, WCC reduced the status of economic development 
by abolishing its Economic Development Committee—resolution passed by full council on 
10th July 1990.  
One of the new Labour administration’s first acts in office was to set up a working party to: 
discuss the importance of Economic Development; the need for a committee; and to work 
out an Economic Development strategy (Interview with senior WCC Labour councillor). 
Following this new political agenda and in order to advance the Labour group’s own 
economic objectives an economic development policy working party was established by the 
council and met for the first time in October 1993. Shortly after this it was itself succeeded 
by a economic development panel in March 1994. Following these initiatives an Economic 
Development Sub-committee was formally [re]established by the council and it met for the 
first time in July 1994 (WCC Committee Services).  
It is difficult to overestimate the impact on the sub-regional political landscape of the 
arrival into office of a Labour administration at WCC. Labour’s entry into power—in what 
had been a longstanding Tory Shire—represented nothing less than a revolution in county 
politics. But of greater significance for the future CWP was that Labour’s ascendancy 
provided a window of opportunity within which the County’s and the City’s politics 
converged.  
Coventry leading partnership 
Interviews conducted with a range of partners indicated that the leadership of Coventry 
City Council was pivotal in stimulating the development of a partnership initiative. In 
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particular, Duncan Sutherland, who took up the post of Director of City Development at 
Coventry City Council on 11th January 1993 [coinciding with record levels of 
unemployment in the Coventry and Warwickshire sub-region – peaking at 11.2% in 
January 1993 with a national average of 10.8% (Challenges and Opportunities, 1998:19)] 
was widely credited by participants as a driving force behind attempts to develop a 
partnership approach to economic development.  
By the early 1990s sentiments between the four core partners had converged sufficiently to 
offer up an opportunity to develop a sub-regional partnership for this part of the West 
Midlands. Ostensibly, the drive and conviction of a number of influential personalities 
proselytising the partnership concept suddenly found a receptive audience. That these ideas 
proved fertile lay as much in the merits of the partnership argument as to the fortuitous 
coincidence of the change in county politics, economic decline [recession] and philosophic 
changes [at a national level] surrounding the delivery of regeneration policy. 
Disaggregating the relative weight of each of these factors is extremely difficult but taken 
together they contributed to a climate conducive to partnership formation. This was quite a 
remarkable change of events as this objective had consistently eluded organisations 
involved in economic development in the sub-region. Nick Scheele, CWP’s first chairman, 
succinctly captured the dilemma and the strategic aspirations of the CWP in an editorial in 
their publication, A Partnership for Prosperity. The CWP is:  
…a great improvement from the days when Coventry lost its natural hinterland and 
Warwickshire lost its geographical heart with the formation of the metropolitan council. To 
consider the economy of the Coventry and Warwickshire sub-region without recognising 
the considerable amount of interaction there is between the two districts is a 
nonsense…Coventry is very tight on its boundaries and needs to relate to Warwickshire. 
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Equally Warwickshire needs to relate to Coventry for without it the county loses its hub 
(CWP, 1996c). 
Partnership logic 
Sutherland believed that statutory agencies should be co-ordinating their efforts; the logic 
of his approach was to prevent wasteful duplication and harmful competition. The first 
obstacle was to develop a co-ordinated economic strategy which all the participants to a 
partnership could sign-up to. A tactic deliberately chosen by Sutherland was to pursue a 
narrow economic focused strategy. The rationale for this approach was that, given the 
historical political and cultural diversity in the sub-region, the pursuit of a narrow economic 
remit would make it easier to secure common ground. It was reasoned that a narrow 
objective would present less opportunities for partners to be drawn into the potentially 
controversial area of ‘socially driven’ expenditure programmes where consensus—amongst 
a group of such disparate partners—on a strategy might not so easily be reached. The logic 
of the original scheme envisaged by Sutherland was that, with the agreement of partners, a 
number of subsidiary companies would be set up to deliver specific elements of the CWP 
economic strategy (CWP, 1995: para.11). The method of delivery for the strategy 
deliberately proposed a partnership vehicle. This was perceived to offer certain practical 
advantages, chief amongst which was that a partnership vehicle should—theoretically at 
least—have no one dominant partner; and it was this quality which commended it to 
partners who expressed reservations [like the TEC] about the potential domination of the 
scheme by Coventry City Council. In addition, the proposal to create a number of discrete 
companies was also seen to acknowledge, and be sensitive to, the diversity of interests 
within the sub-region. An economic development structure based around a number of 
discrete partnership vehicles offered partners the opportunity of discretionary involvement 
180 
 
(i.e., you contribute where you share a common interest) within a strategically agreed 
framework. In the event only one company has been formed, Business Link Coventry and 
Warwickshire Limited but the CWP has been responsible for co-ordinating member 
organisations in conferences, promotional activities and a number of IT initiatives. 
A narrow concept of partnership  
Sutherland’s initial partnership concept was cast narrower than what was ultimately to 
become the CWP. His original idea simply envisaged a Coventry Partnership that 
incorporated key public and private sector players within the City. At the time Coventry 
had an established working relationship with, what was then, the TEC and with whom it 
had co-operated successfully on a number of education and training initiatives and a 
European Regional Strategy document. It also had a working relationship with the Chamber 
which was a conduit to the private sector, especially small firms. Although the Chamber 
was regarded as ineffectual privately it was conceded [in interviews with CWP officers] 
that their involvement was deemed essential in order not to ostracise the private sector. The 
city was also closely involved with the two universities [described in SRB documents as the 
‘private sector’] within the city boundaries: Warwick and Coventry. However the city’s 
initial attempt to formalise a working partnership with the TEC and the private sector met 
with resistance. The principal problem with the TEC was that its mandate was county wide. 
The view was taken by the TEC that entering into a relationship with Coventry could 
prejudice its relations with other significant partners in its area – this sensitivity is not 
surprising in the context of the history of local political conflict. Another obstacle arose 
from an unlikely quarter. “He [Sutherland] comes up not against the Left-wingers at 
Coventry but against the private sector” (Interview with a CWP director). Even before the 
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SRB had been announced Sutherland had anticipated the need to incorporate the private 
sector in order to exploit their expertise, their procedural innovations and their resources. 
His original partnership strategy envisaged creating opportunities for the private sector to 
become more centrally involved in the City’s economic development initiatives. However, 
unlike Coventry with its sharply circumscribed, and with what was perceived [by the 
private sector] to be arbitrary geographical boundaries, the private sector took the view that 
it thought that WCC should be involved because clearly what was being suggested was 
really part of a sub-regional issue (Interview with a CWP director). Given these sentiments 
Coventry approached the county to invite them to join the partnership initiative. One of the 
consequences arising directly out of this invitation was that WCC determined that it could 
not participate without the support of the districts in the county—this was for practical 
delivery reasons and the fact that deprivation lies within district boundaries as has been 
discussed previously. The quid pro quo of county participation was involvement of the 
districts. The issue that then arose is how they would be accommodated within the 
developing partnership structure.  
The development of a sub-regional partnership strategy 
On 29th March 1994 Duncan Sutherland (Director of City Development at Coventry City 
Council) produced a report to the Policy and Advisory Committee entitled: Coventry and 
Warwickshire Partnerships (City of Coventry, 1994). The purpose of the report was to: 
{para.1.1} …outline proposals for the establishment of an economic development 
partnership company to operate throughout Coventry and Warwickshire. This proposal is 
being made as it provides the most effective mechanism for the City Council, as the 
democratically elected local government, to join with others to promote the growth of the 
local economy and the well-being of the area. Informal discussions are being held with 
Warwickshire concerning the extension of the partnership area to the whole sub-
region {my emphasis}. 
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The report sketched out Sutherland’s strategy which envisaged the creation of a Partnership 
Company, Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships, which:  
{para.1.3} …is likely to take the form of an umbrella company responsible for 
strategy and a series of delivery companies and initiatives responsible for implementing 
parts of the strategy e.g. tourism or the centenary of the motor car. [and] 
{para.4.3} The strategy will be delivered through a variety of means depending on 
which is the most effective in each case. [and] 
{para.4.4} Where a part of the strategy falls within the province of one member of 
the Company that member will deliver that part of the strategy directly. Where many 
members want to contribute towards the same element of the strategy or there is a need to 
focus on a specific topic or issue, that part of the strategy will be delivered in partnership. 
The partnership will take different forms, e.g., 
• 100% owned subsidiary companies of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships (possible 
examples are 1996 Centenary of the Motor Car and Coventry Tourism Convention Bureau 
Company). 
• Stand alone joint ventures between members of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships and 
third parties (possible examples are property joint ventures). 
• Looser partnerships and associations (possible examples are joint marketing campaigns). 
The Policy and Advisory Committee approved the establishment of Coventry and 
Warwickshire Partnerships Limited and authorised: “…the officers to negotiate with 
Warwickshire County Council with a view to that authority becoming a founder member of 
the company” (Minutes of Policy Advisory Committee, {para.124f:37} 29/03/94). 
Although approval to establish a partnership was reached in March 1994 informal 
discussions between senior representatives of the county and city had begun as early as July 
1993. From the outset Sutherland’s partnership model only involved the city, the TEC, and 
the Chamber, and only after pressure was this broadened to incorporate the county council. 
Before any substantive actions could be undertaken the partnership was overtaken by 
events. 
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From provisional partnership to SRB bid 
Following the government’s announcement of the round one SRB timetable on 14th April 
1994 the core group [Coventry City Council, WCC, Coventry and Warwickshire TEC and 
the Warwickshire Chamber of Commerce and Industry] set about reorienting their original 
partnership to one tailored to meeting the demands of the SRB. Occurring as it did so early 
on in the life of the partnership the SRB can be seen to have been both a stimulus for the 
formal establishment of a sub-regional partnership and a vehicle to prove that partnership 
was indeed possible. At the time of the announcement discussions amongst the core group 
were at a preliminary stage and no substantive actions had been undertaken. For the core 
group then the SRB initiative was a catalyst that helped coalesce the putative partnership 
into the formal entity that subsequently become the CWP. The SRB helped encourage the 
formation of the CWP partnerships in two important ways. It did this first of all by 
providing a rationale for partnership: only partnerships get government money. Second, it 
defined the structural framework for a participating organisation: partnership.  
Pre-empting the government’s SRB announcement Coventry City Council took the 
initiative and assembled a SRB ‘Bid Co-ordination Team’ in March 1994. This action was 
enormously significant because it preceded the CWP by approximately five months which 
legally only came into existence in August 1994. The decisions that were taken by the core 
partners in this period fundamentally shaped the character of the SRB bid and de facto 
effectively occurred in a strategic vacuum. At the very least crucial strategic decisions 
taken at this stage could not have been endorsed by the partnership as it did not yet exist. 
The Bid Co-ordination Team first step was to set up a SRB Steering Group consisting of 
officers representing the four core partners and with their agreement and a strong steer from 
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Sutherland, also included other interests who were invited to join the team. The team 
operated from day one and included about 20 people and was split into Theme Groups 
consisting of persons who could bring specific areas of expertise and co-opted additional 
expertise as and where required (Interview with CWP officer November 1996). Although 
the partners accepted that the principle benefits arising from partnership working would be 
greater co-ordination and more effective delivery of policy this had not in practice been 
worked out. This meant that when the SRB was announced the partners were still very 
much engaged in discussions designed to explore and identify common agendas. With an 
extremely tight SRB timetable suddenly thrust upon them the partners took an extremely 
pragmatic approach. Each of the partners had in their own right produced a strategic 
analysis for their own organisations and this information was pooled to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the sub-region. The task of the Bid Co-ordination Team was to 
sift through this morass of information and identify, where possible, any common themes 
or concerns. Out of this came target areas and themes.  
The development of the SRB partnership  
Sutherland’s original strategy based upon the formation of a number of companies was 
overtaken by events. It can also be seen that there were a number of structural explanations 
for the demise of a [multiple] companies approach. In the published details accompanying 
the SRB announcement it was made clear to bidders that SRB grants could only be paid by 
GOs through a ‘Single Accountable Body’ (SAB). The SAB would be liable in full for the 
repayment of grant [to GOs] in the event of (either) a failure to deliver contracted outputs 
or as a consequence of mismanagement or maladministration. Given the potential financial 
liability associated with being a SAB this has typically, although not exclusively, meant 
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some form of statutory organisation with considerable resources/assets. Experience 
nationally has indicated that most SABs have been local authorities or TECs (see Mawson 
et al, 1995; Hall et al, 1996, 1997) but other existing organisations [e.g., private-sector led 
partnerships, long-standing voluntary or community organisations] with rigorous systems 
of management and accounting controls have been acceptable to GOs. A practical 
consequence of this approach has been that innovative partnerships without the support of a 
statutory undertaker, or a new partnerships without a track record, are unlikely to be 
acceptable to a GOR.  
The designation of SAB was particularly complicated by the form of organisation adopted 
by the CWP.  
From the outset CWP has been a membership company open to organisations that share 
CWP’s goals and seek to work in partnership with others to achieve the Economic Strategy. 
Following a membership drive in the autumn of 1994 membership built steadily in the first 
half of 1995, with nearly 60 organisations in Membership at the year end (CWP, 1995: 
para.3). [and] 
CWP’s income is derived from substantial contributions from the City Council, the County 
Council and the TEC, and from membership income (CWP, 1995: para.4).  
This structure reflected the desire to incorporate the diversity of interests from around the 
sub-region and feed these into a sub-regional economic strategy. But an additional stimulus 
for the particular form of partnership adopted was the fact that local authorities have no 
statutory authority to spend resources beyond their own territorial boundaries. The CWP 
was thus an [external and independent] organisation established by its members. Once 
constituted the membership company set up the CWP office. This office had a small 
secretariat with a mandate to bid for SRB funds in round two in 1995 and round three in 
1996, although this mandate did not extend to the fourth round in 1997. However, this form 
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of organisation meant that the partnership company had no assets [of substance] and, so in 
the event of a breach of a SRB contract, could not reimburse its grant if required [for 
whatever reason] to do so by its GO.  
For these reasons the CWP does not actually deliver any part of the SRB programme itself, 
instead there are nine Guarantor Organisations—who collectively act as the SAB—and 
with whom the CWP contracts to deliver the programme and who effectively underwrite 
the SRB bid.  
Table 6.6: The original nine guarantors 
1 Coventry & Warwickshire TEC 
2 Coventry City Council 
3 Coventry University 
4 North Warwickshire Borough Council 
5 Nuneaton & Bedworth Borough Council 
6 Touchstone Housing (Brought in because Rugby DC refused) 
7 University of Warwick 
8 Warwickshire County Council 
9 Warwickshire District Council 
 
The legal position of the Company is made clear in the partnership’s accounts which shows 
that:  
Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership Limited acts as an agent for administering and 
claiming SRB grants. During the 17 month period to 31 December 1995 the Company 
received grants of £853,000 and distributed some £790,000 of this to its members and other 
associated organisations. As the company is the grant holder it is ultimately responsible for 
the grant conditions being met. Consequently, if the conditions of the grant funding are not 
met, repayments by the Company may be required, albeit that the Company would 
subsequently reclaim such repayments from the organisations that received the grant 
(CWP, 1996b). 
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SUMMARY 
Given the formidable political obstacles that needed to be overcome it is hard to 
underestimate the enormous political achievement represented by the creation of the CWP. 
When the partnership was formally incorporated it represented an entirely new geopolitical 
structure in the sub-region. Historical and political rivalries stretching back decades had 
effectively prevented partnership working yet under the CWP these had been set aside. In 
the process for the first time county, city and districts were united under the umbrella of 
one partnership and even more remarkable was that the partnership included a wide cross 
section of voluntary, ethnic minority and private sector organisations.  
That it could be established in such a short time was also remarkable. It is clear that 
personalities played a crucial role in the early stages. Duncan Sutherland’s appointment as 
Director of City Development at Coventry was pivotal in the early stages. It was his 
partnership paper that effectively started the ball rolling. However, the creation of the CWP 
cannot be explained by Sutherland alone. The partnership concept as set out by Sutherland 
was transformed as it meandered its way through the harsh realities of the political 
landscape. The fact that politics could play an important part in shaping the outcome of the 
kind of partnership created is itself an indication of the malleability and contested nature of 
the partnership concept. Without doubt recession, high unemployment, and the realisation 
that the philosophy of regeneration as understood by central government had changed, 
fundamentally influenced the four core partners making them more susceptible to 
partnership working. The fact that the four core partners appear to have successfully 
anticipated changes to the policy frame meant that they were already engaged on a 
partnership initiative prior to the announcement of the SRB and this certainly helped the 
partnership to assemble a successful SRB bid in the time available. The existing 
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relationship between the four core partners appears to have placed them in a particularly 
powerful position during the formative period of the partnership. The evidence would 
suggest that early participation provided a much greater opportunity to influence the final 
shape of the partnership and the policies that were adopted. 
As the putative partnership developed each of the four core partners appears to have sought 
to extract concessions as the price of participation. Ultimately, the partnership that was 
delivered at the end of the process bore little resemblance to the one envisaged by 
Sutherland. The evidence suggests that Coventry exploited its acknowledged expertise in 
regeneration and the resources at its disposal to assert influence over the outcome of the 
SRB bid albeit along an agenda acceptable to the four core partners. The gestation of the 
partnership reveals the importance of the interplay between the four core partners and how 
this process shaped the final outcome. The significance of this interplay for the discussion 
on partnership is that the four core partners arrived at their conclusions in isolation from the 
wider community. Notwithstanding that the four core partners represent wider interests, the 
experience of the CWP and the first round SRB strategy that finally evolved from it, was 
that it was effectively an internally managed process. 
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CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH RESULTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Objectives 
This objective of the chapter is to take the conceptual understanding of partnership 
developed in chapter four and apply it to a real partnership. The checklist approach was 
therefore a deliberate attempt to develop a conceptual toolkit that used the theoretical 
insights from chapter four but provided a methodology that could be applied in a practical 
situation. Taking the toolkit and applying it to a SRB partnership offered an insight into 
both the state of partnership relations in contemporary regeneration policy and also 
revealed the strengths and weaknesses of the toolkit methodology in understanding 
partnership relations.  
Methodology 
The Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership (CWP) was chosen because it was an unusual 
SRB partnership with a number of interesting properties which made it particularly 
appealing to study. Nationally the experience has been that where SRB partnerships bring 
together local authorities this has typically involved adjacent authorities who share 
coterminous boundaries or a county authority working with a district. Reporting in 1998 the 
DETR were still able to observe that regions are [still] not comprehensively covered by 
sub-regional partnerships (DETR, 1998e).  
The CWP was therefore novel in terms of the national experience because it brought 
together the county council, the city and the districts—each with distinctly different 
identities—and de facto, by its spatial coverage, created a entirely new sub-regional 
institution. This achievement, let alone the CWP partnership’s success in attracting partners 
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from the private, community and voluntary sectors, was all the more remarkable given the 
history of the area and the absence of any previous experience of joint working on such a 
comprehensive scale.  
Theory meets practice 
In chapter four it was argued that a coherent theoretical model of partnership did not exist. 
To address this lacuna a model of partnership was postulated which took as its starting 
point that partnership represented a specific form of co-ordination. This approach 
acknowledged the widespread abuse of the generic term partnership and the absence of any 
critical theory of partnership. In order to endow partnership with some meaningful and 
critical conceptual validity and to provide a foundation upon which to build a theory of 
partnership it was argued that partnership would have a specific partnership logic. 
Crucially, partnership logic would be distinct from other logics and this would differentiate 
it from other forms of co-ordination. In looking at the problem in this way an intellectual 
bridge could be made linking the theoretical literature on co-ordination with that of 
partnership. 
To develop a theoretical model of partnership—a model which was both critical and 
objective—required the deconstruction of forms of co-ordination in order to identify what 
might be considered as categorical partnership qualities and this was the approach adopted 
in chapter four. It was argued in chapter four that a true partnership was endowed with 
specific institutional and organisational qualities which both distinguished it and contrasted 
it from other forms of co-ordination. The principle research task then was to develop a 
conceptual model that could be applied to a real world situation. The checklist should 
therefore be seen as an analytical toolbox where each item on the list represents an element 
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of the theoretical insight developed in chapter four. This chapter thus seeks to record the 
results of applying the checklist to one SRB partnership.  
TESTING THE CWP AGAINST THE PARTNERSHIP CHECKLIST 
The checklist 
The theoretical analysis in chapter four deconstructed partnership. The analysis identified a 
number of different organisational logics. However, the principle concern of the research 
was to isolate and categorise what might be described as the essential partnership logic, 
what the government describe as ‘true’ partnerships. The theoretical analysis suggested that 
organisations operating with a partnership logic were in fact a distinct sub-set of the wider 
group of organisational logics. In order to be able to isolate partnership logic from the 
wider set of organisational logics a partnership checklist was developed. The purpose of 
this was to provide an intellectual toolkit that could be used to test the quality of 
organisational relations. In principle then, forms of co-ordination that match the partnership 
checklist might accurately be described as partnership. Axiomatically, where organisational 
relations did not satisfy the definition of partnership implicit in the partnership checklist 
then they could not be described as partnership. 
The purpose then of this chapter is to systematically apply the checklist to the experience of 
the CWP. Testing the CWP in this way allows a comparison to be made between the 
relations predicted in the theoretical model with experience on the ground. The checklist is 
reproduced below for reference.  
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The partnership cheklist 
1. Power sharing 
2. Agreement on key issues 
3. Organisational learning 
4. Independent arbitration 
5. Mutual reorientation 
6. Standing orders 
7. Entered into voluntarily 
8. Accountability supported by sanctions 
9. Participation strategy 
10. Expenditure audit  
Complementing the partnership checklist the research uses five primary data sources to 
better understand the context within which the partnership was assembled, these included: 
1. Semi-structured interview with partners; 
2. Interview with Government Office personnel; 
3. Bid documents / Annual Delivery Plans; 
4. Published partnership material; 
5. Local authority published material. 
[a complete list of partners and organisations interviewed in connection with the research is listed in 
Appendix (F)] 
POWER SHARING 
to avoid the accusation that a partnership is nothing more than the clear domination of one 
party over another then partners should share power 
There are a number of ways in which the concept of power sharing can be evaluated within 
the CWP. One way that it can be examined is through its formal executive structure.  
Structure of the CWP Board 
The CWP came into existence on the 19th August 1994 as a Private Limited Company 
registered N°.2960454. In paragraph 5 of the Articles of Association it distinguishes six 
groups of members. 
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a) “Members Group A” shall comprise all Local Authorities, which are for the time being 
Members of the Company; and 
b) “Members Group B” shall comprise all firms and organisations in the private sector or 
appointed representatives of such firms or organisations (as appropriate), which are for the 
time being Members of the Company; and 
c) “Members Group C” shall comprise all institutions of Further and |Higher Education, which 
are for the time being Members of the Company; and 
d) “Members Group D” shall comprise all trades union organisations, which are for the time 
being Members of the Company; and 
e) “Members Group E” shall comprise all community organisations or appointed 
representatives of such organisations (as appropriate), which are for the time being 
Members of the Company; and 
f) “Members Group F” shall comprise the Coventry and Warwickshire Training and 
Enterprise Council and the Coventry and Warwickshire Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry. 
The Articles of Association details the ‘Appointment of Directors’, it states: 
Para.16(a) The Board shall comprise not more than 26 voting directors. 
Para.16(b) Each group of Members will be entitled to appoint (and remove and 
replace) up to the number of directors stated below:- 
Table 7.1 below provides a breakdown of the directors. Column four shows the proportion 
of the individual groups as a percentage of the total Board. What the figures show is that 
the group with the largest representation is ‘B’– the private sector. In strictly numerical 
terms the private sector represents a significant proportion of the Board. With 26⋅9% of 
Board seats this is the largest sectoral grouping but given the distribution of Board seats 
amongst other sectors this is in reality no more than a substantial minority interest. What is 
of more significance is to understand how the distribution of Board seats was arrived at. 
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Table 7.1: Distribution of Directors seats on the CWP Board 
Group Directors Definition % 
 
A 
 
5 
5 Directors, two of whom will be appointed (and removed and 
replaced) by Coventry City Council and two of whom will be 
appointed (and removed and replaced) by Warwickshire County 
Council 
 
19.2 
 
B 7 Private sector 26.9 
 
 
C 
 
 
4 
4 Directors, one being appointed by the University of Coventry, 
one being appointed by the University of Warwick, one 
representing Further Education Colleges in Coventry and the 
other representing Further Education Colleges in Warwickshire 
 
 
15.4 
D 2 Trades unions 7.7 
 
E 
 
3 3 Directors, one of whom shall represent Community Organisations in Coventry and another of whom shall represent 
Community Organisations in Warwickshire 
 
11.5 
F 4 Coventry & Warwickshire TEC and the Coventry & 
Warwickshire Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
15.4 
 
Total = 25 
 
100% 
(source: Adapted from Memorandum and Articles of Association of CWP Ltd: Companies House, Cardiff) 
 
The distribution of seats on the Board 
In its early days when the CWP was being assembled a crucial decision was made between 
the two lead authorities that would have a fundamental impact on the size and character of 
the Board. A pressing concern amongst the local authorities was not to breach Part V of the 
Local Government and Housing Act 1989. Part V constrains the ability of local authorities 
to participate in companies (Berwin, n/d: para.3.6.6.2). The importance to the local 
authorities of the legislation was that it ensured that: 
Local authorities must structure their “joint venture” in such a way so as to achieve the 
minimum impact upon its capital projects. It is an inherent part of the control over local 
authorities capital expenditure that the authorities are given an allocation each year to fund 
their own capital projects and failure to use the right joint venture will use up part, or indeed 
all, of that allocation (Berwin, n/d: para.1.1). 
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According to a senior officer close to the process the issue that was foremost in the minds 
of the local authorities was not to commit themselves to any enterprise that might prejudice 
or potentially jeopardise existing capital allocations from central government. The effect of 
the legislation was that if a local authority set up a company:  
Depending upon the extent of local control, the company may be treated for capital 
spending purposes as part of the local authority group, that is to say the legislation 
controlling capital expenditure will apply to the company as if it were the local authority 
(Berwin, n/d: para.3.6.6.8). 
For the purposes of deciding whether the activities of a company should come under the 
aegis of a local authorities accounts or remain independent of them rested upon this 
principle of identifying with whom control lay. Understanding that power could be asserted 
in a number of different ways the Act established the principle issue as being the power to 
exercise control. The Act provides for a number of different situations where local 
authorities may participate in companies and identifies two different types of companies, 
the local authority controlled company and the local authority influenced company” 
(Berwin, n/d: para. para.3.6.6.9){my emphasis}. Controlled companies are defined where a 
local authority has the power to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors or 
has a majority of voting rights; a company can be an ‘Authorised’ company, authorised by 
the SoS in regulations and where the local authority has a non-controlling interest—that is 
less than 51%; and then there are Influenced companies. The latter has a crucial bearing 
upon the constitution of the CWP Board. Section 69 (1) of the Act states that an Influenced 
company is one which has either: 
a) at least 20 per cent. of the total voting rights of all the members having the right to vote at a 
general meeting of the company are held by persons who are associated with the 
authority… 
b) at least 20 per cent. of the directors of the company are persons who are so associated; or 
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c) at least 20 per cent. of the total voting rights at a meeting of the directors of the company 
are held by persons who are so associated… 
(source: Local Government and Housing Act 1989) 
It is no coincidence that if you examine the distribution of Board seats you will find that the 
five seats held by local authorities [two each for WCC and Coventry City, with the fifth 
seat taken by a representative of the districts, this being the price they extracted for their 
participation] equates to exactly 19⋅2%, [5 / 26*100 = 19.2%] and falls comfortably below 
the 20% threshold for Influenced company status.  
The size of the CWP Board was in fact calculated backwards. First, the number of local 
authority seats was fixed at five—this had been arrived at politically in discussions between 
WCC and Coventry. For their part WCC’s participation meant a representative from both 
the Labour and Conservative groups. This approach reflected the political reality at county 
level where power was finely balanced and which acknowledged that control was 
susceptible to movement in either direction. These political fundamentals influenced the 
character of county relations encouraging a more consensual bi-partisan approach to 
working in a number of policy arenas. Collectively, the local authorities understood that to 
avoid the ‘influenced’ company status local authority seats needed to represent less than 
20% of the total board. Working the calculation out backwards – beginning with the 5 seats 
representing less than 20% – then the entire board would need to be 26 [vis: if 5 seats = 
20% then 100% = 25]. In order to ‘fit’ the local authority presence below the 20% thus 
required a slightly larger board i.e., 26. 
That this formulaic approach to the establishment of the size of the Board was used was 
confirmed in discussions with an officer of the CWP that was close to the process at the 
time. Incidentally, and no doubt related to this formulaic approach is the anomaly in the 
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Memorandum of Association which refers to ‘not more than 26 voting directors’ but then 
only identifies 25 seat. If you repeat the previous calculation using [the actual] 25 Board 
seats as distinct from the 26 seats maximum referred to in the memorandum then the results 
are slightly different vis. 5 / 25*100 = 20%. Under these conditions the company would 
technically be defined as an ‘influenced’company with all that that entailed.  
If we now look just at the proportion of seats that are controlled by the four core partners 
[WCC, Coventry City, TEC and the Chamber]. This works out to 30⋅8% 
[8 / 26*100 = 30⋅8%]. So although the private sector is notionally the largest group the 
potential control implicit in the voting rights of the core group cannot be ignored. It is 
however not surprising that the private sector technically constitutes the largest group on 
the Board. Chapter two observed that the 1980s was a period when government 
progressively privatised policy across a range of activities. Privatisation marginalised local 
authorities by displacing them from dominant positions in areas that they had traditionally 
accepted as their preserve. For much of the Thatcher period private sector values, if not the 
actual private sector, were promoted at the expense of the public. In effect the structure of 
the policy environment was manipulated to place an obligation on the public sector to 
accommodate private sector interests. The lasting legacy of this period was a major fillip 
given to the private sector. In many policy areas the only way forward for local authorities 
was to work with the private sector. It could be argued that the privatisation of policy 
started by Thatcher, led to [and on occasions forced] an accommodation between the public 
and private sectors. If this was the general climate that local authorities operated in—one 
which automatically envisaged an important role for the private sector—policy innovation 
also pointed in this direction.  
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City Challenge rehabilitated local authorities but its structure was firmly rooted in a private 
sector model – it was managed by a board independent from local authorities, it drew upon 
representatives from a variety of interests of which the local authority was one of several. 
The significant change however was that the role of the local authority had been subtly 
redefined its task now was to: “…take the lead in putting an initial bid together and forging 
the partnership which will deliver the programme” (DoE, 1994f:6){original emphasis}. 
The guidance issued for City Challenge made the clear distinction between local authorities 
leading and local authorities controlling partnerships: the former approved the latter to be 
resisted. By separating the concept of leadership from control City Challenge sought to 
redefine the role of local authorities in regeneration initiatives. The regulations guiding 
their formation, and the fact that City Challenge Partnerships required the stamp of 
approval of the SoS, ensured that suitable structures were adopted.  
In 1994, with the City Challenge experience firmly in mind, with the structure of the 
forthcoming SRB being explored via public pronouncements by the government [see for 
example Single Regeneration Budget: Note on Principles (DoE, 1993) and, with the 
consultation document on the draft bidding guidance in circulation from January 1994 
(DoE, 1994a), it was clear that the private sector would be expected to play a part in any 
SRB partnership. The final version of the SRB Bidding Guidance (1994b) [unsurprisingly] 
confirmed the importance of working with other partners. It stated:  
The [SRB] Budget is intended to encourage joint approaches to regeneration through local 
partnerships. Bids should therefore be supported by partnerships representing the 
appropriate range of interests. Individuals or groups with ideas for initiatives should seek to 
involve the relevant partners to work up their proposals into a bid… (DoE, 1994b: para.26). 
That the private sector should come to dominate [numerically] the board of the CWP can be 
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explained by the convergence of a number of factors. First, the obligation that any SRB 
partnership should reflect a range of interests would of itself encourage their inclusion. 
Second, the ‘20% Influenced rule’ inhibited local authorities from taking a controlling 
interest. Third, the SRB followed a decade that had seen local authorities marginalised in 
economic policy and the gradual institutionalisation of a perception of the merits of all 
things private. And finally, with local authorities having been in the front line of the 
government’s squeeze on the public purse then the private sector represented a potential 
alternate source of additional resources. The importance of ‘leverage’ – matching public 
money to other income streams – under the Conservatives became a highly potent measure 
of the effectiveness of policy. The concept had its apotheosis with the London’s Docklands 
UDC and although figures across the country never matched the dizzy heights achieved in 
the uniquely special environment found in the capital the concept of leverage continued to 
figure highly in central government’s estimation of the efficacy of policy. It was these 
conditions that structured the economic and political landscape and this then was the 
backdrop to the formation of the CWP. It was clearly an environment that was particularly 
propitious for an initiative described by its initiators as private-sector led.  
Choice of chairman 
Seeking to further advance the private dimension of the partnership a leading and 
influential private sector chairman was sought out by the core partners. A candidate who 
certainly fulfilled these requirements was Nick Scheele CEO of Jaguar Cars based in 
Coventry. A political judgement was taken that, in the prevailing ‘anti public-sector’ 
climate of the time, it would be advantageous to secure a leading private sector figure as 
chairman. According to a leading Coventry City Councillor the logic behind this approach 
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was that this would provide kudos for the partnership especially in relation to bids either for 
funding through the SRB budget or through European Structural Funds. Significantly 
however the coincidence of other important factors helps explain how Jaguar’s CEO came 
to be put forward as a potential CEO of the CWP.  
Occurring at approximately the same time were discussions taking place about where the 
new Jaguar XJ200 project would be manufactured. There had been veiled threats emanating 
from the parent company—Ford America—that the new Jaguar could potentially be 
manufactured abroad. Local authorities were only too aware of the sub-region’s over-
dependence on manufacturing, particularly automotive: 
Some 12,000 jobs – representing one in five local manufacturing jobs – are directly 
associated with motor vehicle assembly in Coventry and Warwickshire…Moreover, one 
third of all local manufacturing output stems from vehicle manufacturing (Challenges and 
Opportunities, 1998:20) 
Losing the production of the new Jaguar would have serious political and economic 
ramifications for the local economy especially in Coventry. As important as any economic 
loss however was the potentially enormous psychological shock arising from the prospect 
of Jaguar production being taken abroad and what this might imply for the long term 
security of existing production for what is the largest employer in the sub-region. A 
primary reason therefore of seeking Scheele’s candidacy was to: 
…give it [the CWP] that kind of image. [i.e., a high profile private-sector led initiative] It 
was also to attract manufacturing and of course we were working very hard to 
bring…because of the XJ200 project…we were very keen to give a high profile to Jag to 
impress the board at Detroit (Coventry City Councillor). {my emphasis} 
The obvious and understandable sentiments of a local authority faced with economic 
turmoil were entirely complemented by the local TEC’s agenda.  
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The TEC’s position 
A network of TECs had been announced in December 1988 and completed in 1991 
(HMSO, 1994c: para.255). Coventry TEC was formally established in September 1990. 
The TEC movement was established in a fanfare of publicity with aspirations that alluded 
to a substantial role in local economic development—significantly, however, ‘a substantial 
role for the TEC movement’ could only be taken as a threat to the many existing players in 
the economic development arena especially local authorities who feared for the future of 
their economic development functions. For the TEC movement nationally their formative 
years were a period of adjustment and accommodation as they struggled to define their 
raison d’être and establish their legitimacy in local economies—see Peck (1993) for an 
account of these developments. Coinciding with the TEC movement’s formative years the 
government had been undertaking a comprehensive examination of the competitiveness of 
the UK economy and published their first Competitiveness White Paper in May 1994 
(Competitiveness: Helping Business To Win Cm.2563 HMSO, 1994b). The White Paper 
drew particular attention to the impacts of global competition and the importance of 
manufacturing to the UK economy. It went on to identify skill shortages and training 
deficiencies and linked improvements to these to the future wealth and prosperity of the UK 
economy. The importance of manufacturing in this analysis of competitiveness was made 
clear in the Trade and Industry Committee Second Report Competitiveness of UK 
Manufacturing Industry (HMSO, 1994c)[published coincidentally in April 1994—the same 
month as the announcement of the SRB, though hearings had begun in May 1993 see Trade 
and Industry Committee, Minutes of Evidence (session 1992/93, HC 702i)]. The report 
concluded that: 
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There were three reasons for regarding manufacturing as especially important to the 
economy (HMSO, 1994c:125 para.(1)): 
(i) it provides over 60% of UK exports, compared with under 25% in the case of 
services; 
(ii) a significant proportion of the service sector depends on manufacturing; 
(iii) it is extremely improbable that service industries could substitute for a substantial 
part of UK manufacturing. 
Manufacturing holds a particular significance for the West Midlands. The reason for this is 
that it is the most manufacturing dependent of all UK regions with 23⋅6% of employment 
directly attributable to manufacturing compared to 16% in the rest of the UK (The Chamber 
Annual Report, 1997:6). With the West Midland’s regional economy fundamentally geared 
to manufacturing and with an identified training and skills shortage the TEC’s strategic 
objectives mirrored the local authorities sentiments regarding securing the candidacy of a 
high profile manufacturer to lead the CWP. 
Control through nomination 
The Board structure that emerged for the CWP was designed and implemented by the core 
partners. Following agreement to work together on a partnership initiative they had set up 
an Executive Committee to co-ordinate their approach to partnership working, this was 
supported from the start by an Officers Liaison Group staffed by senior officers from each 
of the core partners.  
Having first determined the total number of Board seats as 26 by the ‘reverse formula’[see 
above] and in order to assert the private sector led credentials of the partnership then the 
number of private sector seats had to exceed those of the public sector—so private seats 
were set at seven, two more than the local authorities. With the announcement of the SRB 
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the Executive Committee became intimately involved in the strategic development of a 
Shadow Board for the proposed CWP. This committee had enormous influence. It exploited 
this in its selection of candidates to what was initially a Shadow Board but would 
ultimately become the formal Board of the CWP. The core partners control of the selection 
process can be seen from the minutes of the Executive Committee of 06/06/947. Agenda 
item 5 on Directorships refers to a previous Executive Committee meeting where the merits 
of private sector candidates had been discussed, the minutes note that: 
The Agenda had attached a list of names. Discussions centred around the need for the 
unfilled private sector directorships to be representative of the area and business. After 
considerable discussion eight prospective names or people were suggested… 
 R. Chappel Evening Telegraph 
 M. Ritchley Coventry Building Society 
 Mr. Cooper County Artists {Rugby based Computer Software/hardware business man} 
 CABA Textile business woman? 
 J. Brown AMEC 
 D. Howes Christian Salveston [sic: Salvesen] 
 V. Cocker Seven Trent [sic: Severn Trent]  
Agenda item five of the minutes takes on more significance when read in conjunction with 
agenda item two. This minute refers to a meeting that had already taken place with 
GOWM. The significance of this meeting is the timing. The minutes confirm that 
representatives of the core partners had made a presentation to GOWM setting out the 
proposed £52m SRB bid and that this occurred before the discussion on prospective private 
sector directors. Agenda item 5 of the minutes continue: 
                                                 
7 The Executive Committee was formed prior to the formal registration of the CWP company. The Executive 
Committee minutes were administered by the Corporate Services Secretariat of Coventry City Council. The 
records the author has seen are not complete. The first minutes of 7th June 1994 refer to ‘notes of last meeting’ 
but no record of this or previous meetings exists. 
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The position of Eric Avery of Tile Hill College and a prospective director was discussed 
and it was agreed that the issue should be openly discussed and referred back to the 
Coventry FE Colleges. 
The Director from the Community Helen Aird was agreed as the interim director pending a 
more formal nomination method. 
Trades Unions Directorships is still open with only one or two names suggested. Further 
consideration in this area is needed including the number of directorships. 
The position of the MP’s and the European MPs was briefly considered and agreed that it 
was not appropriate for them to be automatically directors. 
A co-opted Director for the District authorities was noted as a possibility and referred to the 
main Board. 
These minutes reveal the crucially important role of the core partners in determining the 
structure and by definition the character of the CWP Board.  
Not surprisingly the core partners all had Board seats. They determined the size of the 
Board by what was described above as the reverse formula method. Having agreed to create 
a partnership they had formed an Executive Committee to co-ordinate their activities and 
this committee came to play an enormously influential role in the subsequent distribution of 
Board seats in the CWP. The minutes reveal that the Executive Committee exerted control 
over the Board through its management of Board nominations where they were in effect 
vetting candidates to the Board. The Executive Committee also applied its influence in 
another way.  
By the time of its formal incorporation the CWP had 57 member organisations—see 
Appendix (D): Membership of CWP at May 1995. In the Directors first report 
(CWP, 1996b:para.3) it asserts that “From the outset CWP has been a membership 
company open to organisations that share CWP’s goals…” This statement is problematic. 
205 
 
The reason for this is that the company preceded its published goals. Minutes of the 
14/09/94 Executive Committee (para.2) reveal that marketing the putative partnership was 
an important matter for the core partners.  
The following points emerged in the discussion: 
• The need to recognise the different audiences and the different ways that the 
sub-region has to be marketed to them. 
• The importance of knowing how people outside perceive the area. 
• The importance of getting local people involved in the Company’s activities to 
market the area. 
• The need for a brief to develop a positive marketing programme for external 
parties. 
• The emphasis on any money spent on marketing should be on changing 
perceptions rather than telling us what we feel is the current situation. 
A member organisation structure was deliberately chosen in order to provide a vehicle that 
could potentially assimilate the numerous disparate interests within the sub-region. A 
membership organisation, that by definition was comprehensive, neatly dovetailed into the 
prevailing philosophy of inclusive partnership and co-ordination that the government were 
keen to promote with the SRB. A leading councillor from one of the core partners close to 
the process stated that the primary reason for a membership organisation was to be able to 
show central government that here was a new and innovative local approach that was 
showing leadership by seeking to respond to changes in the national debate. A sub-regional 
approach that appeared to incorporate all the various sectors and interests would clearly: 
“…impress government and particularly GOWM…” that what was being proposed was 
genuinely innovative and in tune with government policy. The superficiality of the 
proposed structure is apparent when you realise that member organisations that joined the 
CWP had their first opportunity to ratify the CWP’s goals at the Annual Conference held 
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on the 1st May 1995 held ostensibly to adopt The Economic Strategy for Coventry & 
Warwickshire 1995-1998 (CWP, 1995b). This document represented the definitive strategic 
plan for the sub-region incorporating a wide variety of issues one element of which was 
integration of SRB funding. When the conference took place the strategic parameters of the 
bid had already been determined—this was nine months after the legal incorporation of the 
company and eight months after the submission of the Final bid. Crucial also to an 
understanding of the power relations amongst members was the fact that at the conference 
members endorsed—with only minor amendments—the economic strategy. The SRB bid 
however, which was nominally integrated into that strategy, was not directly debated. In 
any case this was subsequently drastically amended by the Board in the Delivery Plan 
produced in July 1995 when the level of funding sought in the SRB bid was halved by the 
government. The reality for delegates at the Annual Conference was that in the process of 
endorsing the economic strategy document the wider membership de facto abrogated any 
role they might have played in determining the strategic objectives of the SRB bid. The 
agenda of the conference was the endorsement of the economic strategy and not the 
Executive’s right to determine it. Almost unnoticed by the members of the wider 
partnership was that by not challenging this implicit assumption they had not only allowed 
responsibility for the development and implementation of the SRB strategy to remain the 
prerogative of the CWP executive but almost inadvertently, certainly not deliberately, they 
had legitimated the Executive’s authority in these matters. 
What remained after the dust had settled was a partnership ostensibly private sector led and 
incorporating numerous disparate interests. But in reality power remained with the core 
partners with nothing more than the illusion of private sector control and the wider 
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dispersion of power.  
AGREEMENT ON KEY ISSUES 
the aims and objectives of any partnership should reflect the joint aspirations  
of all partners 
SRB priorities 
The government set an extremely demanding timetable for the submission of bids, viz: 
 14th April 1994 SRB bidding timetable announced 
 31st May 1994  Deadline for submission of Outline Bid 
 7th September 1994 Deadline for submissions of Final Bid 
The core partners had already begun to examine their economic development activities 
under the aegis of a shadow partnership board. [The evolution of the bid is depicted in 
figure 7.1: Evolution of the CWP partnership and SRB Bid] One of the first steps they took 
was to instigate a comprehensive audit of all extant economic development initiatives in  
the sub-region. This led to the publication of a report Meeting the Challenge of Change 
(CWP, 1994b). This reviewed the economic outlook for the sub-region, synthesised the 
extant initiatives, and mapped out from this morass of activities a strategic analysis that 
formed the basis upon which an action programme could be taken forward. This logical 
rational analysis would at first appear to commend itself. However, as with the distribution 
of Board seats the timing of this document is problematic. The draft version of this report 
was finally published in December 1994, three months after the submission of the Final 
SRB bid. So the refreshing strategic analysis that the document sought to promote therefore 
cannot be used to explain the SRB programme in round one.  
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Figure 7.1: Evolution of the CWP partnership and SRB bid 
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Experience would suggest that the government grossly underestimated the time needed to 
consult with what would be, by definition, new partnerships. The fact that geopolitically the 
CWP represented a novel organisational entity covering an area that lacked any cohesive 
unity defined by a collective experience of politics or culture could only exaggerate the 
scale of the consultation problem. It therefore seems all the more unrealistic for the 
government to imagine that six months could have been long enough to both effectively 
engage the disparate interests of the sub-region and also submit a bid. The magnitude of the 
problem can be seen by the fact that The Economic Strategy for Coventry & Warwickshire 
1995-1998 (CWP, 1995b) [which was what the Meeting the Challenge of Change 
document became after ratification] was only ratified by CWP’s first annual conference in 
May 1995 some thirteen months after the April announcement of the SRB.  
If the round one SRB objectives cannot be accounted for by any published strategic 
analysis how were the priorities contained in the bid identified? 
Objectives in the outline bid 
The government’s timetable required Outline bids to be submitted to respective GOs by the 
31st May 1994. Remarkably then, the core partners, in a little over six weeks following the 
announcement of the SRB were proposing a massive SRB bid based on a partnership that 
had yet to be formally incorporated—the bid which in the event was the 12th largest in the 
country out of a total of 201 successful bids. [The final bid is reproduced in full in 
Appendix (G): CWP Final Bid document] The early discussions that took place amongst 
the partners was handicapped by a lack of clear information from central government. An 
explanatory note issued to accompany the press release announcing the SRB (DoE, 1993) 
discussed the possibility that each GO might publish a set of regional priorities to assist 
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bidders. By the time of the publication of the Bidding Guidance (DOE, 1994b) this 
suggestion had not been followed through with the result that GOs did not publish a set of 
regional priorities to guide bidders. Similarly, whilst GOs were given indicative budgets 
these were not made public. Bidders therefore did not know what the GOWM regional 
priorities for the SRB were [if any], or the basis upon which national SRB funds would be 
distributed amongst the GOs. Bidders did know from published government documents that 
the aggregate totals were diminishing and that the budget total in 1994/95 would be £1⋅4bn 
(DoE, 1993: para.2). It was also made clear that existing commitments would be honoured. 
By discounting these existing commitments from an albeit diminishing global budget it was 
possible to make an informed judgement about the likely scale of free resources for the 
whole of England. Indeed a provisional figure of £100m, qualified by the clause “on current 
estimates”, was suggested in the January 1994 Draft Bidding Guidance 
(DoE, 1994a. para.12)—and this figure is mentioned in CWP correspondence. A GOWM 
Director suggested in an interview that: “Regional budgets were not actually published but 
the amount was public knowledge”. Jeff Jacobs, Assistant Secretary, Cities Policy and Co-
ordination Division, DoE interviewed by the Environment Select Committee suggested that 
in round one the amount each region would receive: “…was unpublished in a formal sense, 
although the indicative allocations were actually made pretty widely available by regional 
directors (HC, 1995b: para.54). However, even working with a ‘ball park’ figure, bidders 
did not know the basis upon which this amount might be distributed between the regions. 
The position of GOs nationally was that regional indicative budgets were not to be made 
public. However, the Bid Co-ordination Team were aware of the regional allocation and 
used this to make a ‘best judgement’ about the likely magnitude of their proposed Outline 
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bid. The officer involved explained the thinking:  
I worked it out on the basis of saying that we’ve got 10% of the population of the West 
Midlands…8% or whatever it is. That we’ve got a significantly higher level of disadvantage 
than that, although its difficult to compare. And I started saying well what’s a reasonable 
share of the total cake if we were successful. So I said well our upper share is going to 
be…a reasonable share would be anywhere between 8% and 12%, I then said well we ought 
to go higher than that because we’ve got something a bit unique [a sub-regional 
partnership]. And I thought the partnership was something which would appeal to head 
office and we’d done a reasonable amount of work. So I said well let’s go for between 15 
and 17% of the total resources I thought were available over the period of the five years.  
Without any clear understanding of the GOs selection procedures the core partners had to 
make a political judgement based upon crude calculations. Another explanation that was 
offered, and one that was used to garner political support, was a crude calculation of what 
might occur in the event of no bid being submitted, the so called ‘neutrality position’. This 
approach sought to calculate what would be the potential scale of the losses from existing 
budgets that were being transferred into the SRB budget. The officer that did these 
calculations was remarkably surprised to discover that the two approaches produced near 
identical figures. Having two methodologies which such similar figures was expeditious for 
the Bid Co-ordination Team but it was also a comfort in that it enabled it to tailor the 
argument to suit the sentiments of different audiences. So whilst the Bid Co-ordination 
Team used the first approach to argue its case with officers the latter approach was 
extremely powerful with members sensitive to the political ramifications of a loss of any 
resources. That the latter approach could be used tactically can be seen from CWP 
correspondence from the period: 
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Quite simply SRB brings no new money to the table. In 1994/95 the Coventry and 
Warwickshire area received some £10m from the grants subsumed within the SRB. Our bid 
for next year 1995/96 is likely to be £7m. Following informal advice from Government 
Departments even this figure may be too high. So our likely bid over 5 years of £50m will 
at best protect our existing position….{original emphasis} [and]… 
Working in partnership is not just the key to protecting our position in the short-term 
through SRB…{my emphasis}  
(extracts from CWP Bid Co-ordination Team correspondence reproduced in full in 
Appendix (H): CWP Correspondence Bid Size ~ 16th June 1994 
It is logical to argue that, whether or not protecting existing budgets was a dominant 
motivation in the Bid Co-ordination Team’s thinking, the fact that the integration of 
budgets under the SRB threatened the existing resource distribution, then any successful 
bid would redress [in aggregate terms] the negative effects of any resource cuts. However, 
regardless of which of the two methodologies most accurately represents how the Outline 
figure was determined what is far more interesting is that the process of setting the figure 
reveals the strategic influence of the Bid Co-ordination Team based at Coventry City 
council. 
Outline bid summary  
The Outline bid summary provided what was described as a ‘short factual description’ of 
the SRB programme.  
The aim of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd is "to improve the quality of life, 
prosperity and wealth of the inhabitants of Coventry and the county of Warwickshire" Our 
aim is ambitious and our bid for SRB is geared to deliver a substantial and imaginative 
programme which will integrate with other main programmes. Our strategy seeks to 
re-establish the sub-region as one of the most technologically advanced, prosperous and 
equal in Britain. To achieve this we are proposing a regeneration programme totalling 
£421m. SRB of £52⋅0m directly facilitates £175m of this, with the remaining £246m in 
complementary funding. 
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Our SRB Bid has targeted integrated local action in areas of greatest deprivation reinforcing 
broad strategic themes. The targeted areas are Hillfields, Foleshill, Wood End, Willenhall 
and Stoke Aldemoor (Coventry) and parts of west Nuneaton and Bedworth, the Old Town 
area of Leamington Spa and the Benn and Newbold wards in Rugby (para.2 Outline Bid 
Summary compiled by GOWM, 1994).  
A critical examination of the Outline bid raises a number of important questions.  
• How was the £52m figure arrived at? 
• How were the strategic objectives, listed in the bid, identified? 
• How was SRB money to be distributed? 
• Given that the partnership did not get the money it requested how did the partnership manage the 
process of downsizing? 
A £52m bid 
Almost from the moment the core partners began to work together on the partnership 
initiative the SRB timetable was thrust upon them. Co-ordinating a SRB bid quickly 
became an objective of the putative partnership under the control of the Executive 
Committee but delegated to the Bid Co-ordination Team; the bid also came to represent a 
highly visible measure of the capacity of the partners to create the reality of an effective 
partnership mechanism. It seems certain that one of the considerations that pre-occupied the 
partnership was the scale of potential losses that were threatened by the amalgamation of 
budgets under the new SRB budget.  
Strategic objectives in the final bid 
Notwithstanding a lack of time to consult, the SRB Final bid lists what are described as 
three: “working themes to characterise the key areas where we [CWP] will apply SRB 
funds and other resources…” (CWP, 1994a:para.4.8). The three themes were:  
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1) Building business, especially engineering excellence, reskilling the labour force and 
increasing educational attainment (para.4.9). 
2) Spreading market confidence North (para.4.13). 
3) Building self-determining, safe and confident communities (para.4.18). 
The Final bid then lists an additional eight strategic objectives (i.e., 4 - 12) that the 
partnership intended to pursue:  
4) Skills to maximise growth & opportunities 
5) Invest in business: Encourage Growth and Diversity 
6) Promoting Coventry and Warwickshire  
7) City & urban centres 
8) Housing which meets peoples needs 
9) A high quality environment 
10) Safer communities 
11) Health and caring communities 
12) Deliver SRB programmes and monitor against strategy 
 (source: objectives 4 - 12 taken from [table] CWP’s Regeneration Programme 1995/96 to 1999/2000 
in CWP, 1994a:10) 
These objectives are of fundamental importance as they would be used to assess the merits 
of projects submitted to the CWP for SRB funding. Any project submitted would need to 
conform to one or more of the stated objectives in order to qualify for assessment and 
possible inclusion in the SRB programme [i.e., to be included in the Delivery Plan of 
approved projects]. 
How were the SRB objectives determined? 
The four core organisations had already begun a tentative dialogue in order to explore ways 
of co-ordinating their economic development activities—as has been noted this began in 
early 1994 as a result of the partnership initiative promoted by Coventry City under the 
personal aegis of its City Development Director, Duncan Sutherland. Although this putative 
partnership had produced no substantive results this early start bestowed a number of 
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structural advantages which the core group exploited when setting up the CWP. The fact 
that they had commenced a dialogue around partnership conferred upon the core group a 
certain legitimacy vis-à-vis organisations not included in the partnership initiative from the 
start—the obvious fact that these organisations were major players in economic 
development helped reinforce this dominant position. An example of the hegemony that 
their position conferred upon them was the way that the core group could, without 
reference to the views of [future] potential partners, unilaterally set themselves up as an 
Executive Committee [see table 7.3 below]. Being in at the start allowed the core group the 
opportunity to shape the subsequent structure of the CWP. Whether with hindsight the core 
group acted benignly is not the critical issue here. Of much more significance is the 
observation that being ‘in from the start’ offered the core group opportunities to manage the 
evolution of the partnership structure in a way not offered to partners that joined later. An 
officer with a district council interviewed in January 1998 expressed exactly these 
sentiments when describing the evolution of the CWP: 
Coventry approached WCC and asked them if they were prepared to become a partner in 
this economic development company. And WCC were quite positive about that and they 
raced ahead and some way down the line they asked the districts if they would like to be 
involved, and organised a meeting and invited the districts along [where] the districts were 
presented with - essentially - a fait accompli. The county had agreed [already] that they 
were going to join this [CWP]…[and] 
…There was no representation within the structure for the districts. So there was a little bit 
of bad feeling about that and one of the districts was concerned that they had been left to the 
very end to be consulted and were being asked to join something over which they had no 
control over….no representation on. So there were a lot of difficult bits in the early days. 
The CWP experience suggests that there would appear to be clear structural advantages in 
early membership. Organisations close to the partnership at its evolution were party to a 
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discussion about how it should evolve: organisations that came to the partnership later join 
a structure that has been defined by others. In the absence of ‘organisational learning’ [see 
below] timing becomes a significant cleavage that highlights the relative impotence of 
organisations not party to the initial deliberations. This observation is all the more pertinent 
because the SRB bid contained a strategy, set out in a programme of themes tied to specific 
levels of projected expenditure, that was [pre]determined by the core partners, and although 
the programme would affect future [i.e., later] partners directly, they played no part in 
setting them. 
Control through objectives 
The four core partners controlled the SRB by defining the strategic objectives that set the 
parameters for projects submitted to the partnership. These SRB themes were not simply 
plucked out of the air. For most organisations involved in regeneration, need always 
exceeds the available resources—this is especially the case in times of economic decline [as 
in the recession of the early 1990s] or during periods of public expenditure constraint. The 
reality for many organisations is that they have a ‘bank’ of initiatives—ready to be taken 
off-the-shelf—in the event of an opportune funding stream being identified. For local 
authorities however the possibility to fall back upon a bank of initiatives had been 
strengthened as a result of legislation. Introduced in the late 1980s the Local Government 
and Housing Act 1989 sought to formalise economic development undertaken by local 
authorities. Part III (para.35) imposed a duty upon local authorities to examine, before the 
beginning of each financial year, whether they intended to engage in activities to promote 
their area. If an authority wished to engage in economic development they had to set out 
their proposals in a public document. This needed to show the expenditure implications, the 
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likely income and, what the authority intended to achieve by their proposals. For local 
authorities committed to economic development the legislation compelled them to address 
economic development in a more formal and structured way. For those authorities that 
chose to pursue economic development it forced them to confront local priorities but it had 
the added advantage that they had a list of objectives that they could [would] reasonably 
argue had been achieved through an objective rational (technocratic) process. Whether local 
priorities were identified through a rational process or were simply pet projects that 
organisation were keen to pursue, a second important factor appears to have been crucial in 
identifying a number of the themes which the core partners later adopted in their SRB bid. 
These themes arose out of the collective insight that the core group gained preparing their 
part of the West Midlands European development strategy (this strategy was published as 
Partners in Europe, 1993). The core partners involvement however represented only part of 
the process. 
The West Midlands European development strategy 
The preface to the document states: 
The strategy was built up from contributions from the major ‘economic actors’ in the 
Region. Steered by the West Midlands Regional Forum of Local Authorities (comprising 
the Metropolitan Districts, the Shire Counties and the Shire Districts within the Region, and 
the West Midlands Passenger Transport Authority), it draws heavily at regional level on the 
views of, among others, the Regional Economic Consortium (the Regional CBI, Chambers 
of Commerce, TECs, TUC, MPs and MEPs) the Regional Development Agency (WMDA), 
the Region’s Universities. The UK Government’s Regional Departments (the DOE, DTI, 
DEmp, MAFF) have helpfully provided technical information. The document has also 
benefited substantially from detailed consultations at a local level with contributions from 
sub-regional social/economic partners, particularly industry, training agencies, unions, 
educational and research establishments, and the voluntary sector (Partners in Europe, 
1993:2) 
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Partners in Europe was published in 1993 in response to a review of European Structural 
Funds and set out the region’s economic development strategy. The strategic analysis 
underpinning the report was made clear in the opening paragraph which states: 
Present and past implementation of Structural Fund operational programmes and attempts to 
effect the maximum utilisation of all EC funds have demonstrated, both in this Region and 
elsewhere, the value of a clear and practical framework with pre-established priorities 
to marry-up the economic and social needs of the Region with the objectives of European 
aid. This strategy document is a means of building on earlier frameworks in response to the 
current review of the Structural Funds, utilising the experience of the last few years to 
derive a programme for the next three and six years (Partners in Europe, 1993: para.1). 
{my emphasis} 
Partners in Europe is unequivocal about the pivotal importance of manufacturing to the 
wider West Midland’s economy and how this was inextricably linked to its continued 
prosperity. The importance of manufacturing is confirmed when you observe that the first 
identified strategic priority for the region was: “To arrest the decline in manufacturing and 
develop a strong, diversified and adaptable economic base” (Partners in Europe, 1993:12). 
After first setting out a series of priorities and strategic responses that apply to the whole of 
the West Midlands, the remainder of the document consists of seven discrete sections [The 
Sub-Regional Strategies] based on either existing EU Programme Areas or 
Non-Programme Areas. Each of these sections contains an audit of the strengths and 
weaknesses with a list of policy priorities. Section 3 covers the Coventry & Warwickshire 
sub-region. Coincidentally this document was written by David Taylor from Coventry City 
council who was asked by the then WM Forum of Local Authorities to co-ordinate the 
input. The sub-regional priorities in this document bears a striking resemblance to those 
later identified in the SRB bid that was produced almost a year after. Table 7.2 below—
adapted from the European strategy document (Partners in Europe, 1993:15) and the CWP 
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Final bid document (CWP, 1994a:10)—seeks to compare the stated objectives and, where 
applicable, groups similar objectives together. 
Table 7.2: Comparison between Partners in Europe & the SRB final bid 
European Strategy SRB Themes 
City Centre Revival 
Inner City Development Partnership City & urban centres 
Manufacturing and Engineering excellence Skills to maximise growth & opportunities 
East Coventry Employment Programme Invest in business: Encourage Growth and 
Diversity 
The Regeneration of Areas affected  
by Coal Mining Closures A high quality environment 
Safer communities 
Health and caring communities 
Housing which meets peoples needs 
 
Deliver SRB programmes and monitor against 
strategy 
(source: adapted from Partners in Europe, 1993:15; CWP, 1994a:10) 
 
 
What is immediately apparent comparing the columns in table 7.2 is the number of obvious 
similarities between the two programmes. While this is patently clear in relation to the City 
centre objectives. What is perhaps more interesting is the degree of overlap of the other 
objectives that is revealed by a closer reading of the two documents. If you take, for 
example, the heading ‘Manufacturing and Engineering excellence’ in Partners in Europe 
then you can see that this is echoed in the SRB bid. The latter specifically states: There is a 
new national consensus that manufacturing industry needs to be at the forefront of our 
economic effort…” (CWP, 1994a: para.1.8) and goes on to itemise specific manufacturing 
initiatives. The ‘East Coventry Employment Programme’ heading in Partners in Europe 
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focuses on development sites with the potential for industrial units or business parks and 
this again mirrors the SRB objective of ‘Invest in business: Encourage growth and 
diversity’. The ‘Regeneration of Areas affected by Coal Mining Closures’ heading assesses 
the impact of the closure of four coal fields in Bedworth, Nuneaton and Atherstone which 
created derelict land, environmental degradation and a shortage of training facilities. The 
SRB objective of ‘A high quality environment’ clearly responds directly to the degradation 
of the environment. Equally however, the generic nature of the wider SRB objectives 
provides considerable latitude and certainly several of them fit comfortably under the coal 
field regeneration heading. 
It would seem then that the SRB bid drew heavily upon the work previously undertaken in 
the production of Partners in Europe. In the event, as has already been stated, the 
extremely short time scale following the introduction of the SRB prevented wide scale 
consultation and given that the research and consultation for the European development 
strategy was contemporaneous it seems logical that the themes identified by this process 
should appear in the SRB bid. But as has been argued, a set of priorities that emerges under 
a ‘competitiveness’ agenda are unlikely to be the same that might arise under another remit. 
The lack of consultation however makes it impossible to state with any certainty whether 
objectives that arose out of consultation for a European development strategy were 
appropriate to the SRB bid. 
Control through co-ordination 
Duncan Sutherland’s original idea was based around ‘multiple partnership companies’ 
which envisaged linking organisations in discrete economic development initiatives. The 
first step in developing this strategy was a comprehensive sub-regional audit. And so one of 
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the first things that the core partners instigated prior to the formal incorporation of CWP 
was to establish a Strategy Sub-Committee. Sutherland invited Mike Goldstein, vice 
chancellor of Coventry University (chairman) to undertake an audit of the local economy in 
order to prepare a sub-regional economic strategy. The product of this work was the 
Meeting the Challenge of Change report (CWP, 1994b)—completed in December 1994 
after the SRB deadline and which only went out to consultation in January 1995.  
The partners had only just commenced work on the audit at the time of the announcement 
of the SRB—and as described above this was published some time after the submission of 
the Final bid. Without any clearly developed strategic framework the core partners were, at 
the time of the SRB announcement, united simply in a common commitment to the general 
objectives of a sub-regional partnership sketched out by Sutherland. His partnership ideas 
were set out in a report, Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships, that he had produced 
and submitted to the Coventry Policy Advisory Committee (Minutes 29/03/94). Paragraph 
1.2 of the report states that: 
The principal aim of establishing the Partnership Company is to provide a mechanism for 
improving the quality of life, prosperity and wealth of Coventry and its environs (“the 
Area”) by involving all sectors of the community in developing and implementing a cogent 
economic strategy. The principal objectives of the partnership will be: 
• to develop, implement and review a strategy that strengthens and diversifies the economy of the 
Area 
• to encourage, attract and secure investment of all types from both private and public sources 
within the UK, European Union and elsewhere and increase business, training and employment 
opportunities in the Area  
• to undertake and/or participate in projects for the economic development of the Area and 
enhance the skills and capabilities of the population 
• to promote a positive image of the Area and develop it as a centre of business excellence and 
tourism and thereby improve the quality of life, prosperity and wealth of the inhabitants of the 
Area.  
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Setting up SRB structures 
Following publication of the Draft Bidding Guidance (DoE, 1994a) in January 1994 
documents indicate that the core partners began a dialogue on the shape of an SRB bid in 
late March 1994. Immediately following the announcement of the SRB bidding timetable in 
April 1994 two important structures were created that would influence the shape of the 
subsequent SRB bid. The first structure was a ‘SRB Bid Co-ordination team’ made up of 
Coventry officers with a remit to produce a bid. A senior Coventry officer described how 
the stimulus to create such a unit arose from within Coventry city council. Duncan 
Sutherland had been vigorously promoting a partnership strategy and with the 
announcement of the Bidding Guidance took the view that a partnership would be best 
placed to win any competition. Within Coventry he secured the support of chief officers to 
initiate a Bid Co-ordination Team under David Taylor. He then took this proposal to the 
core partners. Coventry’s latent expertise and resources made them particularly prepared to 
lead this initiative. WCC economic development function, although re-established under 
the Labour administration, was not as well developed or equipped to compete with the 
expertise at Coventry. It should be recalled that Taylor had only recently co-ordinated work 
for the sub-region on its input to the European SPD process and this had been relatively 
well received by the local authorities. Coventry’s control of this initiative was not 
challenged by the core partners. The partners response was explained by the combination of 
resource and expertise imbalance, an extremely tight timescale, and as an officer close to 
the process stated: “…no one else was prepared to put in the money to do it”. The Bid Co-
ordination Team was initially one officer, David Taylor, a senior officer within Coventry 
City’s Policy Co-ordination Unit. The ‘team’ was located in the Chief Executive’s 
Department working to Duncan Sutherland, with secretarial support given by the Chief 
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Executive department at Coventry City council [shortly after it commenced work a second 
officer was seconded to provide support to Taylor].  
Taylor in his position as Bid Co-ordination Team set up the second key structure. This was 
the SRB Steering Group (SG) with Taylor in the chair. Taylor invited people onto the group 
to reflect the interests from around the partners. The SG contained 20 members (Table 7.3 
below). Like the Bid Co-ordination Team it was an administrative/technical group rather 
than a political body and contained no councillors. Its composition was made up of officers 
from the four core partners and other statutory organisations along with counterparts drawn 
from the non-statutory sector. With 30% [6 out of 21] of the members from Coventry City 
Council [with Taylor in the chair] this was the largest group and held a significant and 
influential minority interest. 
Control through themes 
Without any adopted SRB strategy in place, and time at a premium, the Bid Co-ordination 
Team sought to impose a rationale on the bid in order to manage its production in the short 
time available. The team’s first action was to organise meetings of the SG to develop a 
SRB agenda. [These meetings were ad hoc and no minutes were taken so no written record 
exists of the discussions that took place] At these very early meetings the SG brought 
forward an eclectic raft of projects. The exact magnitude of the proposed projects is unclear 
but interviewees suggest that the figure was somewhere in the region of £100-£120m.  
The ideas put forward drew upon experience gleaned from a variety of sources including: 
the consultation for a European development strategy, the background of the 
competitiveness agenda, existing economic development strategies, the TEC business plan, 
the preferences of core partners and preliminary indications coming out of the sub-regional 
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audit.  
Table 7.3: SRB Steering Group Membership 
 Name Organisation SG Action Group 
Chair 
     
1 David Taylor (Chair) Coventry City Council  5  
2 Matt Feeley Coventry City Council 3  
3 Bronwen Lacy Coventry City Council 5  
4 Graeme Betts Coventry City Council 3 3 
5 Roger Griffiths Coventry City Council 3 3 
6 Jos Parry Coventry City Council 3  
7 Nigel Gaynor Coventry & Warwickshire TEC 3  
8 Lorraine Butler  Coventry & Warwickshire TEC 5  
9 Eamon Kelley/Noreen Dowd Coventry Health Authority 3 3 
10 Jeremy Howell WCC 3 3 
11 Janet Fortune WCC 3  
12 Jane Carter WCC 3  
13 Eric Linton Coventry Race Equality Council 5  
14 Peter Davis Advanced Technology Centre ~ 
University of Warwick 
5  
15 Alan Durham Coventry & Warwickshire Chambers of 
Commerce & Industry 
5  
16 John Goodman Voluntary Sector 5  
17 Iain Sharp Voluntary Sector 5  
18 Kishor Pala Ethnic Minority Development Alliance 3  
19 Deborah de Haes Rugby Borough Council 5  
20 Chris Garden Nuneaton & Bedworth Borough Council 3  
(Source: CWP internal documents) 
3 = Member of an Action Group 
5 = Not a member of any Action Group 
 
Out of these a number of themes presented themselves as candidates for inclusion in any 
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potential SRB strategy. The formidable task that faced David Taylor as officer in charge of 
the Bid Co-ordination Team, and in his capacity as SG chair, was to take the disparate 
projects put forward by the SG and make them into a coherent SRB programme whilst at 
the same time satisfy the qualifying criteria set out in the Bidding Guidance. The task 
facing the team was thus both operational and strategic. Operationally, it had to design and 
administer a project appraisal mechanism. Strategically, it had to construct a framework 
document—in the form of a SRB bid—that managed simultaneously to satisfy both the 
SRB criteria and reflect the diverse interests of the partners. Board minutes confirm the 
approach taken by the Bid Co-ordination Team:  
The bid has been divided into four groups - Economy and Development, City centre and 
Urban centres, Health and Caring, Living Environment. These contributed to 11 strategic 
objectives (Board minutes: 09/08/94 - para.6.1). 
The Bid Co-ordination Team confirmed that the SG met: “…once a week initially, then 
fortnightly, then quarterly… [adding]…this [team] is now fizzling out with the whole 
process under review” [interview in December 1996 just prior to being restructured]. The 
officer confirmed that the strategic analysis in the SRB bid was: “…a synthesis of existing 
document…[and]…in the event the bid consisted of each partner pursuing their own 
existing development strategies.”  
In order to evaluate projects that might fall under the chosen topic areas four Action 
Groups—as they became known—were created by the Bid Co-ordination team. The Action 
Groups consisted of members drawn from the core partners supplemented with additional 
expertise co-opted where appropriate and included amongst others, representatives from the 
two Universities, representatives of the ethnic minority business community and the 
voluntary sector—see Appendix (I): Composition of Action Groups for a complete list of 
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members. The Bid Co-ordination Team confirmed that in the early days the Action Groups 
met frequently and that in all about twenty people were involved on an ad hoc basis from 
day one.  
Having isolated four strategic themes out of the morass of information the Bid 
Co-ordination Team commissioned Cooper Simms Consultants to write the first draft of the 
bid and to assist in the development of the necessary administrative systems to process 
potential projects. They also had a hand in producing the a project summary form (see 
Appendix (J): Project Summary Form 1995/96). These were distributed widely in a 
mailshot (see Appendix (K): Consultation contact list for SRB Round One) which invited 
interested parties to complete the forms by summarising their project and returning them by 
the 27th June 1994 for inclusion in the assessment process [competition] with the 
possibility of inclusion in the SRB bid. The Bid Co-ordination Team, with the approval of 
the SG, also produced SRB strategic guidance in the form of guidance notes that 
accompanied the PSF. The guidance notes included three strategic process objectives: 
Strategic Objective 1 - Partnership:  
Empower local communities, residents, businesses and voluntary groups by listening and by 
investing in mutually beneficial partnerships and delivery mechanisms which enable 
services to better reflect local needs.  
Strategic Objective 2 - Reducing Disadvantage:  
Make services more accessible. Use resources effectively and direct them towards people 
facing poverty. Enable those in poverty to have greater control over services and their own 
living standards. 
Strategic Objective 3 - Seek to provide equality of opportunity and social justice: 
Enable individuals to exercise control over their lives, make use of available services, 
influence their design and delivery, and participate fully in the economic and social life of 
the sub-region. 
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(source: Taken from Coventry & Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd: SRB Strategic and 
Operational Objectives (08/06/94 page 1) reproduced in full as Appendix (L) 
Interestingly, these objectives did not feature in this form in either the Final bid 
(CWP, 1994a) or the Economic Development Strategy (CWP, 1994b) subsequently 
produced by the CWP but did reappear in the Delivery Plan (CWP, 1995a).  
The three process objectives were mandatory. They ran throughout the whole programme 
and as the PSF Guidance Notes explicitly stated: they had to be addressed by all applicants 
as a qualifying criteria. In addition: “Each project should be ascribed to one of the other 
eight strategic objectives to which it is most closely related” (CWP, 1994c: para.2.6). The 
eight strategic objectives are listed in column three in table 7.4 below. The table illustrates 
the refinement of the bid as it progressed through the bid cycle. In the very early stages of 
the bid the core partners sought not only to define a practical deliverable programme but 
also one that was politically acceptable. The early discussions were a process of bargaining 
and negotiation with each partner seeking to extract the maximum possible benefit for their 
own constituency. And so the early discussions revolved around establishing an 
accommodation between the partners. This accommodation is recorded as adjustments to 
the bid objectives which were progressively refined during the course of the bidding cycle. 
A good examples of this accommodation in practice can be seen in table 7.4 under 
objective number 6 and 7. It can be seen that in their original form the focus of these was 
on Coventry. Within a week of the production of the first draft and following discussions 
with the core partners these proved to be politically unacceptable. In the second draft 
(column 3) following the consultation with partners objective 6 had evolved to incorporate 
the whole of Warwickshire. Similarly, objectives 7, 10 and 11 illustrates the same move 
away from an implicit Coventry focus to a more broadly based spatial objective where 
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Coventry whilst obviously still qualifying is not named directly. 
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Table 7.4: The evolution of strategic objectives during the bid cycle 
N° 
Strategic Objective 
CWP document 
(3rd June 1994) 
Strategic Objective 
CWP document 
(8th June 1994) 
Strategic Objective 
Final Bid 
(7th September 1994) 
 
1 
 
Empowering through 
partnership 
 
Empowering through 
partnership 
Building business, 
especially engineering 
excellence, reskilling the 
labour force and increasing 
educational attainment 
(para.4.9). 
2 Reducing Disadvantage Reducing Disadvantage 
Spreading market 
confidence North 
(para.4.13) 
3 Equality of Opportunity Equality of Opportunity 
Building self-determining, 
safe and confident 
communities (para.4.18) 
4 Ensure skills to maximise growth & opportunities 
Ensure skills to maximise 
growth & opportunities 
Skills to maximise growth 
& opportunities 
5 Investing in business Investing in business 
Invest in business: 
Encourage Growth and 
Diversity 
6 Promoting Coventry 
Promoting Coventry & 
Warwickshire  
Promoting Coventry and 
Warwickshire 
7 Developing the City centre 
Developing Coventry City 
centre & surrounding urban 
centres 
City & urban centres 
8 Housing to meet people’s 
needs 
Housing which meets 
people’s needs 
Housing which meets 
peoples needs 
9 Providing a high quality 
environment 
Providing a high quality 
environment 
A high quality environment 
10 Making the City safe Safe communities Safer communities 
11 
Developing a healthy and 
caring City 
Healthy caring 
communities 
Health and caring 
communities 
12 
  Deliver SRB programmes 
and monitor against 
strategy 
 
(source: Appendix (M): 
CWP document: Coventry & 
Warwickshire Partnerships - SRB 
Guidance Notes on Completion of 
Project Summary Form 03/06/94) 
(source: Appendix (L): 
CWP document: SRB strategic 
objectives Coventry & 
Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd: 
SRB Strategic and Operational 
Objectives 08/06/94) 
(source: objectives 4 - 12 taken 
from [table] CWP’s Regeneration 
Programme 1995/96 to 1999/2000 
in CWP, 1994a:10) 
 
In a similar vein the 03/06/94 Guidance Notes document also refers to a series of themes 
developed by the Bid Co-ordination Team to be used as a means of linking projects which 
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‘meet more than one strategic objective’. Column two in table 7.5 below lists the four 
themes. By the time that the Final bid was produced discussions amongst the core partners 
had ensured that the fourth theme with its explicit emphasis upon Coventry had been 
dropped.  
Table 7.5: Comparison between themes during the bid cycle 
N° Linking Themes 
(3rd June 1994) 
Linking Themes in Final Bid 
(7th September 1994) 
 
1 Building business, especially engineering excellence, reskilling the labour force and 
increasing educational attainment  
Building business, especially engineering 
excellence, reskilling the labour force and 
increasing educational attainment 
(para.4.9). 
 
2 
 
Spreading market confidence North  Spreading market confidence North (para.4.13) 
 
3 Building self-determining, safe and confident communities 
Building self-determining, safe and 
confident communities (para.4.18) 
 
4 
 
Strengthen Coventry City centre 
 
 (source: Appendix (M): 
CWP document: Coventry & Warwickshire 
Partnerships - SRB Guidance Notes on Completion of 
Project Summary Form 03/06/94) 
(source: CWP, 1994a) 
 
 
In drafting the Final Bid document the Bid Co-ordination Team operated at the boundaries 
of the political landscape that separated the core partners. The Bid Co-ordination Team was 
thus required to balance its own self-interest (i.e., pursue with maximum vigour a Coventry 
agenda) against what it determined would be acceptable in the political landscape they 
hoped to co-habit with their partners. The subtle changes referred to in the bid through the 
bid cycle reflected the complexity of the political dynamics of partnership. It also illustrated 
the interdependence of the core partners and their ability to pursue a wider set of interests. 
The evidence in the documents through the bid cycle suggests that the partners’ motivations 
for changes in the themes were to deflate, or at least constrain, the domineering aspirations 
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of Coventry whilst at the same time to assert their own secular interests. The results of this 
bargaining and negotiation was political agreement on a set of acceptable objectives—that 
would ultimately have an distributive impact on any SRB resources won. Consensus by 
definition pre-supposes that the core partners conceded ground to each other in order to 
establish agreement. Without the principle of concession disagreement would inevitably 
lead to the dissolution of the partnership or expulsion of the partner. Almost as a by-product 
of the pursuit of consensus the core partners created a set of strategic objectives that 
defined the new institutional entity [CWP] and yet simultaneously distanced it from the 
existing institutional entities that were the core partners. 
All bids were processed through the Bid Co-ordination Team and they passed them on to an 
appropriate action group for appraisal. Projects would be assessed against a checklist 
produced by the Bid Co-ordination Team this required each project to be scored on a scale 
ranging from ‘very good, good, average, poor to very poor’ (CWP letter explaining Project 
Prioritisation, dated 22/06/94 and including project checklist reproduced in full as 
Appendix (N). 
As has been shown, this early stage of the bid development coincided with and overlapped 
discussions surrounding the structure and constitution of the putative CWP. A consequence 
of this has been a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma which has tended to obfuscate the direction of 
causality that links SRB objectives with who set them. There has been a tendency—in 
documents published by the CWP—to ‘post ad hoc rationale’ the development of the 
strategy in the bid. A good example of this occurs in the Final bid (CWP, 1994a) which 
states that:  
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We have applied best practice to the development of the programme, especially by gaining 
widespread ownership and support for the priorities of the strategic programme…and 
adjusting these priorities as a result of consultation {my emphasis}(para.4.1). [and] 
Consultation early in the programme and bid development, with a wide range of interests 
consulted on principles at key stages: in particularly the community and voluntary sector 
have been closely involved in strategy development…{my emphasis}(para.4.2). 
The cycle of bid development and submission—already discussed—precluded a 
programme of widespread public consultation. It seems reasonable to argue that, in relation 
to consultation, the combination of best practice and haste [especially in the development of 
a new policy initiative] appears to be if not mutually exclusive then mutually antagonistic. 
Similarly, whilst community and ethnic minority interests did sit on the SG and also the 
Action Groups they took no part in defining them and in all cases only constituted a 
minority interest. This is of crucial significance. By managing pre-determined qualifying 
criteria the Action Groups did exert control and influence the nature of submitted bids but 
in the process they ensured [critics might say conspired to guarantee] that SRB funding 
would only be directed to objectives set by others. The fact that community and ethnic 
minority interests were only a [even smaller] minority interest in the SRB Steering Group 
simply reinforces this position. 
A second but important issue arises out of the methodology adopted. By choosing Action 
Groups—even with the caveat that themes have been defined by others—it can legitimately 
be argued that the structure does provide an opportunity for participants, especially those 
from the non-statutory sectors, to become engaged in the shaping of the bid. Crucially 
however, this role is purely administrative. The subtle achievement of the approach adopted 
here is that in providing opportunities for engagement you at the same time deflect attention 
away from other perhaps more controversial areas, notably any discussion on the 
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distribution of SRB resources that had been agreed elsewhere. 
Control by structure 
In figure 7.2 below the SRB management arrangement flow chart is taken from the PIEDA 
audit report (PIEDA, 1995:para.1.1) undertaken in May 1995. The chart describes the 
CWP’s management’s lines of accountability and purports to show how the SRB fitted 
within a logical and rationale structure under the oversight of the CWP main Board. 
However, this structure did not officially exist in the manner described until the CWP was 
formally incorporated. When the bid was being put together there was no Main Board and 
so there could be no SRB sub-group. Figure 7.3 however sets out the organisational 
structure linking the early partnership initiative before incorporation. What did exist was an 
Executive Committee consisting of representatives of the four core partners - effectively 
acting as a putative Shadow Board. Created at the same time was an Officer Liaison Group 
to service the Executive Committee—including David Taylor—with officers drawn from 
the key partners and with one officer representing the five district councils. Directly below 
this was the SRB Steering Group and Bid Co-ordination Team both under the chairmanship 
of David Taylor at Coventry City Council. Below this level was the four Action Groups. 
The result of this structure ensured that in the period before incorporation David Taylor 
occupied an extremely influential position. As team leader of the Bid Co-ordination Team 
Taylor he managed the day-to-day administration of the bid assembly programme; he 
oversaw the creation of the Action Groups, with the Bid  
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Figure 7.2: SRB management arrangements 
CWP Main Board 
(26 Directors: meets 
c4 annually) 
CWP SRB Sub-group 
(11 Directors: meets 
c4 annually) 
 
CWP Executive Team 
 
 
SRB Steering Group 
(meets c8 annually) 
 
SRB Guarantors Group 
(meets c6 annually) 
 
4 SRB Action Groups 
 
(Source: PIEDA, 1995:3) 
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Figure 7.3: SRB management arrangements before incorporation 
 
 
 
CWP Executive Committee 
(Shadow Board) 
 
Four core partners: 2 each from 
Coventry, WCC, TEC & Chamber 
 
SRB Steering Group 
 
Chair: David Taylor 
Coventry City Council 
Chair: David Taylor 
Coventry City Council 
 
Bid Co-Ordination Team 
• Health & Caring 
• City Centre  
• Warwickshire SRB 
• Living / Environment 
 
 
4 SRB Action Groups 
 
Officer Liaison Group 
 
Senior officers drawn 
from core partners 
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Co-ordination Team as the principle conduit to the Action Groups respective chairs; 
through his chairmanship of the SRB SG he influenced the methodology used to assess and 
prioritise projects; he was the principle officer that negotiated with GOWM; he was part of 
the Officer Liaison Group alongside Duncan Sutherland. These roles placed Taylor in an 
extremely fortuitous position, one that commanded him considerable opportunity to exert 
influence on the developing partnership agenda and specifically the strategic direction of 
the SRB bid. A good example of where this influence was used to considerable effect was 
in the deciding what would be the ‘split’ between Action Groups. Whilst there was a 
discussion about the degree of emphasis, the core partner had accepted from the onset that 
any bid would have an economic bias, however, for the purposes of project appraisal Taylor 
needed a clear indication on the distribution of resources between the various Action Group 
areas. Accordingly, he took a short note to the Officer Liaison Group asking them to 
endorse what he thought would be an acceptable distribution. Having secured their 
approval this decision was taken to the SG and these global figures framed subsequent 
prioritising within the groups.  
The apparent contradictions between what is shown as the SRB management arrangement 
in figure 7.2 and practice on the ground (figure 7.3) stems directly from the Government’s 
tight timetable and the evolving partnership’s pragmatic approach to putting a bid together. 
The overriding concern in the early stage was to assemble a bid and submit it in the time 
available. Appendix (O): CWP Single Regeneration Budget Timetable, shows how formal 
planning for the bid had already begun in March before the April announcement of the 
SRB. It is interesting to observe that the timetable indicates that public consultation 
occurred at the end of the bid assembly period. The Bid Co-ordination Team approached 
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bid assembly with a single minded determination. Problems understanding the management 
structure arise because within the same time frame as the bid developed a parallel process 
of developing a Shadow Board, i.e., expanding and formalising the Executive Committee 
was also taking place. Confusion arises because the culmination of the bid coincided with 
the formal creation of a partnership Board. And with an almost circular logic the 
partnership, and its newly constituted Board, was confronted almost immediately with a 
need to deal with the later stages of the SRB bid and had in effect to retrospectively take 
ownership of an achievement secured by others but undertaken in its name.  
Whilst the SRB helped catalyse the development of the CWP, and was important to the 
concept of the sub-regional partnership, it represented only one part of that organisations 
agenda. Even so the SRB proved fortuitous for an evolving CWP because it provided an 
early opportunity to target ‘new’ money; it also allowed the putative partnership to show 
both its partners and observers from within the wider community that broad objectives 
could be achieved through partnership.  
Throughout the period of the bid development the Executive Committee received 
representations from groups wishing to join the Shadow Board and conversely it actively 
canvassed key individuals to sit on it. It was explained by a CWP officer that individuals 
invited to sit on the Shadow Board were encouraged to take an early interest in the 
activities of the partnership and this included involvement in the Steering and Action 
Groups. Although CWP documentation indicates that Action Groups reported to the Bid 
Co-ordination Team and this in turn reported to a Directors SRB Sub-group which had 
ultimate control over the strategic direction of the SRB bid. The evidence suggests however 
that this structure was not fully operational until after the submission of the Final bid. CWP 
238 
 
minutes record the official position which indicated that a sub-group of seven directors with 
a specific SRB remit was only formally constituted on 24/01/95 (para.6.1), with the minutes 
recording the membership as: 
 Helen Aird Voluntary sector 
 Alan Stothard Private sector 
 Colin Holland Private sector 
 Hardev Bahia Ethnic minorities 
 Mike Goldstein Universities 
 Mick Jones  District councils 
Nominations from founding partners to David Taylor by 25 January [1995] 
RESOLVED that the group be chaired by Sir Brian Follett 
Control through downsizing 
However, because the bid was being assembled in the period when technically the CWP did 
not exist in law and de facto there could be no SRB Directors sub-group, then the 
day-to-day oversight of the evolving bid gravitated to David Taylor in his dual roles in the 
Bid Co-ordination Team and SG. 
Having invited bids on the PSFs the Action Groups received a total of 423 bids worth 
£210m (para.6.1 Minutes of the meeting of the Shadow Board of CWP 09/08/94)[i.e., 
requests for £210m of SRB funding]. The bids were sent in the first instance to the Bid 
Co-ordination team and then copied to the Chair of the relevant Action Group; the relevant 
group having been identified by the applicant when defining the primary strategic objective 
of the project in the PSF. At this stage the projects entered what was described by an officer 
as ‘an open competition’. 
The Bid Co-ordination Team and Action Groups performed two distinct roles. The first 
role, performed by the Bid Co-ordination team, was to analyse the aggregate effects of the 
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projects in order to get a strategic oversight of their potential impact. The Bid 
Co-ordination Team therefore sought to assess the impacts of the programme of bids in 
terms of: 
• All expenditure by strategic objective 
• SRB expenditure by strategic objective 
• Outputs by type of strategic objective 
• All expenditure by area 
• SRB expenditure by area 
The Action Groups on the other hand scored and prioritised the individual projects using a 
system of scoring developed by the Bid Co-ordination Team and described in CWP 
correspondence—Single Regeneration Grant: Project Prioritisation (22/06/94) reproduced 
as Appendix (N). The document states that: 
After initial appraisal by the Action Groups, the Bid Co-ordination Team will regroup the 
information into a management report by area. If resources are a constraint then local 
partnerships will be asked to exercise their own priorities in coming down to the appropriate 
resource level (para.1) 
But the level of response produced its own problems. The Bid Co-ordination team was 
immediately faced with the mammoth task of having to cut the programme of projects to 
bring it into line with the £52m figure bid for in the Outline bid. [It should be remembered 
that the amount of money available for round one for the whole of England was envisaged 
to be somewhere in the region of £100m—with an actual outturn of £136⋅4m (HC written 
answer 9th March 1998)]. The process of downsizing was passed down to the Action 
Groups where figures were ‘tweaked’ to fit the bid. An officer with the Bid Co-ordination 
Team explained the procedure:  
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All projects would be scored [using the criteria for project prioritisation – Appendix (N)]. 
There was general agreement that points did not mean prizes…juggling is needed to 
balance issues in terms of employment, capital / revenue split. {my emphasis} 
The officer emphasised that the ‘juggling’ was undertaken by the Bid Co-ordination Team 
and that its deliberations were ‘rubber stamped’ by the Executive Committee. The Bid 
Co-ordination Team could feel confident that they could achieve this without recourse to 
recrimination. The reason for this is that the SG which nominally existed to provide 
strategic oversight to the SRB was chaired by Taylor and in addition had a strong 
contingent of Coventry council officers. This position was reinforced by the interlocking 
nature of relations between the SG and Action Groups. Coventry City officers chaired two 
of the four Action Groups with a third chaired by a Coventry Health Authority officer—see 
table 7.3 above. Thus the first tranche of downsizing that took place at Action Group level 
could be assured to be acceptable at SG level because the same people were represented in 
each group. Minutes of the CWP Shadow Board 09/08/94 (para.6.5) record that:  
David Taylor explained [retrospectively] that the prioritisation process had taken into 
account: 
• the quality of the bidder 
• value for money 
• meeting unmet needs 
• innovation 
• leverage 
[and, in addition] 
It was agreed that the Executive Committee should be authorised to receive comments 
arising from the consultation period and approve the final SRB bid (para.6.6){my 
emphasis} 
First board meeting of CWP 
It transpires that what should have been the inaugural meeting of CWP on 28th June 1994 
was technically invalid because the certificate of incorporation had not yet been granted. 
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Interestingly however, the minutes of this meeting lists the names of only 18 Directors with 
two apologies [not the 26 listed in the Memorandum of Association]; subsequent board 
minutes continue to refer to the appointment of directors. It is only when you get to the 
minutes of the 19/10/94 Board meeting that you get to something approaching a more 
comprehensive list of directors vis., 24 (sic). However the minutes of this first Board 
meeting are revealing in another way. This is because they record the approval of a 
resolution for the creation of an Executive Committee that would consist of ‘the 8 people 
from the founding members’ (Shadow Board Minutes 28/06/94 para.5). [A committee by 
the same name, consisting of the four core partners, had already been meeting for some 
time prior to the SRB] The minutes (para.6) record the remit of this new committee as: 
• The management of the Single Regeneration Budget bid. 
• The development of the Economic Strategy 
• The drafting of financial proposals, and 
• The establishment of delivery mechanisms 
The effect of the resolution was to formally place the control of the SRB bid with the core 
partners: a position that did nothing more than reflect what had been occurring in practice. 
So, whilst the CWP documentation may refer to strategic oversight by a Directors SRB 
sub-group under the chairmanship of Sir Brian Follett, it was clearly not formally structured 
in the manner described by CWP until January 1995 as described above. Rather the process 
at the beginning was seen by an officer who participated as: “…managed but nevertheless 
chaotic”. The combination of an extremely tight timescale along with an absence, or rather 
more accurately, an evolving Shadow Board, effectively created what might reasonably be 
described as a partial strategic vacuum. The vacuum was partial because a number of the 
parameters had already been developed by the Bid Co-ordination Team and accepted by the 
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core partners at the onset and these strategic objectives circumscribed the evolving bid. 
Crucially, a consequence of the gross over-bidding of projects precipitated two tranches of 
downsizing. Because the institutional structure of the partnership was literally being built at 
the same time as the bid was developed the structure remained fluid. Operating in this 
environment the Bid Co-ordination Team could fill in the details. Albeit that the principle 
themes were set, the Bid Co-ordination Team operated in the absence of strategic oversight 
and this latitude provided considerable opportunity for it to influence the specific shape of 
the SRB programme.  
ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING 
…structures should not be set in stone 
Humility 
The test of organisational learning is in fact a test of humility. The presumption underlying 
organisational learning is a recognition that structures are not fixed in stone, i.e., they are 
not organised optimally for the objectives set for the partnership, or that as circumstances 
change then structures need to adapt to reflect changes. This may be framed negatively, and 
this occurs when the current structure is recognised as actively hindering the effective 
delivery of objectives, alternatively it can be framed positively, where new structures are 
recognised as a more effective method of delivering objectives. The logic of the checklist 
implies that a partnership that exhibits no evidence of organisation learning is either 
perfectly aligned or is nothing more than the clear domination of one party over another.  
From executive committee to executive committee 
Having agreed in principle to the concept of developing a sub-regional partnership the four 
core partners in March 1994 established working arrangements under the oversight of what 
was called an Executive Committee—the workings of which were private and the minutes 
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confidential. The choice of this name is problematic for anyone examining the evolution of 
the CWP. The reason for this is that the members of the Executive Committee along with 
invited directors progressively took on the role of a Shadow Board prior to legal 
incorporation as a company. Even as the Shadow Board was evolving the Executive 
Committee continued to operate in parallel to the evolving Shadow Board. Its deliberations 
were private and its minutes were confidential. One of the things the Shadow Board did 
was to create a sub-committee which it called an Executive Committee. Confusion might 
arise because of the name and the fact that it had the same membership. The distinction 
between the two committees however is that whilst the former was in effect a private and 
essentially secret body, and thus had no publicly acknowledged remit beyond an obvious 
concern to develop a partnership; the activities of the latter on the other hand is recorded in 
the CWP minutes as having an expressly SRB remit (28/06/94 Shadow Board minutes). 
The early development of the partnership was pre-occupied with two distinct projects. The 
first, and the more important of the two, was the preparation of a sub-regional economic 
development strategy that would unite and co-ordinate the activities of all the actors in the 
sub-region. The logic underlying this was that in defining a sub-regional strategy you 
simultaneously create a case for partnership working and provide CWP with its raison 
d’être. The second project essentially presented itself with the arrival of the SRB. And with 
it it provided an opportune channel through which the putative partnership could establish 
its credentials both to GOWM but also to the wider community. The need to impress 
GOWM arises from its hegemonic position in the West Midlands polity. Regardless of 
whether GOWM is seen as an agent of central government in the regions, or a 
representative of the regions in London, it sits at the top of the institutional hierarchy in the 
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West Midlands. From here if performs a number of important roles, not least disbursing 
exchequer money through a variety of initiatives [and European money] but it also plays a 
part in the monitoring and oversight of regional expenditure. Either interpretation of the 
role of GOWM sees it as the institutional conduit through which sub-regional actors engage 
with government. The position GOWM occupies, at the top of the sub-regional pyramid, 
ensures that it is enormously influential and for this reason, its support and largesse, would 
be actively courted by any partnership keen to tap into funding. 
It could be argued that SRB precipitated organisational learning. With the announcement 
and publication of the Bidding Guidance (DoE, 1994b) Coventry quickly moved to exploit 
a vacuum. It could exploit this opportunity because of its established capability in this area 
of work. It has been shown that WCC had had an ambivalent attitude to economic 
development and this was illustrated by the downgrading of this function under the 
Conservatives. Similarly, at a district level the local authorities only began to create 
specific economic development officer posts from the mid 1990s. This meant that at the 
time of SRB, although Labour, now in control at WCC, and with a more interventionist 
attitude, the economic development function at the county bore no comparison to that 
operating at Coventry. The City on the other hand through its longstanding concerns with 
areas of multiple deprivation had been linked to a raft of regeneration initiatives, for 
example, Urban Programme, a [failed] City Challenge bid, European funding etc. The 
experience it gained over many years pursuing these initiatives and the knowledge secured 
in successfully tapping into funding streams meant that it could justifiably claim to have a 
certain expertise in this area. In a revealing comment an officer who worked for the city at 
the time observed that: 
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…the City thought it was in a lead role in economic development, ahead of the game if you 
like compared to many authorities. Because of that it was kind of disdainful of WCC and 
their smaller economic development efforts. Just ignored the districts! Of course some of 
the districts did not have an economic development officer at that time. 
One implication of this capability or experience was that Coventry had the operational 
capacity already in place and could at very short notice take a lead in the process of bid 
assembly: an opportunity it did not hesitate to exploit.  
From executive committee to CWP SRB directors group 
From its formation the Bid Co-ordination Team under the chairmanship of David Taylor at 
Coventry successfully managed the development of the bid. This position was not 
challenged until the creation of the CWP SRB Directors Group which was formed after the 
CWP was incorporated (August 1994) and after the Final bid had been submitted to 
GOWM (September 1994). Although, as has already been acknowledged, the SRB bid was 
‘a synthesis of existing documents’, the methodology employed to assess projects, craft an 
SRB programme, and write a coherent bid document out of the melange of projects 
submitted, benefited enormously from the experience and expertise of the officers from 
Coventry city. By administering the PSF forms, setting up Action Groups, chairing the SG 
and: “…writing a strategy which unified the projects into a coherent [SRB] programme” 
David Taylor ensured that he exerted enormous influence over the character of the 
assembled programme. This influence was further enhanced through the Bid Co-ordination 
Team’s control over the process of downsizing the bid first to fit the £52m figure and then 
the £22m 
Evolving structures 
In between submission of the Final bid and winning, the partnership had become 
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incorporated. With this the structure that had developed in a rather ad hoc manner began to 
change. The pressures for this arose from a number of directions. In the first instance the 
need to establish the legal entity of the CWP compelled the partners to prepare 
Memorandum and Articles of Association and this meant that they had to consider the 
formal structure of the partnership. It can be seen that organisational learning was 
stimulated as the partners acknowledged the pressure to formalise ad hoc arrangements and 
put in place structures that would satisfy legal obligations under company law.  
A second equally pressing need was for the partners to agree a Delivery Plan. This took on 
growing importance because it would contractually tie the partners to specific outputs. One 
of the demands contained in the Delivery Plan was the need to show GOWM how a 
partnership would ensure the delivery of outputs claimed in any bid. This meant that the 
Deliver Plan formally set out the SRB management oversight. It would also become a 
measure of the partnership’s effectiveness: with a range of sanctions [including financial] 
being the measure of the partnership’s ineffectiveness. Under this pressure [all SRB] 
partnerships were keen to prove to their respective GOs that they could get this right. For 
the CWP the progressive refinement of ad hoc structures was part of a strategy that sought 
to convince GOWM that the partnership took its obligations seriously. 
Restructuring 
The Delivery Plan proved extremely difficult to negotiate for a variety of reasons. Chief 
amongst these was that the CWP had not only to agree key outputs with GOWM but also 
negotiate service level agreements with the nine Guarantors. The Delivery Plan was only 
approved by GOWM - after several tortuous drafts - in July 1995, some seven months after 
the announcement of the win. Because the SRB contained no provision for ‘roll-over’ of 
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underspends this put immediate pressure on the partnership. It should be remembered that 
in this period the partnership had to set up an office from scratch, establish a secretariat, 
negotiate service level agreements with each of the nine Guarantors and, begin delivery of 
the key outputs agreed in the Delivery Plan. This proved to be an inauspicious start and one 
which very soon had material impacts. The problems are described in a CWP document 
reviewing the partnership’s first year: 
The performance of SRB activity and spend against our forecast has been varied in 1995/96. 
Initially the delay in signing the Grant Offer Letter caused no problems in the first quarter, 
due to the fact that allowances had been made for the delay. The second quarter saw our 
first underperformance against forecast and although at that stage we were commended on 
our management systems as mentioned earlier we also received the Governments "Yellow 
Card" warning. This card is issued to show that the Government Office is aware of an 
underperformance in spend and/or outputs by 10% or over. The third quarter showed that 
the position on spend had not improved enough and we were still underperforming. This 
situation did mean that technically we should have expected a "Red Card", the 
Government’s follow up to the Yellow Card. However to date we have yet to receive 
official notification. By the end of the final quarter we had completely caught up on the 
forecast activity. This was a great ending for a very ambitious first year, but we do need a 
more controlled delivery process in the following years to avoid any possibility of a Yellow 
or Red Card being issued (CWP, 1996e para9).  
The national programme of SRB contained the provision for external monitoring. 
Accordingly, the DOE had commissioned PIEDA Consultants to examine an number of 
SRB partnerships as part of an agreed national programme of case studies. Following the 
partnership’s failure to meet key targets set out in their Delivery Plan, CWP was chosen as 
one of the national case studies. Ostensibly the CWP was selected as part of that national 
programme of work but given GOWM’s concern over CWP’s underperformance the choice 
of CWP seems unsurprising. Although the CWP should have automatically received a ‘red 
card’, in the event GOWM did not serve it having received reassurances that the matters of 
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concern were being addressed with the utmost urgency by the partnership. However, as a 
result of the PIEDA work a number of problems were raised. Chief amongst these were 
concerns with CWP’s relationship with its Guarantors. These had contracted to CWP to 
deliver specific outputs but PIEDA’s work confirmed the GO’s anxiety that the Guarantors 
did not understand their role or responsibilities and this had led to ‘organisational 
confusion’. In January 1996, responding directly to the threat of GO sanctions and the 
PIEDA criticism the CWP Board set about restructuring the management of the SRB. The 
partnership sought to achieve two objectives. First, was to remove any ambiguity about 
what were the responsibilities of the various groups that had arisen in an ad hoc way during 
the early development of the partnership. Second, there was a pressing need to ensure that 
the Guarantors adopted a more professional approach to monitoring with the creation of 
robust reporting mechanisms that fed into the CWP secretariat. [see CWP documents, 
Appendix (P): SRB roles and relationships SRB1 and 2 [and] Appendix (Q): SRB 
Management Processes for the revised structure and CWP’s explanation for the changes].  
INDEPENDENT ARBITRATION 
A partnership is clearly not real if the structure of a partnership emasculates partners and 
operates in such a way as to effectively institutionalise the hegemony of  
any one partner [or sub-set of partners]. 
First among equals 
It is impossible to ignore the influence of the four core partners on the character of the 
partnership that was created. As has been described above the evolution of the Board 
structure built in a institutional bias that favoured the core partners. This hegemony allowed 
the character of the bid to be entirely controlled by the core partners. In the early part of the 
bid this was achieved through the activities of the Bid Co-ordination Team and the SG. 
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Their role was to put into effect the political decisions taken between the core partners 
about the broad geographical distribution of resources. This hegemony continued after 
incorporation through the formal ratification of an Executive Committee—made up of the 
same four core partners—with SRB oversight.  
For the CWP the real test of Independent arbitration is to see what recourse is available to 
anyone who disputes or disagrees with the action or direction that the partnership is taking. 
One possible line of defence is that as a member organisation strategic objectives can be 
challenged at the annual conference. The first of which was held in May 1995, ostensibly to 
inaugurate the partnership and endorse its [three year] Economic Development strategy. 
Whilst this provided an excellent public relations opportunity the conference in total lasted 
only two hours and forty-five minutes from start to finish – see Appendix (R): CWP 
correspondence: Conference Acknowledgement. The economic development strategy was 
endorsed with only minor alterations and formed the strategic backcloth for the next three 
years. Following conferences focused on a celebration of achievements rather than 
providing a forum for discussion or dissent. In the event the agenda for conferences was set 
by the Board and this would of itself provide a significant hurdle for a critic of that Board.  
An useful structure used extensively in the private sector is the concept on non-executive 
directors. In the private sector these provide a mechanism that allows for the oversight of 
the workings of boards. They have proved to be an effective vehicle to examine areas of 
activity where, for example, conflicts of interest arise, issues of probity, propriety or simply 
a critique of the strategic direction of the board. No such equivalent exists in the CWP.  
The nature of the relationship between the CWP and GOWM has been described. As the 
GO is the principle conduit for both funding and approval for a variety of aspects of the 
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SRB programme the nature of the relationship is one of mutual dependence. This 
relationship bestows considerable importance on the Bid Co-ordination Team which acts as 
the primary point of contact between the GO and the partnership. A disgruntled partner 
would be in an invidious position if it unilaterally approached a GO. The reason for this is 
that, in the event that the GO took action, or even simply sought to investigate an issue, 
then it is highly likely that a partnership could identify the source of any criticism and their 
position could be further compromised. In the event that a partner was so aggrieved that it 
needed to contact its GO to complain about its fellow partners then it would be reasonable 
to argue that the principle of partnership working no longer maintained. 
In a somewhat circular logic, it can be seen that, in the absence of independent arbitration 
or some other mechanism to safeguard the interests of individual partners then, in the event 
of a grievance, a partner would need to approach the partnerships to complain about its own 
behaviour. There is a certain irony in this and it is clearly not a tenable logic but is one that 
appears to apply to the CWP. 
MUTUAL REORIENTATION 
A partnership should reflect the objectives of the partnership and not the habits or culture 
of dominant partners 
Dominant partners 
The history of the development of the CWP is dominated by the actions of the four core 
partners. Having agreed to work in partnership the four set up a partnership structure that, 
through its board structure, inherently favoured them. The arrival of the SRB competition 
provided a practical objective for the core partners, it also provided a vehicle through which 
they could be seen to exercise partnership working. At the same time it thrust the putative 
partnership into an invidiously short bidding cycle the most important consequence of 
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which was that Coventry exploited its expertise and resource advantages to lead the SRB 
bid. The result of this was that many of the structures set up in the early stages of the bid 
were fundamentally shaped by decisions taken by, or controlled by, the Bid Co-ordination 
Team. That this would operate impartially is a moot point and one that would certainly be 
disputed. However, regardless of how impartially this role was conducted the power of 
patronage that lay with the Bid Co-ordination Team was significant but of far more 
importance to the structure that was eventually created was that this patronage was not open 
to challenge by partners who joined later. The interlocking membership of the Action 
Groups created by the Bid Co-ordination Team merely helped reinforce the hegemony of 
the four core partners. This domination by the four core partners ensured that their methods 
of working and their culture permeated the early CWP. 
It should be remembered that the partnership developed to promote an agenda wider than 
the SRB. By the middle of 1996 CWP had been successful in the first two rounds of SRB 
and the role of the CWP was evolving reflecting a shift [critics would say drift] away from 
strategy and more towards the administration associated with monitoring the delivery of 
existing projects. This consolidation however exposed the growing rift between what 
should have been a partnership established to develop and implement a sub-regional agenda 
and a partnership that was becoming a vehicle for SRB. These moves proved to be a 
catalyst that encouraged a period of introspection and analysis about the future direction of 
the partnership. Within the Board, Nick Scheele the first chairman, and other private sector 
directors were complaining that the private sector did not understand its role or what its 
specific contribution could be to the partnership. The partnership responded by 
commissioning research by GFA Consultants that examined the private sector’s role in 
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local economic development and the attitude of the CWP private sector board members. 
The report raised a number of concerns one of which was that the size of the Board was 
unwieldy and this was proving to be a serious operational handicap. Alongside this there 
was a growing clamour within the Board that the SRB exercised too much of the main 
Board’s time preventing it from addressing a wider agenda. This concern with excessively 
large boards getting in the way of efficiency reflected national debates about the optimal 
size of boards but it also echoed sentiments expressed by GOWM about the efficacy of 
some of the CWP structures. Compounding the partnership’s problem was that in the same 
period discrepancies arose in relation to one of the partnership’s approved projects 
precipitating an examination by auditors and the involvement of the GOWM. 
It was in this climate that the Board explored a number of options for changing structures 
and improving relations with GOWM. ECOTEC consultants were commissioned by the 
partnership with a remit to: 
…build up partnership and trust with the GOWM, to take a hands on role in managing 
SRB1 and 2, to advise on resource requirements and to provide those extra resources if 
required (source: Executive Committee minutes 17/09/96).  
Stemming directly from these deliberations an extraordinary general meeting was called on 
10th December 1996 to discuss restructuring of the board. This meeting approved a new 
board structure consisting of 12 persons: “…not chosen to be representative of their 
particular sectors, but for their understanding and influence on economic issues in the 
Coventry and Warwickshire area (CWP Directors Report for the 15 months to 31 March 
1997, para.4) - see table 7.6 below. With almost an element of déjà vu the new board 
contained what amounted to the Executive Committee with one additional councillor 
representing the five districts, two universities and one private sector member drawn from 
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the construction industry. 
Table 7.6: Revised CWP board membership 
1 Richard Drew Chairman (Retired) 
2 Cllr John Fletcher Coventry City Council 
3 Cllr Nick Nolan Coventry City council 
4 Cllr Gordon Collett WCC (Cons) 
5 Cllr Derek Forwood WCC (Lab) 
6 Malcom Gillespie C&W Chamber 
7 David Burton Grant Thornton Accountants 
President of C&W Chamber 
8 Cllr Mick Jones Nuneaton & Bedworth Borough Council 
9 Sir Brian Follett Vice Chancellor University of Warwick 
10 Michael Goldstein Vice Chancellor Coventry University 
11 Peter Deeley Deeley Construction 
(source: CWP Directors Report for the 15 months to 31 March 1997) 
 
At the same time a SRB Board Committee was established to replace the role previously 
exercised by the SRB Directors Group, the SRB Steering Group and the SRB Guarantors 
Group - table 7.7 below. As in previous structures appointments to this revised committee 
were the responsibility of the Board but because of their majority on this it could be taken 
as synonymous to approval by the core partners. 
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Table 7.7: Membership of the restructured SRB board committee 
No. Name Organisation 
1 Richard Drew Chair (retired private sector) 
2 Sir Brian Follett Vice Chancellor University of Warwick 
3 David Taylor Coventry City council 
4 Nigel Gaynor Coventry & Warwickshire TEC 
5 Alan Durham Coventry & Warwickshire Chamber of Commerce & Industry 
6 Chris Garden Nuneaton & Bedworth BC 
7 Dorothy Barrett North Warwickshire DC 
8 Dennis Stanley Warwick DC 
9 Anne Haebens West Midlands Probation Service 
10 {to be determined} Coventry University 
11 Alan Rowe University of Warwick 
12 Gordon Stokes Further Education Sector 
13 Helen Aird Coventry CVS 
14 Liz Stewart Nuneaton & Bedworth CVS 
15 Hardev Bahia Coventry REC 
16 Raj Sohal Ethnic Minority Development Alliance 
17 {to be determined} Touchstone Housing 
18 Trevor Cornfoot CWP Ltd Secretariat 
19 Lorraine Butler CWP Ltd Secretariat 
(source: CWP Board Meeting 10/12/96 para.30) 
 
Below this was a number of Forum Groups that were to provide opportunities for the 
numerous member organisations to become involved in the work of the partnership 
STANDING ORDERS 
…the conduct of a partnership should be governed by mutually agreed rules 
He who pays the piper 
The gradual evolution and development of the partnership was strictly circumscribed 
throughout by the core partners. This influence was applied through the original Executive 
Committee and which established the working pattern of the partnership. One of the 
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characteristics of the CWP was that it inhabited a new institutional environment. As a new 
organisational entity it did not fall within the traditional institutional boundaries of local 
authorities nor did it fall within the remit of Quangos (as evidenced by its omission in the 
deliberations by Lord Nolan on the Committee on Standards in Public Life). The 
partnership did adopt a number of standing orders but in each case this originated with one 
of the core partners and was passed with the support of the other core partners. The 
distribution of seats on the Board effectively created an insuperable hurdle for other 
partners. Without any statutory standing orders, or a mechanism to protect the role of 
minorities on boards, then it is reasonable to argue that the structure CWP adopted 
effectively circumscribed the distribution of power. 
ENTERED INTO VOLUNTARILY 
…there should be no barriers to entry or exit 
Fiscal stringency 
As has been described the creation of the SRB integrated a number of budgets under one 
heading. In the process of integration it was understood that this could have a potentially 
serious re-distributive effect, or worse, it could result in cuts to existing programmes. For 
local authorities this was not an entirely new situation. They had been working in a climate 
of fiscal constraint for a number of years. This squeeze on resources also effected TECs 
who, co-incidentally, in the period running up to the introduction of the SRB had suffered: 
“…a substantial decline in annual budget levels – from £3 billion in 1990 to £1⋅4 billion in 
1994” (HC, 1996a: para.2). Any organisation involved in regeneration activity and 
operating in a climate of cuts would have welcomed any opportunity to tap into a new 
funding stream. The effect of this fiscal climate was to create a situation where partners 
found it increasingly difficult to resist the lure of partnership. Indeed, it is logical to argue 
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that the greater the exposure a partner has to funding streams that were to be incorporated 
into the integrated SRB budget the stronger the impetus to engage in partnership working—
the case for this is certainly clear in the case of Coventry. It could be argued, using a 
reverse logic, that fiscal stringency imposed its own compulsion on potential partner 
organisations: they could not reasonably refuse to join a partnership initiative and in this 
sense their was a barrier to exit.  
Given that the health of the voluntary sector is intimately tied to that of local authorities it 
is not surprising therefore that they are even more vulnerable to the fiscal pressure to 
participate in partnership. The voluntary sector receives considerable direct funding from 
local authorities but it also can gain (or suffer) materially from the benefit or removal of 
patronage. One of the insidious effects of patronage was revealed in a interview with a 
representative of the ethnic minority community who recalled the invitation to participate in 
the CWP. Along with another colleague they had been invited to lunch with Duncan 
Sutherland. Over lunch it was suggested to them that they ought to consider participating in 
the CWP. Although not spelt out, they understood that if they did not participate it could 
have repercussions that might effect their relations with the council. The perception was 
that this approach fitted a pattern of local intervention which saw the local authority as: 
“…instrumental in manipulating competition between ethnic minority communities within 
the City.” The interviewee noted with interest that having an established relationship with 
another statutory organisation had meant it had access to a funding stream not under the 
control of the local council. This alternative income stream proved to be a form of security 
that helped insulate it—though not extricate it completely—from coercion. The interviewee 
felt that one of the most important benefits that arose through working with sectors outside 
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of the local authority was that it provided both an independent ally and an opportunity to 
develop relations with the GO independent of the local authority.  
ACCOUNTABILITY SUPPORTED BY SANCTIONS 
If a partnership is to be more than the clear domination of one party over another then 
partners need a mechanism which allows them to call a partnership to account 
Following Nolan’s definition that conflates accountability with sanctions it can be seen 
that, in the absence of formal mechanisms that resolves the different lines of 
accountability—internal, external, downwards—then the primary line of accountability for 
the CWP is ‘upwards’ to the GOWM. Part of the problem lies in the observation that SRB 
partnerships generally are anomalous organisations which can be neither characterised as 
statutory, private or even NDPB. So in the absence of other lines of accountability it is the 
Delivery Plan that de facto performs a measure of financial accountability, and this 
responsibility falls to the GO – this being the only organisation with the power to impose 
sanctions upon the partnership. 
PARTICIPATION STRATEGY 
A partnership should publish a participation strategy which states how  
the different lines of accountability will be resolved 
The CWP does not have a participation strategy. Indeed it is understood that the partnership 
does not even recognise that different lines of accountability exist. It cannot however be 
argued that, as the Board is constituted by members drawn from a variety of sectors, and 
they in turn are elected or have their position ratified in some way that qualifies them as 
representative, then they are in some way accountable to these constituencies. The reason 
that this argument is untenable is because the Memoranda of Association makes clear that 
directors sit in a personal capacity with a primary responsibility to the partnership. 
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EXPENDITURE AUDIT 
Although crude, money is a practical measure of the importance a partnership actually 
attaches to specific action areas. A primary aim of any audit is to compare a partnership’s 
stated priorities with the actual resources attached to 
 each objective to see if they do in fact coincide. 
How was SRB money to be distributed 
Column three in table 7.8 below sets out the distribution of SRB money by expenditure 
activity as indicated in the Final bid (CWP, 1994a). The largest portion of the budget is 
attributed to a ‘Skills to maximise growth & opportunities’ heading, taking 34⋅07% of the 
budget this compares to 12⋅81% for the next category.  
Table 7.8: Distribution of SRB funds in the final bid 
Final 
Objectives £m % 
Skills to maximise growth & opportunities 17.72 34.07 
Invest in business: Encourage Growth and Diversity 6.66 12.81 
City & urban centres 5.24 10.07 
Housing which meets peoples needs 9.90 19.03 
A high quality environment 2.76 5.31 
Safer communities 5.10 9.81 
Health and caring communities 4.40 8.46 
Deliver SRB programmes and monitor against strategy 0.23 0.44 
 52.01 100 
(source: Adapted from Final bid (CWP, 1994a:10)) 
 
The division of the bid into four groups referred to in the Board minutes of 09/08/94 above 
was confirmed in the PIEDA audit (PIEDA, 1995) which indicated that the distribution of 
funds would be allocated in the following proportions. 
Economy Development  40% 
Living [and] Environment  35% 
City Centre  12.5% 
Health & Caring  12.5% 
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However, the distribution of resources is problematic because a variety of methods of 
calculation appear to have been used and what is apparent is that crude heading hide as 
much as they reveal. The 09/08/94 Board minutes also mention that the overall balance of 
the bid, in expenditure terms, was split into employment 45% and environment 55%. 
Regardless of which headings we examine their inherent opaqueness appears to allow 
considerable latitude for interpretation. For example, did these percentages refer to outputs 
or is it expenditure? 
In order to overcome becoming embroiled in a forensic dissection of each of the 53 
approved round one projects and attempt to clarify whether individual projects are 
principally economic or environmental or social or some other combination, then table 7.9 
below instead examines which organisation received the resources rather than attempt to 
analyse them under potentially ambiguous or contested headings. An illustration of the 
problem can be seen by examining Appendix (S): Comparison of SRB outputs - Final To 
Delivery, which compares outputs listed in the Final bid and the subsequent Delivery Plan. 
What Appendix (S) shows is how, in aggregate terms, the character of the bid changed as 
certain types of outputs were cut or added. However, without an understanding of the 
expenditure attached to the outputs it becomes impossible to accurately judge their actual 
value as a proportion of the total bid. 
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Table 7.9: Distribution of SRB funds in round one 
  Total  % 
Coventry City Council  12,781,000 59.1 
TEC   5,310,000 24.6 
Nuneaton & Bedworth BC  1,076,000 5.0 
Warwickshire University   718,000 3.3 
Coventry University   575,000 2.7 
Touchstone Housing   464,000 2.1 
Warwick DC  451,000 2.1 
North Warwickshire BC  118,000 0.5 
West Midlands Probation Service   105,000 0.5 
WCC   28,000 0.1 
Total  21,626,000 100.0 
(source: CWP internal document) 
 
What is clear from table 7.9 is that projects led by Coventry secured the lion’s share of the 
SRB resources. Interviews with the core partners indicates that the geographical 
distribution of SRB funds was the result of political bargaining and negotiations undertaken 
at the start of the SRB cycle. A senior councillor involved in private discussions between 
WCC and Coventry City indicated that officers of the two authorities discussed an options 
paper in the Officers Liaison Group. This paper addressed the question of the distribution 
of resources and formed the basis of confidential discussions amongst the core partners.. 
Participants to the discussion did not dispute Coventry’s legitimate claims for a substantial 
part of the budget. It was openly acknowledged that by any measure of need the scale of 
deprivation in Coventry would justify it receiving the lion’s share of any bid. However, the 
distribution of SRB resources had to acknowledge the political realities. A councillor privy 
to the discussions argued that the distribution of resources was: “…a political carve up”, 
albeit one that acknowledged Coventry’s primacy in any claim. Part of the political 
calculation was that in order to allay the reluctance of the districts to participate, and also to 
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ensure they committed themselves to the partnership, then all four districts needed to get 
something out of the bid [and they did]. A district councillor asked why their authority had 
joined the SRB was unequivocal, we: “…got involved because of the possibility of getting 
SRB money…[adding]…Getting hands on extra money was always a very attractive 
proposition.” These exact sentiments were repeated by an officer from the same district 
authority. When asked: 
Q: Presumably once involved in the SRB did you have a clear understanding as to 
why you were there? 
A: Yes. [laughing]… 
Q: …and what was it? 
A: Principally to secure funds for the district council, for the district council areas, 
and principally those areas identified in the Index of Local Conditions as being 
areas of need. So, if you can picture it then. New initiative. Lots of funding being 
piled into one pot. Lots of funding being taken away from, from… 
Q: …top-slicing? 
A: Yes. And everyone wanting to get a finger in the pie basically. 
Control through prioritising 
The Final bid was submitted to GOWM by the 7th September 1994 deadline. Shortly after 
this the CWP received news that their bid had been well received. However, by late August 
1994 the Bid Co-ordination Team was expressing concerns that the bid would be reduced, 
with GOWM possibly asking CWP in late September to prioritise against a lower total. 
Concerned that this situation could arise the Shadow Partnership was asked to consider the 
need to think about what guidance it might issue in order to prioritise the bid if GOWM 
requested this. At the same time a number of ‘obvious’ options were put to the partnership 
by the Bid Co-ordination Team and these included: 
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a) pro-rata cuts. 
b) placing time limits on capital and revenue funding 
c) abandon projects previously funded by Urban Programme or Safer Cities  
d) giving a specific weighting to each topic area 
Within a fortnight of submission circumstances changed dramatically and this situation is 
recorded in the minutes of an Emergency meeting of the Executive Committee on 27/09/94.  
Duncan Sutherland introduced the item and explained that the Government Offices were 
eager to see our bid scaled down by over half the amount of resources requested. Indeed it 
was noted that the Partnership was expected to respond in only three working days to this 
request. Unofficially the Government Offices had advised the Partnership that a first year 
spend of £2m was to be expected. This figure would double in subsequent years leading to a 
total SRB allocation of about £18m. The question was whether a strategic programme could 
be run at this level (para.2). 
What followed was a discussion on priorities that might help the revision of the bid and 
included, amongst other items, reducing the number of target areas, phasing schemes over a 
number of years. Other suggestions included taking out the city and urban centre schemes 
and removing one of the large housing proposals or schemes formally supported under 
Urban Programme funding. This last suggestion was possibly connected with an URBAN 
bid that Coventry were in the process of submitting to the EU. Conversely a strong case 
was made to protect the Hillfields [Coventry] scheme as the most deprived area in the 
sub-region. 
Following the announcement by the SoS of the winning SRB bids on 6th December 1994 it 
was confirmed that CWP had in fact actually received under half of what it bid for 
(43⋅38%) a total of £22⋅6m over five years with £2⋅5m in the first year. The partnership was 
immediately forced to prepare a second tranche of downsizing.  
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A second tranche of downsizing 
The period after the submission of the Final bid on the 7th September 1994 and the 
confirmation of winners in December 1994 is confusing. The reason for this is that the first 
tranche of downsizing arose because of over-bidding and was managed entirely by 
structures established under the aegis of David Taylor. The need for a second tranche arose 
because of government imposed cuts. Although a formal partnership structure was not 
operational when the Outline bid was presented to GOWM, by the time of the submission 
of the Final bid an informal partnership structure had been in place for a couple of months 
operating as a Shadow Board. The confusion arises because in the early weeks of the 
partnership’s life parallel structures were operating. So alongside Taylor’s work in putting 
together a SRB bid the core partners were also actively engaged in recruiting members to a 
Shadow Board that would become the blueprint for the CWP. So as to be able to progress 
the two distinct objectives of the CWP [an economic development strategy and an SRB bid] 
the core partners established a Strategy sub-committee—the actual date when this began 
work is not recorded. A CWP officer stated that one of the ways in which new directors 
could be ‘brought up to speed’ with what the partnership was doing was to involve them in 
the work of the shadow partnership. One of the ways that this operated was to involve new 
shadow directors in the activity of the SG or more directly in Action Groups, or both. The 
second way that shadow directors were involved was working in the sub-committee 
drafting an economic development strategy. There are no published records of these early 
meetings and it is not possible to state with certainty whether all directors listed in the SG 
participated from the start and/or attended all of the meetings.  
At the time of the incorporation of CWP the oversight of the SRB bid lay with an Executive 
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Committee that had been approved by the Shadow Board on 28th June 1994. Shortly after 
hearing it had won, the CWP subsequently approved the formation of a SRB Directors 
sub-group with a remit to: “oversee the finalisation of the process” (para.6.1 CWP Board 
minutes, 24/01/95). As its title suggested it was constituted by CWP directors. In its 
metamorphosis from SG to SRB Directors sub-group its membership shed the 
representatives of the four core partners. However, subsequent to this development the SRB 
Directors sub-group was enhanced during the production of the Delivery Plan and in the 
process re-incorporated personnel from the four core partners. The changes to the 
partnership structures are recorded below in table 7.10 It is of interest that David Taylor 
serviced both the SRB Directors sub-group and the revised CWP Steering Group as an 
‘advisor’ with the title SRB co-ordinator. 
Table 7.10: Evolution of structures during the bid cycle 
Executive Committee 
(source: Shadow Board  
Mins, 28/06/94) 
David Taylor’s  
{interim} 
Steering Group 
(source: CWP internal 
document) 
SRB Directors  
sub-group 
(source: CWP Minutes 
24/01/95) 
CWP [SRB]  
Steering group 
(source: taken from Delivery 
Plan,1995a) 
Cllr. Brian Clack 
Coventry City Council 
David Taylor 
(Chairman) 
Coventry City Council 
  
Cllr. Kevin Maton 
Coventry City Council 
Matt Feeley 
Coventry City Council 
 Cllr. Kevin Maton 
Coventry City Council 
 Roger Griffiths 
Coventry City Council 
  
 Jos Parry 
Coventry City Council 
  
 Bronwen Lacy 
Coventry City Council 
  
 Graeme Betts 
Coventry City Council 
  
 Eamon Kelly /  
Noreen Dowd  
Coventry Health Auth 
  
Cllr. Derek Forwood 
(Lab) WCC 
Jeremy Howell 
WCC 
 Cllr. Derek Forwood 
WCC 
Cllr. Gordon Collett 
(Cons) WCC 
Janet Fortune 
WCC 
  
 Jane Carter 
WCC 
  
265 
 
Executive Committee 
(source: Shadow Board  
Mins, 28/06/94) 
David Taylor’s  
{interim} 
Steering Group 
(source: CWP internal 
document) 
SRB Directors  
sub-group 
(source: CWP Minutes 
24/01/95) 
CWP [SRB]  
Steering group 
(source: taken from Delivery 
Plan,1995a) 
Mr. D. Burton 
Cov & Warwickshire 
Chamb Comm & Ind 
  Mr. D. Burton 
Cov & Warwickshire 
Chamb Comm & Ind 
Brian Willis  
Cov & Warwickshire 
Chamb Comm & Ind  
Alan Durham 
Cov & Warwickshire 
Chamb Comm & Ind 
  
Mr. Malcom Gillespie 
CEO Cov & Warks TEC 
Nigel Gaynor 
Cov & Warks TEC 
 Mr. Malcom Gillespie 
CEO Cov & Warks TEC
Aaron Jones 
Cov & Warks TEC 
Lorraine Butler  
Cov & Warks TEC 
  
 Peter Davis 
Advanced Tech Centre 
University of Warwick 
Sir Brian Follett 
(Chairman) 
 
Sir Brian Follett 
(Chairman) 
University of Warwick  
 Chris Garden 
Nun & Bedworth BC 
Mick Jones 
District councils 
Cllr. Mick Jones 
Nun & Bedworth BC 
 Deborah de Haes 
Rugby BC 
  
  Dr. Mike Goldstein 
Universities 
Dr. Mike Goldstein 
University of Coventry 
 John Goodman 
Voluntary Sector 
Ms. Helen Aird 
Voluntary sector 
Ms. Helen Aird 
CVS 
 Iain Sharp 
Voluntary Sector 
  
 Eric Linton 
Coventry REC 
Hardev Bahia 
Ethnic minorities 
Mr. Hardev Bahia 
Coventry REC 
 Kishor Pala 
Ethnic Minority 
Development Alliance 
  
  Alan Stothard 
Private sector 
Alan Stothard 
GEC, Rugby 
  Colin Holland 
Private sector 
 
 
Having won less than half of the amount they bid for the partnership had to manage a 
second tranche of downsizing. Looking at table 7.11 below it seems that the approach taken 
was a combination of following the ‘steer’ given by GOWM and expediency. Advice 
emanating from GOWM about the possible scaling back of the bid had already encouraged 
an examination as to how this might be managed. Once again the Bid Co-ordination Team 
played an influential role in this process. David Taylor’s role as the primary conduit for 
information to and from the GOWM was a two edged sword. On the one hand working 
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relations with the GO offered an opportunity to be close to the decision makers and where 
access to information offered opportunities that could be exploited. On the other hand this 
also can be seen to have been somewhat of a poisoned chalice when the GO effectively 
exacted cuts to the Final bids [although the position was that publicly partnerships 
proffered cuts]. This situation was not unique. The evidence from Mawson et al 
(1995, Chp.4) was that nationally the experience of round one was that there had been 
elements of competition and negotiation in the determination of bid size with evidence that 
in the case of GOWM downsizing was undertaken in-house after submission of the Final 
bids.  
By proposing a bid for less than the full amount GOWM was in effect imposing an 
ultimatum: accept or fail. It is entirely unrealistic to imagine, as GOs suggested at the time, 
that once bids were submitted they became in effect sub judice. Here we had a massive 
£50m bid chopped in half. It seems incredulous that the GO would not have discussed 
downsizing with the Bid Co-ordination Team at some point prior to the announcement of 
winners. Even if we accepted the GO position that they did not impose a ceiling it begs the 
question: what possible rationale could the Bid Co-ordination Team have used in the 
absence of any steer about the possible size of an acceptable bid. Like all partnerships 
around the country GOs were themselves under considerable pressure to deliver. It should 
be remembered that they too were new entities, with new organisational structures, 
operating under the same onerous time constraints. As the deadline approached and GOs 
finalised their SRB programmes, reprofiling or queries required immediate action from 
partnerships – especially if ‘negotiation and bargaining’ was needed prior to submission to 
the EDR Cabinet Committee. The strategy that the partnership appears to have used in the 
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second trance of downsizing translated into cuts of approximately 50% across most of the 
objectives; the exception to this being the City & Urban Centres heading which was 
reduced by 82% with the Deliver SRB programmes and the Monitor against Strategy 
heading remaining unchanged.  
Table 7.11: The scale of cuts between final bid stage and delivery plan 
Final Delivery Change Change*
£m £m £m cut % cut 
 
Objectives 
   
City & urban centres 5.24 0.97 4.28 82 
A high quality environment 2.76 1.03 1.73 63 
Housing which meets peoples needs 9.90 4.19 5.71 58 
Skills to maximise growth & opportunities 17.72 8.03 9.69 55 
Health and caring communities 4.40 2.01 2.39 54 
Invest in business: Encourage Growth and Diversity 6.66 3.20 3.46 52 
Safer communities 5.10 2.90 2.20 43 
 0.23 0.23 0.01 2 
   
52.01 22.56 29.45 
*Column (d) expresses Delivery as % of the Final bid  
[vis. (Final - Delivery)/ Final * 100] 
Numbers may not add up due to rounding 
(source: Adapted from Final bid (CWP, 1994a:10) & Delivery Plan (CWP, 1995a:2)) 
 
A CWP officer familiar with the procedure that was followed in the second tranche of 
downsizing observed that decisions were taken in a meeting held between Sir Brian Follett 
and David Taylor. The results of these discussions were ‘presented’ to the remaining 
members of the SRB Directors sub-group with the SRB directors simply accepting the 
judgements that had been made for them. This interpretation of events can be partially 
explained by the way GOWM handled its own SRB programme management. When 
GOWM approached the CWP to discuss scaling down the bid they extracted a 
commitment, made on behalf of the partnership by David Taylor in the Bid Co-ordination 
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Team, for a bid half the original size. Crucially though, Taylor who had to reply to GOWM 
at very short notice had to indicate the profile of a revised bid and he did this on the basis of 
what he understood to be the priorities of the partners. It was this profile that effectively 
circumscribed the parameters of the revised bid. This meant that whilst the CWP Steering 
Group ratified the revised bid figure, they did not take part in the discussion about how, if 
at all, the SRB strategy should be modified in the light of the revised figure, i.e., the 
proportion of expenditure on economic projects could have been increased/decreased or 
changed to reflect other interests for example, environmental, social etc. The role of the 
CWP Steering Group thus was administrative and took the role of ‘culling’ projects that 
least met the objectives set out in the project summary forms. 
CONCLUSIONS 
What did the expenditure audit say about the CWP’s priorities? 
Any attempt to conduct an expenditure audit of the CWP is problematic because of the way 
the bid was assembled. In the first instance the four core partners achieved political 
agreement on the broad split. From this point on the management of the bid was 
co-ordinated by the Bid Co-ordination Team who actively sought to avoid a debate about 
‘figures’ and ‘who got what’. Obfuscation, it was argued, was tactically useful because it 
helped deflect debate about the distribution of resources. Public debate it was suggested 
would almost certainly have ended acrimoniously exposing partnership relations and this 
would have had a seriously prejudicial impact upon the image of the partnership that was 
being assembled; argument and consensus were held to be mutually exclusive. Only the Bid 
Co-ordination Team were in a position to comment on the distribution of resources and 
they confirmed that this analysis could only be undertaken on a project by project basis. 
However, even at the individual project level problems arise. The administrative 
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arrangements put in place by the CWP dictated that before a project could be accepted it 
had to be categorised by its primary activity; it was emphasised that this was not done by 
the CWP rather it was done by whoever submitted the project. Given that a typical SRB 
project will deliver a bundle of outputs there will be occasions when this labelling is, if not 
arbitrary, than has a large element of subjectivity. For example. A project whose primary 
activity is categorised as environmental may contain ethnic minority outputs but no 
distinction is made in returns on what proportion of the project spend relates to individual 
outputs. A £100k project described under an ‘environmental’ heading might have, for 
example, a number of employment and ethnic minority outputs. These specific outputs will 
have of course to be accounted for. Financial probity in the SRB demands a clear audit trail 
but this focuses on reconciling how much is spent (compared to that predicted) and when it 
is spent (timescale) so that outputs can be shown to have been delivered to schedule. The 
crucial point is that returns in this example would show only the aggregate figure of £100k 
spent on environmental issues; it would be practically impossible to disaggregate what 
proportion of that £100k was spent on the ethnic minority outputs described in the original 
project summary: was it £50k £10k or £10? One way of looking at this opacity might be 
that it allows operational flexibility allowing actual expenditure to be directed [skewed] 
towards areas that might not necessarily have benefited as much under a more transparent 
regime. The concern must be however that flexibility can be a two-edged sword. That this 
is an area of wider concern is apparent from the Audit Commission’s criticism of a number 
of SRB partnerships’ expenditure controls. In light of their concerns the Audit Commission 
qualified the audit of the DoE expenditure vote [Appropriation Accounts 1996-97 Class VI 
Vote 2: Regeneration and countryside and wildlife, England] because:  
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…of a limitation in the evidence available to the Comptroller and Auditor General to 
confirm that grants paid in relation to the Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund have 
been applied to the purposes intended by Parliament and conform to the authorities which 
govern them…[and]…. 
In the first year of operation…some partnerships did not operate the financial systems in the 
way intended by the Department [DoE]. This resulted in a number of annual returns being 
qualified by the relevant external auditors. For 40 out of a total of 194 returns where 
certificates were due in 1996-97, covering some £25.1 millions, the external auditors of the 
accountable bodies had stated that there was no evidence available to verify the use of some 
or all of the grants paid by accountable bodies to their partners (Audit Commission, Press 
Notice 9/98). 
It is clear from the CWP minutes and other published documents that the SRB figures have 
been presented in a variety of manners to suit different audiences. An example of how this 
operated is clear from comments made by a representative from the ethnic minority 
community who stated that in the very early days of the partnership ethnic minority 
community representatives received a specific undertaking that 20% of the SRB spend 
would be on ethnic minorities. This commitment played a significant part in convincing the 
ethnic minority community to participate in the partnership. Problems only arose later when 
this figure was challenged by the ethnic minority community. It became clear to them that 
the system of monitoring was not set up to disaggregate outputs at this level of detail. This 
inability to quantify – with any confidence – the actual spend on ethnic minorities became a 
source of considerable tension.  
An evolving partnership 
On the other hand the CWP has shown itself quite able to evolve organisationally. There 
was clear evidence of both mutual reorientation and organisational learning. The 
transformation of project objectives illustrated in table 7.4 is an example of the process of 
mutual reorientation which helped resolve tensions amongst the core partners over the 
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strategic direction of the bid. Similarly, table 7.10 illustrates how the structure of the 
partnership evolved during the development of the SRB bid; from an informal agreement 
amongst the four core partners in pursuit of a common goal to a formal legal structure with 
a broader membership operating with an agreed strategic agenda.  
In the early period, in the transition from round one to round two, control of the bid 
assembly process moved from the Bid Co-ordination Team, to a newly constituted SRB 
Directors sub-group. This example of organisational learning needs to be examined 
critically. The new structure was created by the now legal entity CWP. Ostensibly the wider 
partnership were giving this new arrangement (co-ordination mechanism) a formal 
mandate. However in practice the new arrangements appear merely to have legitimated the 
four core partners control over the SRB process. The same core group of partners continued 
to dominate this revised structure with the role of senior Coventry officers continuing to 
play important roles. This process of organisational learning has continued with the 
restructuring of the CWP Board. Pressures coming from a number of sources encouraged 
the partnership to consider reducing the size of the main Board in order to give it a more 
strategic remit. It was felt that SRB business was dominating the Board’s agenda and that 
this was having a deleterious effect upon the wider effectiveness of the Board. A point 
repeatedly made was that the SRB was intended to be only one element of the partnership’s 
sub-regional economic strategy. A paper produced by the company secretary [the Chief 
Executive of Coventry City Council] examined the option of reducing the size of the Board 
in order to allow it to focus more specifically on a strategic role. The paper proposed that 
oversight of the SRB should be devolved to a sub-committee with a specific SRB remit. 
These proposals formed the basis of an extraordinary AGM held in December 1996 which 
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approved a reduction from 26 directors to ‘not more than 12’. The basis upon how directors 
should be selected was also addressed. The original structure saw directors selected on the 
basis of a representational model, albeit directors sat as individuals, they nominally 
represented specific sectors. The new arrangements called for this representational model to 
be discarded in favour of what could be termed a ‘competency model’ akin to that 
operating in the private sector. Directors in future would be selected on the basis of the 
contribution and expertise that they could bring to the partnership. The extraordinary AGM 
approved the change in the Memorandum of Association. The impact of these changes was 
felt largely by the ethnic minority and community groups whose Board seats were 
abolished—see table 7.10. The four core partners retained seats upon the Board albeit [once 
again] not specifically named as representatives of any particular agency.  
Is the CWP a ‘true’ partnership? 
It is clear from an examination of the Board of CWP that the voting rights of the four key 
partners created a dominant voting block; a position that was maintained even as additional 
sectors were invited to join the partnership board. The subsequent development of a 
membership organisation can on the one hand be seen as an attempt to broaden the 
franchise of the organisation, however, the role of ‘members’ is not defined in the Articles 
of Association and in terms of the Company they have no legal rights. The formal role of 
members appears to have extended no further than consultees along with an invitation to 
attend AGMs to give a mandate for previously drafted policy. These occasions appear to 
have been primarily public relations occasions celebrating the achievement of key 
milestones. A typical AGM lasted approximately three hours with an agenda set by the 
CWP and were not structured as forums for dissent or for the questioning of the strategic 
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direction of CWP. The distribution of seats on the CWP Board ensured that a cabal made 
up of the four key agencies could exert considerable control over the strategic direction of 
the partnership. This same mechanism also allowed the same cabal to manage the 
recruitment of additional Board members. Although the involvement of a diverse range of 
actors and agencies were actively canvassed and genuinely encouraged to participate in the 
evaluation of SRB projects, the structural advantages implicit in the distribution of seats on 
the Board made it possible for the same group of core agencies to determine and manage 
the development of strategic objectives. Whether intended or not a repercussion of this 
structure was that control was not widely distributed. A direct consequence of these 
arrangements was to circumscribe the autonomy and influence of subsidiary partners. The 
reality appears to have been that power resided with the four core partners who effectively 
exerted enormous control over the evolution and development of the partnership. It is also 
clear that the relationship between the four core partners was fundamentally different to the 
relationship that existed between the core partners and partners invited to join later. The 
core cabal met effectively as equals. Albeit that Coventry effectively catalysed the creation 
of both the partnership structure and the SRB strategy the partnerships early development 
was contingent upon agreement being achieved between the four core partners. It seems 
improbable that the CWP could have convinced the GO that the partnership was genuine if 
any one of the core partners had refused to participate or openly dissented about the 
partnerships objectives in round one. The four partners had (in various combinations) 
already worked together prior to the SRB. What was new however was the commitment of 
the four core partners to come together and work on a common economic policy and SRB 
strategy. This was a radical innovation. Throughout the process of building the partnership 
and developing a SRB strategy the core partners effectively recognised their mutual 
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interdependence. The evidence suggests that the partnership they constructed reflected their 
interests first and foremost. However, it is also clear that the core partners came together 
voluntarily. It is also the case that the common agenda that was agreed upon within this 
group was built upon the trust that developed between the partners during the partnership 
building process. In terms of the theoretical model developed in chapter four the core 
partners exhibited all the qualities of a network partnership.  
Summary 
The experience of the CWP then was that although there was clear evidence of mutual 
reorientation and organisational learning this experience was partial. The evidence suggests 
that the four key partners did adjust their operational objectives and reorganised their 
actions to accommodate the concerns of the other core partners. However, what was 
noticeable by its omission was any evidence of accommodation of the needs and interests 
of the subsidiary partners. The inability to disaggregate the expenditure profile by either 
ethnic minority or community interests severely prejudiced the objectivity of the 
partnership in the eyes of these communities and served only to reinforce the perception of 
the dominance of one group over another. [The CWP did in fact present papers with a 
breakdown of expenditure profiles but these were contested by representatives of the 
community sector and served only to illustrate to those who felt aggrieved by the process of 
the importance of transparency]. The experience of the ethnic minority and community 
sector was that mutual reorientation was in fact not mutual and could more accurately be 
described as a one way street in which they were obliged to follow in order to ‘qualify’ for 
funding. The organisational learning experience of the voluntary and community sectors is 
starkly illustrated by their impotence in challenging the revised board structure which 
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effectively further emasculated their sectors roles in the CWP hierarchy. 
As chapter six explained the development of key issues was severely prejudiced by the 
extremely short time table. The partners – even before the incorporation of the CWP – with 
a strong steer from Coventry adopted [what was acknowledged to be an opportunistic 
move] a competitiveness agenda based upon work previously undertaken for the European 
SPD. Having in effect informally adopted this agenda as the strategic backdrop to round 
one the principle of competitiveness was then formally adopted when The Economic 
Strategy for Coventry & Warwickshire 1995-1998 (CWP, 1995b) was approved at the 
CWP’s first AGM. However, approval of an economic strategy for the sub-region does not 
of itself suggest that agreement on key issues should be accepted uncritically. A 
fundamental aim of the wider CWP initiative was to secure the co-ordination of economic 
development strategies across the sub-region. Given that all the local authorities involved in 
the CWP subsequently revised their local plans to accommodate the overarching themes of 
the CWP economic strategy this can be interpreted as a measure of the partnership’s 
success. The fact that the document is described as an ‘economic’ strategy reflects the 
primary focus of the document and no doubt accounts for the emphasis on competitiveness 
and manufacturing. This is not to say that given the opportunity to steer the strategy at an 
earlier stage the voluntary and community sectors may have adopted a programme that 
focused on a different agenda, for example, social exclusion or poverty. The important 
point is that this debate never took place!  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
An academic theory tends to become fashionable at the cost of being amended into 
something approaching a caricature of the more sophisticated and cautious  
formulations of their originators (Jordan, 1990) 
The difference between academic life and government is the difference between  
arguing to a conclusion and arguing to a decision (Healey, 1989) 
 
Partnership? 
This thesis set itself a number of objectives. The first, and most important, was to describe 
and give some objective substance to the idea of partnership. Having developed a 
theoretical model the second task was to translate the theoretical insights into a practical 
toolkit which could be used to examine the quality of relations within partnerships. This 
was operationalised by testing the checklist on the CWP to see if it was a real partnership. 
In the process of this evaluation the efficacy of the partnership checklist itself was tested. 
An important but subsidiary part of this inquiry evolved from the first question and this was 
an exploration of the relationship between partnership and network forms of co-ordination. 
The latter, it was suggested in the academic literature, had been proliferating to the extent 
that it potentially represented a new model of co-ordination, one that potentially threatened 
the dominant partnership orthodoxy. What was envisaged at the onset was an opportunity to 
make a definitive and unambiguous statement as to whether the CWP is a true partnership. 
The answer proved to be both yes and no. 
The test of an SRB partnership 
The test of an SRB partnership, as distinct from a partnership assembled for other reasons, 
is straightforward and has two dimensions. The first is whether the organisational form that 
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is created is a partnership understood in the theoretical terms set out in this thesis. The 
second dimension, reflecting the new localism agenda was to examine whether the 
partnership could realistically be described as local.  
Although City Challenge was widely acknowledged as re-asserting the concept of a 
partnership linked to a specific local agenda it was different in one major respect. This was 
the level of central influence over the partnerships’ that were formed. City Challenge, was 
not an open competition, rather, certain localities were invited by central government to 
form a partnership and these were then subject to ministerial approval. The key 
distinguishing factor, and what made the SRB so radical, was that for the first time, the 
concept of partnership (as an efficacious organisational form) was explicitly linked with a 
new localism [unlike City Challenge invites, the form of SRB partnerships was not overly 
prescriptive or nominally subject to direct ministerial dictat]. In principle then SRB 
partnerships would deliver organisational efficiency and be responsive to local needs. In the 
theoretical terms discussed in chapter four these characteristics represent the 
co-ordinational logic of SRB partnerships: efficiency and localism.  
The checklist seeks to answer the first question by providing a generic methodology 
through which all partnerships can be analysed. It usefulness lies in its ability to compare 
the quality of relations within a partnership against that predicted in a theoretical model and 
in doing so comment on its internal dynamics. However, the checklist is problematic in 
relation to localism. The reason for this is that whilst the checklist provides a systematic 
methodology for evaluating the contribution of partners included in a partnership it has not 
been designed to comment on the role of actors not formally constituted in a partnership. 
The checklist presumes that the various combinations of partners in a locality do in fact 
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constitute a new localism envisaged by central government.  
This partnership checklist then comes with a very important caveat. It does not attempt to 
comment on constituencies of local interest that seek to play no part [for whatever reason] 
in a partnership; it does address exclusion, and the mechanics of exclusion that are seen to 
operate within partnership structures but it does not attempt to explain why interests might 
be excluded. The checklist was therefore principally designed to be used to evaluate the 
quality of organisational forms and the contribution made by, and relations between, the 
various constituency of interests that have either chosen or have been coerced to participate 
in a partnership. Implicit in the methodology is the presumption that the partnership 
approach, by incorporating a diversity of interests, does in fact ‘add up’ to a new localism. 
The checklist’s primary aim was therefore to evaluate the contribution of partners in 
partnership and does not (nor was it designed to) directly address the dynamics of 
constituencies of interest not formally represented in a partnership. The checklist approach 
therefore accepts the government’s assumptions about SRB partnerships and these 
assumptions are important and are worth repeating. First, partners brought together in SRB 
partnerships do in fact constitute a new localism and that their joint endeavours in fact 
describes a comprehensive approach to specific local issues. Second, that the principle of 
‘true and real’ does in fact describe the quality of relations between partners. 
In evaluating the CWP it is crucially important to reflect on the discussion on Arnstein’s 
(1969) eight rung ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’ in chapter four on the potential conflicts 
that arise depending on which sector undertakes the evaluation of a partnership. This debate 
is highly significant for a number of reasons. It should be remembered that a fundamental 
part of the government’s case for promoting partnership was to create an organisational 
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form that could effectively incorporate the diversity of actors that were considered 
absolutely essential for a regeneration policy to be effective. Allied to this concern was the 
government’s stated intention to shift the locus of decision making away from the centre.  
It has been argued that partnership had become the new economic orthodoxy one accepted 
without question and vigorously promoted by successive governments as the institutional 
form that agencies and organisations should adopt when addressing regeneration. This is 
perhaps evident from the recent experience of City Challenge and the SRB but it applies 
equally to European funding. However, it is also clear that partnership has far wider 
acceptance and evidence for this can be seen from the comprehensive list of initiatives 
compiled by HM Treasury (1996) which catalogues the range of government led initiatives 
that promote partnership. In many spheres of activity then partnership has become a 
qualifying criteria and this has meant that there is now a clear structural reason to form or 
become involved in partnership. An inherent problem with the partnership approach to 
regeneration has been that where a system demands the creation of partnerships these may 
in fact not be ‘true’. Critics have consistently argued that there is compelling evidence that 
the obligation of partnership formation has created a climate where organisations and/or 
sectors have been seen to participate in partnership but have in reality been marginal to that 
process – see Mawson et al (1995); HC (1995a); Hall et al (1996, 1998) Dunmore et al 
(1996).  
It was argued in chapter four that a coherent theoretical model of partnership did not exist. 
Because of this a conceptual model of partnership had to be built up from literature from a 
number of disciplines. This approach took as its starting point that partnership represented a 
specific form of organisational co-ordination. To better understand these dynamics the 
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theoretical chapter deconstructed several different forms of co-ordination to isolate the 
various logics of partnership and ‘discover’ what could be considered as categorical 
partnership qualities. It was argued that a ‘true’ partnership is a specific type of 
co-ordination (a discrete sub-set of the various models of co-ordination called partnership) 
endowed with unique institutional and organisational qualities. These characteristics both 
distinguish and contrast partnership from other forms of co-ordination that might lay claim 
to the title of partnership.  
The principle research task then was to develop a conceptual model that had application in 
the real world. This was the intention behind the development of the checklist. The idea of 
which arose from the realisation that there were a variety of organisational forms assembled 
to engage in regeneration activities – many purporting to be partnerships – and that these 
arrangements although called partnership were not necessarily applying a specific 
partnership logic. It was intended to use the checklist [conceptual model] as an analytical 
toolbox to prise open partnerships. Given the multiplicity of partnerships the checklist had 
to achieve a number of objectives. It had to be able to embrace a range of organisational 
forms; it had to be applicable in a variety of settings; it had to be able to identify and 
substantiate the unique partnership qualities predicted in the model but perhaps most 
importantly it should be simple to apply.  
The theoretical model suggested that true partnership logic would be distinct from other 
‘co-ordinational’ logics and these specific qualities would differentiate partnership from 
other forms of co-ordination that might seek to claim the title of partnership. By identifying 
a specific partnership logic the checklist gave real substance to the concept of partnership 
so that it could be used both critically and – it was hoped – constructively. By looking at 
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the problem of partnership in terms of the character of the co-ordination mechanism an 
intellectual bridge was built between the existing theoretical literature on the co-ordination 
of firms with that of partnership. 
The checklist approach was in principle simple. Select a partnership, in this case the CWP, 
and compare the real life experience of the development of the CWP with that predicted in 
theory. The checklist described the cardinal partnership qualities: the observer need only to 
check off the attributes. The logic implicit in this approach was that where an organisation 
under observation did not conform to the model then it could not justifiably qualify as 
partnership. However, exposure to reality revealed the naivety of some of the assumptions 
upon which the checklist was built. 
Future work 
The evidence from chapter seven suggests that the CWP operated as a partnership on many 
levels but what was being sought was one measure, one score, which could be described as 
a definitive statement as to whether the CWP [or any other partnership under examination] 
conformed to the theoretical model of partnership. This question proved extremely difficult 
to answer in practice. Part of the problem is that, in use, whilst the checklist reveals and 
confirms the many dimensions and complexity of what constitutes partnership it 
simultaneously introduces additional layers of complexity that were not initially envisaged 
and are problematic to resolve conclusively. The methodological problem arises in the 
process of translation from pure theory to practice. This can be understood in terms of a 
‘closeness of fit’ dilemma.  
The checklist encourages a systematic dissection of the constituent parts of what are 
considered to be partnership characteristics. In this sense it represents a series of null 
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hypotheses. The task of the researcher is to run through the checklist sequentially accepting 
or rejecting the null hypothesis. In principle the theoretical model of partnership, described 
by the checklist, suggests that if any one hypothesis is rejected then the organisational form 
cannot be a partnership and must be rejected in its entirety. In practice however the 
experience of the CWP was that it matched expectations in some areas but not all. Even this 
needs to be qualified. In some areas the CWP matched expectations – though not entirely. 
Methodologically this poses formidable obstacles for evaluation. However, a principle in 
the checklist was the notion of humility which acknowledges that problems (in all their 
guises) can be ameliorated through learning. This idea was specifically picked-up in the 
concepts of mutual reorientation and organisational learning which imply that within the 
partnership structure there exists the potential for an organisation to examine its own 
shortcomings and make conscious adjustments to its own development trajectory. The 
principle of adjustment, which reflects as it does experience on the ground, does not of 
itself imply that evolution necessarily always have positive outcomes. 
This thesis set out to describe ‘categorical’ partnership qualities with at its starting point an 
examination of the literature on theories of co-ordination. It comes as no real surprise to 
discover that the CWP does not conform precisely to the model postulated in theory. The 
question that arises is how close is the CWP to partnership, and assuming that it is an 
evolving structure, in which direction is it moving (closer to or further from the theoretical 
model). The checklist whilst a useful starting point requires further work in order for it to 
become more sensitive to the realities of partnership operation evident in the real world. 
Having set the parameters of what constitutes a ‘true’ partnership the experience of the 
CWP case study suggests that what is now needed is further refinement to the methodology 
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that would enable the elements to be weighted. In seeking to assess the CWP it became 
clear that the checklist only provides a snapshot of the organisation that can be held as a 
mirror for comparison to the theoretical model. However, for all its inherent weaknesses an 
advantage of this approach is that (if repeated over time) it becomes possible to see in 
which direction the partnership is travelling: either closer to or further away from the ideal 
described in the theoretical model. 
PARTNERSHIP IN URBAN POLICY 
What goes round comes around 
What is remarkable for any researcher examining the involvement of local communities in 
regeneration partnerships are the obvious echoes from the past. Partnership as a policy 
instrument was fundamentally embedded as an institutional response following the seminal 
1977 White Paper. This was acknowledged as providing an unusually perceptive insight 
into the structural problems facing inner urban economies and was widely commended as 
such at the time.  
A core element of the analysis contained in the paper was the recognition that inner urban 
economies were complex systems and any policy response needed to reflect both this 
diversity but also provide a mechanism to bring these disparate constituencies 
(stakeholders) together. Early partnership experience suggests that whilst rhetoric formally 
acknowledged the importance of the various stakeholder groups, partnership in practice was 
something done to, and not with, local communities. A great deal has been written in the 
intervening years on the need to actively involve local communities in their own local 
strategies. The DoE published, Involving Communities in Urban and Rural Regeneration: 
A Guide for Practitioners (DoE, 1995). This weighty report, principally a good partnership 
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guide, provided a convincing and cogently argued case for the efficacy of involving 
communities in the setting of strategies which shape the trajectory of their collective 
futures. Involving communities, it was argued, translates into policies that are sensitive to 
the needs of local economies and are more effective in achieving their objectives. The 
Audit Commission (1999b) have similarly argued that policy shaped by local communities 
for local communities, is more likely to become embedded in local communities and when 
this occurs it has a much more realistic opportunity to become sustainable over the medium 
to long term. That this conclusion needs to be discovered by researchers is a telling 
indictment of the structural failures of partnership working during the last three decades. It 
should be remembered that as long ago as 1969 Skeffington (People and Planning: Report 
of the Committee on Public Participation in Planning) was already saying that participation 
was an active thing: participation meant sharing in the formulation of policies and this 
should take place throughout the plan making process (HMSO, 1969:1). 
The history of regeneration policy over the last three decades is littered with policy echoes. 
The rapid introduction of new policy initiatives understandably makes it difficult to secure 
meaningful engagement of all parties. The experience of Urban Programme Partnerships is 
evidence of this but remarkably this was repeated for both City Challenge and SRB 
partnerships. In practice a partial mandate has always been considered better than no 
mandate. Perhaps the most remarkable observation is the consistent failure of institutional 
actors to create structures that might accommodate community interests on a more equal 
footing. Looking at this the other way round what is equally remarkable is that community 
interests have consistently been overlooked, if not marginalised, in partnerships. It is hard 
not to draw the conclusion that although the merits of community involvement are 
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understood and well documented, institutional actors have chosen not to seek to redress the 
balance. 
What we see in the history of partnership over the last thirty years is how it has been 
continually re-constituted to reflect the hegemony of the prevailing political economy. 
Given that resources are, and probably always will be, distributed unequally, experience 
suggests that resource rich sectors or organisations that are favoured by the prevailing 
political economy will tend to act opportunistically to secure their own advantage. If we 
consider the control exerted by the four core partners in the CWP it becomes hard not to 
concur with Benson’s (one might say cynical) analysis that the core partners’ principal 
objective was to ensure the continued maintenance of their control over the network of 
resources (Benson, 1975). It is difficult, given the evidence, not to conclude that the core 
partners did indeed use their resource advantages to opportunistically maintain their 
dominant position in the policy network. In the absence of any countervailing force, 
partnership effectively rewarded the core partners with hegemony over the policy process 
and control over Benson’s two key resources: money and authority. This experience has 
parallels with the Conservative government's criticism of the Urban Programme 
Partnerships. These along with being accused of being ineffective were criticised because 
their involvement was cynically explained as simply a channel through which local 
government sought to capture additional government money during a period of fiscal 
retrenchment. It is reasonable to suggest that the same criticism could equally be made 
against UDCs, City Challenge and SRB partnerships generally. In each case although the 
core partners might be drawn from different sectors or agencies, the rhetoric of community 
involvement remains undiminished, however, the reality is that partners (in partnerships) 
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are always unequal. On each occasion when partnership has been used in regeneration 
policy the particular form of partnership has been inextricably tied to the prevailing 
political economy. On each occasion the rhetoric of community involvement has been 
undiminished and yet on each occasion communities have been involved as junior partners. 
In the absence of a definition of what constitutes a real partnership, and given the enormous 
resource differences that exist between institutional actors and community groups, this 
situation looks set to remain unchallenged. 
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 APPENDICES 
Appendix (A): Evolution of Neighbourhood Policies in Britain 1964-77 
(source: Figure 12 in Policy Planning and Local Government Hambleton, R. 1978: 135) 
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 Appendix (B): Chronology of Urban Policy 
 
 15th Oct 1964 Labour elected (Harold Wilson wins: majority of four)  
 8th Nov 1965 Race Relations Act 
 1st Mar 1966 Immigration Act 
 31st Mar 1966 Labour re-elected (Harold Wilson) 
 20th Apr 1968 Enoch Powell’s River of Blood speech 
 23rd Apr 1968 Race Relations Bill Second Reading 
 5th May 1968 Urban Programme Announced by Harold Wilson  
 Jul 1969 Community Development Project (CDP) announced 
 1970 Conservatives elected (Heath) 
 Jul 1972 Peter Walker’s announcement of a ‘total approach’ to the cities presaging the 
Inner Area Studies 
 28th Feb 1974 Conservatives elected (Heath) 
 July 1974 Comprehensive Community Programme 
 10th Oct 1974 Wilson/Callaghan Labour Government elected 
 1976 Spring Budget includes Healey’s (Labour) experiment with Monetarism 
 1976 Labour autumn Party Conference Callaghan states you cannot spend your way 
out of a recession 
 6th Apr 1977 Inner Cities (Government Proposals): statement to the House of Commons on 
Government policy for the inner cities by Peter Shore, Labour, SoS for the 
Environment 
 Jun 1977 Policy for the Inner Cities, White Paper 
 8th Nov 1977 Inner Cities: statement to the House of Commons on the development of 
Government policy for the inner cities by Peter Shore, Labour, SoS for the 
Environment. 
 1977 Policy for the Inner Cities White Paper 
 1978 IMF debacle – Healey cancels flight to IMF meeting in Manila 
 3rd May 1979 Labour defeated - first Thatcher government elected 
 1979 Re-drawing of regional policy boundaries 
 1980 UDC policy initiative begun 
 1980 Bristol riots 
 11-14th Apr 1981 Brixton riots 
 9th Jun 1983 Thatcher Second Term 
 3rd Jul Southall, Toxteth and Moss Side riots 
 1983 Re-drawing of regional policy boundaries 
 11th Jun 1987 Thatcher Third Term 
   
 
 
 early 1980s Recession 
 1988 Re-drawing of regional policy boundaries 
 Nov 1990 Thatcher resigns / John Major becomes Prime Minister  
 early 1990s Recession 
 May 1991 Heseltine announces City Challenge 
 9th Apr 1992 John Major Elected (Conservative’s fourth term) 
 Apr 1992 City Challenge commences 
 Nov 1993 Principle of SRB announced 
 25th Mar 1994 Inner Cities Debate, HC 
 Apr 1994 SRB formally established at the same time as Government Office for the  
Regions  
 May 1994 First Competitiveness White Paper 
 14th Apr 1995 SRB round one announced 
   
 1st May 1997 Tony Blair elected (end of 18yrs of Conservative administration) 
 
 
 Appendix (C): Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership Chronology 
 
  May 1985 Conservatives lose control of WCC ~ Hung administration led by Labour. Shortly after 
election WCC Labour group write to Coventry proposing a meeting to discuss economic 
development. Invitation politely declined by Coventry 
 Sep 1990 Coventry & Warwickshire TEC established. Chief Executive Scott Glover  
 11th January 1993 Duncan Sutherland appointed as Director of City Development, Coventry 
 1st May Labour take control of WCC for the first time 
 19th Jul Senior personnel from Coventry City Council & WCC meet informally to discuss 
partnership working 
 Oct  WCC take initial steps to reconstitute a county Economic Development function by 
establishing an Economic Development policy working party  
 4th Nov  Single Regeneration Budget announced by SoS for the Environment  
 8th Nov DoE issue SRB: Notes on Principles 
 Jan 1994  Round one SRB Draft Bidding Guidance issued 
 Mar WCC set up an Economic Development Panel 
 29th Mar Coventry City Policy Advisory Committee approve establishment of Coventry & 
Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd with mandate for officers to negotiate with WCC with a 
view to becoming a founder member. Committee Report ‘Coventry & Warwickshire 
Partnerships’ outlined proposals for an economic development partnership company  
 30th Mar Consultation meeting on SRB 
 1st - 29th Apr Multi-agency action group meetings 
 14th Apr SRB round one Bidding Guidance issued  
 9th May  Consultation letter on operational objectives 
 10th May WCC pass council resolution to participate in Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership 
 11th May Nuneaton & Bedworth BC Policy & Resources Committee endorse sub-regional 
initiative and resolve to support Coventry City and WCC on economic development 
matters  
 23rd May - 3rd Jun Consultation / Information exchange 
  31st May Outline bid submission deadline 
 Jun Malcom Gillespie becomes 2nd Coventry & Warwickshire TEC Chief Executive 
 3rd Jun  CWP presentation to Phillipa Holland Head of Regeneration at GOWM 
 7th Jun Extant Executive Committee Minutes begin ~ references to previous meetings 
 3rd Jun Revised operational objectives and their code numbers issued. Project summary forms 
for projects requiring SRB funds accepted from this date. Project summary forms for 
complementary projects contributing to the objectives issued  
 27th Jun Deadline for project summary forms to be returned 
 28th Jun CWP Shadow Board ~ first meeting.  
  Minutes record an Executive Committee with specific SRB oversight was formed from 
the 8 people from the founding members. 
 Jul WCC re-establish an Economic Development Sub-Committee 
 11th Jul Rugby DC Policy & Resources Committee consider officers report on CWP 
 11th Jul Action Groups send ‘first sieve’ of projects received to Steering Group 
 14th - 22nd Jul CWP and constituent partners, e.g., City Council, TEC Board, endorse strategy 
statement, operational objectives, draft programme. 
 Aug  Nick Scheele named chairman of the CWP 
 22nd Jul - mid Aug Public consultation on SRB bid 
 Mid - end Aug Final bid document finalised and printed. 
 19th Aug CWP Registered as company limited by guarantee 
 25th Aug Executive Committee Minutes record David Taylor’s concerns about the possibility of 
the bid being reduced by GOWM  
 7th Sep  Final Bid submission deadline to GOWM  
 27th Sep Emergency meeting of Executive Committee. Letter from GOWM recommends CWP’s 
£50m bid be scaled down by half. 
 19th Oct Board minutes record growing list of directors - now 24  
 6th Dec  SoS announced winners. 
  Dec Final Recommendations on the Future Local Government of Warwickshire published 
recommending status quo in county administration 
  
 Jan 1995 The CWP Board agree to create a small staff complement to work to the Board to 
further the Partnerships and be independent of the founding partners or other interests. 
   Meeting the Challenge of Change. Interim economic development strategy published for 
consultation 
 24th Jan  CWP Board minutes record resolution to create SRB Directors sub-group  
 20th Feb Rugby DC Policy & Resources Committee pass resolution to become member of CWP 
 14th Feb Warwick DC Policy & Resources Committee pass resolution to become member of 
CWP subsequently ratified by full council on 1st March 1995 
 1st May CWP First Annual Conference 
 May/June PIEDA Audit CWP for GOWM 
 Jun Economic Development Strategy adopted 
 5th Jun Lorraine Butler, SRB Manager appointed  
 3rd Jul Trevor Cornfoot, CWP Executive Manager appointed  
 27th Jul Delivery Plan approved by GOWM 
 Aug CWP sign contracts with Guarantors to deliver SRB programme 
 Sep Staffing & premises in place 
 26th Oct Directors SRB Group given delegated responsibility by the CWP main Board 
 8th Jan 1996 Special SRB Steering Group convened to identify the roles and relationships between 
the various levels and ‘players’ in the management and delivery of SRB rounds one and 
two. Discussion ratified by CWP Board 23rd January 1996. 
 Jan Announcement that the CWP would not make a third round bid itself. Instead CWP 
issued its own strategic guidance for potential round three bidders and anticipated 
considering the endorsement of individual bids. 
 6th Feb CWP SRB Conference - Coventry City Football Ground 
 7th May 2nd Annual Conference 
  10th Dec Extra-ordinary General Meeting. Change of Board structure, reduced from 25 to not 
more than 12. Move away from representation to constituencies of membership  
 
(Sources: Hansard 04/11/93; Coventry Policy Advisory Committee Minutes 29/03/94; round one Bidding Guidance 
(DoE, 1994a); WCC Minutes of Spring Meeting 10/05/94; Nuneaton & Bedworth BC, Policy & Resources 
Committee, minutes of meeting 11/05/94; CWP Internal documents; (HMSO, 1994d) CWP, 1996b; Minutes of 
CWP Extraordinary General Meeting 10/12/96) 
 Appendix (D): Membership of CWP at May 1995  
(source: reproduced from Coventry & Warwickshire Partnerships Limited ~ Annual Report 1996 (CWP, 1996a) 
 
Private Sector 
 
1. Aidl Ltd 
2. Allied Design & 
Management Service 
Ltd 
3. AMEC Design & 
Management Ltd. 
4. British Coal 
Enterprises. 
5. BT. 
6. Burgis & Bullock 
7. Coventry Building 
Society. 
8. Coventry Newspapers 
9. D&P Holt 
10. Deeley Group Ltd 
11. East Midlands 
Electricity Plc 
12. Federation of Small 
Businesses 
13. Galliford Plc 
14. GEC Alstrom Neypric 
Ltd 
15. Grant Thornton 
16. Hilton National Hotel 
17. Jaguar Cars Ltd 
18. Jobs for Coventry 
(Central) Ltd 
19. Massey Ferguson 
20. Midland Bank Plc 
21. Miller Partnerships 
22. Peugeot Motor 
Company Plc 
23. RSA Examinations 
Board 
24. Severn Trent Water Ltd 
25. Sohal Chartered 
Accountants 
26. The National Grid 
Company Ltd 
27. University of Warwick 
Science Park 
28. Workworld Ltd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further & Higher Education 
 
29. Coventry Technical 
College 
30. Coventry University 
31. Henley College 
32. Mid Warwickshire College 
33. Tile Hill College 
34. Stratford Upon Avon 
College 
35. Unit for the Development 
of Alternative Products 
36. University of Warwick 
 
 
Local Authorities and other 
Public Sector 
 
37. Coventry City Council 
38. Employment Service 
39. North Warwickshire 
Borough Council 
40. Nuneaton and Bedworth 
Borough Council 
41. Rugby District Council 
42. Stratford Upon Avon 
Council 
43. Warwick District Council 
44. Warwickshire County 
Council 
45. Warwickshire Health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Community and Voluntary 
Sector 
 
46. Coventry and 
Warwickshire Co-
operative Development 
Agency 
47. Coventry and 
Warwickshire Ecumenical 
Council 
48. Coventry Race Equality 
Council 
49. Coventry CVS 
50. Groundwork Coventry  
51. Hillfields Partnership  
52. National Rural Enterprise 
Centre 
53. Nuneaton and Bedworth 
CVS 
 
 
TEC and Chamber of 
Commerce 
 
54. Coventry and 
Warwickshire Chamber of 
Commerce & Industry 
55. Coventry and 
Warwickshire Training & 
Enterprise Council 
 
 
Trades Unions 
 
56. T&GWU 
57. AEEU
 Appendix (E): Extant Capacity Building Measures 
(source: Annex C taken from Government response to the Environment Committee First Report into the Single 
Regeneration Budget HMSO, 1996a) 
  
CAPACITY BUILDING 
Availability of support for capacity-building 
 
1.1. This Annex describes some of the main sources of support outside the Single 
Regeneration Budget (SRB) for different forms of capacity building i.e., enhancing the ability 
of voluntary groups and local communities to participate in regeneration initiatives. 
GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES 
1.2. Special Grant Programme—This Department of the Environment programme 
provides around £1m per annum for grants to voluntary organisations undertaking 
services or projects relevant to the Department’s policy objectives on regeneration. 
The services/projects must be either of a national nature, or else be a pilot capable of 
national application. Organisations given support include: 
• the NCVO Urban Forum, which provides a forum for dialogue between the Government and 
national voluntary organisations; 
• the Development Trusts Associations; 
• PFA (People for Action) 2001—a membership organisation for housing associations, which 
provides the following services to its members: advice, consultancy, newsletters, training, 
workshops and seminars, a directory of members activities and a handbook of good practice; 
• the Civic Trust Regeneration Unit. 
1.3. The Home Office Voluntary Services Unit—The Home Office Voluntary Services 
Unit aims to support a healthy and cost-effective voluntary sector and to promote 
volunteering activity. The Unit provides core-funding to the NCVO and Community 
Development Foundation (CDF) and The British Association of Settlement and Social 
Action Centres (BASSAC). These national organisations use this funding to develop 
their infrastructure and to provides services—some of which include capacity building 
activities—to their member organisations. The Voluntary Services Unit also gives 
grants to local or national community/voluntary organisations for innovatory and 
replicable projects. 
1.4. European Structural Funds—Like the Challenge Fund, the Objective 1, 2 and 5b 
programmes of the European Structural Funds are open to applications from 
partnerships which may include community/voluntary organisations. 
1.5. Other Government Funding for Capacity Building—Among the other sources of 
Government funding for capacity building are the following: 
 • Section 16 funding for tenant management—The Department of the Environment manages a 
budget of some £5-6m per annum from which grants of up to £40-50k are paid directly to 
tenants groups to promote tenant involvement in housing management. The Government 
provides 75% of each grant on condition that the local authority finds the other 25%. Grants 
normally cover around two years work and may be used for purposes such as training events, 
feasibility work, publicity, meetings and conferences, as well as to cover an agency’s time and 
direct costs, such as photocopying, postage and travel. 
• Department of Health funding for capacity building—Under the National Health 
(Miscellaneous Services) Act 1985, section 64 grants are available to voluntary and community 
groups to develop their capacity to provide health and social care. The grants cover training 
and the cost of replacing staff on training courses. 
2. NON GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES 
2.1. Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs)—TECs run a range of training courses 
which are relevant to community/voluntary organisations (although those receiving 
training need to pay for the courses), Voluntary organisations may also contract with 
TECs to provide training to other organisations and individuals: some of this training 
constitutes capacity building for the organisations receiving the training. 
2.2. A wide range of other organisations also provide capacity building training to local 
organisations, including local authorities, commercial companies and individual 
consultants. The following organisations listed in the Regeneration Source Book 
(produced by EDAW/CR Planning on behalf of the Department of the Environment) 
specifically offer training in capacity building. 
• Civic Trust Regeneration Unit 
• Community Development Foundation 
• Community Matters 
• Development Trust Association 
• Groundwork (Environment Focus) 
• NCVO 
• National Tenants Resource Centre 
• Neighbourhood Initiatives Foundation 
• Association of Community Technical Aid Centres 
• Standing Conference for Community Development. 
2.3. In addition, capacity building can be encouraged through mentoring and secondment. 
These are techniques which enable community/voluntary organisations which are 
lacking in certain skills to obtain these through association with another organisation. 
For example, an established community group may act as mentor, providing advice to 
a newer community group. Alternatively, individuals from community/voluntary 
 organisations can benefit from a period of secondment, for example in their local 
authority. 
3. INFORMATION 
3.1 Access to information is crucial to the process of capacity building in 
community/voluntary organisations. This information comes from a wide range of 
sources and includes seminars, conferences, magazines/newsletters and handbooks. 
Some organisations offer a wide range of services to those involved in regeneration, 
for example the Planning Exchange. Some relevant publications include: 
• NCVO Single Regeneration Budget Handbook—A Guide to Bids for Round 2 of the Challenge 
Fund, directed at Voluntary and Community Organisations. 
• British Urban Regeneration Association (BURA) has published a handbook promoting an 
integrated approach to urban regeneration, aimed at the full spectrum of interest groups involved. 
• Community Development Foundation (CDF) ‘Regeneration and the Community: produced with the 
encouragement of the Department of the Environment, this provides guidance to those involved in 
Challenge Fund partnerships on how to maximise community involvement. 
• Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) have produced a Good Practice Guide on the involvement 
of Ethnic Minorities in the Challenge Fund. 
• PIEDA Good Practice Guide for practitioners on ‘Involving Communities in Urban and Rural 
Regeneration’: published in November 1995 by the Department of the Environment. 
 
 Appendix (F): List of partners and organisations interviewed 
1. Philipa Holland: Housing & Regeneration Division GOWM 01/12/95 
2. Ruth Dudley: Finance & Policy Branch GOWM 17/04/96 
3. Lorraine Butler: Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership 22/05/96 
4. Margaret Tovey & Paul Turnor: Birmingham Employment Services 18/06/96 
5. Linda Roberts: Commission for Racial Equality 04/07/96 
6. Philipa Holland: Housing & Regeneration Division GoWM 24/09/96 
7. GOWM: Heads of Branch Meeting 14/09/96 
8. Mike Walker: University of Birmingham 24/10/96 
9. John O’Shea: GOWM Head of Branch - Birmingham/Cov/Warwickshire 05/11/96 
10. Donna Hopkins: GOWM Birmingham SRB contact officer 05/11/96 
11. John Payne: GOWM Redditch SRB contact officer 06/11/96 
12. Terry Coton: GOWM Head of Branch - South Staffordshire - Burton 06/11/96 
13. Margaret Geary: GOWM Head of Branch - Black Country  07/11/96 
14. Caroline Morrisey: GOWM Impact SRB contact officer 07/11/96 
15. Gill Caves: GOWM CWP SRB contact officer 07/11/96 
16. Andy Monroe: GOWM Head of Branch - Wolverhampton & Sandwell 08/11/96 
17. Deputy Head of Regeneration Division: Sandwell Regeneration Partnership, 
John Sutton {Deputy Head of Regeneration Division}  
Piers Waterston {SRB Programme Manager} 12/11/96 
18. Lorraine Butler: Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership 13/11/96 
19. Paul Goodlad: CEO Burton SRB Regeneration Partnership 18/11/96 
20. Sonja Rowe: Impact Training  
{Round 1 SRB voluntary-led partnership in Dudley } 28/11/96 
21. Nigel Summers CEO: Sandwell Regeneration Partnership  02/12/96 
22. Matt Feeley: Bid Co-ordination Team/Coventry City council 03/12/96 
23. Mr. Bahia, Coventry Race Equality Council 04/12/96 
24. Helen Aird Coventry Voluntary Services 09/12/96 
25. Mr. Kwame: SACDA {Sandwell} 12/12/96 
26. Davinda Panesar: CWP Ethnic Minority Representative 23/12/96 
27. Councillor Mick Jones, Nuneaton & Bedworth Borough Council 15/12/97 
28. Malcom Gillespie, Chief Executive Coventry & Warwickshire TEC 19/12/97 
29. Councillor Nick Nolan Coventry City Council 23/12/97 
30. Councillor Derek Forewood, Warwickshire County Council 15/01/98 
31. Chris Garden: Economic Development Officer, Nuneaton & Bedworth BC 28/01/98 
32. Councillor Gordon Collet, Warwickshire County Council 02/01/98 
33. Trevor Cornfoot: CEO CWP 02/02/98 
34. Lorraine Butler: Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership 14/12/98 
35. David Taylor: Bid Co-ordination Team/Coventry City council 06/01/99 
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ABLE 2A - SUMMARY KEY OUTPUTS 
OCode Output description (per code) Unit Year 1 Total 
1A Jobs created/preserved FTE 2096 9133 
16 Pupils benefiting from projects No 43813 228969 
1C People trained obtaining qualifications No 3732 27337 
1D People accessing employment via train et No 2341 22657 
1J Young people benefiting from projects No 7098 601 15 
2A New start up business No 986 4997 
2B New/improved business/commercial floorsp Sq Mts 52846 72846 
3A Dwellings, completed/improved No 468 3417 
3C Increased rent collected % pa 10 64 
4A Ethnic minority business start-ups No 485 2280 
4B Unemp' ethnic minority people into emp' No 459 2833 
4C Ethnic min' pupils to higher ed' levels No 407 12957 
4E Ethnic min' people advised/assisted No 2975 11254 
5A People benefiting community safety No 38152 65044 
5B Dwellings/bus' space upgraded security No 427 1276 
5C Community safety initiatives No 1122 1555 
6A Land reclaimed for open space Ha 107 161 
6B Land improved or brought back into use Ha 8 14 
6C Buildings improved/brought back into use No 15 55 
7A Local people benefiting new fac's/act's No 86479 468848 
7B Community facilities improved/estab'd No 97 215 
8A Voluntary Organisations supported No 181 433 
Master Database: C: \DBASE\SRB\SRBPINFO. DBF Records printed: 386 
Printed: 06/09/94 11: 24 Report: TABLE-2A Page 
1 
pill loom 
CONTENTS 
Section 
number 
1 Introduction 
.......................... 
2 
Page 
....................................... 1 
The future of Coventry and Warwickshire .............................. 
L 
3 The Coventry and Warwickshire sub-region - 
SWOT analysis ....................................................................... 
3 
4 The SRB bid development - the critical issues and 
the practical response ............................................................. 
5 
5 The strategic programme implementation .............................. 
5 After SRB ............................................................................... 
12 
Annex A 
Annex B 
Annex C 
Annex D 
Annex E 
Annex F 
Annex G 
Annex H 
Annex I 
Standard Tables 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd - Note on 
structure and membership 
List of Steering and Action Group Members 
SRB bid guidance, consultation letters and preparation 
timetable 
Project assessment criteria 
Draft Project appraisal guidance notes 
Project Summary Forms for individual projects within the 
bid 
Base information supporting the SRB Bid 
Supplementary Information 
Already made available: Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd - 
Interim SRB bid 
7th September 1994 
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD 
1.2 
. 
1.3 
1.4 
Single Regeneration Budget Bid 1995/96-1999/2000 
`ý I. INTRODUCTION 
This is Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd bid 
for Single Regeneration Budget (SRB). It follows an 
interim bid made in June 1994 to the Government Office 
for the West Midlands. 
Our aim 
The aim of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships is to 
"improve the quality of life, prosperity und neal! h of the 
inhabitants of Co t enti_r and the Countv of 
War; rickshire. " Our aim is ambitious and our bid for 
SRB is geared to deliver a substantial, 
innovative and imaginative programme which 
integrates with other main programmes. Our strategy 
seeks to re-establish the sub-region as one of the most 
technologically advanced, prosperous and equal in 
Britain, building upon our strong exporting tradition. To 
achieve this we are proposing to implement a 
regeneration programme totalling £421m over five years. 
SRB of £52m will directly facilitate £l75m of this, with 
the remaining £246m in complementary funding from 
the Partners, English Partnerships, the European Union 
and the private sector. Our SRB bid is a strategic hid 
with targeted, integrated local action reinforcing broad 
strategic themes. 
l he Partnership, a limited company. stems from an 
alliance of core players in the area - Coventry City 
Council, Warwickshire County Council, Coventry and 
Warwickshire Training and Enterprise Council and 
Coventry and Warwickshire Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry. The partnership has been widened to bring all 
other relevant interests on board, including the 
universities, the District Councils, higher and further 
education, major employers, trades unions, voluntary and 
community sectors. Many of these operate within the 
same geographic boundary, thus creating a small close 
Partnership which can develop a deep and thorough 
understanding of the local economy. From this base, the 
Partners will use their ability and authority to devise and 
deliver coherent programmes. Details of Coventry and 
Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd are gi. en in Annex C. 
The Partners feel that the need for integration of all the 
relevant agencies, whether public, private or 
voluntary, within the sub-region is of paramount 
importance for effective delivery. To this end, the 
Partnership will bring together Business Link, inward 
investment, tourism, city and centre developments, 
training. technology transfer and small area regeneration 
activities. 
The role of SRB 
I 
.5 The Partnership has worked hard to ensure that this bid 
represents the consensus view of as many consultees as 
possible on priorities for regenerative action in the area. 
This has been a landmark process, being the first ever 
full consultation and joint working on a strategic 
regeneration programme, to take place for the whole of 
Coventry and Warwickshire As such, it embraces far 
more than SRB. The programme covers five scars, as a 
reasonable planning horizon. SRB is deployed to fill 
gaps which the strategy reveals but which there are no 
other funds to fill. Nevertheless, as an indication of the 
scale of the exercise the Partnership received 423 
individual SRB bids totalling f2lOm. 
1.6 The founding partners have agreed to put at the 
direction of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships 
very substantial elements of existing economic 
regeneration programmes. The bid demonstrates this 
through its complementary funding. 
Resources 
1.7 All the Partners share a vision for Coventry and 
Warwickshire but resources constrain how quickly we 
can achieve it. The resource guidelines we received from 
government, and which we shared widely, imply heavy, 
reductions in public sector funding for the task of 
regeneration. 
1.8 There is a new national consensus that manufacturing 
industry needs to be at the forefront of our economic 
effort and must renew itself to compete 
internationally. As a key manufacturing and exporting 
area, our bid adds world class engineering and 
manufacturing excellence to traditional objectives of 
economic regeneration aimed at closing the gap between 
rich and poor, recycling industrial land and renewing 
inner city and other urban communities. 
I 
.9 There 
is no doubt that SRB in 1995/96 is inadequate to 
meet these needs. The bid seeks to balance the scale 
dictated by the strategic analysis and realism over 
resources. We shall be creating added value through all 
our joint working. We have prioritised carefully our 
projects; if necessary, we can demonstrate this at lower 
or higher resource levels. We hope to be successful in a 
realistic bid designed to have significant impact in a five 
year period and to continue to work with Government to 
identify imaginative solutions to a rapidly evolving local 
and international economic situation. 
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2. THE FUTURE OF COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE 6-1 
2.1 The Partners' vision is for: 
An excellent, innovative manufacturing and 
engineering sector - Which will remain key to renewed 
prosperity. We will invest and innovate to stay ahead of 
international competition. Our SRB proposals will create 
or preserve 9,000 jobs. 
An exporting, international quality manufacturing 
sector - The sub-region's manufacturing firms will be 
internationally competitive , strongly supported by Warwick and Coventry Universities. We will be 
enterprising. We will have more, smaller companies 
linked in a network of purchase, supply, technology 
transfer and mutual support to work together for Britain 
and export abroad. 
An expanding service sector - The area now includes 
the Headquarters for Barclays Bank, PowerGen. 
National Grid and Conoco. The Partners' proposals will 
ensure the continued fast growth of services but they 
realise that service growth by itself will not counteract 
the loss of jobs in the local economy. 
A stable, sustainable local economy - Our positive, 
supportive approach to industry will be rewarded with 
retention of major firms, inward investment and new 
companies. We shall listen carefully to the requirements 
of inward investors and expanding local firms. 
A special place for small and medium sized 
companies - The rate of formation of businesses will be 
maintained and survival rates will improve. Major 
companies will continue the trend of out-sourcing; but 
small companies will respond by supplying at low cost 
and high quality. Our proposals will help 5.000 firms. 
A sound rural economy in Warwickshire - The rural 
economy will be experiencing structural employment 
change and will have diversified. People will be engaged 
in new, varied jobs independent of urban infrastructure, 
making use of both traditional rural 
self-sufficiency and modern information technology. 
Equality of prosperity north and south in the sub 
region and within the City of Coventry - The north- 
south divide created by structural employment changes 
and inner city deterioration will be halted and reversed. 
New 'clean' industries will be occupying the sites of the 
old ones. Good transport links will be in place. The 
canal-side running from Coventry northwards will have 
opened up sites and be a part of a newly attractive 
north-south corridor. 
2 
Confident communities - Integrated local action in 
targeted priority areas will mean 3,400 new or improved 
houses, as well as more employment and a better quality 
of life. We will be striving to eliminate poverty. Our 
prosperity will show in the attractive, well-maintained 
appearance of public and private spaces. 65,000 people 
will directly benefit from our Action Against Crime ini- 
tiatives. People will be better able to take charge of their 
own lives and we will support them to do so. 
A people whose positive approach to change values 
skills, knowledge and flexibility - 27,000 people will be 
qualified in relevant and transferable skills. They will 
recognise the crucial link between education, training and 
economic success. The partners will ensure the 
provision of skills is not only reactive to current 
employer demands but is also visionary and identifies 
future trends. However, we also firmly want a 
learning society which underpins social development and 
change as well as providing wealth creating skills. 
Employers will recognise the need to invest in their staff 
to achieve business competitiveness. 
A sub region which values young people as our 
future - Our young people will no longer feature 
excessively in the long term unemployed. They will 
receive positive guidance towards education, training and 
work. Young people will be protected from the risks to 
their health and safety and parents will feel 
confident and enjoy their hope in the next generation. 
This will apply to all young people, whatever their 
starting point. 
A magnet city centre in Coventry and successful 
urban centres in Warwickshire - Which will provide 
positive perceptions, actively help attract inward 
investment, and be a focus for cultural activities whilst 
achieving a strong relationship with local people, 
serving their needs and reflecting their identity. 
A multi-cultural, varied society offering choice, 
opportunity and mutual support - This will be 
reflected in city centre arts, design and media 
productions, in community arts, in shops, markets, local 
cultural and religious events. Discrimination against 
individuals and groups will have no place in Coventry 
and Warwickshire. Caring services. especially informal 
ones will be highly valued. 
An area with prosperity and the environment in 
harmony - Although prosperous, we will be "lean on 
resources", well aware of the need for sustainable 
development and growth, and to limit our impact on the 
environment and energy sources. 
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3. THE COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE SUB REGION- 
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (SWOT) ANALYSIS 
3.1 Building on our existing separate knowledge and 
strategies, Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships has 
analysed the local economy. This analysis is 
summarised in the following SWOT analysis. Basic data 
on the Coventry and Warwickshire sub-region which 
underlies this analysis can be made available to the 
Regional Office at any time. 
3.2 STRENGTHS 
Traditionally, the area has been a focus for positive 
change and local people do not readily accept decline 
Creation of a strong local partnership involving a wide 
range of interests from the public, private and voluntary 
sectors in the sub -region 
Well-established and competent not-for-profit and 
voluntary sector 
Central location in UK on motorway network -MI, M6, 
M40, M42, M69, A14, giving ready access to markets 
and suppliers in an attractive location for distribution, 
with close proximity to Birmingham International 
Airport and NEC 
Record of enterprise - higher than average rate of 
business formation in recent years. Strong capability in 
engineering, manufacturing and design especially in 
autornotives, electrical and power industries 
Good links between industry and education sector. In 
particular, two Universities with specialisms relevant to 
business development, international excellence and 
economic regeneration 
University of Warwick Science Park and successful 
adjacent Business Park 
Good record for inward investment 
Expanding service sector, including Powergen, National 
Grid and the new HQ for Barclays Bank 
Record of sucess in mobilising local private and public 
enterprise in obtaining and applying assistance from the 
Government and the European Union 
3.3 WEAKNESSES 
Severe unemployment, deprivation, poverty, reduced life 
expectancy and other quality of life indicators 
concentrated in parts of Coventry and Warwickshire 
High and concentrated crime rate, and widespread fear of 
crime 
Attitude surveys reveal poor \cll-image in Coventry City 
Changing patterns of employment and living leading to 
pockets of rural deprivation and isolation 
Shortage of good industrial land ready for development 
and unsatisfactory local road access to industrial land 
Poor north-south public transport links 
Large manufacturers shedding staff -'1,000 
manufacturing jobs have been lost between 1984 and 
1991. 
Permanent loss of coal mining jobs concentrated on 
communities in the north of the sub-region 
Narrow employment base -I in 3 of the sub region's 
workforce in manufacturing (mainly vehicles and 
engineering, both declining) compared to I in 5 
nationally 
Over-dependence on larger manufacturing employers and 
under-representation of SME s 
Insufficient companies investing in the potential of their 
staff to maximise performance 
Slow pace of investment in city and other town centres: 
threats from recession and changing retail patterns, lack 
of diversity, poor range of facilities and limited use at 
particular times of day 
Outstanding natural environment and internationally 
renowned historic/cultural heritage in most of the 
county/city serving tourists, visitors, businesses and 
rc. idents 
Uncr\ity of housing across the area, with sufficient good 
qualm housing development opportunities to meet the 
demand for new housing 
Good track record of developing and implementing 
inno\ati%c housing schemes and partnerships especially 
sloth regional Housing Associations 
Shortage of appropriate space for "clean" industries 
requiring high quality environment 
Environmental quality not as good as it could or should 
be, especially in priority areas 
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Dereliction and contamination from former mineral 3.5 THREATS 
working and industrial activity (500Ha) 
Widening gap between successful and unsuccessful areas 
The high level of disrepair of housing stock in public and of the sub-region 
private sectors 
Failure to provide public investment in infrastructure and 
The shortfall in overall availability of sufficient 
affordable social housing 
3.4 OPPORTUNITIES 
Development of Coventry and Warwickshire 
Partnerships offers potential for greater cooperation 
between partners, efficiency in delivery and increased 
capacity 
Assisted area status, Objective 2 status and SRB itself 
Build on continuing inward investment 
UK automotive design in resurgence, Coventry and 
Warwickshire well-placed 
New International Manufacturing Centre at Warwick 
University will be leader in Europe 
R&D infrastructure investment to build on existing 
international excellence 
A series of anticipated and existing government backed 
measures in the north of Coventry, including the North 
South Road, Foleshill Enterprise Park and Foleshill 
Gasworks site. The nearby Coventry Canal offers 
substantial potential for environmental improvement and 
development 
Bermuda Park in N Warwickshire & sites in Rugby 
Hams Hall: European direct freight facility 
A chance to redevelop prestige, Private Finance Initiative 
sites in the City Centre at Parkside and City Centre West 
Build on successful Estate Action and community based 
housing initiatives 
Further partnership with developers, Housing 
Associations and voluntary sector to increase targeted 
housing supply 
services 
Loss of support from the Rural Development 
Commission leading to a risk of failure to address rural 
problems 
New jobs created go to people commuting or moving 
into the area rather than resident unemployed 
Rising disaffection, health, social and housing 
problems, crime and fear of crime 
Unemployment remaining high in Coventry and in 
localised areas of Warwickshire 
Continued rationalisation of dominant larger employers, 
effects on supplier chains and loss of local control of 
productive facilities 
Failure of SMEs to grow rapidly and securely and to 
respond to the quality standards that large firm, 
increasingly set through "out - sourcing" 
Businesses fail to respond to new international 
requirements on quality, cost and environmental 
standards 
Market failures to provide sites and premises, 
particularly on reclaimed or derelict land. Throughout 
Warwickshire, significant areas suffer from the effects of 
mineral extraction 
Reduced resources available for housing leading to 
reduced confidence by communities in the long term 
future of housing in areas of disadvantage 
A 
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4 4. THE SRB BID DEVELOPMENT 
4., As a result of sharing our knowledge and perceptions, we 
have developed a working set of Strategic Objectives and 
more detailed operational objectives, which have been 
made available to Government Office for the West 
Midlands. We have applied best practice to the 
development of the programme, especially by gaining 
widespread ownership and support for the priorities of 
the strategic programme employing SRB and other 
resources and adjusting these priorities as a result of 
consultation. Multi-agency Action Groups have 
subsequently worked to draw together the partners' 
understanding of the issues facing them and have 
identified existing action already planned to achieve 
these priorities. The gaps remaining have been matched 
to the project bids received. Thus via consultation and 
the work of the multi-agency groups, we have created 
allows a strategic approach to the problems 
identified by the bidding process to be developed. 
THE SRB BID - THE CRITICAL ISSUES .. ND THE 
PRACTICAL RESPONSE 
4.4 The Coventry and Warwickshire sub-region has a 
population of some 780,000, one third of whom live 
within the largely urban conurbation of Coventry city, 
the remainder in towns and rural communities in 
Warwickshire. The relationship of City to County is one 
of close interdependence in journey to work patterns, 
supplier networks with industry (especially the motor 
industry) and in the provision of educational and 
healthcare facilities. 
4.5 
priorities for the SRB proposal and for existing 
programmes of public and private sector action. These 
issues are addressed in the next section. 
4.2 The process of programme development had the 
following key features: 
The Partnership delegating initial responsibility to a 
multi-agency Steering Group and strategy - led Action 
Groups. In parallel, key interests in Warwickshire 4.6 
combined within a project team to ensure the 
necessary synergy 
Transparent processes, with papers widely available in 
all sectors, clear timetable and procedures, networked 
contacts across the sub-region 
Consultation earl)' in the programme and hid 
development, with a wide range of interests consulted on 
principles at key stages; in particular the 
community and voluntary sector have been closely 
4 involved in strategy development. Discussions have also 
been held with Government Departments including DOE. 
DTI and Employment Services 
Delivery agencies involved in setting up an effective 
project management database from the start 
Good practice in project appraisal procedures 
disseminated each 4,7 
Central bid coordination but decision-making devolved 
to lowest possible levels 
Programmre of workshopdsenrinars to inform and engage 
all partners 
4.3 We provide in Annexes D to Ga package of supporting 
material on the process, including details of working 
groups, consultation, data management and project 
appraisal and project prioritisation. A response to the 
overwhelming number of individual project bids has 
been the creation of strategic programmes in the areas of 
greatest demand. This defines a balance in resources and 
5 
Proximity to London and the more prosperous south of 
the country may have shaped aspirations in the 
sub-region. Coventry and Warwickshire have a record of 
responding effectively to recession, drawing in new 
activity, new investment. The sub-region makes 
comparisons with national and international exemplars 
and seeks to match the best in manufacturing 
excellence, in city development, in development of its 
people, its tourist attractions, its agricultural practice. 
Coventry and Warwickshire share with all of the We%t 
Midlands a central location in the UK, good transport 
communications and a strong bias towards 
manufacturing in the economy. In common with the 
other West Midlands urban programme areas. Coventry 
has a large ethnic minority population, geographically 
concentrated in a number of inner city wards suffering 
multiple deprivation. The city also suffers the typically 
higher rates of crime, concentrations of single parents. 
poor health indicators and below average educational 
attainment levels. Parts of Warwickshire share many of 
the same problems. The legacy of large scale scarring 
from coal-working in the north of the county and mineral 
working in parts of the remainder is still a deterrent to 
business development and visitors. Similarly, multiple 
deprivation is concentrated in West Nuneaton and in 
parts of Leamington Spa and Rugby. 
The Partnership has developed in consultation with all 
interested parties a strategic programme. Its priorities 
will reflect our joint judgement of where we can most 
effectively intervene in the local economy and 
living environment to achieve regeneration. 
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4.9 
We developed the following working themes to 
characterise the key areas where we will apply SRB 
funds and other resources, which were described in our 
interim bid. Here, we explain how main programme 
funds and private sector resources are contributing to the 
themes, how the themes reinforce each other, and 
describe major features of the SRB projects designed to 
fill the gaps 
Building business, especially engineering 
excellence, reskilling the labour force and increasing 
educational attainment - Working together to help 
engineering and other firms in growth sectors to be 
competitive through reaching the highest international 
standards, using technology transfer, international 
benchmarking, investment in high-level technical and 
managerial skills, especially for SMEs, transferring skills 
from declining to growth areas, enhancing market 
knowledge, building business confidence and providing 
supporting infrastructure. 
4.10 There are pre-existing partnerships, such as the World 
Class Coventry and Manufacturing Excellence 
initiatives through which this theme is being pursued by 
Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd. Successful 
bids for EC funds from the local authorities already 
reflect the initiatives. The Universities have major 
programmes in place funded through EC and 
private sector resources. 
4.1 1 The activities of the TEC and Chambers are central to 
this theme, particularly through Business Links -with 
programmes such as Business reviews, Business 
Development Initiative, the Growth programme, Trade 
and Export Agency, Business Advice Bureaux, Business 
Skills Seminars and Gateways for Business. Their work 
also provides much of the linkage between this theme 
and that of Building self-determining, safe and 
confident communities, whereby people are helped to 
gain the skills which business needs to succeed, and 
special help is extended to disadvantaged groups. These 
groups are concentrated in priority areas, by definition, 
and small area targeting provides the key linkage 
between the themes. 
4.12 Major projects for which SRB funding is requested 
under this theme are: 
" Improving the Engineering Competitiveness of 
SMEs: Coventry University's School of Engineering will 
provide specialised and customised training for 1,500 
people over 5 years in manufacturing management, 
engineering and information technology - with a 
particular emphasis on employees and firms facing 
change. SRB funding of £0.7m will lever another £d. I m. 
including £ 1.71n from the private sector. 
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" Breakthrough Technologies Infrastructure: The 
Advanced Technology Centre at the University of 
Warwick will aim to achieve technology transfer with 
breakthrough technologies in 50 companies over the five 
year programme 
" Manufacturing Excellence Initiative: Warwick 
Manufacturing Group, linked with Engineering 
Management at the University of Warwick, will provide 
advice and training for 400 companies, especially SMEs. 
to develop within sectors and supply chains. The same 
group will address 'benchmarking' by importing 
international best practice in the 'Developing Fertile 
Ground' project. 
" Developing trade and export through the Trading and 
Development Initiative' and 'Regain', working with small 
firms to improve their supply links to larger 
purchasers, and provide training in trade and export 
related topics creating and safeguarding 1.000 jobs. 
" Raising Educational Attainment - Main Programme 
spending on Education in Coventry and Warwickshire is 
already substantial and spending is above Education 
SSA. Nevertheless, the Partners have identified two key 
projects and look for SRB support: Raising Achievement 
in the National Curriculum which will take the lessons 
learned from Section II experience to improve the 
performance against national curriculum targets of 
54,000 students - targeting on disadvantaged groups, in 
particular ethnic minorities. Education Business 
Partnerships is designed to maximise the contribution of 
the business community to raking educational standard,,. 
developing the work-related curriculum, introducing 
General National Vocational Qualification (GNVQ%) and 
achieving the foundation National Targets for Education 
and Training (NTETs). This will be achieved through a 
series of original initiatives most notably the local 
Partnership Centres established on employer premises 
and a mentoring programme for special needs students. 
Over 1,000 people will be trained and obtain 
qualifications, and 300 employers participate. 
" Lifetime Learning - This is a key part of our strategy 
to improve business competitiveness and regenerate the 
sub-region and includes a project to 'Develop Skills in 
the Workplace' focusing on the development of a 
lifetime learning culture in the workplace and raising the 
skills base for 250 local companies. This builds on the 
highly successful Gateways for Business and Assessment 
of Prior Learning (APL) initiatives and will complement 
mainstream programmes to improve competitiveness 
through training eg the Investors in People Award. A 
series of training measures to raise the IT skills base of 
the local community and to increase the stock of local 
people with higher level qualifications will also support 
our efforts to achieve the lifetime learning 
NTETs 
targets. 
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4.13 Spreading market confidence north -Using 
developments in infrastructure such as the North South 
Road, Hams Hall Euro-freight site and the release of 
development sites through industrial rationalisation and 
sector decline to reproduce conditions in the more 
successful south of the county, recycle land and attract 
new, growing and inward migrating business into the 
north of the City and County. 
4.14 The high incidence of unemployment, poor housing and 
dereliction and contamination of land in the north of the 
City and County has led to area-targeted initiatives in 
main programmes. In North Warwickshire, the ERDF 
and RECHAR initiatives have particularly assisted the 
redevelopment of former mining areas and provided help 
for those made redundant by structural change. Examples 
are the Bermuda Park development (50 Hectares with 
potential for 5,000 jobs, the largest in the current 
Objective 2 programme), reclamation at the former 
Newdigate Colliery, Bedworth and Coalpit Fields, 
Nuneaton. The number of small firms have increased, 
with for example, 170 firms attracted to the Attleborough 
Industrial Estate. Structural funds have been used to pro- 
vide training in the coalfield settlements and under 
RECHAR many voluntary groups are involved in local 
projects which address the needs of communities affect- 
ed by colliery closure. 
4.15 In the north of Coventry, the City Council has given 
priority to the North South Road in its Transport Policies 
and Programme which will release several developments. 
One such is the former Foleshill Gasworks site 
(24 hectares) for which a City grant application is under 
appraisal. Urban Partnership Funds have also been 
successfully targeted onto this task, with development of 
the Canal basin and Foleshill Enterprise Park. In 
Willenhall, Estate Action and City Grant money are 
anticipated to improve the quality of housing and provide 
a redesigned shopping centre. 
4.16 This theme is linked to the first, "Building business 
excellence", through the re-use of land for new 
businesses. It is more difficult to attract investment to the 
north than the south of the county and city but all these 
efforts are designed to provide the environment, access 
and quality premises that business needs - close to the 
people who need the employment. The small area 
targeting and theme 3, Building self-determining, 
sore and confident communities reinforces this process. 
This is achieved by designating the local priority areas 
where the need is manifest, mainly in the north 
of the count), and city; Hillfields, Foleshill, Wood End, 
Willenhall and Stoke Aldermoor (Coventry), parts of 
\\'est Nuneaton. the Old Town area in Leamington Spa, 
and the Benn and Newbold wards in Rugby - and 
targeting action there. 
4.17 Major projects requiring SRB funding in this area are: 
" Hillfrelds Partnership: a community led regeneration 
strategy aiming to make significant improvements to 
Hillfields, one of the most disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods in the West Midlands. This is being 
undertaken by a strong partnership of local people, 
voluntary groups, local businesses and statutory 
agencies. The partnership is seeking to revive the local 
economy, improve access to training and jobs, make the 
area safer and more attractive and improve confidence 
and the image of the area, with benefits to the whole 
sub region. 
" Canal Corridor Regeneration: The Coventry Canal 
extends five and half miles from the canal basin in the 
city centre to Hawksbury Junction which is to the south 
of Bedworth. As the thread which links many of the 
city's most important redevelopment sites, the Canal 
Corridor has become a major focus for the regeneration 
of the inner city. This regeneration is being co-ordinated 
by a partnership of public, private and voluntary 
organisations called Coventry Waterside which, amongst 
other things, hopes to establish a Groundwork Trust to 
undertake environmental initiatives. 
" The Bermuda project: SRB would support the 
creation of a Centre for Training on Bermuda Park. a 
prestige inward investment site which is itself part of the 
regeneration strategy for Western Nuneaton/Bedworth, 
greatly affected by coal closures. Non-SRB projects are 
local business park development and housing 
regeneration projects. This area strategy is supported by 
the proposals to strengthen Nuneaton and Bedworth town 
centres. 
" The Barpool Valley Project: This is an 
engineering scheme which would improve drainage in an 
area of West Nuneaton by allowing development to go 
ahead, including housing, health and community projects 
as well as providing a new leisure amenity. 
" Nature Reserve on former colliery: Part of the North 
Warwickshire Leisure Strategy, this is another project 
designed to change the appearance, use and prospects of 
the area. 
4.18 Build self-determining, safe and confident 
communities - Provide the framework to enable people 
to combat both poverty and dependency, especially in 
areas of concentrated multiple deprivation through 
better and more integrated access to employment. 
community safety, health and caring, local environment 
and housing. 
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4.19 A considerable number of main programmes directly 
support this theme. Programmes of work in areas of housing and environment. including projects proposed in 
this bid, are determined by well established locally devel- 
oped strategies. We have been necessarily 
selective in quoting complementary schemes. The local 
authorities' education and community education 
programmes, social service programmes, environmental 
and transport improvement projects and continuing 
Section 11, GEST and Estate Action projects all 
contribute and include targeted action. TEC 
programmes such as STEP, YT Quality Training and 
Career Choice directly assist individuals towards 
employment and thus confidence and prosperity. 
4.20 Many SRB funded projects in this area are strongly 
focused on young people, an investment in our future and 
a recognition of their vulnerability. Several 
programmes under this theme quite specifically create 
links between local people and Business Competitiveness 
through the partner's lifetime learning proposals. 
4.21 Key projects within this theme relate to: 
" Guidance and Access to Training and Employment: 
An 'Access to Training' programme designed to 
provide a bridge between unemployment and 
mainstream programmes for disadvantaged groups, in 
particular ethnic minorities, almost 1,400 of whom will 
enter vocational training. Overall 4,500 will receive train- 
ing from this programme. A 'Customised Training' 
initiative to link the unemployed to vacancies identified 
as a result of inward investment, business expansion and 
property development will provide qualifications for a 
further 1,170 people. A 'Youth Outreach Service' will 
aim to win back disaffected youth to education, training 
and employment as part of a concerted drive to reduce 
the local training 'failure index' and to achieve the 
foundation NTETs targets. These measures will be 
supported by 'One Stop Shops' and Training Access 
Points to ensure that targeted groups have access to high 
quality, up-to-date and comprehensive information 
advice and guidance on education, training and 
employment. 
" Child care: There are few funds available from main 
programmes to assist those unable to afford child care, so 
frequently identified as the barrier to work. Two 
programmes will allow 300 women access to 
employment by enabling them to take up training or 
return to work. 
" Community Safely: With the ending of the Safer Cities 
project, the lack of statutory provision in this area of 
enormous concern to local people re-emerges (47% of 
attitude survey respondents thought Coventry was unsafe 
and 57% had experienced crime). There are over fifty 
initiatives in Coventry alone on community safety. 
8 
Within Coventry an initiative titled Community Action 
Against Crime is underway. which seeks to build a 
partnership amongst key agencies to create a policy 
framework to support community safety schemes taking 
place in local neighbourhoods. This city-wide approach 
will also ensure projects are delivered at a level closest to 
the public, as the particular concerns of each area need to 
be recognised. A specialist worker will be appointed 
shortly to act as a focus for coordinating activities and 
linking across agencies. In 1995/6 a 10% reduction in 
crime is anticipated through 30 initiatives. 
" Helping those with Learning difficulties: 
SRB funding is sought. in particular, for two schemes. A 
'Citizens Advocacy' project will provide advocates for 
those with learning difficulties. The intention is to 
supply a wide range of information on available 
services and help protect the rights of this group of 
people. Similarly. the 'Grapevine' project provides a 
drop-in centre for those with moderate learning 
difficulties. Implemented by the Coventry Cooperative 
Development Agency this centre links to 
'lifetime learning', by providing vocational training for a 
particularly disadvantaged group. 
" Housing improvement as part of small area 
regeneration: schemes of estate improvement in Henley 
Green, Hillfields and Stoke Aldermoor ( all Coventry) 
and Camp Hill (Nuneaton) to improve living conditions, 
the local environment and safety as part of 
comprehensive local action plans for areas with 
exceptionally high deprivation scores in the Index of 
Local Conditions. Over 3,250 dwellings will be improved 
by these projects which will lever £I. 5m of private sector 
investment. 
" Housing for the young and vulnerable: A programme 
consisting of four projects enabling young people and 
others at risk and in housing need to live independently 
in the community by addressing their accommodation 
needs and linking them to other services taking them 
through to employment and Tong term independence. In 
Coventry City Centre a separate 'Foyer' scheme will 
provide linked training facilities and housing 
accommodation for young people. 
" Benn and Newbold Partnerships Centre: A bold 
programme to develop new community resources in the 
most deprived wards of Rugby. The Centres will have 
shared management facilities for voluntary organisations 
to access. Housing units for homeless young people are 
part of the scheme. Over 5 years. 800 people will be 
trained. including 600 from the ethnic minorities. 
" Health for the young and vulnerable: Series of 
projects to promote sexual health, combat developing 
drugs and alcohol dependency and reduce inequalities in 
health. 
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" Local environmental action: Government is 
committed to the development of Local Environmental 
Action Plans (Agenda 21). Drawing on information from 
city-wide and local environmental audits, local 
partnerships (including residents and businesses) will be 
established to identify environmental problems and to 
implement action plans tackling, for example, energy 
efficiency, waste minimisation and pollution. 10,000 
priority area residents will benefit. 
Strengthen Coventry city centre and other urban 
centres - The area's urban centres and, in particular, the 
centre of a major city like Coventry, play an important 
role in the economic, social and cultural life of the whole 
sub-region. Coventry's rebuilt City Centre 
provided an international model for urban 
redevelopment in the 1950s. However, it now needs 
substantial reinvestment to meet the changed demand of 
urban lifestyles. Surveys have shown that negative 
perceptions of the City Centre and surrounding urban 
centres have hindered inward investment. 
In Coventry, the City Council is deploying its own 
resources, including landholdings, in major joint 
ventures with the private sector to ensure the centre is an 
asset actively contributing to economic regeneration. 
Several significant redevelopments and upgrading of 
shopping facilities have already been secured but other 
problems remain. The Private Finance Initiative site at 
Parkside will provide 24 hectares for a small conference 
centre for Coventry University, much needed City Centre 
office floor space, an innovation centre and a science and 
technology park at a cost of £IIm. It is anticipated that it 
quarter of this will be funded by English Partnerships. 
The City also needs to address safety, tourism, gaps in 
key facilities, and the integration of inner city 
communities, especially young people into the centre. 
4.24 On a smaller scale, the urban centres of Nuneaton, 
Bedworth, Rugby and Leamington Spa require support to 
face change and adapt to a new role. Whilst much 
redevelopment is funded by the private sector, gaps 
remain. In respect of Nuneaton and Bedworth there is a 
strong linkage between this theme and that of "Moving 
market confidence north", since these centres 
have key roles to play in the local economy. In Rugby, 
the Borough Council has already committed itself to 
achieving an ongoing programme of 
environmental improvements and has established a 
partnership with developers to secure further town 
centre redevelopment. Many of the targeted 
communities in "Building confident communities" lie 
close to the urban centres and we wish to avoid the 
further fragmentation of our urban areas. 
4.25 SRB funding can facilitate filling these gaps: 
" Centre for Cultural Training and Enterprise: SRB 
funding is sought for a city centre complex which will 
bring together education/training, business, 
employment and leisure activities for young people, 
especially ethnic minorities, alongside a relocated 
Coventry Centre for the Performing Arts. 
" Community Safely: £0.5m from SRB is aimed at a 
programme of community safety initiatives targeted 
towards the City Centre and surrounding urban centres 
and Leamington Old Town Partnership, benefiting over 
10,000 people. 
" City Centre West: This project aims to provide a 
first-class cultural and tourism facility reusing the 
former GPT site in the City Centre. The 26-acre, £37m, 
development creating 800 jobs will provide a flexible 
arena, a theatre, conference centre, "Coventry Past. 
Present and Future" museum and a family entertainment 
centre provided by SEGA Ltd. SRB funding is asked for 
rental guarantees to enable leases to be agreed with the 
private sector operator of the site. This project will 
provide a permanent legacy from the Centenary of the 
Motor Car and Year of British Industry 
celebrations in 1996, and also maximise the potential of 
the medieval buildings in the adjacent Spon Street area. 
" Leamington Old Town Partnership: This is a 
package of projects to redress economic and social 
disadvantage in the Brunswick area of south Leamington. 
The fact that over 20 different agencies combined to 
submit this bid demonstrates the degree of local 
partnership. 10,000 people will benefit from the projects 
supported by SRB. 
SMALL AREA REGENERATION 
4.26 Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership's Strategic 
Regeneration Programme is multi-faceted. The Strategic 
Objectives characterise all the measures we feel are 
necessary to achieve a successful sub-region. As 
partners. we cannot afford to ignore any of them. The 
themes described above target the critical issues and 
priorities for which we can see no alternative but help 
from SRB. Delivery of the regeneration 
programme and the linkage between the themes we have 
identified is mediated through small area targeting. 
Small area regeneration has proved a valuable and 
effective approach and, despite the scarcity of resources. 
we shall not be abandoning it. We are 
strongly involving local partnerships and local action 
plans in the detail of the SRB funded and main strategic 
regeneration programme. 
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4.27 The Partnership has detailed knowledge of the 
concentration of deprivation in Coventry and 
Warwickshire. The diagram on page 13 shows those 
areas which, according to the Index of Local Conditions, 
are most severely disadvantaged. A principal strategic 
consideration of the Partnership in bringing together our 
SRB bid is to focus on these areas. Programmes for 
Hillfields, Foleshill, Wood End, Willenhall and Stoke 
Aldermoor (Coventry) and for parts of West Nuneaton 
and Bedworth, the Old Town area in Leamington Spa 
and the Benn and Newbold wards in Rugby 
(Warwickshire) are specifically targeted. Statistical 
details are provided in Annex 1. Of the total bid of £52m, 
some £32m is targeted for projects in these priority areas. 
In addition, these areas will also benefit from many of 
the sub-regional initiatives. 
4.28 This rolling programme of small area regeneration is 
supported by multi-agency teams. These are all areas 
where local partnerships can combine to achieve 
measurable improvement. Expenditure in small areas 
will only occur when strong local partnerships are in 
place and a clear and effective local action plan has been 
developed. Residents of targeted areas will be given 
priority within the proposed training, community safely 
and environment programmes. 
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIP'S REGENERATION 
PROGRAMME 1995/96 TO 1999/2000 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE SRB FUNDING TOTAL SRB PROGRAMME ADDITIONAL COMPLEMI\T:. RY 
Fl'\'DING 
1995/96 1995/96 1995/96 1995/96- 199.5/% 1995/%- 
1999/2011 19990000 1999! '_O(p 
fM LM LSI f11 fM LM 
4 SKULLS TO SIAXIMISE GROWTH 37 17.72 11.06 53.20 15.0 62.3 
AND OPPORTUNITIES 
5 INVEST IN BUSINESS 
0 93 6 66 57 3 13 18 21.6 44.0 ENCOLRAGF_ GROWTH AND . . . . DIVERSITY 
6 PROMOTING COVENTRY AND 0 0 0 1.7 6.1 
WARN ICKSHIRE 
7 CITY . AND LRBAN Cl: VFRES 0.78 
5.24 10.96 36.23 22.0 58.8 
8 HOUSING WHICH MEETS I15 9.90 3.03 35.00 11.7 41.9 
PEOPLES NEEDS 
9A HIGH QUALITY 0 50 2.76 1.70 8.00 1.2 4.7 ENVIRONMENT . 
10 SAFER COMMUNITIFS 0.99 5.10 2.50 12.90 4.5 23.7 
11 HE. AI. TH AND CARING 0.64 4.4 1.89 11 . 
20 I 
.4 
4.1 
COMMLNITIES 
12 DELIVER SRB PROGRAMMES 0 05 0.23 0.13 0.69 0 0 
AND MONITOR AGAINST STRATEGY . 
TOTALS 7.40 52.00 31 . 
80 175.53 79.1 245.6 
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THE STRATEGIC PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION 
5.1 The applicant for SRB funds is Coventry and 
Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd (CWPL). We have an 
incorporated body which can sign an implementation 
agreement with Government. Our mission statement has 
already been quoted. We have a Board in place. Since the 
organisation is in place, there are no difficulties with 
handover on SRB from hid preparation to operation or 
ensuring continued commitment. The overall structure of 
Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships, its executive 
and delivery companies, is shown in the diagram at 
Annex C. 
5.2 There are 25 Directors on the Board, representing 
different interests as follows: 
3 Community 
The development of the joint KONVER bid joy European 
funds 
Waricick Science Park 
Gatetrass for Business project 
Joint Labour Market anal rsis for the sub-region 
5.6 CWPL already has an executive team, meeting monthly, 
drawn from the funding partners - ie the TEC, Coventry 
City Council, Warwickshire County and District 
Councils and the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 
The role of this group is to ensure that the constituent 
agencies of the Partnership, who have resources to 
deploy, do so in line with the agreed strategy and 
decisions of the main Partnership Board. 
®5 Local authorities 
7 Private sector 
4 TEC/Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
2 Trades Union 
4 Education 
5.3 The Board is chaired by Nick Scheele, Chairman and 
Chief Executive of Januar Cars. The Board meets 
quarterly and a quorum consists of a member from each 
of the interest groups. Directors of the Board are 
nominated by each membership group as specified in the 
Memorandum and Articles of Association. 
5.4 The function of this Board is to determine and ensure 
delivery of, and review the strategy for, regeneration of 
Coventry and Warwickshire. SRB will thus be a small, 
but important part of the Partners' regeneration activity. 
The Board will endorse SRB expenditure through an 
annual Action Plan and individual project approvals. 
However, it would not receive directly these or any other 
funds, other than running costs. 
5.5 CWPL is the formal embodiment of a longstanding 
working partnership in the area which has already 
established a track record, including: 
The European Development Strategy for the current 
EU Objective 2 programme 
The joint bid for Assisted Area status 
The Coventry and Warwickshire Trade and Export 
l, ý'((V 
N'oi/d Class Coventry initiative 
Joint input to the West Midlands Regional Planning 
pridance 
5.7 A small executive support team will be created to 
support all the roles of the Partnership. The Partnership 
will use the experience of preparation of the 
multi-agency SRB bid with a Bid Co-ordination team to 
move on to implementation. The role of the support team 
in relation to SRB would be to quality-check 
projects, issue approvals below delegated limits, 
monitor progress, provide management reports and 
evaluate impact. In addition, the team will coordinate 
information, monitor and review the activities of the 
separate delivery companies and carry out corporate 
functions such as public relations and marketing of the 
Partnership, and consultation, research and survey 
functions. The structure will be as follows: 
5.8 The team will be funded in pan by SRB funds (25%) and 
partly by the Partners (75%). In the first instance, we %ý ill 
provide an SRB Co-ordinator, a programme finance 
officer and an administrative/secretarial officer. 
5.9 The Partnership is linked through its membership with a 
number of key fora in the sub-region. The SRB bid 
preparation process has demonstrated our commitment to 
local consultation with all interested parties. Local area 
partnerships are creating local action plans and will 
scrutinise local programmes. Within a budget agreed by 
the Board, they will be responsible for ensuring local 
priorities are met. 
5.10 For SRB and any subsequent Government grant regime 
initiatives, there will be a series of management 
agreements between the Government and the Board, 
between the Board and the main delivery agencies. 
between those agencies and sub-contractors for services, 
and between the local area partnerships and those 
delivering projects. These agreements would confer 
authority and funds in one direction and ensure 
accountability in the other. 
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S. 1 I No expenditure will occur on a project until a project 
appraisal has been carried out by the relevant lead 
agency and approved by the Partnership at the 
appropriate delegation level. The project appraisal check 
list and approval forms have already been 
provided. Project appraisal will normally occur in three 
stages: 
" the project officer responsible within the agency 
implementing the project will prepare an initial 
project appraisal 
if appropriate, the implementing agency will 
pass the appraisal to the lead or sponsor agency 
(eg the TEC or relevant local authority) who will 
undertake further appraisal or, for smaller 
projects within programmes, the project appraisal 
will pass to project officers within the SRB 
Secretariat 
all projects will be sent for decision to the 
Executive Committee of Coventry & 
Warwickshire Partnership Ltd subject to 
appropriate delegation agreed by the Board. 
carried out after 18 months then again after five }ears, in 
the context of economic activity in the sub region. 
5.15 Details of the systems for project monitoring and 
evaluation are given in Annex B. An Annual Report will 
be produced each year informing all partners of lessons 
learnt, important events and changes in-year, 
achievements of the programme and progress against 
targets. Accountability will also be ensured through audit 
and random quality checks. To ensure widespread 
participation we will hold an Annual Conference on the 
programme whcre local comment and criticism will be 
invited. 
5.16 We anticipate that partnership working will continue to 
deepen and the efficient sharing of management 
information will expand to allow widespread 
understanding and participation in the strategic 
regeneration programme as a whole. This process is 
intended to continue indefinitely; our exit strateg\ 
envisages a future where change is endemic and a 
thinking assessment and response to change is therefore 
always required. Coventry and Warwickshire 
Partnerships will evolve with changes as )et 
unpredicted. The certainty is that we shall be watchful 
and read), to respond. 
5.1 2 The local authorities, the TEC, Chambers and voluntary 
sector are now very familiar with the concept of service 
level agreements. This model will be used for delivery of 
projects and services. The agreement which the 
Partnership makes with the government will be 
implemented through a series of contracts between the 
Board and the lead agencies and between those bodies 
and agencies implementing projects on the -ground. 
AFTER SRB 
5.13 The transition from the bid preparation to 
implementation will be straightforward for Coventry and 
Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd. The organisation is 
already formed and incorporated and has a core staff 
support within the founding agencies. The additional 
staffing described will coordinate the financial and 
output management and monitoring of project progress 
and impact of the programme against baseline data. 
5.14 Indications of our baseline position are given in the 
SWOT analysis and considerable additional detail is held 
and shared by Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships. 
We will continue to update and refine the database and 
checks on progress against baseline will occur in the 
course of normal working. A wide range of organisations 
will be involved in evaluation but specific strategic 
studies will be carried out by Coventry and Warwick 
Universities, on key issues highlighted in the strategy. In 
addition, a full, independent impact evaluation will be 
12 
7th September 1994 
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Appendix (H): CWP correspondence bid size - 16th June 1994 
coveutr)º & 16 JUN M4 
iramvicksbi re 
PARTNERSHIPS 
Dear Colleague 
COVENTRY & WARWICKSHIRE SINGLE REGENERATION BUDGET BID 
It is clear from the consultation process that a number of 
organisations are substantially exaggerating the level of 
funding, that SRB will bring to Coventry and Warwickshire. Can 
I take this opportunity of clarifying the position. 
Quite simply SRB brings no new money to the table. In 1994/95 
the Coventry and Warwickshire area received some £10m from the 
grants subsumed within the SRB. Our bid for next year 1995/96 
is likely to be some £7m. Following informal advice from 
Government Departments even this figure may be too high. So our 
likely bid over 5 years of £50m will at best protect our existing 
position. 
Nationally, the same position is occurring with the loss of the 
Urban Programme and cutbacks in Section II and other grants. A 
parliamentary answer has revealed that across the country 
existing programmes now subsumed under SRB have been cut from 
some £1.7bn per annum to around £1.3bn per annum -a cut of 
almost a quarter. 
Of this national £1.3bn only some £100m is available for new 
schemes. The whole West Midlands region - including Birmingham, 
The Black Country, Staffordshire, Shropshire and Hereford and 
Worcester - as well as Coventry/Warwickshire - 
is likely to 
receive about £13m in 1995/96 through SRB. 
In this context I hope you will agree that individual bids will 
need to be realistic. We must also make the best use of all 
available resources. We will only be successful 
if we can 
demonstrate that we are deploying all other resources to achieve 
our priorities. 
Working in partnership is not just the key to protecting our 
position in the short-term through SRB 
but also to ensure the 
long-term regeneration of Coventry and Warwickshire. 
Yours sincerely 
David Taylor 
SRB Bid Coordination Team 
c/o Chief Executive's Department, 
Coventry City Council 
 Appendix (I): Composition of Action Groups 
 
City Centre Action Group 
(14 members) 
Martin Ritchley (Chair) Chief Executive, Coventry Building Society 
Duncan Sutherland Coventry City Council 
Matt Feeley Coventry City Council 
Tony Vincent Coventry City Council 
Debbie Kingley Coventry City Council 
Jos Parry Coventry City Council 
Peter Deeley Deeley Construction 
Paul Kenny Manager, Marks & Spencers Plc 
Superintendent Mike Bromwich West Midlands Police 
Roger Chappell Editor, Coventry Evening Telegraph 
Roger Monkman Deputy Editor, Coventry Evening Telegraph 
Amos Anderson Ethnic Minority Development Alliance 
Ron Mason Coventry & Warwickshire TEC 
Professor Bellamy Coventry University 
(Source: CWP internal documents) 
 
 
 
Health and Caring Action Group 
(10 members) 
Greame Betts (Chair) Coventry City Council, Social Services 
Kevin Crawford Coventry City Council 
Ian Powell Coventry City Council, Environmental Services 
Noreen Dowd Coventry Health Authority 
Vernon Hunkins Ethnic Minority Development Alliance 
Helen Aird Voluntary Sector 
Dav Panesar Voluntary Sector 
Stuart Rees WCC, Social Services 
Kate Freeman Coventry & Warwickshire TEC 
Kate Stone Rugby Borough Council 
(Source: CWP internal documents) 
 
 
  
Living / Environment Action Group 
(15 members) 
Roger Griffiths (Chair) Coventry City Council 
Penny Duggan Coventry City Council 
Geof Thomas Coventry City Council 
Elaine Cook Coventry City Council 
Bob Keith Coventry City Council 
Geraldine Tsakirakis Voluntary Sector 
Barbara Massey Voluntary Sector 
Dr. Andy Tasker Voluntary Sector 
Stuart Ferguson Voluntary Sector 
Dr. Adnan Lasker Ethnic Minority Development Alliance 
Marion Rowlands Coventry & Warwickshire Chambers of Commerce & Industry 
Sue Bladon Coventry & Warwickshire TEC 
Derek Maudling Nuneaton & Bedworth District Council 
Paul Barnes Rugby Borough Council 
David Baxindale North Warwickshire District Council 
(Source: CWP internal documents) 
 
 Warwickshire SRB Project Team members  
{became: Economy & Development Action Group} 
(12 members) 
Jeremy Howell WCC 
Janet Fortune WCC 
Jane Carter WCC 
Stuart Rees WCC 
Liz Stuart Voluntary Services Council 
Debby de Haes Rugby Borough Council 
Dennis Stanley Warwick District Council 
Chris Garden Nuneaton & Bedworth Borough Council 
John Ware North Warwickshire Borough Council 
Nigel Harrison Stratford District Council 
Nigel Gaynor Coventry & Warwickshire TEC 
Kishor Pala Ethnic Minority Development Alliance 
(Source: CWP internal documents) 
 
Appendix (J): Project Summary Form 1995/96 
\ýý- 
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COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE 
PARTNERSHIPS 
SINGLE REGENERATION BUDGET 
Please read guidance notes to help you complete this form. 
Please use block capitals and black ink. 
CLOSING DATE FOR APPLICATIONS - 27 JUNE 1994 
Office Only: 
Reference No.: Tide: I Action Group: 
Please explain briefly how your project will contribute to the Strategic Objectives/operational objectives, including Strategic Objectives 1-3. 
2. The single regeneration budget will operate where other funding is not available for a key regeneration task. 
Please explain what gap in existing provision your project fills and what justification there is for it, preferably by 
reference to survey data or other evidence of need. 
Please indicate any special problems which will need to be overcome to implement the project - eg other parties' 
agreement acquiring premises, gaining planning permission or other approval, another project needing to go 
ahead at the same time. 
4. Please indicate likely arrangements for monitoring and evaluation of the project. How will you know when and if 
you have succeeded? 
Please make any other point about the project which you feel is important and not covered by the rest of this 
form: 
When complete, please return form to: 
Coventry & Warwickshire SRB Bid, c/o Policy Co-ordination Unit, 
Coventry City Council, Christchurch House, Greyfriars Lane, COVENTRY 
Any enquiries or advice on completing the project summary form can be made to: 
Teresa (halcroft Tel: (0203) 833376 or 
Lesley Butterwick Tel: (0203) 833741 
of The Policy Coordination Unit 
or alternatively 
to lain Sharp at ADEPT on Tel: (0203) 230606 
Title: 
Description: 
linked Projects: 
Apply codes shown in guidance notes to below: 
Theme: 
Strategic Objective: 
Operational Objective: r 
Sponsor/Lead Agency: 
_ 
Implementation Agency: 
Main (ontact 
Name: 
Address: 
Telephone No: 
Position held: 
Key Partners: 
Past (ode 
Fax: 
Target Group: 
Area: 
Target Sector: 
Priority: 
Status: 
I 
PROJECT FUNDING 
Funding Type/Source Regime 1995/96 1996/91 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 Later Yrs Tool 
SRB Funds 
Capital 
Revenue 
Total SRB Funds 
Other Public Fundin 
Other Govt/LA Prags 
Other Public Sector 
EC Funds 
Voluntary Sector 
Private Sector 
TOTAL PROJECT FUNDING 
PROJECT MILESTONES 
Activity Agent Dote 
PROJECT OUTPUTS 
Output Measure 1995/96 Total 
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Appendix (K): Consultation contact list for SRB Round One 
WARWICKSHIRE ORGANISATIONS 
Addressees for SRB Consultation paper 
Roz Keeton N Warwick NHS Trust 
Dr G Wells Dir Public Health 
Diane Cooke Warw Health Auth 
Crispen Atkinson Fam Health Serv Auth 
Anne Rowe Homestart 
Cllr-C GarreU Nun I Bed BC 
CUr S Toothy WCC 
Rob Thompson 
. 
N War College 
John: Landerau Gov/War TEC 
Spt Phil Burton Nuneaton Police :.. _. 
P Wisdom B'ham 
Canon Lardley Cov Diocesan Bd of Educ 
Sgt Colin Rust Leek Wootton 
Abdul Salam Rugby 
H C. Stockford Mid Warw College 
Hanoomän Singh Rugby Coun'for Racial Equality 
Anita Kumari L'ton 
Liz Dodds Rugby Parents Centre 
Julie Dent Pre School Playgroups Assoc 
Bridget Winstanley Young Warwickshire 
Scott Glover Coy I War TEC 
Brian Willis Chamber of Commerce 
Norman Clark Coventry Enterprise 
David Rowe Univ of War Science Park 
Jenny Talbot -Common Purpose 
Prof Keith Cowling ECSTRA, Univ of War 
Dr Avery Tile Hill College 
B Kumar CABA, Ch of Commerce 
B Heeley CAVCA, Univ of War 
Cov Racial Equ Cou ncil Coy 
G Smith. Henley College 
John Bennington Loc. Govt Centre, Univ of War 
C Jarvis. Coy Bus Centre 
W Cambell Heart of Eng Tour Brd 
'D Wellboume Midland Grp Training Services 
Derek Wood DTI, Coy Enterprise Centre 
Preet Grewall Asian. Wms Foundation Training, Coy 
John Goodman CovýCDA 
Koco Ltd :. Coy 
Cheron Byfetd Womens Enterprise Devt Agency 
Jackie Grayson Credo Project` 
Anti Rascke COTU 
Dr M Goldstein Vice Ch, Cqv Univ 
Prof B Fohlen " Vice Ch. Univ of War 
, Ian Sharpe ADEPT 
D Melone War Enterprise Agency `' ` 
CVS Lion 
Pres Ahmaddiyya Muslim Assoc L'ton 
Bath Place Comm Centre ion 
African Carib Assoc Lion 
Alzheimers Disease Soc L'ton 
Hillto Activity Centre L'ton 
his Lees Day Club War 
Hindu Relig Assoc Lion 
Milan Grp L'ton 
British Musfirs Assoc L'ton 
Probation Service War 
WRVS Centre War 
Satkaar Project L'ton 
Brunswick (Asians) Day Club Lton 
Spanish Comm Assoc L'ton 
Bris Asian Business & Prof Assoc L'ton 
Crossroads Care Scheme War 
MENCAP(R Tebbatt) War 
Dr Vaz S War Hospital War 
S War Mental Filth Ser Unit War 
S War Gen Hosp NHS Trust War 
War Health Auth War 
Waverly Day Centre Ken 
Addresses in RUGBY AREA 
War Ethnic Min Forum Rug 
War Coalition of People with Disab Rug 
Meadow View Hse Rug 
Galonos Hse Rug 
Dr C West Rug 
CVS Rug 
W Indian Assoc Rug 
NHS Trust Rug 
Nat Schizo Soc Rug 
Rug & Dis Assoc Rug 
Arthritis Care Rug 
MIND Rug 
Action for Epilepsy Rug 
Parkinsons Disease Soc Rug 
Mencap Rug 
B Clark, Carers Grp Rug 
Cit Advice Bur Rug 
Age Concern Rug 
Rug Mosque Rug 
Bharat Sevak Samaj Rug 
Gurananak Gurudwara x2 Rug 
Hoskyn Centre Rug 
Mayday Trust Rug 
Mental Hlth Assoc Rug 
Crossroads Care Rug 
DIAL Rug 
Hillside & Rokeby Co Ass Rug 
Ferndown Comin Bungalow Rug 
Sight Con(C fIl I'ole 
Bee-Line Atli 
N War Mencap Ath 
Crossroads Atli 
N War Assoc for Blind Atli 
Network Ath 
Atli Carers Grp Ath 
Grendon Carers Grp Ath 
Hartshill Carers Grp Ath 
Rowan Centre Ath 
Pole Hostels/Grp Homes Assoc Pole 
Gateway Club Ath 
Pole Carers Grp Pole 
Merevale House Ath 
Kingsbury Stroke Club Kingsbury 
Father Hudson Homes Coleshitl 
Atli & Dist Blind Assoc New Arley 
Other addresses 
Dist Officer TGWU Cov 
Cov / War Assoc for Deaf Cov 
Reg Org GMB Tam 
P Wood Solihull 
Alcester Carers Alcester 
Reg Org UNISON B'harn 
MENCAP Dis Off Worcs 
Abbeyfields Soc Potters Bar 
Mid Assoc for Spina Bifada B'ham 
Fellowship of Handicapped B'ham 
Spastics Soc Cov 
MND Assoc Cov 
Schizophrenia Fellowship Cov 
In total : 230 addresses 
Appendix (L): SRB Strategic and Operational objectives 08/06/94 
I, 
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSRIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD 
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1- PARTNERSHIPS 
Empower local communities, residents, businesses and voluntary 
groups by listening and by investing in mutually beneficial 
partnerships and delivery mechanisms which enable services to 
better reflect local needs 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2- REDUCING DISADVANTAGE 
Make services more accessible. Use resources effectively and 
direct them towards people facing poverty. Enable those in 
poverty to have greater control over services and their own 
living standards 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3- SEEK TO PROVIDE EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Enable individuals to exercise control over their lives, make use 
of available services, influence their design and delivery, and 
participate fully in the economic and social life of the sub- 
region 
ALL PROJECTS SHOULD ADDRESS THESE THREE "PROCESS" STRATEGIC 
OBJECTIVES 
F 
18 June 1994 
v 
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 4- ENSURE SKILLS TO MAXIMISE GROWTH AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 
Develop and maintain a high level, competitive, versatile, world 
class skills base which ensures equal access by recognising the 
crucial connection between education, training and business 
success 
OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES: 
Enable targeted groups (see note 1) to improve job 
search skills, gain access to education, training and 
employment opportunities and increase their take up of 
available training, eg. improving child care 
arrangements 
2 Improve the competitiveness of local industry by 
identifying and filling critical gaps in 
training/upskilling provision eg SME management (see 
note 2), high level technical skills, numeracy and 
literacy, key sectors undergoing growth and/or change 
(see note 3) 
3 Improve employment prospects of targeted groups by 
identifying and accrediting their skills, particularly 
transferable ones 
4 Further develop the coherence of the framework of 
links between business and education and particularly 
increase the ownership of education-business 
partnership by employers eg. by demonstrating the 
benefits of active involvement 
5 Improve educational attainment and reduce the "failure 
index" by monitoring and improving educational 
performance in schools, including key stages 1-4 in 
schools, and NTETS (national targets for education and 
training) 
NOTE 1: Targeted groups are: young people, women, ethnic 
minorities, the unemployed and people with disabilities. These 
apply to all objectives. 
NOTE 2: SME = Small/medium sized enterprise, less than 250 
employees, including community enterprises 
NOTE 3: Key targeted sectors are: experiencing growth: financial 
services, it/communications, care services, catering, cultural 
industries, distribution. Undergoing change: sme engineering, 
defence, textiles, retail, defence and engineering sub-contractors 
NOTE 4: Failure index = measure of 16/17 year olds who 
do not 
continue in full time education, training or 
jobs with training 
I- 
28 June 1994 
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 5- INVESTING IN BUSINESS 
Develop and implement a coherent economic strategy which 
encourages growth and diversity, particularly through engineering 
excellence and industrial competitiveness 
OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES: 
1 Promote and develop excellence in the engineering 
sector through technology/knowledge transfer, and increasing the availability of state of the art 
equipment for SMEs 
2 Promote and develop diversification that will sustain 
and expand the local economy, including community 
enterprises 
3 Promote and develop innovation and flexibility in 
businesses within targeted sectors by encouraging 
links with the higher/further education sectors, and 
through providing targeted market research and advice 
4 Create and develop active links between local 
purchasers and suppliers in key targeted sectors to 
strengthen local supply chains, ensure more effective 
investment and the sharing of resources 
5 Improve survival rate of SMEs and encourage their 
expansion through the systematic provision of advice, 
information, signposting and expertise, including on 
exporting and through provision of appropriate sites 
and premises, including managed workspace on recycled 
land 
6 Facilitate access to finance and sources of funding 
for SMEs and start-up businesses 
7 Attract inward investors by providing suitable sites, 
wherever possible through recycling/reclaiming land 
i 8 Retain and attract investment and encourage the sub 
region's workforce to reach employment by providing 
access to development sites 
9 Encourage long term success and sustainability of 
businesses through promoting and enabling 
environmental sensitivity and competence, and energy 
efficiency 
10 Maintain the viability of rural communities by 
improving the prospects of survival and expansion of 
SMEs serving these communities 
11 Strengthen the local economy by encouraging local 
investment, ownership and management of businesses and 
the take up of business support options 
38 June 1994 
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 6- PROMOTING COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE 
Promote and develop Coventry and Warwickshire as a prime business 
investment location, visitor destination and high quality place 
to live through an approach which will generate pride in the area 
OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES: 
1 Promote Coventry and Warwickshire as an international 
business location with world class engineering and 
manufacturing base 
2 Further the development and promotion of an integrated 
sub-regional approach to inward investment and 
exporting 
3 Promote positive images of the people, skills, 
specific communities and areas within Coventry and 
Warwickshire 
4 Identify locally distinctive opportunities for 
promoting visitor attractions within Coventry and 
Warwickshire 
5 Encourage diversification of tourist visits to 
Coventry and Warwickshire including development of new 
attractions, increased lengths of stay 
48 June 1994 
1 COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 7- DEVELOPING COVENTRY CITY CENTRE AND SURROUNDING URBAN CENTRES 
Develop Coventry city centre as a major focus, which is safe and accessible for residents, visitors and investors for retail, residential, commercial, cultural, entertainment and leisure facilities. Improve access, facilities and investment in other urban areas within the sub-region. 
Enhance and promote the appeal of the cathedral 
quarter by bringing historic buildings into use and 
animating the quarter through a broad range of 
activities 
2 Improve local people's participation especially those in target groups in developing and delivering city and 
town centre activities and facilities and increase 
their use of existing facilities 
3 Encourage city centre living by encouraging 
development in housing including low rise and low rent 
accommodation, integrated with commercial premises 
4 Stimulate the evening and weekend economy by 
developing events management, encouraging evening 
activities and improving access and safety 
5 Promote investment in the city centre through creating 
an integrated environmental enhancement strategy and 
providing safe, open and attractive pedestrian ways, 
including across the ring road 
6 Promote investment in the city centre by encouraging 
the reuse of historic buildings, and the development 
of conference, exhibition, hotel and catering 
facilities, industrial heritage attractions and 
facilities for cultural industries 
7 Encourage diversification of retailing in the city and 
urban centres to include innovative and independent 
operators 
8 Strengthen the role of the city and urban centres by 
supporting and promoting the arts including the work 
of target groups 
58 June 1994 
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 8- HOUSING WHICH MEETS PEOPLE'S NEEDS 
Ensure that all existing and future citizens of the area have access to a choice of housing in the public rented, owner- occupied and private and voluntary rented sectors that is safe, affordable, of adequate size, condition and quality and is effectively managed 
1 Extend the life and adequacy of existing housing, 
through repair, maintenance, renovation and, when 
other options are not viable, replacement of the stock 
2 Provide housing to meet residents' needs and 
aspirations through renovation and adaptation for 
those with special needs 
3 Ensure areas of unsatisfactory housing environment are 
targeted for comprehensive review and treatment 
4 Facilitate the construction of sufficient new homes to 
meet known housing need and give choice in all sectors 
5 Provide adequate, affordable social housing to meet 
the needs of those least able to compete in the 
housing market, including innovative and creative 
approaches such as self-build and housing cooperatives 
6 Ensure sufficient land is available for the 
development of a full range of housing tenures and 
types to meet different needs 
7 Provide accommodation, advice, training and support 
services to enable access or continued use of existing 
housing by vulnerable groups, including the homeless, 
those leaving care and offenders 
8 Develop partnerships with private, public and 
voluntary sectors to maximise resources for housing 
provision and investment in the condition of stock 
If 
68 June 1994 
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I COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 9- PROVIDING A HIGH QUALITY ENVIRONMENT 
Protect and enhance the area's quality of life by securing the best achievable and sustainable environmental conditions having 
regard to access, safety, employment provision and reduction of disadvantage 
1 Empower local communities to protect and improve their 
local environment, including the preparation and 
implementation of Local Agenda 21 (see note 5) 
2 Make the best use of energy and resources, including 
increasing energy efficiency, recycling and reducing 
waste 
3 Improve the local environment by removing or reducing 
industrial and other pollution 
4 Reduce the impact of transportation on the 
environment, including promoting public transport, 
cycling and traffic management initiatives, and 
ensuring new development promotes movement by public 
transport, cyclists and pedestrians and is accessible 
to people with a variety of disabilities 
5 Improve the quality of the physical environment, 
particularly in relation to identified environmental 
problem areas, key redevelopment sites and key routes 
through and into the sub-region's towns and City 
6 Preserve, restore and enhance the interest of historic 
buildings, in particular encouraging economically 
viable uses or through their upkeep to encourage 
tourism and leisure 
7 Encourage inward investment by reclaiming vacant and 
derelict land, including the removal of contamination, 
improving accessibility and enhancing the wider 
IF environmental setting 
NOTE 5: Local agenda 21 are local environmental action plans 
created and endorsed by local partnerships for their 
neighbourhood 
78 June 1994 
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COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 10 - SAFE COMMUNITIES 
Provide an effective framework for preventing crime, reducing 
fear of crime and supporting victims through developing a multi- 
agency approach based in local communities 
1 Achieve a more effective response to racial harassment 
2 Raise the profile of women's safety and promote 
initiatives to tackle these concerns 
3 Provide a focus for preventative and educative work on 
drugs-related problems 
4 Reduce the fear of crime 
5 Increase support to victims of crime 
6 Promote and develop positive action with young people, 
especially in high crime areas 
7 Reduce the opportunities for crime through advice and 
introduction of physical measures aimed at "designing 
out" crime 
8 Provide opportunities for safe play and a range of 
family support 
88 June 1994 
Appendix (M): CWP - SRB Guidance Notes on completion of project summary form (03/06/94) 
COVENTRY & WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS - SRB GUIDANCE NOTES ON COMPLETION OF PROJECT SUMMARY FORM (PSF) 
GENERAL 
1.1 The form is intended to collect information to create a database of projects and to 
enable an initial assessment of the projects to be made. Please complete in a colour 
of ink which will can be reproduced by a photocopier/fax (n. b. red, and green are not 
good colours). Do not use pencil for versions which are to be returned. 
1.2 The timetable allows for the completion of forms and a return to the Bid Coordinators 
by 27 June 1994. 
1.3 Any queries or questions on the completion of the form should be directed initially 
to the Bid Coordination Team - Teresa Chaicroft on 0203 833376 (Coventry) or Janet 
Fortune on 0926 412090 (Warwickshire). 
1.4 The form is divided into three main data areas plus some questions to help us to 
initially assess the project. These notes provide guidance on filling in the form and 
answering the questions. 
2. PROJECT DESCRIPTIVE DATA 
2.1 Project Reference 
The project reference will be unique to each project and will be derived from the 
strategic objective and operational objective. The format of the reference will be 
9.9.999 where the last element is a sequential number for the project. The initial 
project referencing will be undertaken by the Bid Coordination Team consultants. 
2.2 Project Title 
A short but meaningful title which adequately describes the project eg "Wheels 
Project for Young Offenders", "One Stop Neighbourhood Centre in " etc. 
2.3 Description 
A brief description of the project, which describes what the funds are to be spent on 
and what the project is aiming to achieve. For the first example above the description 
might read "Rental of 2,000 sql of light industrial premises and employment of 
Youth 
Worker to train young offenders aged 13-19 in the x area of the City in motor car 
mechanics, with the object of reducing car crime and stimulating employment 
opportunities through NVQ credits. " 
2.4 Linked Projects 
Where the project has associated, complementary or other related projects, then these 
should be quoted as "linked projects". The form allows for three to be quoted. 
Additional ones may be attached or referred to as comments. 
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COVENTRY & WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS - SRB GUIDANCE NOTES ON COMPLETION OF PROJECT SUMMARY FORM (PSF) 
2.5 Themes 
A series of themes are being agreed by Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships as 
a means of linking projects which meet more than one strategic objective. Where a 
project meets more than one, then all that the project meets should be quoted in the 
sequence which the project is likely to address these eg order 3,1,2 would place key 
aim number 3 as the primary aim, number 1 as the secondary aim etc. The themes 
are still in draft and may be amended when the programme is developed. The current 
draft themes are: 
Building business, especially engineering, excellence - working together to 
help engineering and other firms in growth sectors to be competitive through 
reaching the highest international standards, using technology transfer, 
international benchmarking, investment in high-level technical and managerial 
skills, especially for SMEs, transferring skills from declining to growth areas, 
enhancing market knowledge, building business confidence and ensuring 
premise and infrastructure support 
2 Spreading market confidence north - use developments in infrastructure such 
as the north/south link road, Hams Hall Euro-freight site and the release of 
development sites through industrial rationalisation and sector decline to 
reproduce conditions in the more successful south of the county, recycle land 
and attract new, growing and inward migrating business into the north of the 
City and County 
3 Build self-determining, safe and confident communities - provide the 
framework within which people can combat poverty and dependency, whether 
by making communication links to employment, ensuring education and 
training leading to employment is on offer, making user-friendly self- 
employment easier, freeing people from burdens of crime and fear of crime, 
poor health, environments and housing, and sharing their caring 
responsibilities, especially in areas of concentrated, multiple deprivation. 
4 Strengthen Coventry city centre - build on the city centre development 
opportunities and historical heritage to provide a community, business and 
visitor focus, expressive of a successful sub-region, focusing the area's image 
and serving its population with commercial, leisure and cultural opportunities. 
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2.6 Strategic Objective 
A series of strategic objectives have been agreed by Coventry & Warwickshire 
Partnerships and amended in consultation. The first three run through the whole 
programme and should be addressed by all SRB projects. The last eight relate to 
areas of work. Do not therefore code 1,2 or 3 but explain at the back of the form 
how your project contributes to these Objectives. Each project should be ascribed 
to one of the other eight strategic objectives to which it is most closely related. 
Projects should not be assigned to more than one strategic objective, even though 
some may relate to more than one. Again you can explain further contributions 
at the back of the form. The strategic objectives agreed following consultation are 
as follows: 
(i) - all projects address: 
1 Empowering through partnerships 
2 Reducing disadvantage 
3 Providing equality of opportunity 
(ii) - pick the closest of: 
4 Ensuring skills to maximise growth and opportunities 
5 Investing in business 
6 Promoting Coventry 
7 Developing the City Centre 
8 Housing to meet people's needs 
9 Providing a high quality environment 
10 Making the City safe 
11 Developing a healthy and caring City 
2.7 Operational Objective 
These have been the subject of consultation. The revised objectives are issued 
with this form and guidance notes in the "project pack". 
2.8 Target Group 
Target client groups have been identified for the single regeneration budget 
programme. Projects which target these groups will be given priority. They are as 
follows: 
1 young people 
2 women 
3 ethnic minorities 
4 the unemployed 
5 people with disabilities 
If your project involves one or more of these groups, please fill in the appropriate 
code(s) 
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2.9 Area 
The geographic location or focus of the project. Where a project is based in one 
location but is focused on a wider area, then the wider area should be shown and 
the location included in the project description. Some projects will be part of an 
area strategy; the area code will help us to identify this. Other areas are being 
targeted as having special problems eg. coal areas. Area codes have been 
structured as follows: 
1 Foleshill 
2 Hillfields 
3 Wood End 
4 Willenhall 
5 Stoke Aldemoor 
6 Coventry city centre 
7 Coventry (city-wide/other) 
8 North Warwickshire 
9 Nuneaton and Bedworth 
10 Rugby 
11 Leamington and Warwick 
12 Stratford DC 
13 Warwickshire (county-wide/other) 
2.10 Target sector 
The Action Group concerned with Economy and Development have identified key 
target sectors whose health is critical to the local economy. Projects which assist 
the competitiveness of these sectors will receive priority. Key targeted sectors are: 
experiencing growth: 
1 financial services 
2 IT/communications 
3 care services 
4 catering 
5 cultural industries 
5 distribution 
undergoing change: 
6 SME engineering 
7 defence 
8 textiles 
9 retail 
10 defence and engineering sub-contractors 
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2.11 Priority 
Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships, the SRB Steering Group and Action 
Groups will be considering priorities for projects in the context of overall 
resources and programme. The contribution an individual project makes to 
achieving the Strategic and operational objectives, the justification put forward on 
this project form, targeting on key groups, sectors and areas, value for money and 
readiness for delivery will all be taken into account in setting priorities. The 
Partnership will then consult on the whole programme, its content and balance. 
2.12 Status 
Standard entries for the various project stages are as follows: 
0 Notional - no detailed information available 
1 Feasibility - study commissioned and under way 
2 Preliminary approval 
3 Detailed design 
4 Final approval 
5 Implementation 
6 Live 
7 Complete 
8 Post Implementation Evaluation 
9 Dead 
At this stage, the entry will generally be "0" for bids for funding. 
2.13 Sponsor/Lead Agency 
The name of the organisation promoting and leading the project in its initial 
stages. 
2.14 Implementation Agency 
The name of the organisation actually responsible for the implementation of the . 
project which may differ from the project's sponsor or lead agency. 
2.15 Main contact 
The name of the contact responsible for providing management information for 
the project. Initially this is likely to be a contact in the sponsor/lead agency. 
Subsequently this may change to a contact in the implementing agency. 
2.16 Contact Numbers 
Telephone and Fax numbers for the contact. A list of all contacts will be 
compiled from the initial data trawl. 
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2.17 Partners 
SRB projects should be carried out in partnership. A project which involves only 
one agency is unlikely to attract SRB funding. It may, however, quite legitimately 
be a complementary project funded from other sources. Please indicate here 
community sector partners and whether consultation with relevant local groups 
and interests has taken place. 
3. PROJECT FUNDING 
3.1 This is shown as a table which is broken into three main parts for which details 
are required of estimated annual spend (net income or expenditure) for five years 
and any spend in later years, together with the total spend. All amounts should 
be shown rounded to the nearest £ 100 pounds. The three main parts are as 
follows: 
SRB Funds 
Other Public Funds 
Private Sector Leverage 
3.2 SRB Funds 
A split is required between capital and revenue costs and within these the funding 
regime under which the project costs are most likely to fall. eg Estate Action etc 
A full list of the SRB funding regimes is shown at Annex A. 
3.3 Other Public Funding 
This is further broken down into the Government/Local Authority Programmes 
and Other Public Sector Funds. A suggested differentiation of the two is as 
follows: 
G vernmentlLocal Authority Programmes 
Local Authority Main Programme - Capital eg Education, Housing etc 
Local Authority Main Programme - Revenue eg Education, Housing etc 
Employment Service 
Home Office 
etc 
Use the "regime" column to indicate the funding programme if known. 
Other Public Sector 
Housing Corporation 
Training and Enterprise Councils 
Urban Development Corporation 
English Partnerships 
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EC Structural Funds and community initiatives 
Use the "regime" column to indicate the funding programme if applicable eg Housing Action Grant, City Grant, ERDF, ESF etc. A list of the major sources 
of central and local government finance and other assistance for the inner cities is shown at Annex B. 
Private Sector 
Source company or organisation (if known) 
Only show investment in land, works, plant and machinery, equipment or other 
additional contributions eg training contributions or grants. These should be 
"additional" and are levered as a result of SRB funds. An exception would be 
complementary projects where no direct SRB funds are required. Do not include 
income from fees or charges from the public at large. 
Voluntary sector 
Source company or organisation (if known) 
Only include funds which are not listed elsewhere. If a voluntary sector group are 
funded from local authority or other public sector grant and these funds will be 
used complementary to SRB, they should be shown as the appropriate other 
public sector source. 
4. PROJECT MILESTONES 
4.1 Project milestones are the dates on which certain activities either commence or 
are completed. Information required includes a brief description of the activity, 
many of which are standard, the agent responsible for achieving the target date, 
and the target date itself. The date can be either full or abbreviated to month and 
year ie 12.10.94 and Oct 94 are both valid. Dates in UK format ie DD/MM/YY 
or MM/YY. 
4.2 Some common key activities are shown in Annex B. A project could involve many 
or all of the activities for which milestone dates could be set. Target dates should 
be established for the key activities by which the project may be implemented. 
This should include at least one milestone for each stage of the project (see status 
for stages). The list at Annex C is by no means exhaustive and other activities 
should be shown where appropriate. 
5. PROJECT OUTPUTS 
5.1 A list of the standard "core" outputs and output measures is included as Annex 
C of the bidding guidance which is reproduced in code order as Annex D. The list 
is somewhat long and can be confusing. However, each project should generate 
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one or more outputs and these must be capable of being measured. Overall 
outputs will be amalgamated and will lead to an assessment of "outcomes" eg 
change in the rate of unemployment. 
5.2 Government has in the past focused on certain key outputs, and as a minimum 
these should be quoted if appropriate, as follows: 
o Land reclaimed or brought back into beneficial economic use (hectares) 
" Roads or other infrastructure built/improved (Km) 
" Dwellings built or improved (no) 
" of which for private sale (no) 
" Floorspace created or improved (sq metres) 
New business start-ups 
Jobs created (fte) 
o Jobs preserved (fte) 
" Pupils benefitting (No) 
5.3 Where a project has a definite output which does not appear in the standard list 
of "core" outputs, this should still be shown and marked with an asterix. There are 
clearly several vital ones not listed here - eg. reduction in crime, local people into 
jobs. We would like to see the number of volunteers involved in the project as an 
output. 
6 GENERAL QUESTIONS 
6.1 Contribution to Strategic/Operational objectives 
The project description tells us about the project activity. However, it is 
particularly important in the context of SRB to understand the strategic context 
of the project. Two projects may both employ enterprise development officers but 
have completely different functions - one may be seeking to stimulate community 
enterprise on a run-down estate, the other could be targeting SMEs in a hi-tech 
sector. We need to know the objectives of the project and how they tie in with 
those identified for the programme as a whole. 
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6.2 Justification for the project 
The single regeneration budget will only operate where there is no alternative 
funding source. Projects should use SRB to make maximum use of other funding 
and to fill gaps in existing provision. For example a project may make use of 
existing training provision but increase the take up by ethnic minorities. The 
justification for the project would be evidence that ethnic minorities were under - 
represented on training schemes and the gap identified would be the lack of any 
action being taken to remedy this situation. 
6.3 Special Problems 
The project may be well-targeted and highly desirable, but there may be some 
barriers to implementation. There may be problems of continued funding after 
SRB runs out. If this is likely to occur, we should like to be aware of them, in 
order to engage partners who may be able to solve them or in order to take this 
into account in programming the project by year. 
6.4 Monitoring and evaluation 
The government's bidding guidance for SRB indicates that it will be a 
requirement of all projects funded by SRB that they should be monitored and 
evaluated. We will have to consider carefully the status of projects which are hard 
to evaluate eg "raising awareness", "providing information" and may recommend 
methods of monitoring, for example by "before and after" survey, as a condition 
of project funding. 
6.5 Comments 
Any comments which are pertinent to the project eg "previously rejected by DoE 
for DLG" or other meaningful and relevant comments. Can also be used to 
augment data shown in other parts of the form. 
--- end ---- 
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SRB FUNDING PROGRAMMES 
Department of Environment 
Acronym 
Estate Action EA 
Housing Action Trusts HAT 
City Challenge CC 
Urban Programme UP 
Urban Regeneration Agency EP 
Derelict Land Grant DLG 
City Grant CG 
Urban Development Corporations UDC 
Inner City Task Forces TF 
City Action Teams CAT 
Employment Department 
Programme Development Fund PDF 
Education Business Partnerships EBP 
Teacher Placement Service TPS 
Compacts/Inner City Compacts ICC 
Business Start-Up Schemes BSU 
Local Initiative Fund LIF 
TEC Challenge TEC 
Home Office 
Safer Cities SC 
Section 11 Grants (part) SIX 
Ethnic Minority Grant EMG 
Ethnic Minority Business Initiative EMB 
Department of Trade and Industry 
Regional Enterprise Grants REG 
Department for Education 
Grants for Education Support & Training (part) GEST 
In completing PSF forms it may be convenient to use acronyms rather than full 
descriptions 
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MAJOR SOURCES OF CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND 
OTHER ASSISTANCE FOR THE INNER CITIES 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES 
Department of the Environment 
Housing Investment Programme Allocations HIP 
Living over the Shop LOTS 
Energy Efficiency Demonstration Programme EEDP 
Home Improvement Agency Grants HIA 
Housing Revenue Account Subsidy HRAS 
Private Sector Housing Renewal PSHR 
Revenue Support Grant RSG 
Special Grants Programme SGP 
Grants to UK 2000 UK2K 
Department of Trade & Industry 
Consultancy Scheme CS 
Enterprise Initiative EI 
Export Initiative ExI 
Small Firms Merit Awards for Research & Technology SMART 
Regional Selective Assistance RSA 
English Estates (now English Partnerships) EE 
Department of Employment 
Grants 
Travel to Interview Scheme TIS 
Placing Advisory & Counselling Team PACT 
Enterprise Allowance EAL 
Business & Enterprise Training BET 
Training Credits TC 
National Development Projects NDP 
Career Development Loans CDL 
Loan Guarantee Scheme LGS 
Other Assistance 
Advisory Services AS 
Jobclubs Jbs 
Job Interview Guarantee JIG 
Job Review Workshops JRW 
Job Search Seminars JSM 
Job Self Service iss 
Restart Courses RC 
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Training & Enterprise Councils TEC Employment Training ET 
Youth Training YT 
Employment Action EmpA 
Open & Flexible Learning Systems OFLS 
Race Relations Employment Advisory Service RREAS 
English Tourist Board ET-B 
Home Office 
Drugs Prevention Initiative DPI 
Probation Supervision Grants Scheme PSGS 
Probation Accommodation Scheme PAGS 
Programme Development Unit PDU 
Department for Education 
Grants for Education Support & Training GEST 
City Technology Colleges CTC 
Technology Schools Initiative TSI 
PICKUP PU 
Department for National Heritage 
Sports Council SC 
English Heritage EH 
Arts Council AC 
Department of Transport 
National Road Schemes NRS 
Transport Supplementary Grant TSG 
Industrial Development Act Grant IDAG 
Section 56 Grants S56 
Department of Health 
Primary Health care for homeless people PHCH 
Link worker schemes LWS 
Dental location incentive scheme DUS 
Deprivation payments to GPs DGP 
Department of Social Security 
Benefits via Benefits Agency and local authorities BA 
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OTHER PUBLIC FUNDS 
Housing Corporation 
European Structural Funds 
European Regional Development Fund 
European Social Fund 
RECHAR programme 
KONVER programme 
Multi-fund programmes 
Poverty IV programme 
EC Urban Initiative 
ADAPT programme 
HORIZON programme 
Other EC programme 
HC 
ERDF 
ESF 
RECHAR 
KONVER 
EMF 
POVERTY 
URBAN 
ADAPT 
HORIZON 
OTHER EC 
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COMMON KEY MILESTONE DATES 
Feasibility study - brief prepared by 
Feasibility study - invitation to tender 
Feasibility study - consultant appointed 
Feasibility study - completion 
Consultation commence 
Consultation complete 
Committee approval 
Steering Group approval 
IRO approval 
Detailed design - brief prepared by 
Detailed design - invitation to tender 
Detailed design - consultant appointed 
Detailed design - completion 
Outline planning permission sought 
Outline planning permission granted 
Detailed planning permission sought 
Detailed planning permission granted 
Building regulations approval 
Listed building consent 
Scheduled Ancient Monument consent 
Conservation Area consent 
Compulsory Purchase Order made 
Compulsory Purchase Order confirmed 
Public Inquiry 
Land transfer complete 
Works contracts let 
Works contract complete 
Staff advertised 
Staff appointed 
Project completion 
Post implementation appraisal complete by 
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DOE "CORE" OUTPUTS 
Code Output Measure 
(unit) 
1A Jobs created /safeguarded No FTE 
1B Pupils benefitting from projects No 
IC People trained obtaining qualifications No 
1D 
1E Training weeks No 
IF People trained into employment No 
1G Unemployed people into employment No residents 
1H Ethnic minority pupils benefitting from ESL No 
11 Disadvantaged people into employment No 
IJ Young people benefitting from projects No 
1K Employers involved in educational projects No 
1L Teachers on placement into business % 
2A New business start-ups No 
2B New/improved business/commercial floorspace sq metres 
2C New business survivals % 
3A Dwellings completed/improved No 
3Ai private sector No 
3Aii public sector No 
3B Dwellings into tenant management No 
3C Increased rent collected % increase 
for year 
3D Increased repairs in target time % increase 
for year 
3E Transfers from public sector to owner occupation/rent No 
4A Ethnic minority business start-ups No 
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Code Output Measure 
(unit) 
4B Unemployed ethnic minority people into employment No 
4C Ethnic minority pupils to higher education attainment 
levels 
No 
4D Ethnic minority people entering vocational training No 
4E Ethnic minority people advised or assisted No 
5A People benefitting from community safety initiatives No 
5B Dwellings and commercial buildings upgraded for security No 
5C Community safety initiatives No 
5D Crime prevention initiatives No 
6A Land reclaimed /improved for open space Hectare 
6B Land reclaimed/improved/serviced for development Hectare 
6C Buildings improved and brought back into use No 
6D Roads built/improved Km 
6E Traffic calming schemes No 
6F Waste management /recycling schemes No 
7A Local people benefitting from new activities/facilities No 
7B Community facilities improved /established No 
8A Voluntary Organisations supported No 
8Bi Dwellings into estate management arrangements No 
8Bii Dwellings into estate management arrangements % 
8C People employed in voluntary work No 
8D Local employers with employee volunteer schemes No 
8E Community enterprise start-ups No 
9A Ratio of SRB to private sector funding 1: 
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Coventry ý- 
ulartv icksbire 
' PARTNERSHIPS 
Dear Colleagues 
SINGLE REGENERATION GRANT. PROJECT PRIORITISATION 
I am writing to, you to explain the process for prioritisation of projects that Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd proposes to adopt for the Coventry and Warwickshire SRB 
bid. 
The process will have several distinct phrases which are drawn out below. 
} 1. Project Summary Forms - initial 
processing and prioritisation 
Project information and application packs have been . sent 
to those requesting them. 
Further packs are available from the address below or by telephoning 83 3376 or 83 3374. Project Summary Forms are due in by 27J une, 
It should be 
, 
noted that .. we 
are asking local partnerships to disaggregate their 
programmes by strategic and operational objectives. This is essential for good 
appraisal and to satisfy Government department SRB requirements. After initial 
appraisal by the Action Groups; the Bid Co-ord aätion Team . 
will regroup the 
inform tion into i management report by area. If resources are a constraint then local 
partnerships will be asked to exercise their own priorities in coming down to the 
appropriate resource level.. 
When Project Summary Forms arrive with the Bid Co-ordination Team the projects 
will. be given a. unique reference number. and entered onto a database. The project 
forms will, at the same time, be copied to: the Chair of the, relevant Action Group. 
(The applicant is asked in the Project Summary Form to assign their project to one 
Strategic Objective which will determine *hich Action Group it is allocated to). 
The Action Groups will look at projects and carry out the following tasks: 
Group-to give any issues of inter'r tian, i) nominate a member of the Action 
details or clarity by: direct contact with , 
applicant or o her organiai ons k. ZJJ 
" '! us person, ; Wtü also inform ,1c , appkeatýt; of any simd8 Pro, ; 
were 'ad 
mer ing of p oject ;* or alb least shared`knowled may be desir le= T 
separate Project may result In aah on, Tip ävbi confusion a 
Summary Form will be ssuted fo this purpose; '` 
r5 
ü) undertake a fast sieve of projects The project cntaýia agäi 
t: which the 
Acdon, Team will braise are given ip 1 Each pr twill be 
appraised again t each of tüe criten$ on s sole ranging from vertr. öod, good, 
average, poor to very poor. A Project Appraisal Form will be issued for this purpose. The results of this exercise will be passed by the Action Group chair to the Bid Co-ordination Team; 
recommend where "block" schemes would be the most appropriate form of 
action and suggest criteria to be applied when, if the bid is successful, individual projects are appraised. 
2 Complimentary project forms 
We have asked for complimentary project forms giving information on projects which help to deliver the strategic and operational objectives but do not require SRB funding. Again these will be entered on the database. Where gaps obviously exist the Bid Co- 
ordination Team will chase the data. 
Action Groups will: 
i) check complimentary project forms and comment to the Bid Co-ordination 
Team as appropriate; 
ii) seek to identify more complimentary funding using their day to day contacts. 
We are looking for about £250m of complimentary funding over five years. 
3. Project Summary Form: further prioritisation 
The results of this first sieve will be sent by the Action Groups to the Steering Group 
by 11 July. By this time the Bid Co-ordination Team will also, using the Project 
Summary Forms, provide the Steering Group with a summary analysis of; 
i) all expenditure by strategic objective 
ii) SRB expenditure by strategic objective 
iii) outputs by type of strategic objective 
A'ý 
iv) all expenditure by area 
v) SRB expenditure by area 
We anticipate that at this stage we will find ourselves with an excess of bids over £50m, an 
understatement of outputs and too little complimentary funding. The Steering Group will 
recommend to Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd a balance of resources between 
objectives and areas together with a financial profile over the five years of the bid, In making 
its recommendations the Steering Group will obviously bear in mind the quality of projects 
but will be more concerned with strategic issues, need, and the development of linked 
programmes and themes. 
The Action Groups will be asked to reconsider their prioritisation of projects in the light of 
this guidance from the Steering Group. 
A recommended SRB programme (together with a full list of all SRB schemes submitted) will 
be presented to Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd for their approval towards the 
end of July. 
There will then be a period of further consultation on the draft SRB strategy and programme. 
It is anticipated that the final document will be approved by Coventry and Warwickshire 
Partnerships Ltd in the third week in August so that it can be submitted to Government 
Departments by 7 September. 
Yours sincerely 
'Q (k. 'c- 
David Taylor 
SRB Co-ordinator 
Policy Coordination Unit 
Chief Executive's Department 
Christchurch House 
Greyfriars Lane 
COVENTRY 
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SRB ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS. 
SRB l and 2 
Context 
The management of the Single Regeneration Budget is complex. Overall responsibility lies with 
the Board of CWP Limited but a range of other groups have various roles in the process, notably 
the Directors SRB Group which was given delegated responsibilities by the Board on 26 October 
1995. 
A special SRB Steering Group on 8 January was convened in order to identify the roles and 
relationships between various levels and `players' in the management and delivery of Single 
Regeneration Budget I and 2. This note arose from that meeting and was presented to, and 
agreed by, the Board of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd on 23 January 1996. The 
note was slightly updated following a discussion with Sir Brian Follett on 11 April 1996, in order 
to clarify, further, the roles of the Directors Group and the Steering Group. 
The following roles for each group were agreed as being appropriate for the management of 
SRB 1 and SRB2. No implications should be drawn in relation to roles for SRB3: these are the 
subject of current discussions. 
Board. 
0 Delivering overall SRB I and 2 in Coventry and Warwickshire 
0 Agreeing overall approach to SRB bidding (Type, scale and priorities) 
0 Agreeing amendments to programmes through SRB Directors Group and new projects 
0 Reviewing overall progress 
0 Reviewing delivery in context of CWP Economic Strategy document 
0 Individual Director involvement on projects and/or issues 
0 Overall representation to Government 
+ Delegating responsibilities within the process to the SRB Directors Group, SRß Manager 
and Steering Group as below 
SRB Directors Group 
Operating under delegated responsibilities from the Board ("RESOLVED that the SRB 
Directors' Group be delegated authority to approve the reprofilittg of grants or Increasing 
grants to successful projects. but that new projects should still be referred to the 
Board. ) 
0 Approving Delivery Plan for SRB I and SRB2 
0 Quarterly meetings to receive progress reports and if necessary 
- Reprotiling of agreed activity (over 
110k per project; over E50k per quarter) 
- Inclusion of new projects - exceptionally 
- Re-allocation of grant 
4 Advising Board re strategic role in management and delivery of 
SRB 
0 
SRB Manager 
f Appropriate reports to SRB Directors Group, Executive, Board and Government Office 
f Focal point ot'contact with Government Office on SRB I&2 
f Implementation and management ofSRB contracts with Government and Guarantors 
Strategic overview of implementation of SRB I and 2 
f Convening meetings and producing reports and information 
f Auditing and financial monitoring of individual projects 
f Monitoring relationships between projects and guarantors 
f Information dissemination and publicity 
f Reprofiling of agreed activity (up to £lOk per project and/or £50k per quarter) 
f Commissioning impact studies 
f Drafting Annual Delivery Plans for SRB I and SRB2 
Guarantors 
4 Operating within contractual arrangements of CWP and SRB 
f Reporting on individual and collective projects to SRB Manager 
f Reporting to own committees on own responsibilities 
f Auditing and monitoring of contracts under their control 
Steering Group (chaired by CWP Executive Manager) 
The Steering Group is essentially advisory and represents the Partnership 
f Appraising progress through regular quarterly SRB progress/performance and themed 
meetings 
f Reporting on quarterly progress to SRB Directors Group and advising them on policy and 
action regarding any underspends or overspends 
f Monitoring "balance" of SRB activity 
4 Discussing progress by SRB themes 
f Evaluating impact of SRB activity and customer satisfaction 
f Convening Action Groups 
Action Groups 
f Co-ordination of theme/target area, avoiding duplication of delivery 
f Development/preparation of data for bidding purposes 
f Process role in ensuring awareness 
f Discussing and (sometimes) advising on decisions on underspends 
f Sub Groups of the Steering Group, reporting to Steering Group as appropriate 
1-1_ ')h 
.md . Ip 
I. jt<<l w, III ýu (3 1=miIlctt 1 1.4 96 
CWP Board 
26 members 
C'WP EXecutive Board 
David Burton 
Cllr Derek Forwood 
Malcolm Gillespie 
Brian Willis 
(le 2 City Council, 2 County Council, 2 TEC 
usually I officer from each of 2 LA's) 
Directors SRB Group 
chair Sir Brian Follett 
Helen Aird 
Hardev Singh Bahia 
David Burton 
Alan Durham 
Cllr Derek Forwood 
CWP Executive Manager 
CWP SRB Manager 
GOW V[ Principal Officer 
Trevor Cornfoot 
Lorraine Butler 
John O'Shea 
SRB Guarantors 
City Council 
County Council 
TEC 
Touchstone Housing Association 
University of Warwick 
Coventry University 
Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough Council 
North Warwickshire Borough Council 
Warwick District Council 
Cllr Brian Clack 
CIIr Gordon Collett 
CIIr Nick Nolan 
I Vacancy 
2 Chamber together with 2 CWP Officers and 
Malcolm Gillespie 
Dr Michael Goldstein 
Cllr Mick Jones 
Cllr Nick Nolan 
Gordon Stokes 
Alan Stothard 
SRB Steering JG-r 
CWP Executives Manager (T Cornfoot) 
CWP SRB Manager (L Butler) 
3 City Council (D Taylor, M Feeley, M 
Rawson) 
2 County Council (J Howell, J Fortune) 
I Warwickshire Districts (D De Haes) 
2 TEC (N Gaynor, S Bladon) 
I Chambers of Commerce (A Durham) 
I University Sector (C Dent) 
I FE Sector (C Crawford) 
2 Voluntary Sector (I Sharp, H Aird) 
I Ethnic Minorities (S Malhotra) 
Appendix (Q): SRB Management Processes 
SRB MANAGEMENT PROCESSES 
Ctrn(ext 
At its meeting of 20 March CWP Directors on the Directors SRB Group requested a summary 
document about the processes of SRB Management which would apply to SRB I and SRB 2. 
This paper meets that request and both develops and supplements the paper. aerecd at CWP's 23 
January Board meeting on "SRB Roles and Relationships". 
lt is important to be aware of the changing role of the Directors SRB Group whose activitics 
have now changed, significantly, from a role of approving SRB projects and bids to monitoring 
spend and outputs. This has led to the Group now identifying that its work should be undertaken 
through a programme of meetings centred around the timing of the Quarterly Grant Claim. 
These `Review Meeting' dates are set out in the attached table. 
Given the creation of a regular programme of information collection and assessment as an 
essential part of CWP's monitoring of the SRB it is clearly important that Guarantors submit 
timely and accurate information to CWP, and that each Guarantor receives similarly timely and 
accurate information from their relevant project officers (see `Description of Practical Processes, 
below). Only through such cooperation can the SRB Management process work effectively and 
efficiently to the benefit of the communities and businesses we seek to serve. 
Diagram 
The diagram attached seeks to explain the processes of SRB Management in terms of the groups 
and individuals within the management processes and the nature of the relationship (contractual 
nr advisory). The names of the individuals or organisations involved are also attached. 
At the centre of the diagram are the 100 SR. BI and 2 projects and their delivery on "the ground". 
Moving upwards are a range of mainly contractual relationships between the Guarantor 
Organisations and CWP (represented by CWP staff, Directors SRB Group and the CWP Board). 
Moving downwards are a range of advisory mechanisms which seek to ensure the strategic 
overview and balance of the SRB programmes are maintained. The SRB Steering Group has an 
important advisory function to the CWP Executive Manager and SRB Manager and the Directors 
SRB Group. 
The roles for each of the group in the process are as agreed at 23 January Board. That paper 
is 
attached. The "prime roles" shown on the diagram are an extract from that note, not a 
replacement for it. 
SRB I AND 2 MANAGEMENT PROCESSES 
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Government Office West Midlands 
(GOWM) 
Prune Role: deciding on SRB 
allocations and monitoring spend 
CWP Bsiard 
Chair Nick Scheck 
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Director, SRL3 Gnmp 
Chair Sir Brian Fullcn 
II Directors and I Subsntuic (incets 
quarterly) 
Prcunc Role l/uncforcng SRD 
implementation and advi. vink the 
Board 
CWP Exccutivc Manager 
CWP SRB Manager 
Prime Roles. Contracts witli 
Government; oversees contractual 
and consultative processes: 
liaison with GOWM, reporting to 
Directors Group/Boord 
SRB Guarantors 
9 Guarantor organisations (meets c6 annually) 
Prune Role: contractual and financial responsibilities for SRB 
projects including providing monitoring informnnon on 
expenditure and outputs 
Projects and SRB Delivery 
SRBt: 60Projects 
SRß2: 40 Projects 
Each project has a project officer 
Prime Role, delivery of spend and o« tpuu 
SRB Action Groups 
Economy and Development 
Health and Caring 
Living and Environment 
City and Urban Centres 
Prime Roles: coordination within euch theme; report to 
Steering Group as appropriate; advisory role to SRB Steering 
Group on SRBI &2 bids, may plgv a role in formulating SRB3 
bids. 
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SRB Steering Group 
Chair: CWP Executive Manager 
17 Participants (meets 8 times per ycnr) 
Prime Rule: Appraising SR8 overall prrformwice cuicl prnt'ress 
on SRß themes: reporting gnurrerly ro 
S RB Directors Group, 
convening Action Groups 
___J 
KEY -------- 
Advisory relationships 
. Contract Management relationships 
Ilc%cription of Practical Processes 
till( RI an(I outputs from each of tlhr IU) prujrrts is sent (luarterI hý I) rojcct t(Rer. tu 
their Guarantors. 
lt\ the 20th of the quarter month (April, July. Octohrr. Janu. ir\) this information is 
collated by Lorraine Butler at CWW'I . it is checked against the contract and the 
conclusions put to the SRB Guarantors. 
>. SRB Guarantors meetings occur very soon after the 20th of the quarterly month 
4. Results from the Guarantors meeting then go on to the SRI3 Stec ring Group held a few 
days after the Guarantors meeting. The SRB Steering Group decides on advice they wish 
to give to the Directors SRB Group on the performance of SR[3 activities. 
5. Lorraine Butler, the SRB Manager, and nominated representatives from the SRB Steering 
Group then report to the Directors SRB Group, which meets soon after the Steering 
Groups quarterly progress meeting. 
6. The Directors SRB Group determines any changes necessary to the programme and gives 
authority for Lorraine Butler to make such changes and communicate them throughout 
the SRB process, including to the Government Office West Midlands where necessary 
F IIIIet. 11)IC 
A timetable of meeting dates for the management of SRB 1 and 2 is attached. 
SRI3 3 
The Directors Group will need to meet twice in order to discuss and, if appropriate, endorse 
SR133 bids. The first meeting is tobe on 20 May and the second will need to be in late August 
1996. 
Ca-L-A eg Regeneration 
TC/IG/2304srb. mp 
Appendix (R): CWP correspondence: Conference Acknowledgement 
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20th April 1995 
Dear Colleague 
, 
Ký 
J: 
WARWICKSHIRE 
AA, r15 
Cnu, icil I loos' 
C,, vchy CV) SRP. 
Tel(pJnn- 0703 837050 
1n" 0203 931757 
Thank you for your prompt reply to the invitation to attend Coventry & Warwickshire 
Partnerships' first Annual Conference. 
This will be held on Monday Ist May, 1995 at the Jaguar Cars Conference Suite, Browns 
Lane Plant, Allesley, Coventry. 
Directions are printed overleaf. Please note that on approach to the entrance of Jaguar Cars, 
you will see three barriers, please take the turning to the right and report to the guard in the 
gatehouse who will direct you further. 
Car parking spaces close to the Conference Suite will be limited, so we would advise you 
share transport with colleagues wherever possible. 
Registration and coffee will be available from 2.30 pm. 
The Conference is scheduled to begin at 3.00 pm and finish by 5.45 pm. 
Light refreshments will then be available. 
Enclosed is the revised economic strategy for the sub region produced by Coventry & 
Warwickshire Partnerships. It is still in draft form and will be revised and reissued subject to 
debate at Conference. If you can, it would be useful. if you can spare the time to read the 
document before 1st May. 
Yours sincerely 
; ý`4 2 
Janet Fortune 
for Coventry & Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd 
COVENTRY & WARWICKSHIREý 
pni-1711-7-ship hylliff-d 
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 Appendix (S): Comparison of SRB outputs – Final to Delivery 
 
SRB Output Indicators Final Delivery Change 
   No % 
   
1a No of jobs created/safeguarded (fte) 9,133 6,297 - 2,836 -31
1b No of pupils benefiting from projects 228,969 124,697 - 104,272 -46
1bb Post 16 pupils benefiting  3,760 
1c No of people trained obtaining qualifications 27,337 6,206 - 21,131 -77
1d No of target residents accessing employment 22,657 2,113 - 20,544 -91
1e Training weeks  34,500 
1f People into employment  1,558 
1g Unemployed into employment  1,538 
1h Ethnic minority pupils ESL  18,200 
1i Disadvantaged into employment  360 
1j Young people benefiting from projects 60,115 174,555 114,440 190
1k Employers investing in education  3,822 
2a No of new business start-ups 4,997 1,915 - 3,082 -62
2b New/improved floorspace in msq 72,846 9,145 - 63,701 -87
3a No dwellings completed/improved. 3,417 1,170 - 2,247 -66
3c Increased rent collected (%pa) 64  - 64 -100
4a No of ethnic minority business start-ups 2,280  - 2,280 -100
4b No of ethnic unemployed getting work 2,833  - 2,833 -100
4c No of ethnic pupils achieving higher education attainment 12,957 6 - 12,951 -100
4d No ethnic minority into vocational training  761 
4e No of ethnic minority people advised/assisted 11,254 1,045 - 10,209 -91
5a People benefiting from community safety 65,044 48,045 - 16,999 -26
5b No dwellings/commercial buildings improving security 1,276 666 - 610 -48
5c Community safety initiatives 1,555 72 - 1,483 -95
5d Crime prevention initiatives  38 
6a Ha land reclaimed/improved for open space 161 53 - 108 -67
6b Ha land reclaimed/improved for development 14 159 145 1036
6c No buildings improved/brought back into use 55 34 - 21 -38
6d Roads built/improved  3 
6f Waste management schemes  1 
7a No of locals accessing new opportunities/facilities 468,848 22,031 - 446,817 -95
7b Community facilities improved/established 215 44 - 171 -80
8a No of voluntary organisations supported 433 412 - 21 -5
8c No people employed in voluntary work  1,053 
8e Community enterprise start-ups  10 
98 Companies assisted Tech  430 
99 Co staff trained  1,500 
No education in employment premises  55,000 
SMEs assisted  190 
(source: Final Bid (CWP, 1994a); Delivery Plan (CWP, 1995a) 
 
 
